TELOS

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TELOS

a quarterly journal of radical thought

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INTRODUCTION

On July 28, at the age of 81, Herbert Marcuse died in Starnberg, West Germany. People and publications on the left have begun to pay tribute to his memory, and the associates of *Telos* share in these expressions of grief and gratitude. We are not alone in feeling that none of the customary means of obituary recognition will suffice. We would, for example, like to dedicate this issue of the journal to his memory. Yet, in a real sense, every issue of *Telos* has been a Marcuse issue. His work was part of the inspiration of the journal's very origins in 1968, and since that time we have continuously confronted and appropriated his ideas and vision. As in the past, Herbert Marcuse will remain a focal point of our work.

For the moment, we publish three short comments. Landes' critical appraisal of the problem of women in Marcuse's thought was written well before his death and is not conceived as a eulogy. Cerullo's more compressed remarks, taking a different approach to the same theme, were presented at the memorial service for Marcuse held in Boston on August 30 at the meeting of the American Sociological Association. Shapiro's notes and personal recollections were presented at the same gathering.

Recently, the notion of self-management has come under attack from various sources, often with good reason. Like the idea of socialism, self-management can be defined in economistic and technocratic terms, and thus can be stripped of its emancipatory promise. Bookchin's essay, "Self-Management and the New Technology," critically examines the economistic and technologistic assumptions of various self-management experiments, and indicates what must be brought into play if the idea is to retain a liberatory content. In a related vein, Stojanovic dissects the Yugoslav experience, attempting to locate the obstacles to democratization there. One of the unacknowledged progenitors of present-day libertarian communist thinking is the German anarchist, Gustav Landauer, whose great book, *For Socialism* (1911), was published last year by Telos Press. We present now an appraisal of this early critic of Marxism and bureaucratic socialism by the late Heinz-Joachim Heydorn, whose essay first appeared as the foreword to the 1967 German edition of Landauer's book.

If Landauer remains a sort of grey eminence of certain contemporary themes, Gramsci has become a virtual household name in the English-speaking left. Yet, his heritage has been discussed almost exclusively in relation to the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Given the notorious blinders through which that tradition has read its own history, it is not surprising that the philosophical roots of Gramsci's Marxism have suffered considerable distortion. With an eye toward setting the record straight, Finocchiaro excavates Gramsci's critique of Croce, showing that critique to be Crocean through and through. While Gramsci reiterated the need for Marxism to be an autonomous world view, his very notion of a Marxist philosophy came from Croce and, moreover, had nothing to do with either official Marxism-Leninism or its various derivatives.

When Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* appeared in English translation, several reviewers noted that the principles of selection left much to be desired. The whole presentation was molded to the Togliattian view of Gramsci and thus distorted the general intent of his work — pushing to the background, for example, Gramsci's critique of the scientific claims of what came to be known as Marxism-Leninism. To this, the English editors added a few censorial touches of their own: excising a section of the *Prison Notebooks* in which Gramsci clearly identifies science and Marxism as *superstructures* and *ideologies*. We can only speculate on whether or not inclusion of the few censored notes would have hindered the neo-Trotskyist reception of Gramsci in Britain. In any case, we translate and publish them here, their first appearance in English.

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These brief notes on "Science and 'Scientific' Ideologies" also bear on contemporary debates touched on in this issue: McLaughlin's review of Feyerabend's recent work and Good's review of Sagan's popular *Broca's Brain*. Implicitly echoing but also diverging from both Gramsci's and Marcuse's appraisals of relations between science, society and human values, these reviews also recall Ferguson's "The Political Economy of Knowledge and the Changing Politics of Philosophy of Science" (*Telos* 15). More important, they point to themes with which the journal will increasingly need to occupy itself in the future.

Recent discussion in these pages by Carlo, Denitch, Arato, Feher and others has suggested some of the problems and prospects of a critical interpretation of the Soviet Union. In this issue, Wildt takes another step, contending that modern Russia should be seen as a state capitalist regime not significantly different from the classical fascist versions. From his examination of the literature on the issue, Wildt vindicates the council communist analyses of Korsch, Rühle and Mattick from the 1930s and 1940s. The Soviet regime has of course exerted immense impact on the "socialist bloc" nations, largely determining, for example, the problems of the oppositional intellectuals there. Vajda's commentary on Kadarism (*Telos* 39) was part of our continuing concern with this large problem. In this number, we present Boella's survey of some of the main positions in the contemporary Hungarian opposition, including some of the dividing issues in the dispersion of the "Budapest School." In the same broad context, we present Rittersporn's historical reconstruction of the internal political conflicts in the U.S.S.R. between 1936 and 1938. Drawing extensively on elusive documents, Rittersporn illuminates some of the dynamics of Stalinism and reasons for its success. Fehér's review of Pateman's analysis of political participation brings some of the eastern European experience to bear on the theoretical aspects of discussions of democracy on the left in the west today.

Our preoccupation with Marcuse's work has, of course, extended to other associates of the Frankfurt School and to Western Marxism as a whole. We present here Wolin's study of the structure of Adorno's *Aesthetische Theorie* and Cowan's review of aspects of the debate of aesthetics among Lukacs, Bloch, *et al.* in the 1930s. Some of the historical background to these themes are touched on in Odoni's review of Boella's recent book, *Il Giovane Lukacs*, while Blume takes up anew the motif of messianism in Walter Benjamin. Reed, who brought some Frankfurt School themes to bear on black experience in America in *Telos* 39, now examines Mosse's new study of the historical origins of racism in Europe. Ulmen provides an introduction to and, sadly, an obituary note on Ludz's "Lukacs and Hauser," while Steinvorth contributes another chapter to what has proven to be a most vigorous debate: that on Wittgenstein, which seems to vindicate Isaac Bashevis Singer's remark that in the modern world, anything is possible.

Paul Breines *Paul Piccone*

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SELF-MANAGEMENT AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGY

by Murray Bookchin*

I

Self-management in all its rich and varied meanings has always been closely wedded to technical developments — often to an extent that has not received the explicit attention it deserves. By emphasizing the association between the two, I do not mean to advance a crude, reductionist theory of technological determinism. People are completely social beings. They develop values, institutions and cultural relationships which either foster or inhibit the evolution of technics. It need hardly be emphasized that basic technical inventions such as the steam engine, so vital to capitalism, indeed to early industrial society, were known to the Hellenistic world more than two millenia ago. That this major source of power was never used as more than a plaything attests to the enormous hold of ancient values and culture on the evolution of technics generally, and specifically on eras that were not assimilated to a market-oriented rationality.

But it would be equally crude and in its own way reductionist to deny the extent to which technics, once it is established in one form or another, contributes to humanity's definitions and interpretations of self-management. This is evident today when self-management is conceived primarily in *economic* terms such as "workers' control," "industrial democracy," "workers' participation," indeed even as radical anarchosyndicalist demands for "economic collectivization." The fact that this unadorned economic interpretation of self-management has pre-empted other interpretations of the term, notably forms reminiscent of the municipal confederations of medieval society, the French revolutionary sections of 1793 and the Paris Commune, will be discussed later. This much is clear: when we speak of "self-management" today, we usually mean one or another form of syndicalism. We mean an economic formation that involves the way in which labor is organized, tools and machines deployed and material resources rationally allocated. In short, we mean technics.

Once we bring technics into the situation, however, we open the way to a number of paradoxes that cannot be dismissed by bellicose rhetoric and moral platitudes. If the role of technics in shaping society and thinking has often been overstated by writers as disparate in their social views as Marshall MacLuhan and Jacques Ellul, its influence in forming social institutions and cultural attitudes cannot be dismissed. The highly economistic meaning we so often impart to the term "self-management" is itself damning evidence of the extent to which industrial society "industrializes" the meaning of terms.[1] The words

*This is a modified version of a lecture delivered at the *Convegno Internazionale di Studi sull'Autogestione* in Venice, September 28-30, 1979.

1. Consider the degree to which cybernetics has entered into commonplace linguistic usage as evidence of this development, for example. We no longer ask for an interlocutor's "advice" but for his or her "feedback", and we no longer engage in a "dialogue" but solicit an individual's "input". This sinister invasion of the world of "logos", in its wide-ranging meaning as speech and

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"self-management" become intellectually disassociated into their components and ideologically opposed to each other. "Management" tends to pre-empt "self"; administration tends to assume sovereignty over individual autonomy. Owing to the influence of technocratic values over thinking, selfhood — so crucial to the meaning of libertarian management in all aspects of life — is subtly displaced by the virtues of efficient administrative strategies. Accordingly, "self-management" is increasingly promoted for functional rather than liberatory reasons, even by the most committed syndicalists. We are urged to think that "small is beautiful" because it yields the conservation of "energy" rather than a human scale that renders society comprehensible and controllable by all. Self-activity and self-management are seen as aspects of industrial logistics that resolve economic and technical problems rather than moral and social ones. Thus, the very technocratic society that denies selfhood to humanity establishes the terms of discourse for those who wish to replace it by a libertarian one. It reaches into the sensibility of its most radical opponents by establishing the parameters for their critique and practice, in short, by "industrializing" syndicalism.

No less paradoxical is the limited nature of "self-management" itself when it leaves its technical premises unquestioned. Can we comfortably assume that collectivized enterprises controlled by workers have changed the social, cultural and intellectual status of workers to a decisive degree? Do factories, mines and large-scale agricultural enterprises become domains of freedom because their operations are now managed — however anarchistically — by workers' collectives? By eliminating economic exploitation have we actually eliminated social domination? By removing class rule have we removed hierarchical rule? To state the issue bluntly: can present-day technics remain substantially the way it is while the men and women who operate it are expected to undergo significant transformation as human beings?

Here notions such as "workers' control," "industrial democracy" and "workers' participation" face the challenge of an exploitative technics in its sharpest form. Perhaps no more compelling argument has been advanced against syndicalist notions of economic organization than the fact that modern technology is intrinsically authoritarian. Such arguments, as we shall see, come not merely from overtly bourgeois ideologists, but from seemingly "radical" ones as well. What underpins these arguments from all sides of the political spectrum is a shared assumption that technics is socially neutral. The functional view that technics is merely the instrumental means for humanity's "metabolism" with nature is broadly accepted as given. That factories are the loci of authority is reduced to a "natural fact" — in short, a fact beyond the purview of ethics and social consideration.

Tragically, when ethical views of technics are removed from their historic and social context, the functional view tends to prevail for precisely the same

reason, by the electronic terminology of modern technocracy represents not only the subversion of human interaction at every level of social experience, but of personality itself as an organic and developmental phenomenon. LeMettrie's *Man a Machine* enters his modern estate as a cybernetic system--not merely in his physical attributes but in his very subjectivity.

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reason that the ethical view fails — for both views assume that technology is always a matter of mere design, a "given" that is either efficient or not. Only recently have we begun to see a popular questioning of technics as merely "given," notably with respect to nuclear power installations. The notion that even the "peaceful atom" is *intrinsically* a "demonic atom" has become very widespread as a result of the Three Mile Island "incident." What is perhaps most significant about this nuclear "incident" is that critics of nuclear power have focused public attention on new, ecologically sound and implicitly more *humanistic* technologies that await development and application. The distinction between "good" and "bad" technics — that is, an *ethical* evaluation of technical development — has taken root on a scale that is unknown at any time in the past since the early Industrial Revolution.

What I propose to emphasize here is the need for proponents of self-management to deal with technics in the same *ethical* context that anti-nuclear groups deal with energy resources. I propose to ask if the factory, mine and modern agricultural enterprises can legitimately be regarded as an acceptable arena for a libertarian concept of self-management and, if not, what alternatives exist that can legitimate that concept on a new ethical, social and cultural level. This responsibility becomes all the more crucial today because "self-management" has increasingly been denatured to mean a more technical problem in industrial management, one that renders it palatable to sophisticated sections of the bourgeoisie and to neo-Marxian tendencies. "Workers' control" may even become fashionable management strategies as long as workers consent to remain merely workers. Their "decisions" may be viewed as desirable, indeed "productive," if they contribute to the technical rationalization of industrial operations, however "radical" the rhetoric and colorful the institutions within which they "manage" industry.

Yet, if self-management remains no more than another form of management of existing forms of technics; if toil is socialized or collectivized rather than transmuted into meaningful self-expression; if these feeble, indeed insidious modifications of the material conditions of life are equated with "freedom," self-management becomes a hollow goal. Viewed from this perspective, the very concept of self-management requires re-examination if freedom is to be rescued from the semantics of technocracy. We would do well to examine some basic conceptions of "self" and "management," particularly in relation to technological development, before the two words are recoupled again as a liberatory social ideal.

II

Selfhood has its authentic origins in the Hellenic notion of *autonomia,* of "self-rule." The word "rule" deserves emphasis. That *autonomia*, or "autonomy," has come, in our own time, to mean merely "independence" is evidence of our gross simplification of terms that often had a rich ethical meaning in pre-market eras. Greek "selfhood" was intimately associated with rule, *social* rule, the capacity of the individual to directly participate in governing society even before he could manage his economic affairs. The very term

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"economics," in fact, denoted the management of the household — the *oikos* — rather than society, a somewhat inferior, even if necessary, activity by comparison with participation in the community or *polis*.

Selfhood, I would claim, was thus associated with individual claims to *power within society* rather than the management of material life. To be sure, the ability to exercise power within society and thereby be an *individual*, a "self," presupposed the leisure and material freedom afforded by a well-managed household. But once this *oikos* is granted, "selfhood" presupposed considerably more, and these presuppositions are tremendously significant for our own age, when the self has become grossly powerless and individuality has become little more than a euphemism for egotism.

To begin with, selfhood implied the recognition of individual competence. *Autonomia* or "self-rule" would have been completely meaningless if the fraternity of selves that composed the Hellenic *polis* (notably, the Athenian democracy) was not constituted of men of strong character who could *discharge* the formidable responsibilities of "rule." The *polis* in short, rested on the premise that its citizens could be entrusted with "power" because they possessed the personal capacity to use power in a trustworthy fashion. The education of citizens into rule was therefore an education into personal competence, intelligence, moral probity and social commitment. The *ecclesia* of Athens, a popular assembly of the citizen body that met at least 40 times a year, was the testing ground of this education into self-rule; the *agora*, the public square where Athenians transacted almost every aspect of their affairs, was its authentic school. Selfhood, in effect, originated first and foremost in a politics of personality, not in processes of production.[2] It is almost meaningless etymologically to disassociate the word "self" from the capacity to exercise control over social life, to "rule" in the Greek sense of the term. Denied its characterological meaning, i.e., its connotations of personal fortitude and moral probity, selfhood dissolves into mere "egohood," that hollow, often neurotic shell of human personality that lies strewn amidst the wastes of bourgeois society like the debris of its industrial operations.

To divest selfhood of these personal traits is to be irresponsibly footloose with any term to which the word "self" is appended. "Self-activity," to use another common expression, implies the activation of these strong character traits in social processes. It, too, rests on the demanding foundations of a politics of personality that is educative of the individual, formative of his or her capacity to intervene and directly alter social events and, carried to action itself, to enter into a shared social practice. Without the personal judgment, moral force, will and sensibility to be active in this *full* and *direct* sense of the term, such a self would atrophy and its activity would be reduced to a relationship based on obedience and command. Self-activity, in this sense, can only be *direct* action. But direct action, like rule, can only be understood as the predicates of a self

2. It should be evident to the reader that I use the word "politics" in the Hellenic meaning of the term, as the administration of *polis*, not in any electoral sense. The administration of the *polis* was seen by the Athenians as a continual educative process as well as a vital social activity in which each citizen was expected to participate.

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that is engaged in the social processes these terms denote. Self, the education toward selfhood and the exercise of selfhood, almost as a daily gymnastic in the making of individuality, is an end in itself, the culmination of what we so flippantly call "self-actualization."

Anarchist organization and its policy of direct action is, by definition, the educational instrument for achieving these time-honored goals. It is the *agora*, as it were, for a politics of personality. The "affinity group" form, at its best, is a unique form of consociation based on a mutual recognition of competence in all its members or, at least, the need to attain competence. Where such groups cease to educate toward this goal, they become mere euphemisms. Worse, they "produce" militants rather than anarchists, subordinates rather than selves. Optimally, the anarchist affinity group is an ethical union of free, morally strong individuals who can directly participate in consensual rule because they are competent and live in mutual recognition of each other's competence. Only when they have attained this condition and thereby sufficiently revolutionized *themselves* as selves can they profess to be revolutionaries, to be the citizens of a future libertarian society.

I have dwelt upon these aspects of the term "self" because it has become the weakest link in the concept of "self-management." Until such selves are minimally attained, self-management becomes a contradiction in terms. Self-management without the "self" that is expected to engage in this "managing," in fact, turns into its very opposite: hierarchy based on obedience and command. The abolition of class rule in no way challenges the existence of such hierarchical relations. They may exist within the family between sex and age groups, among disparate ethnic groups, within bureaucracies and in administrative social groups that profess to be executing the policies of a libertarian organization or a libertarian society. There is no way to immunize *any* social formation, even the most dedicated anarchist groups, from hierarchical relations except through the wisdom of "self-consciousness" that comes from the "self-actualization" of the individual's potentiality for selfhood. This has been the message of Western philosophy from Socrates to Hegel. Its plea for wisdom and self-consciousness as the sole guide to truth and insight remains even more compelling today than it did in earlier, more articulated social eras.

Before turning to the challenge posed by technics in the process of "self-formation," it is important to remember that self-rule [*autonomia*] historically precedes the modern notion of "self-management." Ironically, the fact that *autonomia* denotes "independence" with its implications of a free-wheeling materialistic bourgeois ego rather than a socially involved individual is significant. Self-rule applies to society as a whole, not merely to the economy. Hellenic selfhood found its fullest expression in the *polis* rather than in the *oikos*, in the social community rather than the technical. Once we cross the threshold of history, self-management is the management of villages, neighborhoods, towns and cities. The technical sphere of life is conspicuously secondary to the social. In the two revolutions that open the modern era of secular politics — the American and the French — self-management emerges in the libertarian town meetings that swept from Boston to Charleston and the

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popular sections that assembled in Parisian *quatiers*. The intensely *civic* nature of self-management stands in marked contrast to its crassly *economic* nature today. It would be redundant, given Kropotkin's impressive work in this field, to explore earlier social periods for evidence of this juxtaposition or to enter into additional details. The fact remains that self-management had a broader meaning in libertarian practice than it has at the present time.

III

Here, technics must be assigned a greater role in producing this change than it ordinarily receives. The tool-using artisan nature of pre-capitalist societies always provided a material space for a subterranean libertarian development, even when politically centralized states had attained a considerable degree of growth. Beneath the imperial institutions of European and Asian states lay the clan, village and guild systems of consociation that neither army nor tax farmer could effectively demolish. Both Marx and Kropotkin include classic descriptions of this archaic social network — an ancient, seemingly faceless world impervious to change or destruction. The Hellenic *polis* and the Christian congregation added the rich tints of individuality, selfhood and self-consciousness to this tapestry until self-management acquired the resplendent colors of a highly individuated world. In the urban democracies of central Europe and Italy, as in the *poleis* of the Greek promontory, municipal self-management in towns scaled to comprehensible human dimensions reached a colorful, if brief, effluorescence in the fullest sense of the term. The norms of a socially committed individualism were established that were to haunt the American and French revolutions centuries later and to define the most advanced concepts of self and management into our own time.

There can be no return to these periods — either socially or technically. Their limits are only too clear to excuse an atavistic yearning for the past. But the social and technical forces that were to destroy them are even more transitory than we tend to believe. I will focus here on the technical dimension to the exclusion of the institutional. Of the technical changes that separate our own era from past ones, no single "device" was more important than the least "mechanical" of all — the factory. At the risk of casting all caution to the wind, I will aver that neither Watt's steam engine nor Bessemer's steel furnace was more significant than the simple process of rationalizing labor into an industrial engine for the production of commodities. Machinery, in the conventional sense of the term, heightened this process vastly, but the systematic rationalization of labor to serve labor in ever-specialized tasks totally demolished the technical structure of self-managed societies and ultimately of workmanship, the "selfhood" of the economic realm.

We must pause to weigh the meaning of these remarks. Artisanship relies on skill and a surprisingly small tool kit. Skill, in fact, is its real premise: training and long experience in a rich variety of expressive, often artistic tasks; highly purposeful, often intellectual activity; dexterity of fingers and coordination of body; the challenge of a rich variety of stimuli and subtle expressions of self. Its background is the work song, its spirituality the pleasure of articulating in raw

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materials their own latent possibilities for acquiring a pleasing and useful form. Not surprisingly, Plato's deity is literally a craftsman who imprints the forms on matter. The presuppositions that support these artisan traits are obvious — a roundedness and fullness of personal virtuosity that is ethical, spiritual and esthetic as well as technical. True craftsmanship is loving work, not onerous toil. It arouses the senses and does not dull them. It adds dignity to humanity, and does not demean it. It gives free reign to the spirit, does not abort it. Within the technical sphere it is the expression of selfhood *par excellence,* of individuation, consciousness and freedom. These words dance throughout every account of well-crafted objects and artistic works.

The factory worker lives merely on the memory of such traits. The din of the factory drowns out every thought, not to speak of any song; the division of labor denies the worker any relationship to the commodity; the rationalization of labor dulls his or her senses and exhausts his or her body. There is no room whatsoever for any of the artisan's modes of expression — from artistry to spirituality — other than an interaction with objects that reduce the worker to mere object. The distinction between artisan and worker hardly requires elucidation. But two significant facts stand out that turn the transformation from craft to factory into a social and characterological disaster. The first fact is the dehumanization of the worker into a mass being; the second is the worker's reduction into a hierarchical being.

There is a certain significance in the fact that this devolution of the artisan into a mere toiler was adduced by Marx and Engels as evidence of the proletariat's intrinsically revolutionary traits. It is precisely in this gross misjudgment of the proletariat's destiny that syndicalism often follows in the wake of Marxism. Both ideologies share the notion that the factory is the "school" of revolution (in the case of syndicalism, of social reconstruction) rather than its undoing. Both share a common commitment to the factory's structural role as a source of social mobilization.

For better or for worse, Marx and Engels express these views more clearly than syndicalist and anarcho-syndicalist theorists. Conceived as a mass being or a class being, Marx's proletariat becomes a mere instrument of history. Its very depersonalization into a category of political economy ironically frees it of every human trait but need, "urgent, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative *need*. . ." As pure "class" or social "agent" comparable to the pure, disenchanted social world produced by capitalism, it has no *personal* will but only a *historical* one. It is an instrument of history in the strictest sense of the term. Thus, to Marx, "the question is not what this or that proletariat, or even the whole proletariat *considers* as its aim. The question is *what the proletariat is,* and what, consequent on that being, it will be compelled to do."

Here, being is separated from person, action from will, social activity from selfhood. Indeed, it is the very divestiture of the proletariat's selfhood, its dehumanization that gives it the quality of a "universal" social agent, one that gives it almost transcendental social qualities. My quotations, taken from *The Holy Family* of the early 1840s, were to permeate Marx's writings for decades to follow. Without bearing them in mind during readings of Marx in his later

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works, these works become unintelligible and are reduced to mere rhetoric about the moral superiority of the proletariat.

Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that for Marx the factory provides a virtually ecclesiastical arena for the schooling of this social "agent." Here, technics functions not only as a means for humanity's metabolism with nature, but for humanity's metabolism with itself. Together with the centralization of industry through competition and expropriation, "the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows; but with this there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly increasing in numbers, and *trained, united and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production*," declares Marx in the closing pages of Volume One of *Capital*. "The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourished alongside and under it.... This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."

The importance of these famous lines by Marx lies in the revolutionary function they assign to the factory, its role in training, uniting and organizing the proletariat "by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production." The factory, one might very well say, almost "fabricates" revolution with the same impersonality that it "fabricates" commodities. But even more significant is the fact that it "fabricates" the proletariat itself. This specific view is intrinsic to syndicalism as well. Paradoxically, the factory structure in both cases is not merely a technical structure; it is also a social structure. Marx tends to disdain it historically as a domain of necessity, one whose invasion into life must ultimately be attenuated by the free time required for communism. Syndicalism hypostasizes this structure; it forms the contours for a libertarian society. Both, however, underscore its significance as a technical arena for social organization, whether it be for the proletariat as a class or for society as a whole.

We arrive at the troubling fact that this structure, far from functioning as a force for social change, actually functions as a force for social regression. Marxism and syndicalism alike, by virtue of their commitment to the factory as a revolutionary social arena, must recast self-management to mean the industrial management of the self. For Marxism this poses no problem. Selfhood can never exist within the factory walls. The factory serves not only to mobilize and train the proletariat, but also to dehumanize it. Freedom is to be found not within the factory, but rather outside it. For freedom "cannot consist of anything else but the fact that socialized men, the associated producers, regulate their interchange with nature rationally, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power," Marx observes in Volume 3 of *Capital*. "But it always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power which is its own end, the true realm of freedom which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise."

Obviously, the factory conceived as a "realm of necessity" requires no need for self-management. Indeed, it is the very antithesis of a school for self-

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formation like the *agora* and the Hellenic notion of education. For contemporary Marxists to ape their syndicalist opponents by demanding "workers' control" of industry is a travesty of the very spirit of Marx's concept of freedom. It is to demean a great thinker in his own name on terms that are completely alien to his ideas. Appropriately, Engels, in his essay "On Authority," draws Marx's critique of anarchism to its harshest conclusions precisely on the basis of factory operations. Authority, conceived as "the imposition of the will of another upon ours," as "subordination," is unavoidable in any industrial society, including communism. It is a *natural* fact of modern technics, as indispensable (in Engels' view) as the factory itself. Engels then proceeds to detail this view against the anarchists with the philistine exactitude of the Victorian mind. Coordination of industrial operations presupposes subordination to command; indeed, to the "despotism" of automatic machinery and the "necessity of authority, . . . of *imperious* authority" to managerial command. Engels never fails us in our narrowest prejudices on this score. He deftly skips from the commanding role of cotton-spinning machinery to the "instantaneous and absolute obedience" required by the captain of a ship. Coordination is dutifully confused with command, organization with hierarchy, agreement with domination — indeed, "imperious" domination.

What is more interesting than the fallacies of Engels' essay are its insidious truths. The factory is, in fact, a realm of necessity, not a realm of freedom. It is a school for hierarchy, for obedience and command, not for a liberatory revolution. It reproduces the servility of the proletariat and undermines its selfhood and its capacity to transcend need. Accordingly, insofar as self-management, self-activity and selfhood are the very essence of the "realm of freedom," they must be denied at the "material base" of society while they are presumably affirmed in its "superstructure," at least as long as the factory and the technics of capitalist production are conceived *merely* as technics, as natural facts of production.

On the other hand, viewed as a social arena, we must further conceive that this dehumanized realm of necessity riddled by "imperious authority" can somehow enlarge the class consciousness of a dehumanized working being into a universal social consciousness; that this being, divested of all selfhood in its daily life of toil can recover the social commitment and competence presupposed by a sweeping social revolution and a truly free society based on self-management in the broadest sense of the term. Finally, we must conceive that this free society can remove hierarchy in one realm while "imperiously" fostering it in another, perhaps more basic one. Carried to its fullest logic, the paradox assumes absurd proportions. Hierarchy, like overalls, becomes a garment that one discards in the "realm of freedom" only to don it again in the "realm of necessity." Like a seesaw, freedom rises and falls at the point where we place our social fulcrum — possibly at a center of the plank in one "stage" of history, closer to one end or another at other "stages," but in any event strictly measurable by the length of the "working day."

Syndicalism shares this fatal paradox no less than Marxism. Its redeeming

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virtue lies in its implicit awareness (which becomes virtually explicit in the works of Charles Fourier) that technics must be divested of its hierarchical and joyless character if society is to be freed of these burdens. With syndicalism, however, this awareness is often warped by its acceptance of the factory as the infrastructure of the new society within the old, as a model for working class organization, and as a school for the humanization and mobilization of the proletariat as a revolutionary social force. Hence, technics raises a startling dilemma for libertarian concepts of self-management. From what source are workers — indeed, all dominated people such as women, young and elderly people, ethnic groups, and cultural communities — to acquire the subjectivity that fosters selfhood? What technologies can supplant the hierarchical mobilization of labor into factories? And finally, what constitutes "management" that involves the fostering of authentic competence, moral probity and wisdom?

IV

Technics is no more a "natural fact" than our chemically treated food crops and our synthetically fermented beverages. Even Marx is obliged to treat it in a social context when he sees it in terms of its class functions. Far from being a "given," it is potentially the most malleable of humanity's modes of "metabolizing" with nature. The institutions, values and cultural shibboleths with which humans engage in a "metabolic" relationship with the natural world are often less amenable to change than the tools and machines that give them material tangibility. Notwithstanding what social determinists may say, the primacy of these institutions over social relations is mythical. They are immersed in a social world of human intentions, needs, wills and interactions.

The factory exhibits this social dimension with a vengeance. Its appearance in the world was determined not by strictly mechanical factors but organic ones. It was a means for *rationalizing* labor, not for *implementing* labor with tools. Once this fact is fully weighed, the factory ceases to enjoy the autonomy it acquires from Engels and his acolytes. It is a "realm of necessity" only insofar as a need remains for its existence. But this need is not strictly technical; on the contrary, it is largely social. The factory is the realm of hierarchy and domination, not the battleground of "man's" conflict with nature. Once its functions as an instrument of human domination are questioned, we can reasonably ask how valid the "need" is for its perpetuation. By the same token, money, weapons and nuclear power plants are instruments of a society gone mad. Once the insanity of society is lifted, we can also ask how valid the "need" is for their perpetuation. "Need" itself is a socially conditioned phenomenon — a fact not unknown to Marx, by any means — that may be intrinsically rational or irrational. The "realm of necessity" thus has highly elastic, perhaps ineffable boundaries; in fact, it is as "necessary" socially as the vision one has of freedom. To separate one from the other inexorably is sheer ideology, for it may well be that freedom does not "base" itself on the "realm of necessity," but rather really determines it.

To Fourier, this conclusion was implicit in the best lines of his writings. The two "realms" of necessity and freedom were resynthesized into a higher level of

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societal behavior and value in which joy, creativity and pleasure were ends in themselves. Freedom had subsumed necessity and joy has subsumed toil. But such sweeping notions cannot be advanced abstractly. They must be established concretely, or else the rich possibilities of reality become elusive categories that deny the claims of imagination. Hence, the enormous power of utopian thinking at its best: the ability to show almost visually what so often remains the abstractions of competing ideologies. Consider concretely, indeed utopistically, the alternatives that may turn arduous work into festive play: a harvest that is marked by dancing, feasting, singing and loving contrasted with the monotony of gang labor or deadening mechanization. One form of harvesting reinforces community; the other, isolation and a sense of oppression. The same task performed esthetically may be a work of art; performed under the lash of domination, it becomes an ignominious burden. The identical task under conditions of freedom is an esthetic experience; under conditions of domination, it becomes onerous toil. To assume that every arduous task must be a tormenting one is a social judgment determined by the social structure itself, not simply the technical conditions of work. The employer who demands silence from his employees is, in fact, an employer. The same work may be performed playfully, creatively, imaginatively, even artistically in the absence of social constraints that identify responsibility with renunciation and efficiency with sobriety.

Elsewhere, I have addressed and inventoried the technical alternatives that are available to existing forms of technology.[3] Since this assessment, there is much I would add and much I would reject in the technical aspects of my account. Perhaps more important than any details that can now be found in such outstanding books as *Radical Technology* by British anarchists are the principles I would want to emphasize here. A new technology is emerging — a technology no less significant for the future than the factory is for the present. Potentially, it lends itself to a sifting of existing technics in terms of their ecological integrity and their impact on human freedom. On its own terms, it can be a highly decentralized technics that is human in scale, simple in construction and naturalistic in orientation. It can acquire its energy from the sun and wind, from recycled wastes and replenishable "resources" such as timber. It affords the possibility of making food cultivation into a spiritually and materially rewarding form of gardening. It is restorative of the environment and, perhaps more significantly, of personal and communal autonomy.

This new technology may rightly be called a "people's technology." The French-intensive community gardens spontaneously opened by ghetto dwellers in gutted neighborhoods of New York, the hand-crafted solar panels that are gradually appearing on the rooftops of tenements, the small windmills that have been raised aloft beside them to generate electric power — all, taken together, express new initiatives by ordinarily passive communities to reclaim

3. See "Toward a Liberatory Technology" in my *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (Ramparts Press, 1971).

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control over the material conditions of their lives. What counts is not whether a food cooperative can replace a giant supermarket, or a community garden the produce supplied by agribusiness, or a wind-powered generator the electricity supplied by a smothering public utility. The cooperatives, gardens and windmills are the technical *symbols* of a resurgence of selfhood that is ordinarily denied to the ghetto "masses" and a growing sense of competence that is ordinarily denied to a client citizenry. The factory image of the city, even of citizenship, has already gone so far in repressing the smallest sparks of public life that technical and institutional alternatives may be able to go far enough to restore a sense of self-management in its traditional civic forms.

If one grants the silence that exists in factories today, the most important voices for self-management in any popular sense are heard from the neighborhoods of municipalities (perhaps its most traditional source), from feminist and ecological movements, from "masses" that have acquired a new stake in personal, cultural, sexual and civic autonomy. The new technology to which I have alluded has not initiated this development. If anything, it may well be the result of a new sensibility of selfhood and competence that an overbearing technocratic society has produced as a result of its own repressive excesses. Solar and wind power and community gardens are vastly older technical strategies than the factory. That they have been revived as a people's technology suggests a driving need to disengage from a social system whose greatest weakness and strength is its all-encompassing nature. But these alternative technics provide a new, perhaps historic context for social change. They impart the *tangible* possibility for a recovery of self-management with all the rich nuances of the past, albeit without a return to the past. Their concreteness makes them thoroughly utopian, even realistic rather than visionary. Finally, as educative devices for community, they tend to create a politics of personality that compares only with the anarchist "affinity group" as an educative arena.

Alternatives are today in conflict on a scale comparable only to the breakdown of traditional society on the eve of the capitalist era. The same new technology can also become a corporate technology — the bases for solar power utilities, space satellites and an "organic" agribusiness comparable only to the highly chemicalized one so prevalent today. The decentralized gardens, solar panels, windmills and recycling centers can be centralized, industrialized and structured along rationalized hierarchical lines. Neither Marxism nor syndicalism can comprehend the nature of these alternatives, much less their subtle implications. Yet, rarely has there been a greater need for theoretical insight into the possibilities that lie before us and the historically new directions which humanity may follow. In the absence of a libertarian interpretation of these directions, of a libertarian *consciousness* that articulates the logic of this new technical framework, we may well witness the integration of a people's technology into a managerial and technocratic society, in which case we will have been reduced like a Greek chorus to lamentations and incantations to a fate that leaves the future of society predestined, under the sway of forces beyond its control. This may be a heroic posture, but it also remains a futile one.

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GRAMSCI'S CROCEAN MARXISM

by Maurice A. Finocchiaro

The problem of the democratic credibility of Eurocommunism has been equated to the squaring of the circle[1], and it revolves around whether there is a viable Marxist alternative to both Marxism-Leninism and democratic socialism consistent with the ideals of classical pluralistic liberalism and appropriate to Western Europe. The answer to this problem requires a study of the experiences of Marxist parties in Italy, France, Spain and Portugal. Although there are already many useful studies for the more important cases of Italy and France,[2] they remain inconclusive, and the problem of meaningfully articulating the Eurocommunist alternative is far from solved. There is, to be sure, near-unanimous agreement that this alternative is rooted in Gramsci's works, but this only displaces the problem since interpretations of Gramsci are notoriously difficult. The single most important fact in this context is the 1975 publication of the definitive critical edition of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*.[3] This lifted the interpretation of Gramsci onto a new plane and allowed the careful study of Gramsci's thought required in order to fully evaluate his impact. This is because, as Gerratana reiterates in the "Preface" to the critical edition by quoting Gramsci directly, "if you want to study the birth of a world view which has never been systematically expounded by its founder . . . , you need as a preliminary to undertake a detailed philological work conducted with the greatest scruple for exactness, scientific honesty, intellectual sincerity, and absence of preconception and a priorism or *partis pris*."

This, however, does not automatically render obsolete all previous scholarship on the subject, and works such as Davidson's 1972 exhaustive review of literature remain extremely valuable. In that work, in fact, Davidson analyzes the 30-year history of Gramscian studies as a polemic between a Leninist and a Crocean interpretation of Gramsci. The Leninist interpretation derives partly from the authority of Togliatti and partly from an emphasis on Gramsci's middle period (1921-27). The Crocean interpretation derives primarily from a reading of the *Prison Notebooks*.

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1. Enzo Bettiza, "Eurocommunism in Limbo", in *Eurocommunism: The Italian Case*, edited by Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 131.

2. Donald L.M. Blackmer, *Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World* (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1968); idem, "Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism", in *Communism in Italy and France*, edited by D.L.M. Blackmer (Princeton, 1975), pp. 21-68; Stephen Hellman, "The PCI's Alliance Strategy and the case of the Middle Classes", in *Communism in Italy and France*, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-419; and idem, "PCI Strategy and the Question of Revolution in the West", in *Varieties of Marxism*, edited by Shlomo Avineri (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 195-226.

3. Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere*, ed. V. Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi, 1975).

4. Valentino Gerratana, "Prefazione" to *Quaderni del Carcere, op.cit.*

5. Alastair B. Davidson, "The Varying Seasons of Gramscian Studies," *Political Studies* 20 (1972), pp. 448-461.

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Davidson argued that the Leninist approach tends to be factually inadequate in that it either invents fictional details of Gramsci's life (e.g., the myth of his peasant background) or distorts biographical facts. On the other hand, the Crocean approach tends to be methodologically unsound in that it relies exclusively on a textual analysis of the *Notebooks* and ignores facts of his biography which indicate how these notes should be read. Following suggestions made by Garin and Regionieri at the 1967 Conference on Gramsci in Cagliari, Davidson concludes that the methodological lesson from the past 30 years is that of "proceeding from biography to intellectual biography to interpretation of the notes", so that "the meaning of Gramsci's notes would have to remain an open question until more research"[6] into his life has been completed.

As a plea for an intellectual biography of Gramsci, and as a criticism of the Leninist interpretation,[7] Davidson's account is acceptable; but his criticism of the Crocean interpretation and of the textual approach is inadequate. His main objection is that the Crocean interpretation relies too heavily on the textual approach, and that the latter is unhistorical. Yet, although the Crocean interpretation does rely on the analysis of texts, it need not rely *exclusively* on that.[8] There need not be anything unhistorical in textual analysis, nor can historical context be equated to mere biography.[9] In other words, we may agree that in the study of someone like Gramsci, it is desirable to aim at a synthetic approach whereby his thought is connected with his biography. On the other hand, there is no obvious end at which to stop in one's attempt to integrate a given element with the rest of the whole; nor is there necessarily any preferred direction of inquiry. In studying Gramsci's

6. *Ibid.*, p. 459.

7. Since Davidson's 1972 review, the interpretation of Gramsci as a Leninist has received further criticism in Davidson's own *Antonio Gramsci: Toward an Intellectual Biography* (London: Merlin Press, 1977), especially pp. 232-242. See also Paul Piccone, "Gramsci's Marxism: Beyond Lenin and Togliatti," *Theory and Society* 3 (1976), pp. 485-512. In spite of these convincing critiques, the thesis of Gramsci's Leninism continues to be reasserted, e.g., by Bettiza, who views "Gramsci as a sort of Lenin with a doctorate in Eurocommunism" (in "Eurocommunism in Limbo", *op. cit.*, p. 127).

8. For example, here are two facts mentioned by Davidson that involve no textual analysis but which are sometimes mentioned to support the Crocean interpretation: (1) that in reviewing the *Letters from Prison* in 1947 Croce asserted that Gramsci was "one of us"; and (2) Bordiga's boast in the 1920s that unlike Gramsci he had never read Croce and was therefore a better Marxist.

9. For example, Kissinger's claim in his "Communist Parties in Western Europe: Challenge to the West," in *Eurocommunism: The Italian Case, op.cit.*, p. 186, that Gramsci's concept of "hegemony" is merely "a more elegant phrase" than the traditional Marxist-Leninist "dictatorship of the proletariat" but represents the same "disdain for democratic procedures" could be refuted by arguing with Perry Anderson that the theory of hegemony in the *Notebooks* is a species of reformism (cf. Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," *New Left Review*, 100 [Nov. 1976-Jan. 1977], pp. 72-73). After such a determination of Gramsci's meaning, his theory may be criticized and connected with his political practice. Again, with Anderson, the fact that Gramsci "fought and suffered a long agony for" a proletarian revolution could also be adduced as proof that this reformistic theory is false, that "in the labyrinth of the notebooks, Gramsci lost his way. Against his own intention, formal conclusions can be drawn from his work that lead away from revolutionary socialism". Yet, *what* he *thought* about hegemony remains unaffected. Furthermore, there is no greater urgency about dealing with this than there is about connecting Gramsci's concept of hegemony with his theory of intellectuals (which Anderson himself regards as his greatest and most original achievement).

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thought, it is desirable to follow a historical, contextual approach; and the most directly and immediately relevant historical context is likely to be other thoughts. In the case of Gramsci, it is well known that the intellectual context is provided by Croce's ideas. Yet, insufficient attention has been given to this, so that often otherwise-competent students of Gramsci misunderstand him because they misunderstand Croce. The following will provide some of this Crocean background by criticizing the way in which Croce has been understood by recent Gramsci students such as Davidson and Anderson.

In his book, Davidson claims that Croce's book *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia* influenced Gramsci, first in 1916, when the essays constituting the book were published in Croce's journal *La Critica*, and then again in 1929 when Gramsci re-read the book in prison. According to Davidson, "in 1918 he [Gramsci] declared that the central points which Croce reached in these essays were 'undoubtedly right' "; that this was the first book Gramsci requested from the prison officials; and that he wrote in his *Letters* that this book "contains, not only a synthesis of the entire Crocean philosophical system, but a real true revision of that system".[10] Yet, Davidson gives a very haphazard explanation of this book's ideas, misses the importance of its central thesis that all history is contemporary, and even misquotes the book's title (which he always writes as *Teoria della Storia della Storiografia*).[11]

Similarly, Anderson claims that *one* of Gramsci's several mutually inconsistent conceptions of the state involves the abolition of the distinction between state and civil society and the inclusion of the latter as a part of the former. Anderson blames the inconsistencies on prison conditions, and this one alleged error on Croce's influence. "Gramsci did not produce the idea of an indefinite extension of the state as a political structure from nowhere. He took it quite directly from Benedetto Croce".[12] In support of this allegation, Anderson refers to passages in the *Prison Notebooks* where Gramsci, in agreement with Croce, is discussing the normative and nonempirical meaning of the concept of state; i.e., how, on some occasions, elements outside the government and hence outside the empirical state (e.g., revolutionary forces) may be taken to belong to the "real" state, whereas on other occasions, one may question whether elements of the government and hence of the empirical state (e.g., parliaments) belong to the "real" state.[13] But these discussions indicate Gramsci's attempt to make a distinction, rather than to abolish one.

10. Davidson, *Antonio Gramsci*, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-95, and 244-46.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96, 244, 246, 287, 314, and 335.
12. Anderson, "Antonomies of Antonio Gramsci," *op.cit.*, pp. 33-34 and 39-40. Anderson's evidence for ascribing this view of Gramsci is less than adequate. For example, he quotes from Notebook 13 on Machiavelli where Gramsci says, "In reality civil society and State are one and the same" (p. 33, quoted from *Quaderni del Carcere*, p. 1590, corresponding to p. 160 of *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, tr. and ed. Q. Hoare and G. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). However, this sentence is taken out of context, since Gramsci goes on to talk about two ways of distinguishing between political and civil society; he objects to interpreting the distinction as an organic one but seems to hold that the distinction is methodological.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40. Anderson refers to *Quaderni del Carcere*, *op.cit.*, pp. 858, 1087, 1223-24, 1302, and 1707-08.

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Moreover, though the topic of discussion is the normative and nonempirical meaning of the concept of state, it is prejudicial to describe it as "metaphysical" and as "the idea of a numinous essence of the State". Finally, an examination of Croce's works readily shows how far Croce's view is from being, as Anderson says, "a typically Hegelian heritage".[14] In his major work directly on political philosophy, the *Elementi di Politica*, Croce concludes his critique of the Hegelian "ethical state" as follows: "In spite of these exaltations and this Dyonisiac delirium about state and government, one must be firm and consider the State for what it truly is: an elementary and narrow form of practical life, from which moral life escapes through every part and overflows, spreading into abundant and rich streams, so rich that states and political life are perpetually undone and redone, that is, are forced to renew themselves in conformity with the requirements it presents."[15]

One could go on criticizing similar misunderstandings. For the present, however, it will be sufficient to focus on the widespread tendency to neglect Croce's involvement with Marxism. The exact nature of this involvement is, of course, at least as complex as Gramsci's own involvement with Croce. Nevertheless, Croce's involvement with Marxism seems to be a well-kept secret among English-speaking scholars since it is not mentioned, let alone discussed, by Anderson, Davidson, or Cammett. Moreover, even in Italy, where Croce's involvement is well known, it does not receive the recognition it deserves.[16]

Although it is an exaggeration to say, with Gramsci, that Croce was obsessed[17] with Marxism through his long philosophical career (1893-1952), it is not a groundless fabrication. In fact, virtually all of his voluminous writings on topics other than aesthetics and literary criticism may be divided into works dealing explicitly with Marxism and related topics, with the philosophy of history, and with moral and political philosophy. Croce's philosophy of history is related to Marxism in that he was trying to provide an alternative to historical materialism. His political and moral philosophy, furthermore, is a result of his early studies of Marxism.[18]

Croce's engagement with Marxism falls into two periods. His "revisionist" period spans from the late 1890s to 1911, when he proclaimed the "death of socialism."[19] During this time, he encouraged Labriola to write on Marxism and edited and published the latter's books. He was also developing Marxist

14. "Antinomies", *op.cit.*, p. 39-40.

15. Benedetto Croce, *Etica e Politica* (Economical Edition. Bari: Laterza, 1967), p. 188.

16. The fact has been recognized by thinkers as diverse as Giovanni Gentile ("Il Marxismo di Benedetto Croce", *Il Resto del Carlino*, May 14, 1918; reprinted in Gentile's *La Filosofia di Marx*, ed. V. Bellezza, Florence, Sansoni, 1974, pp. 295-99) and Raffaello Franchini (*Intervista su Croce*, ed. A. Fratta, Naples, Società Editrice Napoletana, 1978, pp. 21-23).

17. *Cf.* Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere, op.cit.*, p. 1240. Gramsci, of course, is aware of the exaggeration in the light of his realization that "one must not look for a general philosophical problem in Croce", *Quaderni*, p. 1239, and his realization of the importance of Croce's work in aesthetics and literary criticism, *Quaderni*, p. 1303.

18. *Cf.* the preface to the 1906 edition, in Benedetto Croce, *Materialismo Storico ed Economia Marxistica* (Economical Edition. Bari: Laterza, 1968), p. xii.

19. Benedetto Croce, *Cultura e Vita Morale* (Bari: Laterza, 1955), pp. 150-159.

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interpretations similar to Sorel's and Bernstein's which led to the first major "crisis of Marxism". During this period, Croce felt honored to be regarded as a socialist — even though he never joined the socialist party — and he acknowledged the Marxist origin of his philosophy of the practical.[20]

The second period of Croce's interest in Marxism germinated in 1911 and matured with World War I, which he saw as proof that Marx's class struggles had been superseded by national struggles.[21] Croce's new attitude was crystallized by the Russian Revolution, which, as Gramsci described it in a classic article,[22] may have seemed more of a revolt against *Capital*. Following Gramsci,[23] this may be called the "liquidationist" period since Croce's aim now was to get rid of Marxism once and for all. He fought the battle on at least four fronts. First, cognizant that the human mind abhors a vacuum, he developed an alternative philosophy of history. Second, he denied that Marxism had had any formative influence on his views.[24] Third, he tried to deny the philosophical character of Marxism, assigning to it merely a practical, "ideological" status. Fourth, he tried to reduce all of Marxism to Vulgar Marxism and thereby dismiss it.

Generally speaking, while Croce's revisionism was largely successful, his liquidationism was not: Marxism was revised but not liquidated. Yet, the reasons for the failure may be more instructive than those for the success, for these reasons are not accidental but intrinsic to the Marxist nature of some of Croce's works.[25] However, whatever Marxism there is in Croce, it is *Crocean* Marxism. Gramsci's critique of Croce reveals both its character as well as the nature of Croce's liquidation of Marxism. To be more specific, Croce's liquidationist critique consists of a dismissal for its "theological" character, a rejection of its ideological involvement, and a replacement by Croce's own philosophy of history and of politics. In his analysis, Gramsci argues that the theological character of Marxism can be explained and justified by Croce's own philosophy or religion, and its ideological character by Croce's own meta-philosophy, while his philosophy of history and politics is Marxist in its sound parts and unsound otherwise. If this makes Croce a Marxist of sorts as

20. Croce, *Materialismo Storico*, *op.cit.*, p. xii. He described then the main theses of his interpretation and criticism of Marxism as: "the justification of Marxian economics, understood not as general economic science, but as sociological comparative economics which treats of labor conditions in societies"; "as the liberation of historical materialism from every apriorist conception. . .and the construal of the doctrine as indeed fruitful, but simply as a canon of historical interpretation"; and as the internal criticism that the law of the fall of the rate of profit (in the third volume of *Capital*) does not follow from the basic principles of Marxian economics.

21. B. Croce, Preface to the 1917 edition, *Materialism Storico*, *op.cit.*, p. xiv.

22. In "La Rivoluzione contro il *Capitale*," *Avanti!* November 24, 1917, now translated into English in *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci*, ed. P. Cavalcanti and P. Piccone (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975), pp. 123-26. As for Gramsci's self-image, in the *Quaderni*, referring to the year 1917, he says that "I was tendentially rather Crocean" (p. 1233).

23. See, for example, *Quaderni*, pp. 1215, 1254.

24 Using Gramsci's brilliant simile, we may say that Croce tried to claim that Marxism had been like a chemical catalyst for the development of his own thinking, that just as no trace of the catalyst remains in the product resulting from a catalytic chemical reaction, so their was no trace of Marxism in his own philosophy. *Cf. Quaderni*, p. 1232.

25. Cf. G. Gentile, "Il Marxismo di Benedetto Croce," *op.cit.*; and R. Franchini, *Intervista su Croce*, *op.cit.*, pp. 21-23.

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regards his theory of "religion" (or popular culture), his theory of philosophy, and the sounder parts of his philosophy of history and of politics, it also means that Gramsci is a Crocean insofar as he accepts Croce's philosophy of religion, metaphilosophy, style, and method of criticism.

Marxism as a Religion

Bearing the title "The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce", the tenth of the *Prison Notebooks* was written between 1932 and 1935 and was divided into two parts, the first dealing almost exclusively and directly with Croce (Q1207-38).[26] The most frequent topic is Croce's criticism of Marxism, and it is itself criticized by Gramsci in 28 sections. The second most frequent topic is dealt with in a group of 19 sections that criticize Croce's own philosophy of history, politics and religion. Third, there are a series of discussions, consisting of 13 sections, which are primarily interpretative rather than critical. The central concern of Gramsci's critique is Croce's liquidation of Marxism. This was expressed most eloquently by Croce in 1914-15.[27]

Gramsci agrees with distinguishing two versions of Marxism since he speaks of a "lower current" of the "philosophy of praxis" (Q1291) and of a presumably higher current which neither crudely separates superstructure

26. Hereafter page reference to the *Quaderni* will be made in parenthesis in the text, by prefixing the page numbers by a "Q." The second section (Q1239-1362) deals with such other topics as Gramsci's elaboration of his own philosophy of praxis, his introduction to philosophy, and economic theory. Altogether, there are 98 main sections labelled or numbered as paragraphs by Gramsci himself or by the editor of the critical edition. Of these 98 sections, 60 deal directly and explicity with Croce.

27. Benedetto Croce, *Storia della Storiografia Italiana nel Secolo Decimonono* (Bari: Laterza, 1964. First edition, 1921), pp. 136-37: "In scientific terms, it was not possible to escape the dilemma: either historical materialism, continuing on the path of the old philosophy of history, was forced resolutely to become a revelation of the meaning of history, that is, of the real history which underlies the apparent one; or else, obeying to the better impulse of whatever novelty it contained, it was forced no less resolutely to humanize the economy, treating it as a mental activity or aspect of mental activity, and to conceive history as a unified whole in which one cannot distinguish (as Goethe's saying goes) the grain from the chaff. But, in the second case, it would have negated its principle and ceased to be materialism, that is, it would have nullified itself and would have been displaced by a new and better philosophy"; pp. 125-26: "The first was a very old metaphysical and transcendent idea, and therefore also a naturalistic one apt to ally itself with positivistic and evolutionist currents: Matter, or the so-called Economy, conceived as the hidden God of history, as the one who pulls the strings of individuals and their actions, as Reality versus Appearance, as Substance versus Accident, as the new form or new world by which one presents anew the transcendent God or Providence of theologians, or the Absolute, the Idea, or the Unconscious of the no less transcendent and more recent metaphysicians. To call such a transcendent concept God, Providence, the Idea, the Absolute and the Unconscious, or else Matter and Economy does not change anything of the essence because, being transcendent, it is as unknowable as it is unreal and is translated only in mythological images; nor are any of the consequences changed, because from the transcendent Matter and Economy, as well as from the analogous principles of theology and or metaphysics, we obtain the same conception of history as moving with a pre-ordained design, with a beginning and an end in time with an origin of the world and of society and with a terminal state or state of perfection, be it paradise, the beatific vision, or even nirvana, or be it the coming into being of Communism and the transition from the slavery of Necessity to the kingdom of Freedom, which the theologians of historical materialism prophesized. From this feature of historical materialism, just as in the old theological and metaphysical systems of Philosophy or History, derives the methodological tendency to construct history a priori and to turn a deaf ear or to silence the genuine voices of facts that documents render audible in the mind of those who welcome them with a desire for understanding."

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and structure nor conceives the latter theologically and transcendentally (Q1300). Concerning Croce's criticism of the higher current, Gramsci suggests that is reduced to a terminological point (Q1274), for the "new and better philosophy" of which Croce speaks is supposedly Croce's own, and Gramsci thinks that "what there is which is healthy and progressive in Croce's thought is nothing but the philosophy of praxis presented in speculative language" (Q1268). In fact, Croce speaks only of this "lower" current when he reiterated this criticism in 1924 and again in 1930.[28] Gramsci argues that Croce's dismissal of the "theological" version of Marxism (the "lower current") is inconsistent with Croce's own (1) earlier revisionism, (2) intellectual objectivity, (3) anti-Masonic attitude toward religion, (4) realistic, anti-intellectualistic historical interpretations, (5) appreciation of Luther vis-à-vis Erasmus, (7) metaphilosophy, (8) theory of error, (9) dialectic of distincts, (10) attitude during the First World War, and (11) opposition to Catholic modernism.

Croce's "theological" interpretation of Marxism is inconsistent with his earlier revisionist claim that historical materialism is a valuable canon for explaining historical events on the basis of economic factors (Q1275). It is also inconsistent with Croce's earlier rejection of Stammler's construal of Marxism, which was precisely the "theological" interpretation that Croce later adopted (Q1280).[29] Gramsci emphasizes that Croce at no time subjected his own earlier revisionist work to a critical analysis exposing his own earlier errors and justifying the necessity of the theological interpretation (Q1301, 1254). This leads Gramsci to suspect that Croce's change of mind has no rational motivation, but rather a political one. Thus, Gramsci points out that "before 1900 he [Croce] felt honored to pass even politically as a follower of the philosophy of praxis, because at that time the historical situation made this movement an ally of liberalism, whereas nowadays [1932-35] things have changed greatly and certain games would be dangerous" (Q1301). Moreover, there was at the time a widespread belief in the imminent cultural strengthening of Marxism, and Gramsci thinks that Croce is reacting against this trend (Q1249). Furthermore, Croce's liquidation of Marxism seeks to strengthen his own camp rather than convert his opponents, since he does not polemicize with Marxists, is not too well up-to-date, and does not expose the errors of his earlier revisionism but merely equates Marxism with historical economism (Q1254). Finally, Gramsci notes that Croce praised Henri De Man's book against Marxism — an intellectually mediocre work grounded in that same psychoanalysis of which Croce had such a low opinion (Q1264-65).

In his third objection, Gramsci compares Croce's liquidation to the criticism of confessional religion by anti-clerical masons and vulgar rationalists (1292) since "Croce's anti-clericalism is an aristocratic atheism

28. *Etica e Politica, op.cit.*, p. 225. At the 1930 World Congress of Philosophy in Oxford, reacting with comments on a paper delivered by a former Soviet minister of education, Lunacharsky, dealing with "bourgeois aesthetics." Cf. *La Nuova Italia*, October 20, 1930, vol. I, No. 10, pp. 431-432; cf. also *Quaderni*, pp. 2745-46, and 2748.

29. Cf. Benedetto Croce, *Materialismo Storico*, pp. 9-15, 74-85, and 108.

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which abhors the plebian rudeness and crudity of vulgar anti-clerical critics" (Q1303).

Gramsci's fourth objection is that Croce ends up "judging a historical movement from its propaganda literature and...failing to understand that even a banal booklet can be the expression of very important and vital movements" (Q1292). This contrasts with Croce's typical attitude toward, for example, the moralists of the seventeenth century, which, "though of small stature compared to Machiavelli, 'represented an ulterior and superior stage in political philosophy' " (Q1301).[30]

Next Gramsci argues that "precisely the analysis of religions that Croce made in the *History of Europe* and the concept of religion that Croce elaborated serve to understand better the historical meaning of the philosophy of praxis and the reasons for its resistance to all attacks and all desertions" (Q1292-93). Croce's concept of religion, of course, is that "the essence and intrinsic character of every religion...resides always in a world view and a corresponding ethic," and that the moral aspects of religion are "forces and capacities worthy of assimilating and gradually transforming, but not to be destroyed without somehow knowing how to replace them or without actually replacing them."[31] To Gramsci, it is obvious that Marxism is a religion in Croce's sense (Q1292), and it is also evident that Croce was unwilling or unable to popularize his philosophy so that it could become a norm of conduct (Q1294). It follows that his liquidation is misconceived, or inconvenient, unrefined, inhumane, and politically naive — to use words Croce applied to a Voltairian criticism of the Catholic Church in the 19th century.

Gramsci also draws an analogy between Croce's attitude and Erasmus' opposition to the Reformation. Croce's dismissal of Marxism as an outmoded philosophy of history is similar to Erasmus' dictum that "wherever Luther appears, culture dies", and Croce's aristocratic lack of interest in popular enlightenment is similar to the failure of Renaissance culture to filter down to the masses the way Protestantism did (Q1293). The differences are to Croce's disadvantage, for he "relives a position which has been shown historically to be false and reactionary and which he himself has contributed to showing to be false and reactionary" (Q1293), while he forgets that the Reformation and the "regressive" Luther were instrumental for the rise of classical German philosophy and ultimately of Croce himself (Q1293-94).

To show the conflict with Croce's theory of philosophy, Gramsci notes that whereas Croce objects to the Marxist conception of superstructures as appearances, he also defends the historicity and nondefinitiveness of philosophical thought, which is merely another way of expressing the same thing (Q1298-99). More generally, Croce deserves credit to the extent that he has "stressed the value of the concept of philosophical problem, by contrast to

30. Gramsci is quoting from B. Croce, *Storia dell'Età Barocca in Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 1929), p. 89.

31. Benedetto Croce, *Storia d'Europa nel Secolo Decimonono* (Economical Edition, Bari: Laterza, 1965), pp. 20 and 26.

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the concept of system, has denied that thought abstractly produces other thought, and has declared that the problems which philosophers have to solve are not an abstract result of previous philosophical thought but are proposed by the actual historical development" (Q1225). Precisely because of this, the philosophy of praxis must be conceived immanently rather than speculatively. Thus, the structure must be conceived not as a "hidden God" but "as the set of social relations in which actual men move and operate" (Q1226). In fact, Gramsci's objection concerning the theory of error claims that whereas Croce objects to the Marxist claim that morality, philosophy, art, and other superstructural elements are illusions, one of Croce's doctrines deals precisely with the practical origins of theoretical error.

The problem with the dialectic of distincts is that Croce should have known better than to find objectionable the Marxist distinction between structure and superstructure, since an essential element of his own philosophy is a fourfold distinction which, among other things, was easily misinterpreted by people such as Gentile and his followers (Q1300). The four distincts in Croce's system are expressive cognitive acts (identified with art), ratiocinative cognitive acts (identified with philosophy), general volitional acts (identified with economic practice), and moral volitional acts (identified with moral action). Gramsci's point is that, since Croce interprets the inter-relations among his four distinctions dialectically rather than abstractly, there is no good reason why he should not be able to interpret the relation between structure and superstructure in a similar manner.

In addition to these nine Gramscian replies to Croce, contained in this notebook's longest paragraph, two additional replies are contained in other paragraphs. The first one discusses Croce's attitude toward World War I. Although Croce never accepted the idea that the war between Italy and Germany was one of morality versus immorality, or of civilization against barbarism, he did not oppose preaching this idea to the common people so that they would fight. His point was that intellectuals should not lower themselves to the level of the masses, but should realize that the latter are unable to lift themselves to the level of the former. Gramsci calls this "great statesmanship by contrast to petty politics" (Q1212). A final inconsistency stems from Croce's opposition to the turn-of-the-century movement of Catholic reform that came to be condemned by Pope Pius X as "modernism". It could be held against Croce that his opposition strengthened the forces of relation within the Church (Q1213). And his attitude could be taken as a sign of "lack of civic character and courage" (Q1304). Gramsci's main concern, however, is Croce's reason for his oppositon, namely "that between transcendental religion and immanentistic philosophy there cannot be an uncertain and equivocal *tertium quid*" (Q1304). In other words, since Croce allowed transcendental religion for the Catholic masses, he should also allow it to the working masses for whom the lower current of Marxism is meant.

Gramsci's critique here is fundamentally accurate. The Crocean inconsistencies just mentioned do indeed exist, and the underlying interpretations of Croce are basically fair and correct. However, this basic

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justice should not make us forget that the critique is essentially a criticism of Croce with Croce, that is, of one part of his philosophy with another. This does not necessarily render it invalid, but it suggests that Gramsci is essentially a Crocean. The main doctrines of Croce's philosophy that Gramsci seems to accept here are Croce's philosophy of religion and his metaphilosophy. Gramsci's main argument seems to be that Croce's liquidationist dismissal of Marxism involves a misapplication of his own theories of religion and of philosophy, and that their proper use can reveal the proper place that a vulgar version of Marxism has. Indeed, vulgar Marxism need not be vulgarized.

As regards Croce's philosophy of religion, the above "indirect" evidence (namely, that implicit in Gramsci's critical practice), can be strengthened by direct evidence (namely, explicit favorable acknowledgements) that Gramsci accepts the essence of this element of Croce's philosophy. This occurs in a paragraph which explicitly discusses "Croce and religion" (Q1217) and considered that his philosophy of religion "is one of the most important points to be analyzed in order to understand the historical meaning of Croceanism" (Q1217). After a statement of Croce's definition of religion, Gramsci approvingly draws the consequence that "religion is every philosophy, namely every world view, insofar as it has become 'faith', i.e., insofar as it is considered not as a theoretical activity (creating new thought), but as a stimulus to action (concrete ethico-political activity, creating new history)" (Q1217). In a later paragraph (Q1250-52), Gramsci shows appreciation and admiration for Croce's (critical) response to the Lateran Treaty and argues that it is much wiser than Gentile's.

Marxism as a Philosophy

Croce's liquidationist *replacement* of Marxism assumes that Marxism is incapable of taking a "higher" form and needs to be replaced by a better philosophy — presumably Croce's own. Croce argues that historical materialism would be a contradiction in terms if its "matter", i.e., the economic structure, were given a humanistic, or "spiritual", interpretation. We may agree with Gramsci that this is a verbal quibble (Q1274). However, Croce put forth another argument, i.e., that Marxism is not a cognitive, philosophical system of thought, but rather an ideology.[32] Accordingly, Marxism is essentially the attempt to replace philosophical theory by socio-political action.

Gramsci replies that Marx's alleged turning Hegel right-side-up means that whereas Hegel makes theory prior to practice, practice is prior to theory (Q1273): "If philosophy is history of philosophy, if philosophy is 'history,' if

32. B. Croce, "Marxismo e Filosofia", *Conversazioni Critiche*, Series I (Bari: Laterza, 1950), pp. 296-306. This is a review-essay occasioned by Emile Hammacher's *Das Philosophisch-oekonomische System des Marxismus* (Leipzig, 1901). Croce supported this claim with his interpretation of such texts as Marx's allegation that in Hegel philosophy stands on its head and that one must put it back on its feet, Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach that philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways while the point is to change it, and Engel's claim that the German proletariat is the heir of classical German philosophy.

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philosophy develops because of the development of the general history of the world (that is, the social relations by which men live), and not because a great philosopher is followed by a greater philosopher and so forth, it is clear that by working practically to make history, one also makes 'implicit' philosophy which will be 'explicit' insofar as philosophers will elaborate it conherently, and one stimulates cognitive problems which, besides a 'practical' type of solution, will sooner or later find a theoretical type of solution by specialists, after having found the ingenuous form of popular common sense, namely of the practical agents in historical developments." What is important is that the premises from which Gramsci argues are central theses of Croce's metaphilosophy.[33]

Gramsci's interpretation of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach is that it is an expression of "annoyance toward philosophers and their parrotism and an energetic affirmation of the unity of theory and practice" (Q1270). Similarly, Engels' dictum about the German proletariat "means precisely that the 'heir' continues the predecessor, but continues it 'practially' since from mere contemplation he had deduced an active will, transformer of the world, and in this practical activity is also contained the 'knowledge' which is 'real knowledge' rather than 'scholasticism' only in practical activity" (Q1271). Gramsci notes furthermore that his interpretations are simply an "affirmation of the historicity of philosophy made in terms of absolute immanence, of 'absolute secularism' " (Q1271). Such an affirmation, in turn, is obviously an adaptation of Croce's metaphilosophy (Q1241).

Thus, Croce's denial of the philosophical character of Marxism is inconsistent with Croce's own historicist view of philosophy since his criticism runs counter to his own metaphilosophy. To be sure, Gramsi also criticizes him for the excessively speculative (Q1271), abstract (Q1272), bookish and antiquarian (Q1242) approach, and for being unable to apply properly his own theory (Q1240-41). For Gramsci, "only the identification of history and politics" (Q1242) could solve this problem, and that would lead to a concept of history as contemporary: "If the politician is a historian (not only in the sense that he makes history, but also in the sense that while operating on the present he interprets the past), the historian is a politician, and in this sense (which after all appears even in Croce), history is always contemporary history, namely politics" (Q1242). Since the thesis that all history is contemporary history[34] is one of the most characteristic Crocean principles,

33. See, for example, B. Croce, *Logica*, Part II, Chapter IV, (Economical Edition. Bari: Laterza, 1967; pp. 184-195), and Part III, Chapter VII (*ibid.*, pp. 283-290); *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia*, Part I, Chapter IV (Bari: Laterza, 1969; pp. 38-42) and Part VIII (*Ibid.*, pp. 342-49); *Ultimi Saggi* (Bari: Laterza, 1963), pp. 395-400; and *Il Carattere della Filosofia Moderna* (Bari: Laterza, 1963), pp. 1-23.

34. B. Croce, *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia,* Part I, Chapter I, pp. 1-17. Immediately after the passage just quoted from Gramsci (Q1242) he seems to contradict himself by apparently denying that Croce held this view: "but Croce cannot arrive all the way to this necessary conclusion, precisely because it leads to the identification of history and politics and hence of ideology and philosophy" (Q1242). This is indeed puzzling, especially in view of Gramsci's realization, expressed elsewhere, in *Lettere del Carcere* (Turin: Einaudi, 1947), p. 157, that the book where the contemporariness of history is explicitly put, *Theory and History of*

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Gramsci's point is that the primary difference between Croce and Marxism is verbal: "Croce has retranslated in speculative language the progressive achievements of the philosophy of praxis, and in this retranslation is the best of his thought" (Q1271).

Gramsci is aware that he is accepting Croce's view. Discussing the relative popularity of Croce's thought, Gramsci argues that "one must say that the most important element of Croce's popularity is intrinsic to his thought and to the method of his thinking and is to be found in the greater correspondence to life by Croce's philosophy than by any other speculative philosophy" (Q1216). He goes on to summarize the view of philosophy presented by Croce in a 1930 essay[35] where his historicist conception is briefly but clearly expounded and concludes by explaining approvingly how Croce's scholarly practice conformed to that view of philosophy.

Thus, Gramsci takes the sting out of Croce's "philosophical" criticism of Marxism by using Crocean principles. In that sense he is Crocean. But at the same time, since Gramsci's aim is to defend Marxism, he is attempting to locate the Marxist elements in Croce's thought. In other words, Gramsci is developing his own Crocean Marxism. This explains Gramsci's general program (Q1233): "One must redo for Croce's philosophical conception the same reduction which the first theorists of the philosophy of history did for the Hegelian conception. This is the only historically fruitful manner of determining an adequate reform of the philosophy of praxis, of elevating this conception which because of the necessity of immediate practical life has been 'vulgarized,' to the height that it must reach for the solution of the most complex tasks proposed by the present development of our struggle; that is, to the creation of a new integral culture which would have the popular character of the Protestant Reformation and of the French Enlightenment and the classic features of Greek civilization and of the Italian Renaissance. This would be a culture that (to use Carducci's words) would synthesize Maximillian Robespierre and Immanuel Kant, politics and philosophy, in a dialectical unity inherent not only in a French or German society, but in a European world-wide one."

Croce as a Marxist

Next Gramsci objects to Croce's philosophy of history and philosophy of politics, meant to provide a constructive substitute for Marxism and thus supplement Croce's negative criticism. The three important elements of Croce's philosophy of history are his histories of Europe and of Italy[36] (his historiographical practice), his theory of history as the story of liberty[37] (his

Historiography, "contains not only a synthesis of the entire Crocean philosophical system, but a real, true revision of that system."

35. B. Croce, "Il Filosofo," *Ultimi Saggi, op.cit.,* pp. 395-400.

36. B. Croce, *Storia d'Europa nel Secolo Decimonono, op.cit.; Storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915,* first published in 1928, now available in an "Economical Edition" (Bari: Laterza, 1967).

37. See "La Concezione Liberale come Concezione della Vita" and "Liberismo e Liberalismo" in *Etica e Politica*; see also the *Storia come Pensiero e come Azione* (first published in 1938;

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liberalism), and his concept of ethico-political history.[38]

Gramsci objects to Croce's historiography partly "because its fundamental preoccupation is a fear of Jacobin movements, of every active intervention by the great popular masses as a factor of historical progress" (Q1220). Furthermore, Croce "presupposes 'mechanically' that the thesis must be 'conserved' by the antithesis" (Q1220-21), and he "elevate[s] to methodological status what is mere immediacy, thus elevating ideology to philosophy" (Q1221). Elsewhere Gramsci points out that Croce's *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* begins with the year 1815 and thus neglects the upheaval of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic Wars, while his *History of Italy* begins with the year 1871 and thus neglects the struggles and unrest of the *Risorgimento*. This is tendentiously in favor of a cultural, legal, reformistic, and relatively passive aspect of historical development (Q1227). For Gramsci this is in effect a Fascist apology since it suggests that the national socialism which followed the Italian unrest of 1917-21 is the "civilized" manner of achieving a planned economy, i.e., the means for a greater production of wealth and for a more equitable distribution of it without upsetting the foundation of society (Q1228).

Finally, Gramsci objects that Croce's historiography is "nothing but a form of political moderatism, which proposes as the only method of political action the one in which historical development and progress result from the dialectic of conservation and innovation" (Q1325). This is nationalistic, in the tradition of Gioberti's concept of Italian classicism, which consists precisely in the interplay of conservation and innovation (Q1324-25). Moreover, such moderatism is the result of a practical-political ideology, rather than of objective scholarship, since there is no reason why the conservation which is to accompany innovation should consist in the particular items chosen by Croce (Q1325).

The second target of Gramsci's criticism of Croce's philosophy of history is his liberalism. Gramsci argues that it is either philosophical but empty or else has content but is a political ideology. For "if history is the story of liberty — according to Hegel's contention [adapted by Croce] — the formula is valid for the history of mankind of every time and of every place, and even the history of oriental despotism is liberty. Thus liberty means only 'movement,' development, dialectic" (Q1229). Moreover, such a concept "lends itself to being employed even by the Jesuits, against liberals, who become libertines, by contrast to the 'true' partisans of just liberty" (Q1230), whereas it cannot explain "why in 1848 Croatian peasants fought against Milanese liberals, and

Economical Edition, Bari, 1966), which was translated as *History as the Story of Liberty* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1941).

38. See the "Elementi di Politica," especially the "Storia Economico-Politica e Storia Etico-Politica," in B. Croce, *Etica e Politica,* Economical Edition, pp. 225-234. See also his *Storia come Pensiero e come Azione*. The importance of the notion of ethico-political history in Croce's philosophy has received additional confirmation recently in the work of a somewhat orthodox interpreter and commentator, G. Sasso's *Benedetto Croce: La Ricerca della Dialettica* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1975). This extremely detailed and comprehensive (more than one thousand pages) work divides Croce's development into three periods, the middle one being 1909-38, during which he articulated a philosophy centered around the concept of ethico-political history.

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the peasants of Lombardy and Veneto fought against Viennese liberals" (Q1236). On the other hand, liberalism may be made concrete by identifying it with the "history of liberty conscious of being such" (Q1229) of 19th-century Europe. In this case, it becomes "a means of conserving the particular political and economic institutions founded in the course of the French Revolution and of the repercussion it had in Europe" (Q1230). Or one could equate liberalism with nationalism and the ideal of liberty with the well-being of the Fatherland (Q1230, 1237), but the problem here is that just as plausibly such patriotism 'was a synonym of the State, that is of authority and not of 'liberty,' was an element of 'conservation' and a source of persecutions and of a new Inquisition" (Q1230-31). Perhaps the least objectionable interpretation of liberalism is the liberal form of government, "namely the form which guarantees freedom of movement and of competition to every political force" (Q1237). But Gramsci does not accept even this since it would amount to "conceiving historical development as a game of sport with its umpire and its pre-established norms to be loyally respected" (Q1238), to "a form of pre-fabricated history where the ideology stems not from a political content but from a form and method of struggle" (Q1238). Consequently, Croce's philosophy of liberty is either not philosophy or not liberty.

However, Gramsci's critique of Croce's philosophy of history is not wholly negative. He accepts the Crocean concept of ethico-political history. This concept underlies both Croce's historiography and his liberalism. Gramsci's main point is that "whatever there is which is healthy and progressive in Croce's thought is nothing but the philosophy of praxis presented in speculative language" (Q1268). For example, one ought not to neglect the double aspect (ethical and political) of the concept (Q1302): "*ethics* refers to the activity of civil society, to hegemony; *politics* refers to state and governmental initiative and coercion. When there is contrast between ethics and politics, between requirements of liberty and requirements of force, between the civil society and the government or state, we have a crisis. Croce goes so far as to say that the true 'state,' that is, the directing force of historical development, must sometimes be sought not where one would think (in the state legally understood), but in 'private' forces and even in so-called revolutionaries."[39] Nor should we forget that Croce himself theorizes about an economico-political history, distinct from the ethico-political one, which is after all required by his own "dialectic of distincts" (Q1316). In other words, the problem with ethico-political history is not that it has no place in a sound philosophy of history, but rather that in Croce's hands it becomes "a mechanical and arbitrary hypostatization of the aspect of hegemony, of political administration, of consensus, in the life and the development of the activities of the State and of civil society" (Q1222). To prevent such hypostatization, ethico-political history "may be taken as an 'empirical canon'

39. This is a ingenious interpretation, but here Gramsci is misled by Croce's phrase and forgets that for Croce "ethico-political" is synonymous with "moral". He avoids the latter term in order to prevent confusion with a moralistic approach, which he opposed. See B. Croce, *Etica e Politica, op.cit.*, pp. 225-234.

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of historical research, always to keep in mind in the examination and understanding of historical development" (Q1235). According to Gramsci, Marxism is far from excluding ethico-political history, "rather the most recent phase of its development consists precisely in the vindication of the moment of hegemony as essential to its concept of the state, and in the appreciation of cultural facts and activities and of a cultural front as necessary besides the merely economic and merely political ones" (Q1224). What he has in mind here is Lenin's opposition to economism and his cultural interpretation of the idea of "permanent revolution" (Q1235).

Gramsci's critique follows a typical Crocean *method* against Croce's *particular* theses. Gramsci is aware of this: "even in the evaluation of Croce's thought must we use the criterion that a philosophical position should be criticized and evaluated not for what it pretends to be, but for what it really is and how it is manifested in concrete historical works" (Q1235). This was one of the most fundamental principles preached and practiced by Croce on innumerable occasions, e.g., in his criticism of Hegel, Vico, philosophies of history, literary works, and current political events. Another Crocean feature of Gramsci's approach is his reduction of Croce's ethico-political history to *a canon* of historical interpretation, which is analogous to Croce's revisionist reduction of historical materialism (in the sense of economism) to another such canon. Third, Gramsci's charge that Croce's anti-Jacobinism is "mechanical" is a typically Crocean objection, while Gramsci's attempt to balance his negative criticism with positive interpretations is an effort to emulate the olympic serenity which was Croce's usual trait, and which Gramsci frequently recognizes. What this amounts to is the use of an essentially Crocean method of criticism to criticize Croce's philosophy of history in order to extract from it some acceptable Marxist content.

Besides his philosophy of history, the other element of Croce's constructive substitute for Marxism is his philosophy of politics. Gramsci's criticism of the latter is not as Crocean as the previously examined material, but it is Crocean nonetheless. One thing discussed by Gramsci is Croce's lack of practical political involvement. This is not indifference (Q1261, 1349), but rather a sign of the nature of Croce's involvement. For example, though Croce was not a member of any political organization,[40] he was associated with the "conservative" newspaper *Giornale d'Italia,* and he did function as the chief of cultural propaganda for several "progressive" political groups (Q1352-53). Even after the advent of Fascism, Croce's "non-involvement" was aimed at the education of the ruling classes (Q1259). Thus, his was "a reformist activity from above" (Q1261). Gramsci is not explicit about this, but it is clear that Croce's reformism from above may be occasionally appropriate but cannot be regarded as universally valid, on pain of mechanistically hypostatizing a particular ideological interest. This, however, is another typically Crocean objection.

40. At the end and soon after the Second World War, Croce did become practically involved with the so-called Italian Liberal Party, but that period is obviously outside Gramsci's temporal frame of reference.

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Another target of Gramsci's criticism is Croce's conception of political science. Although for Croce politics is the expression of passion and interest, political *science* dissolves them by giving them a theoretical explanation. For Gramsci this is intellectualistic, and turns political science into a "medicine" of passions (Q1307-08). Moreover, party leaders are living proof that the theoretical articulation of political interests does not destroy those interests (Q1309).

As regards Croce's identification of *politics* with passion, Gramsci approves of Croce's underlying motivation. That is, Croce did take an interest in the improvement of the conditions of disadvantaged classes, and he thus theorized that political action stems from the need to remove injustice. This, however, explains only what might be called "defensive" and not "offensive" political activity. Hence Croce's analysis is one-sided and should be regarded as a special case of the Marxist theory of permanent struggle (Q1319). Thus, here too, Gramsci argues that Croce's political philosophy is right insofar as it is Marxist, and wrong otherwise — and his argument is an application of Croce's own *method* of criticism.

To conclude, we have shown in detail how Gramsci's critique of Croce is itself Crocean: it accepts Croce's theory of religion to vindicate the "religious" validity of Marxism; it accepts Croce's metaphilosophy to defend the philosophical character of Marxism; and it accepts a Crocean style and method of criticism to separate what is alive from what is dead in Croce's philosophy of history and of politics. Our proof lends support to the Crocean character of Gramsci's thought in general. It remains for his biographers, or for students of his political practice, to determine how to integrate our results into his life as a whole; certainly nothing they can ascertain can alter the fact established here that Gramsci thought as a Crocean while in prison from 1932 to 1935. Similarly, it remains as a problem for general political theorists to determine exactly how this fact that we have ascertained contributes to an understanding of Eurocommunism.

BOOKS FROM TELOS PRESS

FOR SOCIALISM by Gustav Landauer

INTRODUCTION by Tim Luke and Russell Berman

From his protest against Bebel's exclusion of the anarchists from the Second International in 1893 until his murder in 1919 by the reactionary troops suppression the Bavarian revolution, Landauer remained a tireless critic of all forms of bureaucratism and an advocate of a decentralized, libertarian socialism. A friend of Buber, Landauer had a great influence on the anarcho-socialist trends of the early Zionist movement and the development of the *Kibbutz*. Originally published in 1911, *For Socialism* is a critique of an official Marxism that had become an obstacle to emancipation.

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TOTALITARIAN STATE CAPITALISM: ON THE STRUCTURE AND HISTORICAL FUNCTION OF SOVIET-TYPE SOCIETIES

by Andreas Wildt*

Societies patterned on the Soviet model have been described as "really existing socialism," "transitional society," "state socialism," "integral statism," "bureaucratic collectivism," "monopoly socialism," and "proto-socialism." All of these accounts are in some ways inadequate and in the following paper, the notion of "totalitarian state capitalism" will be developed to provide a more accurate account. The point of departure is a re-examination of the concept of "totalitarianism". The unqualified rejection of the "bourgeois" theory of totalitarianism by the German Left in the 50's and 60's was a serious mistake, which still prevents an accurate understanding of contemporary realities. Originally developed by the Council Communists in their disputes with the Bolsheviks, the analysis of Soviet-type societies as totalitarian leads to an account of these societies as "state capitalist". In order to develop this account, a critique of Bahro is necessary since he has provided the most complete Marxist analysis of Soviet-type societies so far.

State Capitalism

In his book *Die Alternative* Bahro argues that : "Our really existing socialism is a different system in principle from that developed in Marx's socialist theory. This practice can be compared with that theory but it must not be measured by it. It must be explained by its own laws. All theories of deformation, from Krushchev to Garaudy, only distract from this task."[1] Bahro rightly does not spend much time explaining why Soviet-type societies cannot be considered socialist since they lack workers' control, self-management, equality and brotherhood. To speak of "really existing socialism", however, indirectly raises this question. How then can Bahro provide a positive definition of "really existing socialism"? He sees it as unmistakably a "late class society".[2] Yet, although it involves things such as "capital", "wage-labor", "added value", etc.,[3] it is not a variant of capitalism. Since he seems to be familiar with the theory of state capitalism only from the writings of Lenin and his predecessors,[4] he argues that Soviet-type societies can best be characterized in terms of "proto-socialist, i.e., socialism in a larval state." Presumably, a society is proto-socialist if it must develop into socialism through intrinsic laws unless destroyed by external forces. This, however, is what was predicated by traditional and objectivist Marxism of all class societies — especially capitalism. Thus, if Bahro's

* Translated by David J. Parent.

1. Rudolf Bahro, *Die Alternative. Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus* (Frankfurt, 1977), p.14. The English translation has appeared only recently as *The Alternative in Eastern Europe* (London, 1978).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 196ff., 242, 493.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

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larva-metaphor is to be more than a general reformulation of a deterministic theory of revolution, it must entail that no intermediary stage is possible between the social system of Soviet-type societies and socialism, and that a systematic transition is possible not from capitalism to socialism, but from Soviet-type societies to socialism. Bahro wants to argue that Soviet-type societies are closer to socialism than capitalist ones.

Thus Bahro stands in the tradition of Trotsky, who in 1936 held that in the Soviet Union the relations of production were socialist — because of state ownership of the means of production, a planned economy, a monopoly of foreign trade — but the relations of distribution were bourgeois; the Bolshevist party, deviant; and the "Workers' State", degenerate.[6] He saw these contradictions between base and superstructure, the relations of production and of distribution as possible only during a short transition period: the nature of the Soviet Union would be decided by the class struggle following the proletarian offensive in Spain and France in 1936.[7] Yet, for Trotsky, the forthcoming revolution in the Soviet Union would be merely political in character.

This position was discredited by the Comintern's counterrevolutionary policy in the Spanish Civil War,[8] the Stalin-Hitler pact, Russia's imperialist policy in World War II, and the Comintern's strangulation of every independent mass initiative in Europe. No historical experience, however, has been able to shake the widespread and indecisive leftist stand to exonerate the USSR by regarding it as a "transitional society".[9] Thus, although her views should logically lead her to the state-capitalist thesis, Rossanda continues to ascribe to the theory of the "transitional society" despite her refusal to equate relations of production and of ownership: "Socialist society is a *transitional* society in the full sense of the term; it is a historical form in which elements of capital continue to exist, mingled with other elements, and to exercise decisive pressure on the political sphere, on the relationship between men, on the relationship between governors and governed."[10]

6. Leon Trotsky, *Verratene Revolution. Was ist die Sowjetunion und wohin treibt sie?* English translation: *The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going?* (Garden City, N.Y., 1937).

7. *Ibid.*, p. 275, 279ff.

8. As is well known, the Barcelona workers responded to repression by the Communist Party in May 1937 by erecting barricades and attacking the Communist Party's offices.

9. One of the rare exceptions is Merleau-Ponty, who in *Humanism and Terror* in 1947 still held on to the "waiting Marxist attitude" toward the Soviet Union. When he discovered the truth about the concentration camps and when the Soviet Union did not stop the Korean War, he dropped his stance of "sympathy without consent" and called for an analysis of Soviet-type societies as "variants of a more general economic system." Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Adventures of the Dialectic* (Evanston, 1972). Cf. also *Uebergangsgesellschaft: Herrschaftsform und Praxis am Beispiel der Sowjetunion*, P.W. Schulze, ed. (Frankfurt, 1974). This volume also contains an essay by Heidt and Mangen on "Parteivergesellschaftung," which undermines the theory of a "transitional society" concerning the Soviet by a thoroughgoing critique of Leninism. To still claim today that there is a contradiction between socialist conditions of production and bourgeois conditions of distribution, as Mandel does, is a clear break with Marxism and understandable only in the context of the dogmatism of the Fourth International.

10. Rossana Rossanda, "Revolutionary Intellectuals and the Soviet Union," in *The Socialist*

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Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that the Leftist opposition to Soviet-type societies, e.g., Havemann and Biermann who can legally put forth only immanent critiques, assumed that in the GDR the socialist revolution began with the anti-Fascist purges and the nationalization of the most important means of production so that the GDR is the "better German state."[11] Actually, the social system in the GDR is based on the repression of the anti-Fascist committees which after 1945 were becoming organs of revolutionary power,[12] and on the liquidation of the factory-council movement.[13]

Already by the end of the 30's, the Soviet Union had been analyzed as a new class society by Schachtmann, Rizzi and Burnham under the label of "bureaucratic collectivism".[14] Regardless of other differences,[15] these positions share Trotsky's claim that the Soviet Union is not capitalist in character. Castoriadis also holds this thesis of a new bureacratic class society and, more recently, anti-Stalinist investigations of the Soviet Union, especially by Carlo and Ticktin, combine the thesis of its retrogressive development into a capitalist market economy since Stalin's death, or the 1955 economic reforms.[16]

Bahro's account of the "proto-socialism" of Soviet-type societies can be understood as an attempt to radicalize and strengthen the thesis of the non-capitalist class structure of these societies. Bahro sees the social structure of proto-socialism as ultimately based on the dominant social division of labor — especially the domination of mental labor over physical labor. Implicitly polemicizing against Trotskyists, Bahro concludes that: "Mere political

Register (1974), p. 43.

11. Cf. for instance the interviews in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Dec. 30, 1972, and Oct. 22, 1975. More recently, however, Havemann himself has written: "It is an error to believe that in the GDR we had begun building socialism — even if without the full consent of the people. And that, despite all the inadequacies of 'previous achievements,' it were just a matter of further developing and expanding socialist democracy. How can one 'expand' a democracy that does not even exist?" Cf. Robert Havemann, "Volksfront im Westen-Sozialismus im Osten: Ein Widerspruch?" in *Kursbuch* 46 (1976), p. 176.

12. D. Staritz, *Sozialismus in einem halben Land. Zur Programmatik und Politik der KPD-SED in der Phase der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umwälzung in der DDR* (Wagenbach, 1976), pp. 86f.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 90ff. Cf. also Benno Sarel, *Arbeiter gegen den "Kommunismus." Zur Geschichte des proletarischen Widerstands in der DDR (1945-1958)* (Munich, 1975). Biermann concurs with this in his best writings (e.g., the thesis of one of the songs of the Cologne Concert that became the pretext for his expulsion): that socialism ultimately can be prevented by wanting to "Expand it! Expand it! Expand it!"

14. The theory of "bureaucratic collectivism" is held today especially by Antonio Carlo, "The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR," in *Telos* 21 (Fall 1974), pp. 2-86. Carlo believes that Kuron and Modezelewsky also hold this view, which, however, seems doubtful.

15. See "Theories of State Capitalism," which appeared under the authorship of "Calvin" in *Revolutionary Perspectives* 1 (Glasgow, 1976), p. 9.

16. Cornelius Castoriadis, "Les rapports de production en Russie," reprinted in *La société burocratique* (Paris, 1973), pp. 205-232. Later Castoriadis interprets the Soviet Union as bureaucratic capitalism. Cf. his "The Social Regime in Russia," *Telos* 38 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 32-47, and Hillel Ticktin, "Toward a Political Economy of the USSR," in *Critique* 1 (Glasgow, 1973). For a positive evaluation of Ticktin see O. Kallscheuer, "Theoretische Aspekte der 'Innenkritik' der sowjetschen Gesellschaften," in *Politikon* 50 (February 1976).

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changes by themselves would improve nothing in the realities produced by the present order and resulting from its exploitation. We must realize how the prevalent social division of labor manifests itself on the level of modern industrialism."[17] Bahro's detailed program for the socialist transformation of "proto-socialism" is therefore one of cultural revolution. Although non-capitalist revolutions cannot lead to socialism, nonetheless "mankind, with the revolutions in Russia and China, with the revolutionary process in Latin America, in Africa and India, is taking the shortest road to socialism."[18] This means that socialist revolutions in advanced capitalism alone cannot lead to a socialist society and that anti-capitalist revolutions can lead only to proto-socialism.

Calling attention to the colonialist attitudes and cultural Eurocentrism of German Social Democracy since Engels, Bahro tries to show that the workers' revolution in the West after World War I could not have led to socialist world society. Since it would have to be shown why, even in a revolutionary situation, the proletariat cannot overcome this Social Democratic bias, Bahro presupposes the Leninist view that by itself the proletariat can develop only trade-unionist consciousness. He goes even further in claiming that the proletariat's political perspective is in principle particular and servile, and he speaks of the "obvious fact that the proletariat cannot be the ruling class."[19]

If proletarian revolutions in the West cannot relieve the countries kept underdeveloped by imperialism from having to undertake an independent economic development, the revolution there cannot lead to socialism. Bahro rejects critiques of the Leninist policy during the Russian revolution as follows: "Nonetheless, it can simply not be explained from Marx how a pre-capitalist country can be industrialized without wage-labor *and* without extra-economic forced labor. The abolition of capitalist private property there means a decision for terrorism (or for an unending developmental torture, if no stable dictatorship comes about), and the real problem consists in its productive function."[20] In short: "The sum of individually-felt unhappiness increases when the course of history is accelerated."[21] Bahro tries to explain the difference between the Russian and Chinese revolutions accordingly: "China, for example, has the good fortune that its population, even in its earlier Asiatic mode of production, was forced to use a labor-intensive agriculture, which on the other hand excluded serfdom."[22]

17. Bahro, *op.cit.*, p. 179.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 70f., 223, 172, 174, 231. Bahro sees European society as a whole as particularistic: "For the Eurpoean exporting of civilization is in its essence colonialist, even when carried on by a labor government." *Ibid.*, p. 71.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 31f.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 32. In the Russian revolution, the problem of national disunity compounds that of labor discipline: "Under these circumstances a factory-council system functioning from below in the heavy industry concentrated in a few localities would inevitably amount to a particular cooperative association against the majority of the nation". *Ibid.*, p. 111. Bahro's critique of council communism goes even deeper: "It can at any rate not be an accident that the

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Within these premises, Bahro's non-doctrinaire critique and materialist understanding of the structure of Soviet-type societies becomes a defense of the history of workers' organizations — especially of the Bolshevik party. He even holds that to refrain from appointing plant managers from above would have meant the end of Soviet power.[24] In summary, Bahro argues that: "the apparatus originally did not take away any positively perceived rights and activities from the working masses. It can only be reproached for reproducing the old disenfranchisement."[25]

This typically Leninist account, however, will not withstand historical examination. Contrary to the Bolshevik critique of a narrow, enterprise-centered "syndicalism", which was merely an expression of the Bolshevik claim to a monopoly of power,[26] the factory committees were the ones who in 1917 prevented the country from economic collapse, and who undertook the central planning of the economy; but were soon forced to buckle under the unions, and, hence, to the Party and the government apparatus.[27] The grass-roots democracy movement had such strong mass support that at the beginning of 1918 it almost led to a split in the Bolshevik party. The Bolshevik commissar-economy demoralized collectivist initiatives and in turn led from one economic catastrophe to the other.[28] Piece-work, Taylorism, and

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principle of workers' councils has never yet led to the desired results. Precisely in really existing socialism is it proved with all clarity that the industrial proletariat as such does not have the predicted perspectives. What Marx compressed into the concept of a world-historical mission of the proletariat dissolves into the *history* of non- or post-capitalist industrial societies." *Ibid.*, p. 224.

23. Bahro defends the establishment of the Bolshevik party dictatorship over the councils as follows: "Since the working class can absolutely not be homogeneous and since it cannot rule like a 'sack of potatoes,' the necessity of such an organization of its political life as ruling class [namely, the Party] is understandable. Moreover, the old German Social Democracy did not organize its influence any different. The Leninist conception does not have the least lacuna, as long as one affirms the rule of the working class under the given conditions as at all a reality." *Ibid.*, p. 126.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

26. Cf. Uwe Brügmann, *Die russischen Gewerkschaften in Revolution und Bürgerkrieg, 1917-1919* (Neustadt, 1973), pp. 44ff., 170ff. In 1921, the party-internal "worker opposition" was silenced with the label "syndicalism"--sharpened to "anarchosyndicalism". The concept of anarchosyndicalism is still being misused today against leftist Communism. Thus Olle, in reference to the leftist Communist theory of state capitalism, speaks only of the "anarchosyndicalist variant" of the theory of state capitalism. Cf. Olle, "Zur Problematik der mao-strukturalistischen Theorie des Staatskapitalismus", in Schulze, *Uebergangsgesellschaft*, etc., p. 18. How senseless this use of terms is can be seen from the fact that N. Osinsky, the spokesman for the Bolshevik left, who criticized the concept of the majority as "state-capitalist", rejected the reproach of syndicalism against the policy of plant committees and at the same time opposed a "syndicalist" structure of the economic council system. Cf. *Arbeiterdemokratie oder Parteidiktatur*, eds. Fritz Kool and Erwin Oberländer (Munich, 1972), Vol. 1, p. 115.

27. Falk Döring, *Organisationsprobleme der russischen Wirtschaft in Revolution und Bürgerkrieg, 1918-20* (Hannover, 1970), pp. 70, 57, 71. Cf. also Brügmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 88ff and 195. The question whether a democratic economic planning based on the factory committees would have been implementable if the Bolsheviks had supported it can hardly be decided after the fact — at least not by pointing to economic difficulties and a few negative experiences. Döring, *op.cit.*, p. 111. Although Döring and Brügmann do not directly attack the syndicalism-reproach against the factory committee, they do supply quite a bit of material to undermine it.

28. Cf. Volin, *Die Unbekannte Revolution*, Vol. 2 (Hamburg, 1976), and Frederick Pollock, *Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion.*

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one-man leadership in the factory, which had already been decided by the Bolsheviks or by the unions in the spring of 1918, could be implemented only after long struggles. In the political realm it is simply false that the Bolshevik party "took away no positively perceived rights and activities from the working masses." [29]

Bahro seems aware of the fact that his Leninist explanations for Bolshevik policy after the October revolution are inadequate. Otherwise, his appeal to Marx's beginnings of a theory of the "Asiatic mode of production" — rather incongruous in the Leninist framework — is hardly understandable. [30] The Asiatic mode of production can be schematically categorized as a combination of residual forms of peasant common ownership with a despotic state economically and politically strong enough to restrain the tendencies for the development of social classes based on private property. The Asiatic agrarian-despotic past, as Bahro explains, burdens revolutionary society with a strong tendency to develop an industrial despotism based on a rigid separation of mental and physical work.

Bahro's recourse to the theory of the Asiatic mode of production has two weaknesses. First, the authoritarian and despotic Asiatic heritage seems to explain only at what pace and in what forms the development of the Soviet Union into a class-society took place *after* the workers' and peasants' movement was defeated, i.e., by 1921 at the latest; since the movement far excelled the non-Asiatic, Western countries in revolutionary spontaneity. Stalin looked much like a "new Czar" — as the Chinese today call Brezhnev, who would far prefer to be a Western hero. Secondly, like Dutschke,[31] Bahro does not refer to the other feature of the Asiatic mode of production, the residual forms of peasant common ownership and collective life in the village communities, which Marx saw as the "fulcrum for the social rebirth of Russia." [32] The Bolsheviks, however, made no attempt to revive the European village community in the revolutionary peasant movement,[33] and they persecuted the radical Peasants' Party of the left social revolutionaries to

29. See Volin, *op.cit.*, and Richard Lorenz, *Sozialgeschichte der Sowjetunion*, I (Frankfurt, 1979), p. 251; and Walter Pietsch, *Revolution und Staat* (Cologne, 1969).

30. Bahro, *op.cit.*, chap. I, pp. 2, 3. On the Marxist discussion of the Asiatic mode of production, cf. Gianni Soffri.

31. Rudi Dutschke, *Versuch, Lenin auf die Füsse zu stellen* (Berlin, 1974).

32. Cf. Marx's letter to V.I. Sassulitsch, March 8, 1881, and the drafts of it (*Werke*, Vol. 19). Fritz Kramer was the first in West Germany to use these texts to renew the left-radical critique of the policies of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution in the context of the historical experience of the Chinese revolution. Cf. Fritz Kramer, "Ueber den Sozialismus in Russland und China und die marxsche Theorie der Geschichte," in *Rotes Forum. Organ des Heidelberger SDS* (1970), No. 3; in addition, see his "Kollektiv-wirtschaftliche Ursprünge des Sozialismus in China und Russland", in *Gesellschaftsstrukturen*, ed. Meschkat and Negt (Frankfurt, 1973). In contrast, recourse to Marx's theories of Asiatic societies, in Dutschke, reduces the critique of Bolshevism to an ideology critique of Lenin's writings, and by siding with the VKPD against the leftist radicals and praising the policy of the "unified front" with the SPD it aims at a merging of the spontaneous movement and reformism. Dutschke, pp. 19, 220, 221, 283ff., 301 note 10a.

33. Lorenz, *op.cit.*, pp. 82, 132; D.J. Male, *Russian Peasant Organization before Collectivization. A Study of Commune and Gathering (1925-30)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

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extinction. Their policy, therefore, can be explained neither by the immaturity of the proletariat nor by objective economic constraints, nor by the Asiatic heritage, especially in rural life, but only by the state capitalist horizon of the Social Democratic world movement, whose radical wing the Bolsheviks were.

Bahro notes this himself in regard to organization-theory and above all to the understanding of socialism: "The Soviet state monopoly in the economy represents in many respects the direct counterpart to the state-monopoly tendencies of Western Europe as extrapolated at the time by the masterminds of the Second International, and in particular the trend of the German military economy."[34] This, however, is no reason to criticize Social Democracy and Bolshevism. Rather, the Bolshevik policies – along with the customarily cited conditions of inadequate and irrational development of production, foreign dangers, etc. – seem to Bahro to be determined by Russia's semi-Asiatic past and the general state of development of the socialist labor movement in Europe: "Even with the differentiation of the 'workers' aristocracy', i.e., when a great part of hand labor required distinctive skills on the basis of capitalist industrialization and with the growth of the middle-management stratum based on the differentiation of leadership functions, the labor movement had become reformist. Its division into divergent parties instead of wings is understandable only within the context of the victorious Russian revolution, i.e., it was from the beginning no purely internal phenomenon of highly industrialized countries."[35] This is a questionable claim, if one considers that the split in Social Democracy, apart from the "youth" movement, had been developing since the beginning of the century and that a social revolution was developing at the latest since the November revolution independently of party questions.

Bahro sees the connection between Social Democratic state-capitalism and Leninist theory; thus he explicitly deals with Lenin's writings on this subject from 1917 on. To Lenin's definition that: "Socialism is nothing but a state capitalist monopoly for the benefit of the entire nation and therefore is no longer a capitalist monopoly,"[36] Bahro remarks: "Those are the foundations on which our system is based. We need not delay here with the accent on state capitalism. Lenin also applied the category in a more special sense to genuine capitalist elements which are linked differently as concessionaires to the political state. As distinguished from socialism in general, "state capitalism' here means nothing but state disposal over all funds and products which the revolution has stripped of their real character of capital."[37]

But several of Bahro's statements concerning the economy of Soviet-type

34. Bahro, *op.cit.*, p. 157.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
36. Lenin, *Werke*, Vol. 25, p. 379, note 1.
37. Bahro, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

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societies contradict this distinction.[38] That Bahro does not develop a theory of state capitalism is probably due to the fact that he believes Soviet-type societies to be closer to socialism than Western capitalism, and he does not think much of the revolutionary potential of workers in "proto-socialism": "None of the earlier and none of the most recent social collisions leads to any conclusion which even approximately could be interpreted as the development of an authentic power of workers!"[39] This is difficult to understand in view of the council-movement in the Soviet Union in 1917-1921, Hungary in 1956, and the most recent beginnings in Poland (unless Bahro lacks elementary information) — although there are indications that such beginnings will be able to develop fully only within a more general revolutionary cultural movement whose character Bahro has described in detail.

Bahro's theory of history makes it possible to understand his concept of "proto-socialism" more precisely. This concept does not mean that "really existing socialism" is a preliminary form of socialism, but that Western capitalism was and is much further removed from socialism than Marxism had assumed. The experience of Eastern Europe is one condition why the socialist movement in the West cannot go beyond its state-capitalist and cultural-imperialistic horizon. One conclusion to be drawn from this would be to characterize Soviet-type societies as state-capitalism, since their real development may enlighten Western socialism concerning its own unrecognized premisses. Bahro avoids this conclusion by emphasizing the decisive significance of the Asiatic heritage. This thesis, however, removes "proto-socialism" still further from socialism than the organized Western labor movement which is to a great extent state-capitalistically stultified. Since Marx's concept of capital essentially implies the latent power of the proletariat, it is thus quite logical for Bahro not to seriously consider the theory of state-capitalism for Soviet-type societies.

The thesis concerning the capitalist character of Soviet-type societies is today almost exclusively known in the theoretically ambiguous Chinese Communist Party's version. The Chinese speak first of the "restoration" of the capitalist market economy through the 1955 economic reforms, then of a new "state bourgeoisie", i.e., the bourgeoisie of a state capitalism. Despite all tendencies toward decentralizing economic decisions, self-financing and profit-enterprise orientation, one cannot speak of a restoration of the market economy in Soviet-type societies as long as the most important prices are determined primarily by the state.

38. Thus, he claims, "Fundamental is, first, the 'greatest possible self-exploitation of capital,' i.e., of the funds entering into our state capital, especially physical funds, i.e., buildings and equipment." *Ibid.*, p. 196. "The wage is nothing but the price of the commodity 'labor-power' paid by the state as appropriator", *Ibid.*, p. 242. "The Party- and state-bureaucracy acts analogously to capital insofar as it is guided by the effort to appropriate abstract labor, more work-time and value in order to use its concentrated weight as means of domination." *Ibid.*, p. 493.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

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The Chinese Communist Party cannot show how, with Stalin's death or Krushchev's assumption of power, a fundamental change has supposedly begun in the Soviet Union. Interesting, Lin Piao, who has long since been removed from office, stated at the time of the offensive of the cultural revolution in China that the origin of the capitalist restoration in the USSR must be sought in the lack of an experience comparable to the cultural revolution — above all in the lack of a broad-based Soviet democracy.[40]

More systematic efforts to develop a theory of state-capitalism were those of Bordiga within the Italian Communist Party, and Tony Cliff, the theoretician of the "International Socialists."[41] But, as with theories of 'bureaucratic collectivism,' these views hold firm to the proletarian nature of the Leninist phase of the Russian revolution, and even see Stalinist state capitalism as a progressive system compared with Western capitalism. They even deny the imperialist nature of Soviet foreign policy in general, i.e., for the Eastern European satellite countries, or at least for countries not ruled by Leninist parties such as Egypt, India, and Iran.

Critiques of the Soviet Union as a state capitalist society, however, serve other purposes than merely to provide the critique of Stalinism with a theoretical foundation. It developed immediately after the October revolution by the Bolshevik opposition, the "leftist Communists" around Bukharin and Osinsky, with the critique of Lenin's state-capitalist conception and corresponding policies. Thus, Osinsky writes against Lenin: "Either socialism and the socialist organization are built up by the proletariat itself, or they are not built up at all, but something else is established, i.e., state capitalism." This critique was later developed further by Western Left Communists in the context of a critique of Leninism. To explain it, it is necessary to go back to Lenin himself.

Shortly before the October revolution, Lenin had already outlined his idea of socialism as follows: "Socialism is nothing but a state-capitalist monopoly for the benefit of the whole nation and therefore no longer capitalist monopoly." The difference from capitalism, then, consists in that "transformation of all citizens into workers and employees of a large syndicate, namely the entire state, and the complete subordination of all the work of this syndicate under a

40. This summary of Lin Piao's speech before an assembly of the Red Guard on Nov. 3, 1966 (printed in *Peking Review*, No. 46, 1966), was taken from Carlo's article, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-18.

41. I know the works of these authors only from secondary literature. Cf. Amadeo Bordiga, "Dialogue avec Staline," in *Programme Communiste* No. 8 (Marseille, 1959); "L'économie soviétique et la révolution à nos jours," *Programme Communiste* Nos. 40-42; Raya Dunayevskaya, *Marxism and Freedom* (London, 1971); Tony Cliff, *Staatskapitalismus in Russland* (Frankfurt, 1975). Rita di Leo's *Die Arbeiter und das sowjetische System* (Munich, 1973) is wrongly considered to be an exposition of the leftist radical critique of state capitalism, for her point of departure is that the Soviet Union at the time of the NEP stood under the leadership of the working class. According to Carlo, *op.cit.*, she stands closer to Bordiga. Victor Serge mentions that even Zinoviev spoke of "state capitalism" in the USSR under Stalin; and Wollenberg reports that the state-capitalist nature of the Soviet Union was a "self-evident Marxist matter" for Bukharin, Rykov, Pjatakov and Krupskaya (foreward by E. Wollenberg to Victor Serge, *Erinnerungen eines Revolutionärs* [Vienna, 1974], p. ix).

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truly democratic state."[42] After the October revolution, Lenin asked: "As long as in Germany the revolution is delayed, it is our task to learn from state capitalism, to take it over with all our strength, to fear no dictatorial methods to accelerate this takeover in the same way that Peter the Great accelerated the adoption of Western culture by barbaric Russia without hesitating to use barbaric weapons in the struggle abainst barbarism."[43] Yet, Lenin apparently considered the Soviets' political domination to be compatible with the economic organization of the German military economy and of the postal system of the German *Reich*. Thus, under the slogan of "workers' control", Lenin opposed the socialization of industry and decreed their nationalization only after the factory committees had taken over the factories on their own.[44] Even then, he still held to the contradictory idea of a state capitalism under the leadership of a proletarian state. State capitalism then assumed new forms (reprivatization, concessions, etc.) during the NEP period.

The Leninist concept of state capitalism should not be restricted to a directed private capitalism such as prevailed in the first months after the October revolution and during the NEP period. But this is the usual argument of opponents of the theory of state capitalism: "As Trotsky already explained, the concept of state capitalism developed by Lenin presupposes a bourgeoisie in whose name the state organizes capitalist production in the limits pre-given by anarchic competition."[45] The decisive feature of state capitalism, however, is the restoration of capitalist working conditions, including the corresponding forms of reward, for the purpose of a maximal accumulation independently and at the expense of the needs of the working population. In this respect, the introduction of piece-work had already been decided by the unions in April 1918 (!). At the 14th Party Congress of the Bolsheviks in December, 1925, a speaker of the inner-party opposition described industrial working conditions as state capitalist, not socialist, and cited as an example, among other things, the preponderance of piecework. The introduction of Taylorism drastically increased work intensity.[46] One-man management was introduced against workers' resistance and strikes were repressed. All these tendencies became fully implemented under Stalinism. Wage-differentials were even greater than under western capitalism and the Stakhanov system produced a real labor aristocracy.[47] The primacy of accumulation was shown in the long-lasting stagnation of wages and in the imbalance between production goods and consumer goods that is still growing today.[48]

The description of the Soviet Union as "state capitalist" since 1918 or at the

42. Lenin, *Werke, op.cit.*, vol. 25, p. 484. Elsewhere, Lenin writes: "All society becomes an office and a factory with equal work and equal pay." *Ibid.*, p. 488.
43. Lenin, *Werke*, vol. 27, p. 333.
44. Lorenz, *op.cit.*, pp. 84ff.
45. Carlo, *op.cit.*
46. Rainer Traub, "Lenin and Taylor", *Telos* 37 (Fall 1978), pp. 82-92.
47. Lorenz, *op.cit.*, p. 243.
48. Cf. Carlo, *op.cit.*, pp. 32ff.

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latest since 1921 is shared both by Lenin as a spokesman of the Bolshevik majority and the Left opposition. "State capitalism" here refers not only, as in the Social Democratic tradition, to strengthened governmental regulations and organization of private capitalism, but to an economic concept for a politically victorious workers' party, which in contrast with capitalism in its partial statist development could be called "integral state capitalism". The concept of "state capitalism" also applies to the basic decision of the post-revolutionary economic policy: the primacy of accumulation and implementation of capitalist working conditions and wage-relations.

The advantages of the concept of state capitalism are not diminished by its weaknesses. Yet, it is not specific enough to define societies like the Soviet Union, because it does not take into consideration the way the socio-economic structure is affected by the revolutionary movement and the partially pre-capitalist past. Only in this context can Soviet-type state capitalism be distinguished from the state capitalism that develops in underdeveloped countries as a result of peasants' revolutions or military movements, and as a result of fascist regimes in economically highly developed capitalist countries.

Marxists often reject the description of planned economies as "state capitalist" on the grounds that Marx based his theory of capitalism on the analysis of the commodity. Thus, it is argued that one can speak of capitalism only in a market economy, i.e., an economy with a division of labor and independently producing economic units that relate to one another through competition in the marketplace.[49] Rühle, the first Marxist to criticize the Bolsheviks as fundamentally bourgeois, predicted the "end of the Bolshevik party dictatorship" and the coming of a "genuine and real capitalism."[50] Of course, Marx occasionally says that market competition is a necessary condition for "capital." But Marx's and Engels' discussions of the abolition of "private production" or of "capital as private property" in stock companies, trusts, and cooperative factories, are not entirely applicable,[52] since these forms of organization, as well as partial nationalization, government contracts, etc., do not abolish the market economy. If market competition were to be part of the definition of capitalism, it is unlikely that Marx was really all that concerned with distinguishing the "inner nature" of capitalism from these phenomena.[53] As for the systematic description of capital, a dialectical "development" can be interpreted so radically that in the course of development the categories with which the description begins are not just

49. *Ibid.*

50. Otto Rühle, *Von der bürgerlichen zur proletarischen Revolution* (Berlin, 1970), pp. 15, 21; cf. Fr. G. Hermann, "Otto Rühle als politischer Theoretiker," in *Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, No. 17 (December 1972).

51. Cf. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 317, 542ff.

52. Cf. Engels, *Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfs* (MEW, Vol. 22, p. 231); Marx, *Kapital*, Vol. III, p. 452. But M.P. Buddeberg, "Wer herrscht in den 'nachkapitalistischen' Gesellschaften? — Eine Kritik an Renate Damus," in *Probleme des Klassenkampfs*, Vol. 22, p. 139.

53. Karl Marx, *Kapital*, I, p. 335.

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critically relativized, specific, and completed, but abolished. Actually, the famous definition in *Capital* of capital as a disjointed movement of the self-exploitation of value for which commodities and money are mere forms, is only the first step toward a full definition of capital. Disjointedness and self-exploitation are more central to this preliminary definition than commodity and money and are followed by the definitions of the "domination of reified labor over living labor"[54] — which implies not mere exploitation, but the "specifically capitalist mode of production" with "real subsumption" — and accumulation.[55] Accordingly, what is decisive for capitalism is not that the products of labor take the form of commodities, but the structural pressure for accumulation, which is realized through the exploitation of the commodity "labor power." Whether this compulsion for accumulation is the result of market competition or otherwise is secondary.[56]

Labor relations in the Soviet Union took an increasingly stronger capitalist character immediately after the revolution. Although the specific laws of the capitalist labor market do not apply to Soviet-type societies,[57] the bringing together of the means of production and workers by purchasing the commodity "labor power" is similarly mediated. While Rizzi claimed that Stalinism involved a sort of slave-society, absenteeism and changes of workplace corresponded to those in comparable industrial states.[58] Finally, after over fifty years of planned economy, accumulation in the Soviet Union can hardly be understood as the expression of a policy that can be modified within the system. Despite all promises to the contrary, wages have remained low and the consumer goods sector has remained hopelessly underdeveloped compared with the industrial sector. Even the members of the Polish opposition, Kuron and Medzelewski, in the 1950s based their analysis on an independent, self-motivated accumulation.[59]

The high rate of accumulation cannot be adequately explained by competition on the world market.[60] That the particularly pronounced dependence on the world market which the Soviet Union had inherited from Czarism was not overcome but increased,[61] resulted from a policy of

54. *Ibid.*, p. 328; cf. Marx, *Lohnarbeit und Kapital.*

55. Marx, *Kapital*, I, p. 533; *Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses*, pp. 60ff.

56. Of course it is by no means historically contingent that capitalism developed in the milieu of commodity production, but it is certainly questionable whether its genesis can be explained just by the dynamics of market competition.

57. E.g., an increase in wages does not always follow from full employment during economic expansion in the Soviet Union. Cf. Carlo, *op.cit.*, pp. 24ff.

58. Alec Nove, *Economic History of the USSR* (London), p. 197.

59. Kuron and Medzelewski start with the production goal of "production for production's sake": *Oeffener Brief an die polnische vereinigte Arbeiterpartei* (Hoffman und Champe, 1969), pp. 29ff., without, however, explaining this. They do not use the term "state capitalism", but they use it implicitly: "The monopolistic bureaucracy consequently strives to increase its capital, to expand the production apparatus, to increase accumulation. It is the custodian of collective capital and tends to increase it; exactly in the same way the individual capitalist is the custodian of private capital" (p. 30).

60. But even Mattick claims this. Cf. his *Marx and Keynes* (Boston, 1969), p. 290.

61. Contrary to the usual propaganda, even the industrialization of the first 5-year plan was based on Western technology. Cf. Spohn, "Die technologische Abhängigkeit der SU vom Weltmarkt", in *Probleme des Klassenkampfes*, Nos. 19-21.

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development more interested in disciplining the labor force than in world revolution. From the very beginning, the bureaucracy's need to construct an efficient power apparatus to legitimate its rule through an impressive rise of industrial productivity, and to compensate for a low labor productivity — which is primarily the expression of a lack of convergence of interests in state capitalism — led to the decision to coerce accumulation.[62] More recently, however, the mere dependence on the world market may be sufficient to explain this coercion.

Totalitarianism

When applied to non-fascist systems, "totalitarianism" has been used to establish close connections between non-fascist and fascist systems. The characterization of Soviet-type societies as "totalitarian state capitalist" in the following pages is meant to express not only common structures, but also a common underlying historical context.[63] The Council Communists, of course, were the first to connect Stalinism and Fascism. They were interested not only in typological correspondences between post-revolutionary Bolshevism and fascism, but in the counter-revolutionary historical function of Bolshevism and in the transformation of capitalism as a whole promoted by fascism and Stalinism.

Otto Rühle described the Bolsheviks' work against the revolutionary German council-movement since 1919 as follows: "Everywhere Bolshevik functionaries or party-members appeared as spies, informers, tale-bearers, witnesses, accomplices, and gangster-types which one must have experienced

62. A few council communists (e.g., in *Revolutionary Perspectives*) and Bordiga also assume the validity of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall for the Soviet planned economy.

63. This is not just a reflection of cold war hysteria or of Chinese propaganda. Consider the following letter of an old Soviet Citizen to the famous opposition writer Pavel Litvinov: "I really believe that your famous grandfather would have found no fault in you, a grandson worthy of him. I am speaking to you as a Communist, as a person to whom the fate of our ideals is not indifferent. I remember the speech your grandfather gave in the League of Nations. In his declarations, he castigated the Fascist brown shirts. But fascists can dress in every color and wear any kind of clothing. You declare war on a new fascism, one that has, like a chameleon, put on our glorious red. Even under the Czarist regime, authors were not put on trial. This happens only where fascism flourishes. We, as simple people, have long been asking ourselves the question: 'How did we allow the Soviet power to slip from our hands? Into whose hands has it fallen?' " Quoted from the "Open Letter" of P. Grigorenko to the participants in the Conference of the Communist Parties in Budapest, 1968: in Mandel, Medvedev, Grigorenko, "Revolutionäre oder bürgerliche Kritik an der SU," *Rote Hefte* 3 (of the GIM), pp. 39ff. Similarly, the rebellious Polish dockworkers (1970-71) answered the shots of police with shouts of "Gestapo, Gestapo!" When the Soviet opposition group "The Sower" writes, "The cruelty of the Stalinist regime justifies its being called fascist", it would have to show, first, to what extent Stalinist terrorism differs qualitatively from, e.g., South American gorilla dictatorships, and secondly, how far congruencies between fascism and Soviet societies justify an equation of them. Cf. Borys Lewytzkyj, *Die linke Opposition in der Sowjetunion* (Hamburg, 1974), p. 141. Information on the opposition in East European states is readily available in the report of Amnesty International: *Politische Gefangene in der UdSSR* (1975). In addition, Lewytzkyj, *Politische Opposition in der Sowjetunion 1960-1972, Analysen und Dokumente* (Munich, 1972); Jiri Pelikan, *Sozialistische Opposition in der CSSR* (Cologne, 1973). Material on repression in the Warsaw Pact countries is constantly appearing in the publications of the Socialist East-Europe Committee, Hamburg, and in the "Listy-Blätter", the periodical of the Czechoslovak socialist opposition.

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to understand from what arsenals fascism later could so rapidly recruit its bands of ruffians.[64] According to Rühle, the policies of the German Communist Party and of the Comintern since 1919 promoted the rise of the Nazis, just as the counterrevolutionary development of Russian Bolshevism after the October revolution promoted the development of the Nazi system: "German fascism would not have developed so swiftly, smoothly and successfully into a totalitarian, dictatorial and terrorist-bureaucratic one-party system nor been able to build up its state into a power-apparatus of such unity, precision and irresistability, had it not found and used Russian Bolshevism as a model."[65]

As for the Soviet Union itself, Paul Mattick comments on Trotsky's "view that Bolshevism in Russia in 1917 had prevented the rise of fascism", that "it should long since have become clear that all that Lenin and Trotsky prevented in Russia was the use of a non-Marxist ideology for the fascist reconstruction of Russia."[66] Mattick's view that in the Russian revolution the Bolsheviks had done as much as was historically possible, does not detract from the fact: "That Lenin's role was less terroristic than Stalin's is questionable. Like Stalin, Lenin too classified all his victims as 'counter-revolutionaries'; a ...Bolshevik 'tolerance' toward such non-Bolshevik organizations as the Social Revolutionaries in the first phase of Lenin's rule stemmed not — as Trotsky claims — from Lenin's democratic inclinations, but from the impossibility of destroying all non-Bolshevik organizations at once. The totalitarian features of Lenin's Bolshevism increased to the extent that his control and political power grew." Similarly: "All beginnings are naturally small, and Lenin's and Trotsky's Bolshevism differ from present-day Stalinism just like Hitler's brown terrorism of 1933 differed from the National Socialism of WWII."[67] Mattick rightly points out that the Leninist conception of a state capitalist party rule was not just a variant of the Social Democratic understanding of socialism.[68] But he then argues that to consider Bolshevism as a form of "fascism" is historically untenable. German Social Democracy was certainly not crypto-fascist and from April to October 1917, the Bolsheviks were a logical expression and driving force of the Russian revolutionary movement. Although afterwards they did restrain this

64. Otto Rühle, "Brauner und roter Faschismus," in *Schriften, Perspektiven einer Revolution in hochindustrialisierten Ländern* (Reinbek, 1971), p. 41.

65. *Ibid.*, "Weltkrieg-Weltfaschismus-Weltrevolution," p. 84.

66. Paul Mattick, "Bolschewismus und Stalinismus," introduction to Willy Huhn, *Trotski — Der gescheiterte Stalin* (Berlin, 1973), p. 21. Incidentally, Mattick weakens his thesis in the cited passage by incorporating it into a global perspective: "In all aspects the three systems (Bolshevism, fascism, and capitalism) are identical and represent just different stages of the same development." Mattick is here adopting the same standpoint as the anarchist Volin: "The Communist 'statist' regime is only a variant of the fascist system." Cf. Volin: *Die unbekannte Revolution*, vol. 2, p. 48. Volin also speaks of the "totalitarian state" of Bolshevism, *ibid.*, pp. 92,

67. Mattick, *op.cit.*, pp. 14, 16f, and 9.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 19. For Mattick's concept of "totalitarian society," see his *Marx und Keynes, op.cit.*, p. 308.

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movement and even fought it with terroristic means,[69] artillery and shock troops, they still somehow continued to represent it until they themselves were finally exterminated by Stalin.

Despite their partisanship for the October revolution, Rühle and Mattick ultimately saw Bolshevism as "nothing more than one aspect of the world-wide trend toward a fascist world economy" on a state capitalist basis which merely developed to its purest form with Stalinism.[70] Although Korsch saw a difference in principles between Bolshevism and fascism in that the fascist transformation entails no "economic revolution or radical dissolution of the old relations of production or the freeing of new productive forces,"[71] and does not go so far as to predict a fascist world economy, he did share the Council Communists' decisive insight that the function of Bolshevism had become counterrevolutionary in the totalitarian reconstruction of the post-revolutionary capitalist world system.

According to Langerhans: "The function of Stalinism, like the function of fascism at the time, was to beat up workers. So, for example, the terrorist aspect of fascism, which at first troubled so many Marxists, did not surprise the ones who had already experienced all these methods during their resistance to Stalinization, such as for example the Korsch group."[72] Korsch himself wrote: "In an historical process which...may be described as a gradual degeneration, the Russian state in its basic functioning increasingly gave up its former revolutionary and proletarian features. Through the consistence and comprehensiveness of its anti-democratic and totalitarian development it often anticipated the so-called fascist traits of the openly counterrevolutionary European and Asian states.[73]

69. Cf. especially the material in Volin, *op.cit.* Mattick's opinion that mass spontaneity did not go beyond the Bolshevik goal (p. 14) is just as one-sided as Rühle's opposite view: "For the failure of the Russian revolution is not conditioned by Russia, by the failure of the world revolution, by the sins of the bureaucracy, by Stalin. It is conditioned absolutely only by the Bolshevik system" (p. 25).

70. Mattick, *op.cit.*, p. 21. Rühle expects "a delayed federative-collectivism on a state-capitalist basis, i.e., a fascistization of the entire capitalist world" (pp. 70ff.). "They too [the democracies] are left with state capitalism as the only possibility for further development. And this can remain in power only with the methods of fascism," *ibid.* Korsch also spoke of the "victory of fascist state capitalism". Cf. "Staat und Konterrevolution" (1939) in Karl Korsch, *Politische Texte* (Berlin, 1974), p. 331. Rühle says in one passage that fascism is just a "preliminary form of state capitalism" which is already fully realized in the Soviet Union, p. 246.

71. Korsch, "Theses toward a Critique of the Fascist Conception of the State" (1932), in *Karl Korsch, Revolutionary Theory*, ed. Douglas Kellner (Austin, Tex., 1977), p. 237.

72. "Revolution und Konterrevolution. Eine Diskussion zwischen Buckmiller, Kammler und Langerhans" in *Jahrbuch der Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt, 1973), p. 282.

73. Korsch, "State and Counterrevolution," *op.cit.*, p. 242. Cf. also "Marxism and the Present Task of the Proletarian Class Struggle, *op.cit.*, p. 193. Marxism "serves at this very moment as an ideological screen for the debunking of the hitherto predominant role of the ruling party itself and for the further enhancement of the quasi-fascist personal leadership of Stalin and of his all-adaptable agencies. At the same time, on the international scene, the so-called anti-fascist policy of the 'Marxist' Comintern has come to play in the present struggles between the various alliances of capitalist powers exactly the same role as its opposite, the 'anti-communist' and 'anti-Marxist' international policy of the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese warlords. According to Korsch, "It ceases to be inconceivable that the Russian state in its present structure should act as a powerful lever in the fascistization of Europe." Cf. Korsch, "State and

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Of course, unorthodox Marxist theoreticians in the Leninist tradition reject the lumping together of Bolshevism, Stalinism, and fascism. But this has not prevented oppositional Marxists from Trotsky, Kuron and Medzelewski to Dubcek and the theoreticians of the Italian Communist Party from calling Stalinism "totalitarian,"[74] and discovering serious similarities between fascism and Stalinism. The evidence is overwhelming: personal dictatorship and the corresponding "personality cult";[75] the manipulated mass demonstrations; terrorism;[76] the ideological corruption of the arts and sciences;[77] the Stalin-Hitler pact, etc. Leftists often either explain these facts metaphysically as secondary matters or "deformations", or interpret them away teleologically as "strategy and tactics."[78] But the Stalin-Hitler

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Counterrevolution," *op.cit.*, p. 242. Korsch uses programmatically the concept of totalitarianism to designate the world-historical function of post-revolutionary Bolshevism: "Bourgeois rule had not proven to be 'obsolete'; it had gained a new lease on life — a mighty rejuvenation — by the transition from 19th-century capitalism to 20th-century totalitarianism. This process of transition was and is going on in many different forms in the most developed countries of America and Europe as well as in the (for the West) 'new' countries of Asia. The most original and far-reaching results were not achieved by the counter-revolutionary actions of Mussolini and Hitler and their smaller allies. They were initiated by Lenin's, Stalin's, and to that extent also Trotsky's Revolution in Russia and were continued much less ambiguously by that second phase of totalitarian revolution in Eurasia which is characterized by the three 5-year plans 1929-1941 and by World War II (1941-1945)." Cf. Korsch, "Restauration oder Totalisierung" (1946), in *Politische Texte, op.cit.*, pp. 369ff. Korsch's description shows that the leftist radical paralleling of fascism and Stalinism from a Marxist perspective points beyond the actual theory of fascism or Stalinism to a theory of the capitalism of our era. Korsch uses "totalitarianism" precisely for this reason. The concept of totalitarianism of the anarchist, Victor Serge, who joined the Bolshevik left, has to do, on the contrary, only with the phenomenology of the Stalinist despotism. Cf. Serge, *Erinnerungen eines Revolutionärs, op.cit.*, pp. 452, 494, 528; and his *Für eine Erneuerung des Sozialismus, Unbekannte Aufsätze* (Hamburg, 1975), pp. 21, 45ff., 54ff.

74. In 1936, Trotsky spoke of the "present totalitarian regime" in the Soviet Union, in *The Revolution Betrayed, op.cit.*, p. 269; Kuron and Medzelewski speak of "the Stalinist system of totalitarian police-dictatorship" in "Open Letter," *op.cit.*, p. 74; the Movement of Czechoslovak Revolutionary Youth — a resistance group formed after the Soviet occupation — claims that: "The system, under which our society lives, is not socialist, but centralist, bureaucratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian" (quoted in Sybille Plogstedt, "Am Beispiel CSSR," in *Kursbuch* 30 [1973], p. 78); on this group see note 125 in Plogstedt.

75. Since the 1930s, Stalin even had himself be addressed as "Leader."

76. Clearly, more people, including Communists, died in Soviet concentration camps than in Nazi ones, both in absolute numbers and in terms of percentage of the population. Roy Medvedev estimates the number of victims killed by the Stalinist repression to be between 25 million and 26 million. Solzhenitsyn numbers them at more than 66 million. Cf. Roy Medvedev, "Was erwartet uns? Ueber den Brief von H.I. Solschenizyn," in *Die Sowjetunion, Solschenizyn, und die westliche Linke*, ed. Rudi Dutschke and M. Wilke (Reinbek, 1975), p. 245. André Glucksmann accepts the number of 50 million. Cf. his *Köchin und Menschenfresser. Ueber die Beziehung zwischen Staat, Marxismus und Konzentrationslager* (Berlin, 1976).

77. In the case of the charlatan Lysenko, it even led to agricultural losses in the billions. On the subject of the Soviet pedagogy, one can read in Trotsky: "Many of the pedagogical aphorisms and regulations of recent times could have been written by Goebbels, if he did not himself, to a considerable degree, copy them from Stalin's collaborators" (*Verratene Revolution*, p. 156).

78. But of course there is such a thing as sheer apologetics. That even independent minds can fall prey to it becomes drastically clear from Bloch's articles on the Moscow trials in 1937; the identification with power makes even the language false, bombastic, pseudo-mythical: "It is the united energy of the Nazi-beast, the Japanese robber-state, Trotskyist hatred; to trivialize the trial against the activities of this three-headed monster, even to mock or to calumniate it, requires

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pact was not a short-term tactic. Rather, the collaboration of Stalinists and Nazis even extended to the persecution of leftist radicals.[79] The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union found it completely surprised and unprepared;[80] and, after the victory over the fascist armies, the Stalinist Communist Parties of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary even formed coalition governments with old heroes of counterrevolutionary terror.[81]

Equally unreal is the statement of one of the polemical booklets (which played an important role in theoretically preparing the radicalization of the intellectual opposition of the 1960's), that there is a "fundamental difference between work camps and extermination camps".[82] The helpless anti-Stalinism, which accompanied the critique of "helpless anti-Fascism" in the Abendroth school,[83] is summed up in the same booklet as follows: "Whereas fascism found a pre-existing highly industrialized economy and only in a later phase, through 'plans', organized it exclusively in order to produce armaments, the goal of Bolshevism was the maximal provisioning of the population after complete industrialization" and the "emancipation of the masses".[84] This is false even for the Leninist phase of the Russian

a recklessness whose equal cannot be found in the history of political emigration." Cf. "Kritik einer Prozesskritik," in Bloch, *Vom Hasard zur Katastrophe. Politische Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1934-39* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 179; on page 180, Bloch calls the prominent victims of the trials "the tangible serpents' heads."

79. Cf. the foreword by Erich Wollenberg, the former leader of the Red Front Soldiers' League, in Serge's *Erinnerungen*, p. i. On Stalin's closest collaborators' liking for Hitler, cf. *ibid.*, p. iv, where Arendt, referring to Deutscher's biography of Stalin, concludes: "That Stalin had complete trust in Hitler can hardly still be doubted." Cf. Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft* (Frankfurt, 1955), p. 548, note 6. According to Arendt, Kravchenko, author of *I Chose Freedom* (New York, 1946), describes how the alliance with Hitler was also taken seriously ideologically, while the democratic and nationalist propaganda during the war never reached as far as the highest strata of functionaries of the party, where all this had just the value of propaganda. Arendt further reports that Hitler, in turn, spoke in his table conversations "with unqualified respect of the genial Stalin", and that Goebbels stressed repeatedly in his war diaries that Mussolini was no "revolutionary like Hitler or Stalin." *Ibid.*, pp. 493ff.

80. R. Lorenz, *Sozialgeschichte der Sowjetunion I (1917-1934)* (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 251ff.

81. Andy Anderson, *Die ungarische Revolution* (Hamburg, 1977), pp. 25ff.

82. B. Blanke, Exkurs: "Rot gleich Braun" in *Das Argument*, 7:2 (Berlin, May, 1965), p. 27. According to Glucksmann (*op.cit.*, p. 29), Merleau-Ponty and Sartre held a similar view in 1950. Of course, no justification in terms of economic rationality can be provided for the Stalinist camp system. Thus, for example, life expectancy in the Kolyma mines was, at most, five weeks. Glucksmann, *op.cit.*, p. 57. Arendt's view that the economic benefit of the camps of the Soviet bloc was reduced, as with the Nazis, essentially to subsistence for their guards and so amounted to zero from an economic viewpoint does not, however, take into account the opening-up of the country under extreme conditions, especially in Siberia.

83. Wolfgang F. Haug, editor of *Das Argument*, in 1967 published a book *Der Hilflose Antifaschismus* (Cologne), which sharply opposed the "red-equals-brown" stereotype.

84. Blanke, *op.cit.*, pp. 29, 30. This position is similar to that of Wolfgang Abendroth in his 1956 essay on "Die Wende des Stalinismus," now reprinted in his *Antagonistische Gesellschaft und politische Demokratie* (Neuwied, 1967), pp. 65ff. "By virtue of their immanent tendencies, a path leads from Kemalism and Bolshevism directly to a broadening of freedom for the broad strata of the people, as soon as the task of the modernization of society has been solved, as the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, despite all the limits of the present stage of development, again shows." Abendroth based this "immanent thesis" not simply, like Blanke, on the ideology of the rulers, but on the interest in freedom, on the part of the rising "broad stata of technological, scientific and administrative intelligentsia." *Ibid.*, p. 64.

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Communist Party, and Stalinism did not aim at all to increase consumption and emancipation of the masses, but to force them to submit to totalitarian methods of state accumulation through work norms, excessive wage differentials, competition and terror.[85]

Bourgeois theory of totalitarianism originated in the 1930's and 1940's in the United States in order to show the identical nature of fascism and Stalinism.[86] Unlike Korsch, for whom "totalitarianism" obviously designated a profound world-historical transformation, most Marxists rejected the concept on the ground that it was purely formal, i.e., it sought to define a system without reference to its specific form of socialization. As it turns out, however, Arendt's theory of fascism is immensely more specific than the Marxist slogans about monopoly, imperialism, and the petty bourgeoisie.

By "totalitarianism," Arendt did not just mean the blurring of the liberal distinction between state and civil society, as Italian fascism had characterized itself and as the term had been employed in the 1920's to characterize the Soviet Union.[87] She distinguished between authoritarianism and totalitarianism since authority, along with tyranny, despotism, etc., is connected with both hierarchy and tradition, and has to do with the limitation of freedom, while totalitarian rule seeks to abolish freedom and to eliminate all spontaneity. This difference is in the fact that in the leader-dominated state the cadres of the totalitarian movement must carry out not so much the explicit command of the leader as the "will" of the leader which can be derived only from the history and "world-view" of the movement. Unlike institutionally unrestricted dictatorship, totalitarian rule is characterized by a "contradiction between state and movement."[88]

85. A similar reply applies to Werner Hofmann's attempt to contrast Stalinism as an "educational dictatorship" with fascism as a "retardative dictatorship" (*Beharrungsdiktatur*) and to define Stalinism academically as an "excessively power-oriented order" without a "domination order" (since allgedly it did not involve exploitation). Cf. Werner Hofmann, *Stalinismus und Antikommunismus* (Frankfurt, 1967), p. 17; Hofmann, *Die Arbeitsverfassung der Sowjetunion* (Berlin, 1956), p. 303; and R. Müller, *Untersuchungen zur Struktur des Dritten Reiches und zur Theorie des Totalitarismus* (Marburg, dissertation, 1961).

86. Cf. "Symposium on the Totalitarian State", Nov. 1939, in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 82. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*; and *Totalitarianism*, proceedings of a conference held at the American Academy of Arts and Science, March 1953, ed. L.J. Friedrich (Cambridge, Mass., 1954). An overall view of the subsequent totalitarianism debate is presented by G. Schäfer in his essay "Demokratie und Totalitarismus," in *Politikwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in ihre Probleme*, ed., Kress and Senghaas (Vienna, 1969), pp. 105ff.

87. Giovanni Gentile spoke of the "totalitarian nature of the fascist doctrine" in his *Origini e Dottrina del Fascismo* (Rome, 1929). Cf. also Hans Buchheim, *Totalitäre Herrschaft* (Munich, 1964), p. 120. Forsthoff also contrasts the "totalitarian state" with the liberal state and uses the concept interchangeably with the "authoritarian state". Cf. Ernst Forsthoff, *Der totale Staat* (Hamburg, 1933), p. 38. A different view is given by H.O. Ziegler, *Autoritärer oder totaler Staat* (Tübingen. 1932). From this Schmitt concluded that there is really no such thing as a "totalitarian state"; that the totalitarian character is rather a result of the seizure of power by a "totalitarian party," i.e., the "negation of the whole body by a part." Cf. Conrad Schmitt, *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze* (Berlin, 1959), pp. 365ff., quoted in G. Schäfer, *Demokratie und Totalitarismus*, p. 131, note 85.

88. Arendt, *op.cit.*, p. 621. As I gather from Schäfer's essay, *op.cit.*, pp. 130ff., F.L.

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Totalitarian movements do not just seek a rigorous reform of the states in which they develop — though this was to a great extent true of Italian fascism. Rather, they transcend the national state. Thus, the Nazis wanted not just a *Reich* of the German people, but the world domination of the Aryan race. Similarly, in domestic policy they did not merely seek to erect a stable Party dictatorship, but a permanent political transformation. Thus, the Nazis did not just want to establish a totalitarian state under their party's rule but the domination of the Aryan race and final division of mankind into masters and slaves, Aryans and non-Aryans.

Arendt's emphasis on the contradiction between the state and the movement captures the specific nature of fascist rule more accurately than current Marxist categories dealing with the smashing of the workers' movement and the imperialist armaments economy.[89] Yet, her conservative prejudice against all mass-movement prevented her from recognizing the superficiality of the fascist "movement," i.e., the fact that it cannot solve the contradictions of bourgeois society but can only reproduce them in a new form.[90] This, however, does not change the fact that it effectively integrates the masses and thus destroys the condition for any mass resistance movement.

Arendt limits her analysis to the "Nazi *Reich* after 1938 (and the Soviet Union after 1930), and refuses to extend it, for example, to Italian Fascism.[91] Thus, she only partially succeeds in drawing an analogy between fascism and Stalinism. She does not see the fascist state as having a monolithic structure, and she compares it with Stalinism only in the dualism of political façade (parliament or soviet) and real power (party leadership and secret police).[92]

The underlying differences between Stalinist and Nazi ideologies cannot be glossed over by the fact that both systems legitimate themselves by appealing to objective processes and laws (the law of nature, or of history). In Marxist theory, the appeal to systematic historical processes has a rational, though insufficient, foundation while the paranoid logic with which, for instance, Stalin deduced concrete political measures from assumed general laws is totalitarian. Furthermore, it is crucial that, unlike in fascism, political resistance can appeal to the theory which the political rulers themselves advocate. The confessions of old Bolshevik revolutionaries in the Moscow

Neumann's *Behemoth* (1942) already distinguished between the (totalitarian) state and the totalitarian movement. Schmitt and Forsthoff also dealt with this problem. Cf. Schäfer *op.cit.*, p. 131, note 85.

89. Meanwhile, the Marxist discussion of fascism has also turned its attention to the Fascist movement. Cf. Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Oeffentlichkeit und Erfahrung* (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 277ff., and the contributions of Anson Rabinbach in *New German Critique* 3 (Fall 1974), and E. Hennig in *Aesthetik und Kommunikation* (1975).

90. Negt and Kluge, *op.cit.*, p. 278.

91. She does so only with explicit reference to terrorism, not to the underlying contradiction between state and movement. Thus, she writes, "That the Fascist dictatorship in Italy was not totalitarian in nature is already evidenced by the slight number of political arrests and the mild degree of punishment for political opponents." Arendt, *op.cit.*, p. 493, note 10.

92. The anarchic structure of the Nazi ruling system is fundamentally different from the structural anarchy of a bureaucratic planned economy. Cf. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (1942).

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trials have less to do with a fascist destruction of personal identity through terroristic integration into an insane system than with the way in which Party elites caught in the Bolshevist tradition seek to preserve their revolutionary identity.[93] That the secret police in Stalinist Russia disposed over a political power similar to that of the SS elite-corps under Hitler is refuted by what Arendt herself says on the subject.[94]

These errors of Arendt's analysis of Stalinism can be traced back to her unmediated definition of totalitarianism. Stalinism is not a mass-movement standing in an ambivalent conflict with the political system whose power it has conquered. Rather, Stalinist rule presupposes the liquidation of the mass movement not through the power of spontaneity organized in a counter-revolutionary way, but through a gigantic coercive state apparatus. There has never been a decidedly Stalinist mass movement that would have really supported Stalinist terror, compulsory collectivization, the Stakhanov system, the mass purges, the repression of minorities, and the domestic system of camps.[95] It is hardly worthwhile to discuss the process that led Arendt to see Nazism and Stalinism as simple variants of the world-historical *novum* of the 20th century, called "totalitarianism." One need only mention her idea of the "decline of class society" in an amorphous mass society in which totalitarian movements "to this day are the only forms of organization that the modern masses have found and that seem adequate to them."[96] It is noteworthy that despite such conservative prejudices, Arendt does not equate Bolshevism and fascism, and that she does not extend totalitarianism to include every social revolutionary movement, as, for example, Martin Draht's widely accepted definition of totalitarianism as a "primary phenomenon".[97]

93. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror* (Boston, 1969).

94. Arendt, *op.cit.*, pp. 642, 674. Arendt convincingly describes the totalitarian change of function of the secret police under Stalin; it no longer has primarily the function of fighting political opponents (and therefore, e.g., it no longer works with provocation tactics), but it has become the "only accomplice knowing what in other countries corresponds to state secrets."

95. In case one can speak of it in the Spanish civil war, it was rather a movement of the petty bourgeoisie than of the proletariat. On this, Serge writes: "The mechanization of every social activity and the highest degree of concentration of power against a deeply embittered and disillusioned population before which the tremendous masses adapt passively and without illusion, goes the route of least resistance. Of course, there are some believers, the same as everywhere; some self-seeking, and others young and youthfully candid." Cf. Victor Serge, "Alles ist in Frage gestellt," in *Tagebuch eines Revolutionärs, op.cit.*, p. 453. This rules out Arendt's narrow criterion for totalitarianism, which is modelled on fascism: "Totalitarianism is impossible without a mass movement and without the support of the masses terrorized by it." Cf. Arendt, *op.cit.*, p. 486.

96. Arendt, *op.cit.*, p. 486.

97. That it wishes to impose a completely different system of values than the ones prevalent in society distinguishes totalitarianism from authoritarianism. It appeals to this not only incidentally, but to recruit supporters and legitimate itself. "The establishment of an order based on this new system of values and therefore radically deviating from the prevalent societal valuations is the goal of totalitarianism." Cf. Martin Draht, "Totalitarismus in der Volksdemokratie," introduction to E. Richert, *Macht ohne Mandat* (Cologne and Opladen, 1963), p. xxvi. M. Greiffenhage, in his survey of works dealing with totalitarianism, adopts Draht's concept and draws from it the absurd conclusion of rejecting the concept of totalitarianism for Nazism and limiting it to the Stalinist phase of the Soviet Union. Cf. Greiffenhage, "Der Totalitarismusbegriff in der Regimenlehre," in *BVS* 9 (1968), pp. 391, 395.

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At any rate, Arendt's work provides an accurate description of the structural relation of Stalinism and fascism, i.e., in the analysis of terrorism. Her point of departure is the discovery that real mass terror in totalitarian systems begins only after every political resistance has already been liquidated as was the case in Germany after 1936 and in Russia after 1930: "What happened was that terrorism did not decrease with the decreasing opposition, but intensified, so that it looked as if this opposition had not (as liberal opponents of the totalitarian regime had always believed) been the cause of the coercive system but on the contrary the last obstacle standing in the way of its complete, unmerciful development." Similarly, "Terrorism ceases being just a means for repressing and policing the population when all real opposition has been liquidated. Total domination, whose true essence is terrorism, begins only at this stage." [98]

In this attempt to ascribe a positive function to terrorism, however, Arendt's prejudice against a classless society shows through. Mass terrorism no longer directed against a real opposition becomes a preventative counterrevolution. It is supposed to forestall the formation of even the least resistance, both within the dominant elite and within the repressed masses. That is also the significance of the system of concentration camps: "The lack of purpose of the camps, their cynically admitted counterproductivity, is only apparent. In truth, they serve more effectively to preserve the regime's power than any of its other institutions. Without the camps, without the indefnite fear of them and without the very definite education to total domination, which could be tried out nowhere else in its most radical possibilities, a total domination can neither exalt its core-troops, nor keep an entire people in complete apathy." [99]

This analysis of Stalinism as based on the systematic terror against loyal cadres and masses gives rise to the objection that it loses sight of the underlying continuity of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist phases in Russia. Arendt considers it improbable for the Soviet Union that "in purely objective terms the possibility exists to redirect totalitarian domination back to a sort of enlightened despotism."[100] Thus, the post-Stalinist change would compel Arendt to consider totalitarianism inapplicable even for the Stalin era. In political science, the post-Stalinist change of the East-European societies has, however, led to restricting "totalitarianism" to the Stalinist phase and, after that, to speaking of "authoritarian" rule.[101]

But such conclusions are reached only if fascism and Stalinism are ahistorically equated. In their institutions and ideology, post-Stalinist societies differ only incidentally from those of the Stalin era. Although mass

98. H. Arendt, *op.cit.*, pp. 625, 666.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 717.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 594, note 65.
101. Peter C. Ludz, *Parteielite im Wandel. Funktionsaufgabe, Sozialstruktur und Ideologie der SED Führung* (Cologne and Opladen, 1968). Cf. also his introduction to *Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der DDR* (Cologne and Opladen, 1964).

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terror has not been repeated,[102] the corresponding apparatus now operates with more modern "scientific" means and legal opposition — even in art and science — is just as impossible now as it was under Stalin. This is justification enough to speak of a totalitarian regime. Institutions justify the concept of the "totalitarian state," but not of "totalitarianism," i.e., of a "totalitarian social system." For that one would have to show that the terror differs not only quantitatively from the terror of modern military dictatorships, but fulfills a specific historical function in the development of the respective economic system. Actually, Stalinism did fulfill in semi-Asiatic Russia the same historical function as fascism in capitalist countries.

One of the defining traits of fascist distatorships is the provision of a state solution to deep-seated problems of accumulation.[103] This criterion also applies to the Soviet Union. Fascism and Stalinism are further characterized by the historical defeat of the revolutionary movement. That this defeat takes place in Stalinism only after the temporary victory of the masses requires a socio-economic explanation but it merely determines the *form* of that defeat. The power-vacuum created by the defeat makes possible a comprehensive solution to the problems of accumulation based on power. The fact that it temporarily succeeds in solving these problems provides the totalitarian system enough legitimation to develop the terror sufficiently to prevent all effective opposition. Stalinist mass terror has fulfilled its historical function of depoliticizing the population and rêndering it apathetic long enough to stabilize the specific class structure of Soviet state capitalism under conditions of extreme accumulation problems. It is therefore misleading to equate Stalinism and fascism under the label of "totalitarianism" but more correct to qualify not only the Soviet state, but also Soviet-type societies, as "totalitarian", i.e., as "totalitarian state capitalist".[104]

Under Russian socio-economic conditions, the state-capitalist accumulation required a comprehensive counterrevolution, i.e., a violent destruction of the revolutionary achievements of the Soviet workers and peasants without this leading economically to a restoration.[105] The first and decisive steps were

102. The Soviet mass camps have been replaced by special psychiatric clinics and the hundreds of thousands of members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia expelled after 1969 were not sent to concentration camps.

103. Franz Borkenau, "Zur Soziologie des Faschismus," in *Theorien des Fascismus*, ed. E. Nolte (Cologne, Berlin, 1967), p. 156.

104. Characteristically, the concept of totalitarianism of revisionist critics of Soviet societies, such as Dubcek and the Italian Communist Party, is restricted to the form of government. Cf. the report of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Feb. 25, 1976, concerning the statements by Umberto Terracini: "As an example of the 'comprehensive totalitarianism of the Soviet government,' the leadership names the regional and local parliaments, which seldom meet and always unrestrictedly accept the directives of the central government. Other examples he cited were the transformation of the judicial administration into an 'arm of political power' and the mighty bureaucratic machinery, which represent the 'other face of the extreme centralism of all Soviet structures and superstructure'."

105. Rudi Dutschke, in reference to the political system of the Soviet Union, speaks of an "Asiatic restoration", in *Links. Sozialistische Zeitung* 90 (July-August 1977).

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already taken under Lenin. Then followed the ban on strikes and the nationalization of the labor unions. The power of disposal over the land and its products, which the farmers had acquired during the revolution, was taken away from them, thus re-introducing a kind of "new serfdom".[106] Finally, millions of rural people were concentrated as new industrial wage-workers in the new industrial centers and capitalist work discipline was drilled into them through terror and excessive individual competition (the Stakhanov system).[107] In 1932, the domestic passport was reintroduced, and in 1940 a change of place of employment was generally forbidden.[108] The lacking functionality of voluntarist and bureaucratic planning was concealed by a search for scapegoats and compensated from above by the mobilization of the labor force.[109]

With Arendt, the whole problem can be formulated as a contradiction between state and movement (but not between state and mass-movement), as a contradiction in the state itself: the state organizes state-capitalist accumulation while carrying out a terroristic mobilization of society from above in order to prevent any return to the revolutionary experiences of the mass movement. As the history of the Soviet Union shows, this contradiction leads to catastrophic failures and structural stagnation even in important sectors of the economy. The result of the totalitarian contradiction is a specific interlocking of productive and destructive forces and of the abject apathy and depolitization of formerly revolutionary masses. During his incarceration in a correctional work-colony in 1966, the Ukrainian historian Moros described this as follows: "Stalin invented a programmed man. Stalin is the creator of the little cog. . . . The desire not to be conspicuous, to vanish into the crowd, to become just like the other fellow in order not to attract attention, was widespread. And that meant a complete leveling of personality. . . the little cog — that is an ideal of every 'totalitarian'."[110]

106. Lorenz, *op.cit.*, p. 191.

107. But the methods of "mass competition, with whose help the Communist Party in the period of wartime Communism, had mobilized large parts of the workers", now lead only to "a short-term mobilization of parts of the working people, especially the working youth." Lorenz, *op.cit.*, p. 222.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 245-246.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 231. The only possible struggle against the hypertrophied bureaucracy under Stalinism consisted in its physical decimation. As is generally known, Lenin's late appeals to fight against the bureaucracy remained completely futile.

110. Walentin Moros, "Reportage aus einem Reservat namens Berija," in Lewytzky, *Politische Opposition in der Sowjetunion, op.cit.*, pp. 201, 203. The Hungarian critic Rakovsky has provided a vivid description of the system of totalitarian mobilization: "In such an economy (which paralyzes the balance mechanism prescribed for the normal functioning of economic organizations by repressing the autonomy of all formal organizations) workers must be ready to carry out every assignment unconditionally at every moment whatsoever. This presupposes a control over workers not only as wage-dependent, but as integral personalities. In this atmosphere of total mobilization, it becomes impossible to distinguish between personal responsibility and objective difficulties. A difficulty in performance is always taken as a sign of a lack of zeal in fulfilling the guidelines or even of something far worse. And the less it becomes possible to produce a recognizable connection between "offense" and "penalty", i.e., the less the individual is in a position to adapt rationally to the state of uncertainty, the more effective the periodic

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Recently in American political science the concept of "mobilization system" has been used instead of totalitarianism. Unlike the rigid totalitarian model, fixed in institutions which cannot answer all questions, the concept of "mobilization system" grasps socialist systems as forms of manifestation of the comprehensive, dynamic process of modernization of backward societies in which the state, acting as a developmental agency with more or less totalitarian traits, substitutes for the potentials for change which are elsewhere created spontaneously. "Totalitarianism" is thus no longer understood as a reprehensible form of governance, new in principle, and contradictory to the "Western" way of life, but is genetically relativized as a functional equivalent to market forces at work under "normal" conditions.[111] This systematic "overcoming" of the concept of totalitarianism could be reconstructed as the replacement of the concept of totalitarianism by that of state capitalism, but it no longer explains why there result "more or less totalitarian traits".

A genetic and structural concept of totalitarianism allows a solution of the difficulty not only on the subject of "totalitarian *regimes*" but of "totalitarian *systems*" of the Eastern bloc countries, i.e., that the political apathy typical of the Soviet Union did not last long in other Eastern European countries, as the movements in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland have shown. The establishment of totalitarian regimes and Stalinist terrorism down to the 1950s have not sufficed in these countries to generate the apathy necessary for the long-range stabilization of a state-capitalist system of the Stalinist type. East European state-capitalism is therefore dependent on the occupation of the Russian army. It can therefore not be called "totalitarian" with regard to the genetically and structurally conditioned constitution of social consciousness, but only with regard to its political constitution.

Finally, the concept of totalitarianism is essential for describing 20th-century trends. First, however, the radical Leftist view dating back to the fascist era must be corrected insofar as, in capitalist countries, totalitarian state capitalism has not won out, nor has it succeeded in developing countries ruled by a Marxist-Leninist party.[112]

Besides the leftist Communists, Critical Theory especially has, under the title of "authoritarian state" (Horkheimer), "administrated world" (Adorno), and "one-dimensional society" (Marcuse), described a fundamental tendency of late capitalism toward totalitarianism: "In the entire way and manner in

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waves of purges become, because they guarantee the subjugation of all particular interests under a single one, the interest of accumulation." Cf. Marc Rakovski, "Der Marxismus angesichts der sowjetischen Gesellschaften," in Andras Hegedüs and Mihaly Vajda, *Die neue Linke in Ungarn*, Vol. 2 (Merve Verlag, 1976), pp. 156ff.; Rakovski also used the term "totalitarian". *Ibid.*, p. 160.

111. H. Kaiser, "Vom 'Totalitarismus' zum 'Mobilisierungs'-Modell", in *Neue Politische Literatur* 2 (1973), pp. 163, 164.

112. Orthodox Council Communists believe that in underdeveloped countries nothing is possible but state capitalism. Cf. Paul Mattick, "Der Leninismus und die Arbeiterbewegung des Westens", in *Lenin. Revolution und Politik* (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 45.

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which modern industrial society has organized its technological basis, it tends toward totalitarianism. For not only a terroristic political coordination of society is 'totalitarian,' but also a non-terroristic economic-technical coordination in which the needs of interested powers are manipulated, and so the rise of an effective opposition to the unity organized by these interests is prevented." In this perspective, then, the (bourgeois) theory of totalitarianism, which equates Stalinism, Bolshevism, and fascism, can be interpreted as a projective defense of the totalitarian tendency of Western capitalism.

The political development of the late sixties, however, casts doubt on Critical Theory's thesis that the technology of totalized capital relation, from the Taylorization of the work-process, through commodity aesthetics and media-manipulation, to imperialistic war-machines, suffices to constitute "a society without opposition".

It is, therefore, inappropriate to apply the concept of "totalitarianism" to modern capitalism where there are no totalitarian state apparatuses.[114] That Western democracies are developing totalitarian state apparatuses in reaction to the movements of the last decade has hitherto remained unsubstantiated.[115] Even the population's strong fascist potential does not by itself justify speaking of Western totalitarianism. Perhaps, as already indicated by the Leftist Communists, a concept of totalitarianism that goes beyond fascism and Stalinism today captures capitalism's tendency, triggered by the historical defeat of the revolutionary labor movement, to result in either fascism or the Eastern European variety of state capitalism. That the profound paralysis of every autonomous Communist movement cannot be separated from the pressure of competition of Western capitalism does not salvage the historically progressive function of Soveiet-type societies, but only shows once again their state-capitalist nature.

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113. Herbert Marcuse, "Ueber das Ideologieproblem in der hochentwickelten Industriegesellschaft" (1962) in *Ideologiekritik und Wissenssoziologie*, ed. K. Lenk, p. 345. Cf. also Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), p. 3: "By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian." On p. 81, he writes, "In the area of culture the new totalitarianism is manifested precisely in a harmonizing pluralism, in which the mutually contradictory works and truths coexist peacefully side by side."

114. Marcuse no longer uses it in reference to late-capitalist democracies. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972).

115. Cf. Foucault, Geismar, Glucksmann, *et al.*, *Neuer Faschismus, Neue Demokratie* (Berlin, 1972).

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EASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES*

by Laura Boella

The End of the Intellectuals' Reformism

On August 21, 1968, Hungarian dissenters experienced their most important turning point. The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia marked the end of the Hungarian intellectuals' "reformism," the end of all hopes in the possibility that progressive forces could win a place within the communist parties in power in countries with "actually existing socialism." An authentic process of democratization turned out to be incompatible with the present East European regimes: when it went beyond the sphere predetermined by the ruling elite, this process was immediately branded as counter-revolutionary.

Hungarian intellectuals have subsequently undergone a profound crisis which resulted in a redefinition of the "Budapest School" as compared to that provided by Lukacs in his 1971 letter to *The Times Literary Supplement*.[1] The original nucleus of the Budapest School — Heller, Feher, Vajda and Markus — has by now moved well beyond Lukacsian Marxism and even beyond Lukacs' last phase of political radicalization and anti-bureacratism.[2] Works dating back to the early 1970s, such as Vajda's on fascism[3] and the book by Bence, Kis and Markus entitled *Is a Critique of Political Economy Possible?*[4] (suppressed both inside and outside of Hungary) represent a new departure beyond the critique of historical materialism toward a humanistic vision of socialism.

Lukacs' pupils are now dispersed: Agnes Heller, Ferenc Feher, György and Maria Markus teach in Australia; Mihaly Vajda is in Bremen. Their most recent work, however, although moving in different directions,[5] remains concerned with the structure of East European societies. One need only recall Miklos Harszti's *Piece-Work* (1974), which provided an analysis of working conditions in East European countries: Konrad's and Szelenyi's *The*

*Translated by George R. Alkalay.

1. Cf. Georg Lukacs, "Letter to the *Times Literary Supplement*," Feb. 15, 1971.

2. Lukacs' work from 1968 to his death is very critical of the bureaucracy and favors a "democratization of everyday life." In the summer of 1968, immediately after the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, Lukacs wrote a monograph *On Democratization*, still unpublished, in which he vigorously criticizes East European regimes.

3. Cf. M. Vajda, *Fascism as a Mass Movement* (London, 1976).

4. The book by György Bence, Janos Kis and György Markus is a critical analysis of *Capital* and an elaboration of the antinomies in the Marxian definition of use value. It is an attempt to provide a framework whereby to criticize the political economy of "actual socialism," revising, where necessary, some of the classical concepts. Although they recognize the progressive elements of the reform in regards to the planned economy, the authors consciously detach themselves from the humanistic Marxist criticism of the reform movement. Notwithstanding the fact that this is a theoretical work, one of the main concerns is the possibility of the self-determination of the direct producers.

5. Already in the 1960s, the unity of the Budapest School was largely the fictional image of the "faction" created by the Party's Cultural Commission in its 1973 condemnation. Cf. "Presa di Posizione della Commissione per la Politica Culturale Operante Presso il CC del Partito Comunista Ungherese Riguardo alla Visione Antimarxista di Alcuni Cultori di Scienze Sociale" in *Szoziologia*, 1 (1973); now in *Aut Aut*, 140 (1974), pp. 97-110. Cf. also Redaktionskollektiv, "Zur Entwicklung der neuen Linken in Ungarn," in *Politikon*, 50 (1976).

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Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (1974), which describes the sociological nature of the "ruling" class in actual socialism and seeks to explain the antagonism between its interests and those of the working class; Marc Rakovski's book, *Marxism in East European Countries* (1975).[6] Nor can one ignore the works of the "official" sociologists such as Tomas Kolosi and Lajos Hethy and Csaba Mako.

It has been argued that the new Hungarian intellectual dissent is the product of the general crisis in East Europe during the transition from extensive to intensive growth. As in many East European countries, after 1956 Hungary's economy began to shift from the exclusive production of means of production and the vast employment of agricultural workers in industry to investments in the so-called "Sector 8," i.e., that of consumer goods. Confronted with the need to create an equilibrium between heavy, light, and consumer goods industry along with the simultaneous dynamic development of distribution and agriculture, the Hungarian ruling elite found itself unable to smoothly manage the transition to the intensive phase of industrial development while simultaneously preserving the institutional preconditions for its power, i.e., the political and administrative hierarchy founded on Stalin's model of development of production for production's sake.[7] This gave rise to the internecine struggles between various groups within the bureaucracy typical of the de-Stalinization period and marked the fate of the various attempts at reform during the 1960s.

It is not by chance that Vajda's book on fascism provides not only the first convincing Marxist attempt to interpret the sociological nature of fascism, but also depicts a broad historical parable — something that was quite clear to the Hungarian censors who prohibited the publication of the complete version. Vajda, in fact, analyzes a situation of economic and social crisis comparable to that experienced by Eastern Europe. The political form and the structural conflicts of fascism are related to the economic forces prevailing during the emergence of the intensive phase of economic growth.

Most of those Hungarian intellectuals who today constitute a critical public sphere were thus formed during a period of "compromise," dating back to the early 1960s, i.e., to the beginning of a process of economic reform. The speed with which the events of 1956 were forgotten and the similarly rapid consolidation of the regime under Kadar produced a pact of national solidarity between the ruling powers and the intellectuals: a pact guaranteed by the latent threat of a return to Stalinism. Under those circumstances, no one could or would call into question the regime's foundations, i.e., the political system imposed by Russia on Hungary. In that system, the leading role of the Communist Party was identified with socialism and whoever denied that was considered an enemy of socialism. This generated the conviction shared by all Hungarian

6. Cf. Marc Rakovski, *Le Marxisme Face aux Pays de l'Est* (Paris, 1977). Rakovski is a pseudonym.

7. This problem is analyzed in reference to the various East European countries by J. Kuron and K. Modzelewski, in their "Lettera Aperta al Partito Unificato Polacco dei Lavoratori" (1964), in *Il Marxismo Polacco all'Opposizione* (Rome, 1967), and H.H. Ticktin, "Towards a Political Economy of the USSR," in *Critique* 1 (1973), pp. 20-41.

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critical intellectuals (the sole exception to this being Hegedüs) that the absolute power of the party renders any form of democracy impossible — even democracy within the party.

The Kadarian compromise meant that if intellectuals did not call into question the regime, the party leadership would do everything to make life tolerable for them. This is how the Hungarian power structure became "liberal." For the people this liberalization meant a relaxing life as long as they forsook participation in the formation of the political will and became depoliticized and privatized. And here we find what became the distinguishing characteristic of Kadarism. It is not tied to economic collapse, as in Novotny's Czechoslovakia, or to a continuous strategy of increasing involvement with the Common Market, as in the case of Yugoslavia, but rather reflects the regime's structural requirements. By replacing Rakosi's forced industrialization with a slow, steady growth in people's incomes, Kadar showed that he was primarily looking forward to the construction of a short-term social equilibrium so as to prevent or resolve open social conflicts, as in the case of the agricultural workers who were transformed by the reform into a class of beneficiaries with a high standard of living and with strong decisional autonomy in matters concerning them. This rise in consumerism gave birth to new political subjects who accept the state's supremacy, but take advantage of the recognition of their role as private consumer-subjects in order to carry out a kind of guerrilla warfare against the state itself (here one need only mention the "second economy" sustained by self-employment, semi-legal trade in foreign goods, etc.).

For intellectuals, liberalization entailed the right to criticism, but never in a public and organized manner, i.e., never in such a way as to call into question the system's foundations. The only interlocutors of such criticism were the holders of power. In short, the unlimited tyranny of Stalinism had been replaced by enlightened absolutism. Unlike the rest of the population, which was fully aware of their lack of power and will, the intellectuals harbored the illusion that their activity would lead to a democratic socialism and that reforms from above corresponded to the popular will.

During this period (1960-68), the Budapest School people were among the intellectuals entertaining these hopes. Respected members of the academic community, they participated in the planning of economic reforms, believing that they would lead to political and social reforms in civil rights and in the management of industry. The Budapest School was the "loyal opposition." Its humanistic criticism did not threaten the political establishment, for it was considered "constructive" and, to the extent that it did not advocate a structural critique of the regime, it was possible to coopt it into the official ideology.[8]

Searching for the theoretical tools for a critical sociology, from 1965 on the Budapest School found itself in a growing political and ideological crisis: did the technocrats of the new economic reform or the conservative state and party bureaucracy threaten socialist ideals? Was it possible to develop the scientific tools for a critical analysis out of Marx's early works, or was it necessary to

8. Cf. I. Szelényi, "Notes on the 'Budapest School'," in *Critique*, 8 (1977), p. 63.

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return to his critique of political economy by reformulating, if necessary, some of his theses? Was there only one or various Marxisms? And, if the latter was the case, which should be used in the analysis of East European reality?

This group broke from its role as loyal opposition with Hegedüs and Maria Markus' critique of the possible negative and anti-egalitarian consequences of the acquisitive logic implicit in economic development concerned with optimalization. In fact, it turned out to be the result of a mistaken evaluation of power relations in Hungary during the mid-1960s. The faith in the technocrats' victory was so complete that the economic reform was attacked before it was even carried out.[9] It came as a surprise to the liberal reformists who viewed Hegedüs as an ally and as an ideologist of political reform, rather than as a humanistic critic of economic reforms. At any rate, this was enough to alienate the liberal reformists from the school, which did not thereby gain the sympathies of the conservative anti-reformist bureaucrats. With the publication of Hegedüs' work on bureaucracy,[10] the School faced liquidation by the bureaucrats without any support from the liberal reformists. Following their protest against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Heller, Vajda, Hegedüs and Markus were expelled from the party. In 1973 they also lost their jobs as researchers in the Academy of Science and found themselves living in isolation and engaged in a difficult daily struggle for survival.

The political defeat of un-official Hungarian Marxism also marked the end of its legality, and its refuge into isolated groups. This is why Vajda could write with remarkable lucidity that "if there is no social force realizing our objectives, then our standpoint is transcendental."[11] Having lost all hopes of influencing socialist development in Eastern Europe through gradual reforms, the Budapest School sought to locate the "ontological guarantees of human freedom,"[12] and investigated the possibility of a pluralistic Marxism. But this was only an apparent departure from social and structural problems. In fact, it was a more radical way of posing the question as to alternative forms of socialism. Yet, while the universal category of freedom emphasized the needs of the masses, individuals and praxis, it delegated to others the tasks of social theory such as the analysis of the economic and social forces behind the bureaucratic elite's counteroffensive which in 1972 marked the end of the reform.

In the early 1960s, the refusal to define the subject of praxis in class terms, the declaration that "man" alone makes history, had already indicated the potential of a radical critique of Eastern European regimes. The philosophy of praxis derived from the early Lukacs and Gramsci was a decisive challenge to the "substitutionism" characteristic of official Marxism, i.e., an apparatus ruling society in the name and in the alleged interest of the working class. The post-Stalinist stabilization meant the failure of the historical and political basis for such a conception of the subject and of praxis. It was also a defeat for the

9. Cf. C. Cartwright, "Hungary — The Myth of the Reform," in *Critique* 5 (1975), pp. 71-83.
10. Cf. A. Hegedüs, *Socialism and Bureaucracy* (London, 1976).
11. Cf. Vajda's article in *Die neue Linke in Ungarn II* (Berlin, 1976), p. 71.
12. Rakovski, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

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working class, for whom the return to Stalinism meant the re-establishment of productivism, underconsumption and mass mobilization. Even official Marxist-Leninist ideology underwent a legitimation crisis. The ruling elite came to use this ideology solely as rhetoric. "Mankind" itself appeared disintegrated, with each social stratum seeking to use the possibilities offered by the new system for its own ends. The concrete aspirations of various social groups were no longer immediately related to a Marxist philosophical humanism, and in some cases were even decidedly opposed to it.[13]

Lacking any social bases and driven underground, Marxism began to question itself. It was at this point that the Budapest School stopped counterposing "authentic Marxism" to Soviet societies, and began to settle accounts with its own analysis by means of the social sciences and political economy. In order to demonstrate that it was the only possibility for radical opposition, Marxism had to offer a re-interpretation of Soviet societies in terms of concrete analyses. And this is what led the Budapest School beyond Lukacs' philosophy and toward a radical alternative to Eastern European socialism.

The tragic outcome of the Prague Spring and the consolidation of the ruling group triggered a positive crisis, resulting in the maturation of Hungarian critical intellectuals. Once the conditions for a compromise failed, intellectuals were left with only a marginal space. Thus, in a more fluid and ambiguous situation, youths faced the transition from integration to non-conformism as a choice which had to take into account the peculiar function of the official intelligentsia. As the protector of non-conformists the official intelligentsia acted as a barrier against the repression by the ruling powers, while relegating non-conformists to a sort of ecological niche of survival.

On the other hand, in societies lacking any autonomous organization of interests, communication through intellectual debate and scientific exchanges represent the only form of real ideological and political confrontation. Looking at Poland, whose lesson was completely the opposite of that of Czechoslovakia (Russia did not intervene after the Danzig events and the new ruling group in the Party had to permit independent labor organizations as well as tolerate an alliance between intellectuals and the working class), the Hungarian intellectuals today emphasize the necessity and the right to criticize the system's foundations, not with a feeling of desperate resignation, but with a strong will of renovation.

Soviet-type Societies as New Social Formations

Most recent accounts by Hungarian critical intellectuals reject the alternative underlying the various Western Marxist analyses emphasizing the transitional or capitalist nature of Eastern European societies (recall Mandel and Bettelheim). With Bahro, they interpret Soviet-type societies as new social formations[14] and they clearly distinguish their views from those of East European economists such as Ota Sik and Vladimir Brus, for whom East

13. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

14. See R. Bahro, *Die Alternative* (Frankfurt am Main, 1976). The recognition of the importance of Bahro's analyses does not mean an acceptance of his political conclusions such as, e.g., the conception of the Party and the strategy to be pursued in East European countries.

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European societies, although requiring a careful integration of plan and market, are superior to classical capitalism. Allegedly, within these societies, many of Marxism's historical objectives, such as unemployment, under-utilization of resources and plant capacity, have been reached, thus putting an end to numerous defects of capitalism.

Among Hungarian intellectuals there are various accounts of Soviet-type societies as class societies (Rakovski, Konrad-Szelenyi), "dictatorship over needs" (Heller, Feher, Markus), and as profoundly antagonistic societies exhibiting conflicts between the individual and the corporative power of an elite pretending to be the embodiment of the "State of all people" — something which can no longer be grasped in terms of the Marxian concept of class (Vajda). Aside from all of these differences, however, the Hungarian New Left agrees that the real function of these social formations cannot be described either by the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production nor by Marx's principles of socialism-communism, but only by means of new concepts. This does not mean that such a critique must be entirely independent of values inspired by Marx's vision of communism. While they reject attributing responsibility for the Gulag to Marxism as a whole, they do not attempt to salvage an authentic nucleus allegedly untainted by historical experience. The need to understand the East-European socio-economic structure necessitates a criticism of certain Marxist ideas and the acknowledgement of a connection between the practice of Eastern European societies and the original socialist project (expropriation of private property, abolition of the market), not to mention the radical contradiction between reality and Marx's fundamental values.

In a recent interview, Heller has characterized this position as a "relativization of the East" in the face of the common destiny of the Left and of all radical and progressive movements in the West.[15] This entails confronting the crisis of Marxism and reconsidering Marx's work, especially his critique of political economy. Obviously, this is not just a theoretical problem, and involves determining the concrete social forces able to revitalize Eastern European countries. In this context, to speak of a "new" socio-economic formation does not mean placing it at a somehow higher stage relative to capitalism, nor in an unspecified limbo of the unpredictable "irregularity" of history.[16] On the contrary, Soviet-type societies represent a particular response to the crises of capitalism after World War I. Along with the New Deal and fascism, these societies have to be understood as based on a new form of social regulation seeking the abolition of exploitation and based on a principle of rationality organizing the social whole in contrast to the anarchy of bourgeois society. In these societies the leading role of the ruling elite becomes crucial in safeguarding the "public good."[17]

The similarity of patterns of consumption and of the technostructure in both

15. See "Marxist Ethics and the Future of Eastern Europe: An Interview with Agnes Heller," in *Telos* 38 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 153-174.

16. Cf. Mihaly Vajda, "Is Kadarism an Alternative?" in *Telos* 39 (Spring 1979), pp. 172-179.

17. Cf. Ferenc Feher, "The Dictatorship over Needs," *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 31-42.

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Western and Soviet-type societies increases, rather than decreases, the reasons for rejecting a convergence theory which the Western Left has frequently invoked to put an end to illusions about the socialist character of Eastern European regimes. At the same time, the alternative between a planned economy and a market economy is also rejected as "ideological." Yet, it remains important to establish which of the two "ideological" models is the organizing principle of society and to analyze the specificity of economic cycles and their political consequences in Eastern European countries. As Rakovski put it: "Similar phenomena reproduced by different mechanisms are not the same thing for social praxis."[18]

In order to analyze Soviet-type societies, it is essential to consider Marx's philosophy of history, which presupposes a unilinear scheme of development and the primacy of economics in the explanation of history.[19] Although in capitalism economic forces become central *vis-à-vis* other social dimensions, to pretend to explain the functioning of society through capital relations presupposes the complete unfolding of the laws of the self-regulating market discovered by classical economics. This was only a "negative utopia" of the bourgeoisie, against which there are numerous countertendencies.[20] Evolutionist historicism and economism are thus welded together in Marx's mistaken prediction of the historical tendency of capitalist society. Marx's critique of political economy must consequently be reconsidered in light of a changed social context no longer determined by the self-regulation of market mechanisms, but through a central political bureaucracy.

These considerations introduce into Marx's traditional theory "the primacy of the political." Although Hungarian dissident intellectuals interpret this in various ways, they all seek to go beyond theories of "bureaucratic societies" which simply describe how administrative and controlling functions become autonomous and do not afford any democratic protections. The central question has to do with the concrete relation between politics and a form of production which, although it has abolished private property, has not done away with wage-labor but, rather, has universalized it.

In Rakovski's analysis, Soviet-type societies are characterized by the impossibility of separating politics from economics because of the hierarchical organization of society. Thus, what distinguishes Soviet-type societies from capitalist ones is this: "There is a fundamental difference between those societies in which at least some of the institutions are formally independent, and those in which everything is formally subordinated to a single administrative hierarchy. And precisely this institutional difference separates capitalist societies from Soviet-type societies. Certainly, in Soviet-type societies, the institutional spheres are equally differentiated. But the institutions here do not have the formal independence characteristic of capitalism. They are integrated into a unified administrative hierarchy pro-

18. Cf. Rakovski, *op.cit.*, p. 135.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.
20. Cf. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1957). The Budapest School intellectuals accept Polanyi's claim that the English situation discussed by Marx represented only a brief transitional period in the history of capitalism.

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hibiting any autonomous organization capable of expressing contradictory social functions or representing conflicting interests."[21] Soviet-type societies are thus characterized by a particular nexus of centralism and decentralization. Relations of dependence and subordination do not necessarily result in an overgrowth of authority, but give rise to an institutional structure which concentrates economic and political power. This institutional structure not only organizes social relations, but also determines the social division of labor. It not only enforces political control but also embodies the administrative hierarchy. It does this in many ways: through the right to appoint, monitor, and suspend managers of enterprises in spite of whatever autonomy was granted following the economic reform; through the appropriation of a large portion of the surplus product; by controlling the various sectors (the national economy, full employment, education, etc.); by controlling all credit and investment institutions; by means of party discipline; by containing the particular interests of the working class; etc.

This interconnnection of economy and politics prevents the autonomous organization of social interests as group interests counterposed to those of other groups. According to Vajda, Feher, Heller and Markus, East European countries have an economy which is not so much planned a "directed." It is not motivated by profit, but by the goal of maximizing material resources subject to the exclusive rule of the bureaucratic apparatus. Such an economy does not really satisfy needs but confines itself to dominating and guiding them. The power of the planners derives from the fact that they "create" needs. In this manner, the production of exchange values has been replaced by the production of fictitious use values, and is guided by political decisions, rather than by the immanent laws of the economy.[22] This was the case not only during the Stalinist period of forced industrialization, but also during the phase of greater decentralization, i.e., the phase during which industrial managers were given more power and certain price mechanisms were revived.

The attempt to "reintroduce market categories" which, according to Rakovski, was "the last ideology which portrayed the East European experience as meaningful," generated considerable debate and raised normative questions such as whether market socialism, understood as an ideal model sought by Soviet-type societies, was an alternative to central planning.[23] Western Marxists interpreted this in two ways: 1) the introduction of limited price fluctuations (fixed centrally) in a consumer goods market; and 2) the institutionalization of relative autonomy at the intermediate and low levels of the hierarchy subject to central administrative and political control, i.e., greater space for negotiation within the range of centrally determined priorities.

In reality, within production itself, profit without competition has turned out to be "nothing but a technical phenomenon,"[24] since crucial indicators were centrally determined. Thus, the marginalization of the market has not

21. Rakovski, *op.cit.*, pp. 26-27.
22. Cf. Vajda, "Is Kadarism an Alternative?" *op.cit.*
23. Rakovski, *op.cit.*, p. 66.
24. Cf. Ticktin, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

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eliminated distortions in indicators of success. What has been eliminated, on the other hand, are automatic feed-back mechanisms — self-regulation of the rate of profit relative to at least part of the technical possibilities and social needs — capable of keeping distortions within tolerable limits.[25] Autonomy and decentralization were greatest in the consumer goods sector — even though it was still limited by the determination of prices independently of costs and the unavailability of consumer durable goods for most of the population (the only exception being East Germany). Notwithstanding the increased "transparency" of social relations stemming from the greater prominence of money,[26] real differences in distribution between the various social groups remained in the opaque form of perquisites (housing, cars, etc.) granted to the strata above that of manual workers. In fact, prices and the supply of consumer goods in Soviet-type societies reflect political power relations between the working class and the ruling elite, rather than being the result of capitalist market mechanisms.

The ambiguity in the introduction of "socialist market relations" is exemplified by the denial of legal autonomy to productive units. The political consequences of this are particularly interesting. Not by chance, the social stability of Kadar's regime in Hungary is based in large part on the extra-legal recognition of pressure groups. In a system which does not question one-party rule and suppresses all forms of self-organization, interest groups, such as the official intelligentsia, conservative Church leaders, technocrats, rich and influential farmers, certain sectors of the political bureaucracy, and workers' factory collectives, are nevertheless recognized. Thus, social conflicts are handled through a subtle method of manipulation whereby negotiations between the ruling power and these groups are conducted through semi-official emissaries and never in the presence of official authorities. This is how the "pseudo-market" and pluralism function within the confines of a juridical-institutional system which denies their existence.

The particular role of politics in Soviet-type societies is not discussed much by Marx. It necessitates a new analysis of the state and of politics. According to Vajda, the Marxian conception of the State and political power as simple domination, the pure instrument of bourgeois class rule, the superstructure of true social relations rooted in economics, has prevented the formulation of a theory of socialism able to deal with power relations remaining after the abolition of private property. In the Marxian idea of socialism as the free association of free workers, democracy is conceived as an homogeneous whole lacking any internal articulation. But what is the "administration of things" independently of the exercise of power in the productive process and in society as a whole?

It is not an instrumental conception of the State, but its relative autonomy and the possibility of domination being reproduced outside of capitalist relations which explains the new complexity of social and institutional

25. Rakovski, *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39.

26. Cf. Ferenc Fehér, "Kadarism as the Model State of Krushchevism," in *Telos* 40 (Summer 1979), pp. 19-31.

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phenomena characterizing countries of "actually existing socialism." It is significant that the primacy of economics, which distinguishes capitalism from all other previous social formations, also entails a depoliticization of civil society. The State's function consists solely in defining as not political all material relations inherent in differences in wealth, birth, education and status, and therefore reserving to property the role of determining social differentiations. When Marxism traces all ideological formations (law, State, religion, morality, art, science) back to their economic explanation, it rules out an understanding of the foundations of the State and of political power stemming from the repoliticization of civil society. This process is a counter-tendency already immanent in capitalism, especially in its most recent development when State intervention in the economy becomes crucial. It is also what has happened with the "political revolutions" of the 1920's, i.e., with the attainment of State power by a revolutionary party, the consequent abolition of private property and the instauration of a "State mode of production." Under these conditions, State and political power turn out to be tied to the division of labor and thus represent a specific ruling apparatus within a pattern of social stratification determined not only by economics, but also by status, tradition, life-style and consciousness. This is what allows the State to become the comprehensive ruler of society and an autonomous organ of political oppression.

The Problem of Class and Social Stratification

The representation of the new socio-economic formations in terms of a "corporative pluralism," in which conflicts of interest between the technocracy and the party apparatus never lead to open conflict, requires a redefinition of the antagonisms which divide those in the unified managerial hierarchy who participate in decisions concerning the activity of others and can compel them to execute these decisions, and those excluded from it. In this respect, Vajda challenges the use of the concept of class (in terms of position in the production process) and proposes the more general concept of status. Rakovski also claims that Soviet-type societies have no classes in the traditional sense, i.e., as expressing socio-economic interests as class interests and representing them through appropriate organizations.[27] Economic organizations in Soviet-type societies do not have anything equivalent to capitalist property or to the controls of profitability of invested capital independent of public authorities responsible for the national economy. The organs directly controlling production also guarantee employment, provide supplies, etc. They are subordinate parts of the universal hierarchy encompassing other organizations such as the Party and the unions which represent more than just economic objectives. The dominant class does not impose its goals by means specifically meant to serve its particular interests, but through the functioning of the whole apparatus and its main goal: to prevent all groups from forming specific organizations.[28]

27. Rakovski, *op.cit.*, p. 53.
28. Vajda, "Is Kadarism an Alternative?" *op.cit.*, and Rakovski, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-56.

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This solution, however, does not eliminate conflicts of interest between social groups or a fundamentally dichotomous structure in all Soviet-type societies. Rakovski claims that "class" is still useful in defining such a dichotomy: there is a "class of producers" engaged in real activity, and a "class in power" engaged in regulation and ruling. Of course, there are disparities between class structure and stratification (income, skills, lifestyle, prestige) and there is an intermediate group, comprised of the heads of productive units, which cushions the shocks between the lower levels of the hierarchy and the producers. But the function of this group is to create the false illusion of a certain degree of vertical mobility which is actually nonexistent, given the endogenous self-reproduction of the ruling elite.

The real problem lies elsewhere. Vajda rejects the Marxian concept of class for very specific reasons. To bypass the analysis of a class' real situation, i.e., to fail to define its consciousness and interests as the sum or average of the consciousness or interests of its individual members, amounts to adopting the method of imputation typical of Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness*. There, theory defines the class in relation to an unreal, postulated situation. Under present conditions in Eastern European countries, adopting the Marxian concept of class conflict would mean assuming the viewpoint of the working class, which would interpret in an immediately univocal sense the series of phenomena resulting from the real analysis of Soviet-type societies.

Rakovski poses the problem of the relation between the institutional system and the technostructure in Soviet-type societies somewhat differently. What happens when the lower administrative hierarchy (factory directors and intermediate administrators) does not have specific institutions which can express its "class interests" with respect to those of the central, political bureaucracy, i.e., when the interests of the technocracy have to be articulated within the politically dominated vertical hierarchy? What effects does the new technical composition of the political and administrative ruling apparatus have on workers' consciousness and life? What are the possibilities for the working class to organize at the workplace? Can unions be changed from transmission belts for the realization of the plan, to institutions articulating workers' needs?

For Rakovski, in Soviet-type societies class refers to the identity of social groups in conflict. At such an undifferentiated level, social behavior can only refer to small groups in the workplace and in neighborhoods where social differences assume tangible forms (styles of dress, types of furniture, etc.). To be able to carry out a broader activity and a universal social project, classes have to build their own organizations within the economic and the political spheres. This is precisely what is forbidden by the structure of Soviet-type societies. In fact, because of the lack of institutions articulating fundamental conflicts of interest, all classes, whether dominated or dominating, expect the State to satisfy their needs (consumption, wages, supply of goods). There is thus a serious obstacle to the interpretation of the accumulation and consumption processes in terms of opposing class interests. A no less important consequence of this is the reduction to a minimum of the rate of direct actions by producers who never have the time to create the organizational forms neces-

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sary for the resistance, stabilization and expansion of whatever movements happen to be started, e.g., by wildcat strikes.

Even within the apparatus, interests groups struggling to extend their control over a large part of the hierarchy would not derive any advantage by breaking its essential unity. The case of factory managers is typical. Although higher authorities limit their own freedom of action, these same authorities represent also a defense against workers. Central authorities are in a position to provide the means for the satisfaction of workers' "normal" demands, but also to mobilize the repressive apparatus when it is necessary to break "excessive demands.

In Search of a Space within which to Oppose State-Bureaucratic Power

Under conditions of a social conflict so difficult to define, Hungarian critical intellectuals consider the question of political democracy the test for the existence of effective class discrimination. One of the most ambiguous aspects of Kadarism is its reputation as a "rational" police state. Kadar, in fact, has succeeded in administering a system of light repression and of ideological tolerance within a context lacking legal protections and combining police persecution with the leading role of the Party.

Each year in Hungary, hundreds of people are tried for crimes of opinion and political crimes, under the accusation of "agitation." Rarely are intellectuals accused: usually those accused belong in the lower classes. Furthermore, restrictions on individual liberties not only take the form of repressive police measures, but also lack of freedom to change job and place of residence. The placement office severely limits job mobility, especially among restless, unstable or "disturbed" subjects. Consequently, the working class is divided into two strata: the urban workers, tied to specific branches of industry, advancing within the same workplace, and having a regular family life; and "new workers," frequently young and of peasant origin, who resent the effects of the lack of coordination between industrialization and urbanization, are largely commuters forced to live in villages around large industrial cities, frequently change workplace and residence, supplement their wages by holding a second — occasionally agricultural — job, and have an unstructured private life. It is this "rootless working class" that is hit hardest by restrictions on freedom of employment (a negative liberty relative to the "positive" liberty so widely propagandized by the self-proclaimed socialist regimes, i.e., the right to work).[29]

Only within the framework of political democracy, control of power, and

29. The anti-democratic disparagement of freedom of employment is all the more revealing since the right to work is not recognized as a citizen right but only as an economic-demographic factor related to the accumulation model which in Hungary entails a chronic lack of manpower, low wages, little automation, and inadequate urbanization. To give a further example, even on the level of freedom of conscience and of worship, significant class differences appear in the application of formally identical juridical rules. Religious tolerance is essentially extended only to the high conservative clergy and not to small independent religious communities and sects, where religion is not just an institutional fact, but a communal way of life. Cf. Mark Rakovski, "La Hongrie est-elle réellement si différente?" in *Esprit*, 19-20 (1978), pp. 53-65.

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protections against its abuse, does state control over the means of production and everyday life become socialist. This entails the subsequent recognition that the elimination of market mechanisms leads to the same anarchy of production charcteristic of the completely self-regulating market economy. Such a recognition is followed by qualifications which indicate how far critical Hungarian intellectuals are from any ideological exaltation of the market over the "plan." Whenever the market becomes the main form of economic regulation, it fails completely to satisfy social needs. In sum, either it remains an essentially technical mechanism of competition between units producing consumer goods, or the market becomes synonymous with unemployment and material inequality, which can only be fought with the freedom of organization and the right to strike: in short, with political democracy.[30]

At this point Vajda, in polemic with Bahro, poses a central question: does not proposing political democracy and "corporative-capitalistic competition" [31] as the condition for socialist development mean proposing capitalism without capitalists? Vajda's question summarizes the complexity of a perspective which he does not want to relate to a class viewpoint, but prefers to focus on political democracy (which means a multi-party system, i.e., the end of one-party rule with all that this entails for the institutional character of "actually existing socialism"). The fact that he concentrated on this latter demonstrates once again that it is exactly the opposite of a formal neo-liberal demand, and includes considerations rooted in a particular experience of the management of the economy and society.

Vajda's thesis is that the question of capitalism versus socialism cannot be resolved on the political level. The sphere of the State and of politics, insofar as it has to come to terms with the ineliminable division of labor and hence with the problem of power and its abuse, has nothing to do with socialism: "The socialist State is nonsense." Socialism is a movement of society. It is people's self-determination and self-management, and not the State's "introduction" of relations different from those of capitalism. If there must be a State which permits this process of transformation, then it would be better if it were the State of democratic and pluralistic rights which considers relations of production to be "non-political." To the extent that formal democracy does not deal with problems concerning the concrete structural organization of society, it does not restrict social aspirations and is the best terrain for the construction of socialism.

Unless it is resolved within the political sphere, the question of capitalism versus socialism concerns the forms of human interaction in everyday life (above all at work, but not only there). This leads to the Budapest School's most recent contribution to the debate concerning Eastern European societies. It refuses to speak arbitrarily in the name of the "people" or of the

30. See Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher, "Forms of Equality," in *Telos* 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 6-26. The Budapest School's evaluation of the phenomenon of the market is related to the already cited analyses of Polanyi, which lead to the conclusion that the market is not a phenomenon intrinsic to the economy, but rather external, peripheral in regard to the institutional functioning of society.

31. Bahro, *Die Alternative, op.cit.*, p. 159.

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working class. The critique of actual socialism has only one purpose: that of creating an authentic public sphere which, much more inclusively than its bourgeois forerunner, whether through self-management, counter-culture, or new forms of communal life, should give rise to a democratic and egalitarian communication among the masses, thus creating those new values, needs and forms of action which are alone able to bring about the qualitative leap from capitalism to socialism.[32]

This clarifies the difference developed in recent years between the positions of Heller, Feher, Vajda, Markus and those of Hegedüs. From 1966, Hegedüs has argued for the necessity of having the bureaucracy rule in Eastern European countries. This bureaucracy was not seen as the result of the failure of the transition to socialism, but the product of industrial development as such. The separation developing at a determinate stage of the division of labor between legal property and its exercise has brought about the transfer of managerial and administrative functions to a professionally highly qualified class endowed with strong centralizing powers. Thus, according to Hegedüs, East-European societies have a dichotomous structure. This stems from the existence of bureaucratic strata with particular interests which reproduce themselves by means of the State apparatus as well as through firms and market mechanisms. Although in conflict with official ideology, this analysis remains within an economistic outlook insofar as it refers exclusively to the level of society's economic and industrial development. In this light, the relation between advanced capitalist countries and Eastern European countries comes down to the relation between higher and lower levels of development. For Hegedüs, it follows that the path of Eastern European societies is appropriate for Third World countries.

Bureaucratization can be overcome only through social control by the movements comprising public opinion, but which have to remain outside the power structure. The social dichotomy has to be maintained in the sense that, next to State power, whose one-party form is meant to guarantee the stable integration of particular interests, only an external social sphere can function. This external social sphere would control power through criticism, resistance, freedom of the press, and the public disclosure of bureaucratic procedures. Thus, the answer is neither a multi-party system, nor the revolution of everyday life, since the complete socialization of power is a utopia incompatible with the efficiency of economic development guaranteed only by the bureaucratic apparatus. What Hegedüs rejects is the claim to power, perhaps following "some radical change," by movements exerting pressure from below. In this model of social equilibrium guaranteed by one-party rule and by the persistence of the power apparatus, the pluralism which should characterize the "external social sphere" seems founded on a relativism of values and on an altogether formal idea of the public sphere which does not threaten the power structure. In short, this is quite far not only from an idea of democracy not committed simply to the toleration of those holding

32. Agnes Heller, "Un Avenir," *Esprit*, 19-20 (1978), pp. 66-77.

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power, but also from "workers' control" on the factory level and even farther from direct workers' power.

Hegedüs' recent positions reflect a self-criticism concerning the over-estimation of the reforming capacity of the East-European systems during the 1960s. He has learned a lesson in political realism that does not call into question his basic economism and determinism in relation to which even the Budapest School's philosophical categories, which he adopted in the early 1960s, seem to have remained entirely external. The political process of radicalization of the Budapest School after the crisis of reformism in the 1960s moved in the opposite direction. Kadarism as an alternative or new model which can be followed by other countries has been clearly rejected. It is seen as nothing but a "variation" of the social formation typical of East European countries, and its undeniable specificity must, and can, be explained solely by means of specific Hungarian historical traditions.[33]

In addition to the firm conviction that the regime cannot be reformed from within, these analyses also provide the theoretical and political justification of the ideal-typical method employed by all Hungarian critical intellectuals — from Vajda to Rakovski to Heller, Fehér and Markus — in their analysis of Soviet-type societies. This attempt to derive "models" of analysis from the stabilization of the post-Stalinist regimes has a special meaning for intellectuals who do not want to see their function reduced to merely registering atypical examples of contemporary socio-economic development and have already actively participated in the internationalization of the dissent of recent years.

This position is accompanied by the refusal to rush into politics by assuming the role of intellectuals speaking in the name of the "people" or the working class. It is not accidental that their analyses of Soviet-type societies as "dictatorships over needs" focus specifically on their "ideological" character. Those are societies in which the source of legitimation of the elite's power resides in the "true knowledge" of the laws of development of society and history. The over-rationalism typical of the radical intellectuals who in the 1920s led the revolutionary movement is seen as the origin of a social construction in which a vanguard considered itself legitimated in creating, "for" the masses still immersed in capitalist alienation, the conditions of life corresponding to a model they deemed "just" and "valid."[34] The firm stand against every illusory use of politics in the present conditions is a result of the historical lessons of elitism, of "substitutionalism," and of the voluntarism of the Bolshevist movements. Only when there will be an East European public sphere will it be possible to speak of developmental tendencies and political programs.

The Budapest School has come a long way from the "abstractions" of the early 1960s. The vindication of an autonomous theoretical space for philosophy, especially in Heller — perhaps the one most clearly tied to the Lukacsian heritage — has by now given way to the elaboration of a radical

33. Vajda, "Is Kadarism an Alternative?" *op.cit.*
34. Cf. Feher, "The Dictatorship over Needs," *op.cit.*

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utopia to provide an ideal foundation for politics. It is no accident that the postulate of the state's duty to respect certain democratic rules today constitutes the basis for the political activity of the "new Hungarian opposition."

Against the pragmatism of those who adapt to reality, accept partial concessions and remain satisfied with exerting some influence on the weak points of the system, the new opposition has chosen a strategy of human rights seeking to transcend the system's limitations. In the face of a consolidated and stable system, the vindication in every single case of violation of the fundamental human and civil rights means to seize partial areas of free thought and action. The rebirth of civil society in the form of a democratic public sphere means to increase the ability to limit state power. Unlike intellectuals who risk losing their acquired privileges, "the lower classes have nothing to lose. For them it is always better that the government has to face public opinion whenever it violates fundamental human rights."

What Alternatives?

In their work in progress, Heller, Fehér and Markus do not overlook present conflicts in East European countries. They classify them according to the types of needs they represent. The most elementary type of conflict which, however, is capable of unifying a large part of the population, regardless of the various viewpoints, expresses the need for the rational functioning of the system. It embodies a "revolt" of instrumental reason not only in the economy, but also in politics, and reveals a growing intolerance of the irrationality characterizing the management of power in Eastern Europe. The cultural revolt is set off, in turn, by the need for free cultural activity against the privileges of intellectuals. The civil rights movement expresses the whole society's need for the autonomy of law, its independence from power, and the abolition of the dominant elite's privileges. The opposition's authentic socialist strategy goes even further and takes the form of a political struggle for the autonomy of various collectives, for pluralism, the right of coalition and self-organization, workers' control and free unions.

These are only possible alternatives, not unfolded realities. Yet they are nourished by the system's legitimation crisis which characterizes the present situation in East European countries. "Actually existing socialism" has not given rise to a new system of needs. Rather, it has merely reproduced alienated bourgeois needs. Nevertheless, there seem to be some new expectations, frequently concealed in the shadows of individualist tendencies resembling alienation in Western societies. For example, it is no accident that individual autonomy, the only form of working class autonomy conceivable under present conditions, is making headway precisely through the accumulation of personal property: through that consumerism which to the Western Left appears in radical contradiction to what should be the collective aspiration of the working

35. Cf. G. Bence and J. Kis, "La Vecchia e Nuova Opposizione Ungherese," in *Manifesto*, Jan. 5, 1979.

36. Rakovski, "La Hongrie est-elle Réellement si Différente?" *op.cit.*, p. 65.

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class to assume control over conditions of life and work. The same holds true for the growing emancipation within the private sphere, particularly the family, the religious sphere, and in certain aspects of national and cultural life from the organized control and manipulation of the ruling elite. Decentralization, now in an embryonic stage, in addition to indicating an increasing non-conformism among intellectuals, also means a great differentiation of the dominant class and, for subordinate strata, greater autonomy in decisions and contracts, improvements in the budgets of working class families, the possibility for young workers to have greater job mobility and, at times, even the choice of temporary jobs and challenging attitudes. In a nutshell, it means the formation of a true counterculture capable of spreading to broad social strata. These are phenomena and tendencies which, by themselves, are not sufficient to provoke a crisis within the institutional framework of society. But once a political crisis does occur, they will promote its extension and articulation, as has already partially taken place in the transitional period following Stalin's death.

All of this testifies to the fecundity of the "works in progress" of Hungarian critical intellectuals. If the crucial questions about the role of intellectuals and of the redefinition of the tools of Marxist analysis are unresolved, this indicates that they are no longer the "last buffaloes," exemplars of a dying species, but rather the direct interlocutors of all the forces of the Left engaged in a unified front for the limitation of state power, for grass-roots democracy and for the abolition of exploitation.

Smuggled out of Hungary, this provocative study of class power behind the Iron Curtain may have an impact comparable to Djilas's *The New Class.*

The controversial thesis of this highly original book is that a new class is developing in the Communist societies. This class, the intelligentsia, is at present engaged in a power struggle with the political party elite. The authors predict that the intellectuals on their road to power may ally themselves with the workers, since both are being oppressed by the party apparatus.

Teeming with new ideas and presenting a new model of economics, this book will become a much-discussed and written-about publishing event.


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THE POSSIBILITY OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

by Svetozar Stojanovic*

From 1941 to 1945, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia waged a war of national liberation and succeeded in turning that war into a revolution. After coming to power, it began to establish a new socio-economic system patterned after the Soviet model. The choice of this model for the reconstruction of Yugoslavian society must be attributed to a Stalinist dimension[1] in the Party.

Stalinism exerted tremendous influence on *all* Communist parties. When it functioned as the international vehicle of Stalin's authority, the Third International confirmed and even installed national party leaderships everywhere in the world — including Yugoslavia. To understand the full impact of Stalinism on the CPY requires investigating how the "Bolshevization" (Stalinization) of the CPY was accomplished, as well as grasp the party's sectarianism and its attacks on anti-Stalinist leftist intellectuals before the war,[2] how resistance to Stalinization was crushed, the nature of relations between the leaders of the CPY during the purges in the Soviet Union and the revolutionary terror during and after the war.

The CPY's achievement in 1948 was impressive inasmuch as its protagonists had to liberate themselves from *both* an external and an internal Stalinism. Internal Stalinism required a hard struggle against the Cominform adherents even in the highest offices of the party, the state and the army. The latent contradiction between the independent Yugoslav revolution and Stalinist influence had to end in open conflict. Moreover, there has never been a single independent socialist revolution that could resist the hegemonic claims of the "international revolutionary center." (Cuba might have proved an exception had it not faced a dangerous threat from the United States.)

From the beginning, Stalin strove to undermine the independence of the Yugoslav revolution, to subordinate it to Soviet interests. During the war he criticized the leadership of the CPY for alleged leftist deviations.[3] Interestingly, in 1947, at the First Cominform Conference, Moscow had perfidiously induced these same leaders to criticize the Communist Parties of

*Translated by David J. Parent.

1. This is not even mentioned, for example, in the *Outline History of the Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia*, written and published under commission and with approval of the leadership of the FCY by a group of authors.

2. Yugoslavian politicians claim that these attacks were necessary because only thus could the Party be unified in the struggle against Nationalist Socialism. But that is only an alibi for the monolithic view, for there is no necessary psychological connection — not to mention the absence of a logical one — between readiness for the common struggle against Nazism and the acceptance of the canon of socialist realism and dialectical-historical materialism that was the issue at that time.

3. When the proletarian units were formed and the Second Conference of the Antifacist Council of the Yugoslav Popular Liberation [AVNO] set up a provisional government in November 1943.

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France and Italy which contributed to the CPY's own isolation when its turn to be criticized came the following year. Then, in 1948 Stalin accused them of a dual deviation, though more to the right than to the left. The Yugoslavian leaders reacted ambivalently. Understandably so, if one considers the psychological peculiarity described by William James: men cannot accept something new as true unless they can graft it upon the stock of existing truths with *a minimum of disturbance* and a maximum of continuity. Deeply offended, the CPY leadership rejected all charges, saying that it would prove through action that it had been falsely accused.

Hence, to vindicate itself, the CPY passed a series of ultra-leftist measures that it would later regret: nationalization of the last remnants of small business, services, and weekend houses; further tightening of the agriculture policy that meant that farmers sometimes had to relinquish a greater share of the harvest; increased pressure to make the farmers join agricultural collectives; [4] and purging the national front of "bourgeois elements." Thus, the CPY used Stalinist measures to defend itself against Stalin's criticism. [5] Further evidence of identification with Stalinist methods was its great brutality in the dispute with its pro-Stalinist comrades.

To what extent can these occurrences be justified by considering the hard times of 1948? I am certain that future generations will continue to affirm the need to isolate and expel the Stalinists. Undoubtedly, a much greater terror would have developed had Stalin succeeded in putting a Quisling group in power in Yugoslavia! So rehabilitating the dyed-in-the-wool Cominformists was out of the question. But nothing can justify false arrests, torture and the inhumane conditions of the prisons. And what is to be said about reprisals against the Cominformists' families?

The leaders of the CPY at first did not know how far-reaching their decision to resist Stalin was. They sought to protect their independence and

4. The following dialogue took place among top leaders: "That much grain can't be drummed up in the whole county", said Veselinov, "for the simple reason that the farmers don't have any." "There is grain, but you simply don't want to take it away from them", replied Kidric angrily, "You don't want to have a falling out with the kulaks, that is sheer opportunism on your part".

Oppressive silence prevailed. Veselinov tried to say something, but the words stuck in his throat. With tears in his eyes he managed with great effort to say: "No, that is not opportunism! It is simply true that there is no grain, and we are trying to make the farmers create it out of nothing. So we have started a real war with them. About a thousand farmers have already been arrested and convicted. Some have even been killed. With axes the people defend the bit of grain produced each year from the soil. There are also some kulaks among them, but for the most part those are our people! They were on our side in the Popular Liberation Front, and now they have become our enemies! Not because they are kulaks, but because too much is exacted of them. Our activists who collect these grain taxes have isolated themselves from the people. These very men who were most popular during the war are now the most hated. I believe this should not have been allowed to happen." (Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, *Revolucija koja tece* [The Revolution in Progress], Vol. 2, pp. 127ff.

5. "At an executive session of top leaders, Blogoje Neškovic, Mosa Pijade, and I were instructed to prepare a draft of the Party statutes to be presented to the Fifth Party Congress. We did this work quickly since we had already agreed at the first meeting, to use the Statutes of the Soviet Communist Part as a basis, merely adapting them to our conditions. That was in line with our intention to establish the same kind of socialism as existed in the Soviet Union, and to build a party like the Bolshevist Party." *Ibid.*, p. 93.

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dignity, rather than to create a different internal system of socialism. A real theoretical basis and justification was elaborated only in stages after the fact, while workers' councils as a nucleus for the new socialism were established only two years later. Had the Yugoslavian Communists surrendered to Stalin, like so many others, the Yugoslavian revolution of 1941-45 would have remained an event of local significance. Instead, it developed a world-historical dimension as the first socialist revolution to back out of the "socialist" (statist) containment. All later attempts at more radical transformations in Eastern Europe failed to break through this containment. Hence, the Yugoslav victory in its struggle with Stalin is one of the most important events in world Communism since the October revolution.

This cannot be denied even considering that those who broke with Stalin in 1948 had to give up their own Stalinist position. Certainly, objective factors are at work in history as well as human decisions. But a few of the protagonists of that break are not consistent: while declaring the anti-Stalinist struggle to be the outcome of their own *objective* decision, they nonetheless describe the Stalinist features of their former policy as the result of objective circumstances.

But, to what extent was the time during the terrible political, economic and military blockade of Yugoslavia by the Eastern bloc more conducive to the creation of workers' councils than the period immediately after the war? Obviously, the statist conception of socialism with which the CPY had come to power — and not objective necessity — played a decisive role here. The terms "objective necessity" and "objective factors" often lend themselves to the ideological distortion of history if separated from the positions of the main actors.

Yugoslavia is proof that in a world of tremendously concentrated material and military might, a small country can achieve nothing significant unless it is ready to sacrifice to preserve its independence. The Vietnamese revolution also proved convincingly that small countries can succeed if they have this readiness. Incidentally, while the Vietnamese revolution acted as a catalyst of the New Left movement in the West, Yugoslavia also unleashed policies that promoted a differentiation in the Eastern bloc and between Communist parties in general.

Authoritarian-pauperistic Communism played the leading role in the Yugoslav revolution. Authoritarianism was developed under the Stalinist influence. Its pauperism, however, calls to mind the war communism of Lenin's Bolsheviks inasmuch as its heroic partisan morality was ascetic, collectivist and egalitarian. Adoption of the statist model led to increasing tension between the people and the political leaders. The broad masses of the people, including the majority of the CPY members, lived in an ascetic, egalitarian and collectivistic manner, while elites of the Party and state apparatus enjoyed special privileges such as luxurious living in private residential districts.[6] From the present viewpoint, the privileges of those times

6. "The top leadership cadre of the state and Party were especially favored. They obtained

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were nothing special. But to the people living in extreme destitution, they were an outright provocation.

Thus, the struggle with Stalin led the leaders of the CPY to revise their authoritarian-statist conception of Stalinism. But, since the blockade of Yugoslavia imposed further privations, the pauperistic aspect of Communist policy and ideology became the object of critical studies only later.

After the 1948 turning point, an anti-Stalinist bloc gradually developed in Yugoslavia. Until the end of the 1950s it seemed to be homogeneous, but then, as circumstances changed, it became more differentiated. Since then, under the common rubric of *self-administrative socialism,* several conflicting tendencies have been operating, e.g., *liberal statism, bourgeois socialism,* and *democratic socialism.*

The basic ideas for overcoming statism were initially developed by the Party and state leadership. Their original notions included workers' self-management, lessened state power, and the transformation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia into a Communist federation. To what extent were these aims realized?

The main achievement of this "de-governmentalization" was the development of self-management *in the workplace,* which began in the economy and spread to other areas. But, in practice, self-management is restricted solely to problems of production and distribution. Political questions, in particular, are reserved for the organizations of the Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia and its top leadership agencies.[7]

In the social hierarchy, a series of self-administrative institutions has been created: assemblies for delegates of towns, republics and the federation; communities of interest; various associations and chambers. But since there are no real elections to these bodies, all of this remains merely *formal*

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industrial commodities from the 'Diplomat Stores' which were intended to supply the diplomatic delegations. These stores were organized on the model of those in the Soviet Union. Their existence was justified by the necessity of relieving the leading cadre of daily wants so that they could devote themselves to constructing the new society. We top party leaders also obtained food from our own store. We paid a flat rate of 1000 Dinars per month per member of a household and each took whatever he needed from the store. *We introduced a kind of Communism.* From the very first day abuses appeared in this kind of provision: some top leaders obtained various materials, linens and other items in quantities far exceeding their needs; these commodities were passed on to relatives and friends. . . . We had to react to these phenomena: we passed a regulation that only a certain quantity per member of a household could be bought in the store. That decreased the amount of speculation but did not abolish it completely." (*Ibid.*, p. 22)

"Parallel with the process of the migration of Communists out of production into administration, the material privileges of the administration assumed greater and greater proportions. All ministries, general and main directorships at the federal and state level, directorships of enterprises, county and town popular committees, had their own farms from which they supplied themselves with food at low cost. Moreover, they had villas and summer homes at the seashore or in the mountains where the administration spent its free time. The Communists were doubly privileged: they were in top posts in the administration, and there they enjoyed significant material privileges." (*Ibid.*, p. 134).

7. Whenever the works, e.g., in the universities, schools, newspapers, publishing firms, or cultural institutes, tried to cross these boundaries, their autonomy was so restricted that it was no longer a self-administration, but only participation in supervision. And by means of the rule on "moral-political suitability" as a legal precondition for all important posts, the possibility was created, if needed, to remove all political undesirables.

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self-administration. If there were elections, nothing would equal the democratic content of this system with its nearly two million different delegates.

Self-administration *is* a democratic component in the existing system. But it is also an ideological tool of the status quo. For real self-administration in the work collectives[8] has fostered an ideological image of Yugoslavia as a "society of self-administration of workers and society." To speak summarily of self-administration is ideological; real self-administration is measured in its concrete freedoms and rights as well as by the citizens' possibilities for actually exercising it.

By simple deduction from the ideology of the "self-administered society" the conclusion is drawn — when necessary — that every one of its more important institutions and organizations aims at becoming "self-administrative." In this logic, pressure from below to change these organizations or even to thoroughly criticize them can be characterized by definition as an attack on self-administration. This tendency demonstrates that the authoritarian, statist conception of socialism has not seriously been questioned.[9]

In its time, the slogan "Factories to the workers" signaled a break with statism in Yugoslavia. But today it is necessary to demand a new and equally radical socialist democratization, namely, the self-administration of society by the workers from the bottom up. That is the decisive demarcation between democratic socialism and liberalized statism.

Nothing is more urgent today than to develop a political theory of socialism. The founders of bourgeois democracy initially assumed that power corrupts man. Therefore they realistically attempted to balance personal and group interests by distributing power to both. Marxists have not seen the need for institutional reform. Strangely, they have fallen into helpless moralism in seeking only a guarantee against a non-humanistic misuse of power. While some tinkered with the Marxist theme of the state's withering away, others seized a monopoly of power in the name of Marxism. The result is an acceptance of the state, for better or worse, and a complete inability to distinguish between a good and a bad state. Consequently, no attempts were made to design and establish limits and counterweights against political monopoly. Much could be done in this regard even with only one party ruling.

Recent events do not substantiate the official claims that in Yugoslavia the historical process of the state's withering away has begun, or that politics as

8. This, of course, does not mean that at this level there is no difference between formal and actual self-administration.

9 In Slovenia, a few years ago, a group of 25 Communist delegates was sharply attacked and removed from office merely because they had wanted to add just one name to the official list of candidates for the ruling *presidium* of the Soviet Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It did not matter that as a precaution they proposed a high, trustworthy functionary and that their action was in complete accord with the law passed shortly before by the Slovenian popular assembly. Their action was, nonetheless, branded as a violation of the principle of political self-administration.

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alienated social power exercised by a particular professional group is being overcome. After the victorious revolution, the state nationalized the most important means of production to direct all areas of social life. In this period, a gigantic party and state apparatus was created. From 1950 to today, however, this apparatus has been considerably *decentralized*, and its jurisdiction restricted. Indeed, the role of the politico-economic apparatus is smaller in Yugoslavia than in any other country ruled by a Communist Party. Still, it is significantly greater than in many other countries, especially capitalist ones.

Much effort and many words have been spent on "de-governmentalizing" Yugoslavia. Here, however, the ruling party must be examined very closely. The Yugoslavs live in a society in which the party is the most important institution of rule, of continuity and change. In such a society, further democratization is impossible without greater democracy within the party. Any critique of statism that overlooks the party becomes preoccupied with its secondary aspect in governmental administration.

To distance themselves from other Communist systems, Yugoslav politicians claim that their social order is not a one-party system (although obviously it is not a multi-party system either). In reality, Yugoslavia differs from other Communist-ruled countries not in its party structure, but in its liberal policies and conditions within the party, in the development of self-management in the workplace and in the market economy.

A critical analysis of the party must admit that essentially nothing has been achieved in transforming the party into a federation of Communists. The numerous radical reforms of the party all have ended modestly as minor reorganizations. And yet, critical analysis must go beyond investigating the relationship of the party to the people. It is not merely that the party's relation to the workers far more closely resembles a class-for-itself rather than a class-in-itself. Even within the party, there exists a practical division into a sort of separate party (the leadership) within the broader party (the ordinary members). The dominant influence in its policies and all of political life is exercised by people educated in the spirit of the Communism of the late Third International. Not even in the Federation of Communists — though it ranks first among the ruling Communist parties in its political innovations — has inner-party democracy reached the same level that was known in the Bolshevist Party before the 10th Party Congress in 1921.

Still, people of extremely different origins, interests and opinions belong to the party. Other factors also prevent monolithism: economic development, the level of education, the openness of the country to global intellectual and political influences, and cleavages in the Communist world movement. Sooner or later, the monolithic conception of the party must be adapted to its manifold composition as well as to the variegated milieu in which it operates and Yugoslavia's developmental needs. Until now, efforts to adapt the Yugoslav reality to the monolithic-centralist principle have always predominated. Due to the predominance of this principle, all movements and schools in the party endorse the same platform, even though *only abstractly*.

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In the party no one asks whether the majority of members endorses the official policies. There are no genuine elections in the party. Almost without exception, only one candidate is presented for each important post. Thus, the top leadership is renewed according to its own taste. And its conflicts until now have been solved in the narrowest circle. The public learned of such conflicts only when the subsequent expulsions or resignations were announced.

What if in the future the Party Congress were to elect a few of the top agencies so that they would be independent of one another and responsible only to it: let us say, an executive committee, a control committee, and an information committee? Besides these agencies, which must also include professional politicians, the Party Congress might also elect a body made up of "ordinary" members to participate in all committee work (except the voting) and to give an independent report on the situation at the next Party Congress. As things stand now, the minority in the party cannot work openly to change policy. The assertion that this would cripple the party is unfounded because a democratically determined policy would remain binding until the minority became a majority.

The members and basic organizations now are kept separate, thus encouraging a monopoly of power in the hands of top leadership agencies. "Ordinary" Communists do not have the right to communicate *directly* with one another to influence party policies. Since the leadership can expel members and abolish entire organizations, this means *de facto* that they determine their stance — instead of vice versa. Theoretically the leaderships could completely change the composition of the party. (In the history of Communism that has sometimes actually happened.)

Politically, not only are "ordinary" party members separated from one another, but also from the workers and citizens in general. The professional political apparatus still has the decisive word in party and society. The career politicians' monopoly of power and their privileges are obscured by numerous proclamations on the "de-professionalization" of politics.

If a Communist Party is organized internally along the lines of the Third International, then its external relations to other organizations and institutions are of the same kind. This fact is not changed just because there is no longer strict personal unity between the party leaderships, the state administration and the leaderships of the mass political organizations. A certain division of labor and of competencies has been undertaken, but other factors in the system are still just party instruments. The party assures itself of decisive influence by filling *all important posts* with its disciplined cadres. The party does not struggle for its influence through conviction, thus contradicting the idea that it is an internal, not an external, avant-garde. Sincere efforts have been made to establish the party's influence by force of argument but old methods were swiftly returned to whenever serious differences of opinion arose.

Genuine development from *authoritarian* to *democratic* Communism in Yugoslavia still lies in the future. Yet, the step from *pauperistic* Communism was taken in record time. No trace of asceticism remains as everyone strives

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for as high a material standard as possible. During and immediately after the revolution, collectivism scorned any striving to satisfy individual and group interests. Soon, however, interest was seen as a stimulus to social progress as well as the rights of individuals and groups. Considerable differences of income have long since been permitted to promote production, creativity and education.

Thus, the former asceticism has frequently been replaced by a vulgar and hedonistic consumerism. And, at times, it appears as if hedonism remains the only realistic alternative to collectivism, which has been overcome. But as material egalitarianism was cast aside, the very principle of social equality was also threatened. With critique of the "egalitarian syndrome," a real anti-egalitarian syndrome developed.

Egalitarianism of leveling is not intrinsically justified, because it impedes economic and social progress. But excessive differences between strata of the population also leads to the same result. What remains of socialism if we increasingly are divided into a consumer society and a society of scarcity?

Equality is, according to Marx, the basis of Communism and its political justification. Social equality must remain a basic ideal of Marxist socialism. Socialist equality means distribution according to the work one accomplishes, combined with provision for each individual (regardless of the work he does) of a minimal living standard and the greatest possible opportunity for education, health care and cultural development. How can further modernization be carried out so that the chances for social equality and justice as well as for participation of the broad masses in public life are improved? How much social differentiation is the inevitable price for escaping scarcity? Surely there is no iron-clad law of social differentiation analogous to Michel's "iron law of oligarchy." Discussions on the differentiation of Yugoslav society usually deal only with the economic side of the problem, forgetting that the existing distribution of political power also causes social differences.

Loosening the state plan necessitated reintroducing the market. Lenin, too, had sensed that socialism would not be able simply to abolish the commodity nature of production. Therefore, he replaced the economic impasse of wartime Communism with the NEP. However, Lenin wanted to confine the market to the sphere of small property, understanding the NEP as a temporary deviation from socialism. But that, too, was replaced by dogmatists among the Bolshevists with a completely centralized, distributive and statist economy.

This dogma, however, was rejected in Yugoslavia when it was pointed out that in socialism the economy was supposed to have a market character. But these reforms carried out from a bourgeois viewpoint also began to fetishize the free market economy. Consequently, in the late 1960s, a renewal of the *laissez-faire* conception of the market arose in Yugoslavia.

People regarded the economy as an aggregate of self-administered enterprises competing with one another and completely insulated from broader social influence, permitting them to pursue their legitimate interest

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of increasing their incomes. The next step was to implement market procedures in other areas — in school, culture, health care, and housing policy — allegedly to achieve a broader socialization of property and development of self-administration. This path soon led to group ownership and to particularistic group self-management. The technocratic strata warmly welcomed economic liberalism for they felt that oligarchic groups now had their great chance with this form of "self-administration."

Supporters of the market demanded freedom for "self-administered capital" and proposed the introduction of "self-administered stock ownership." To directly participate in the fate of their plants, the workers were to be transformed into a particular kind of stockholder. Few worried about what sort of a society would come about if, after a short idyll of egalitarian and "self-administered" stock ownership, men were divided into those with shares and those without shares.

A real picture of an unlimited "free market economy" emerged only abroad. There some Yugoslav firms soon went by the names of their managers, who began to behave virtually like owners. The purchase, export and exploitation of the labor force increased as the pressure to abolish all serious controls of imports and exports, as well as of foreign investments, also increased.

Historically, capitalism developed from classical, anti-statist liberalism to a neo-liberalism that demanded state intervention in the economy and in social problems. In Yugoslavia, development during the 1960s went more and more in the opposite direction from statism to an economic liberalism with strong resemblances to classical *laissez-faire* liberalism.

As the antagonist of the feudal state, classical liberalism played a revolutionary role everywhere in the world. But in time it so hindered progress that its adherents were then branded as conservatives. In contrast to classical liberalism, neo-liberalism displays a certain affinity for statism and for socialism.

In Yugoslavia, too, economic liberalism had a progressive function as the antithesis of the state-run economy. But it soon showed a regressive element in fostering a particular kind of *capitalist* relation among the work collectives. Economic liberalism necessarily led to market anarchy, to new contradictions between social production and private appropriation and to unacceptable social differences. The state planners naturally sought a way out of this crisis with government intervention. But when the economy was throttled by hasty government measures, the advocates of a market economy again went into action.

The Yugoslav economy will continue to oscillate between state-intervention and market anarchy until an integral system of self-management combining market competition and social-democratic planning and direction has been developed. But since there is no historical model for such an economic and social system it is understandably not easy, even theoretically, to find the right solutions.

Nonetheless, a "liberalized" statism and "bourgeois" socialism cannot

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co-exist equally under Yugoslav conditions. Whenever they have collided directly, the latter has always proved weaker. The statists have easily exploited popular dissatisfaction with market anarchy by restricting the political freedom achieved through de-governmentalization.

For Yugoslavia, the last three and a half decades have constituted an entire historical epoch, not just a period. Without the Communist Party, the reconstruction of Yugoslavia from the rubble of foreign occupation and civil and religious war would not have been possible. The revolution rapidly accelerated the historical development of this region.

In the Yugoslav Federation, there is now considerable equality of the federated nations and national minorities. During this period Yugoslavia has developed from a backward agricultural country into a moderately developed industrial and agricultural one.[10] After the CPY gave up the compulsory collectivization of the village, agriculture was considerably modernized. Measured by the quantity and variety of consumer goods, Yugoslavia hardly falls short of comparably developed Western countries. Education, social services and health care are available to the broad masses. Self-management is developing in the work collectives. Individual areas of art, science and philosophy are blossoming. And Yugoslavia is the only Communist governed country that is open to the world. (This is one of the reasons why the claims and expectations of the population have risen so greatly.)

So Yugoslavs live in a society which, by its material criteria, has closely approached the moderately developed countries. But it is also a society with many political failings. Despite pressure from the progressive wing in the leadership and grass-roots of the CPY, the conservative wing periodically strays from its democratic promises and statements. Still, the ideology sets alluring goals whose true and concrete meaning is revealed only in practice. "It turns out that words are no eye of a needle, but a door wide open for everyone. One can easily get in through them like out of the dark into the morning light."[11] Whether those in power support genuine democratization can be measured by their acceptance of its inevitable consequences: the critique of their work, the possibility of removing them from office, and the appearance of "undesirables" on the political stage.

The cyclical alternation of political hard and soft lines ("loosenings" and "tightenings") will continue as long as the party maintains itself in the role of change from a protector of order rather than an initiator of the *socialist movement*. For Marx, Communism was primarily a movement. And many Communists still understand "Party" as a synonym for "movement." In all previous socialist revolutions, the movement was more inclusive than a Communist Party. Other participants were swept from the stage only after the seizure of power. How can the revolutionary and post-revolutionary dictatorship be democratized if the Communists do not recapture the idea of

10. Statistics documenting this can be read in the book *Yugoslavija trideset godina posle oslobodjeni i pobede nad fasizmon 1971-75* [Yugoslavia Thirty Years after the Liberation and the Victory over Fascism 1941-1975] (Federal Institute of Statistics, Belgrade, 1975).

11. Jerzy Andrzejevski, *Ciemnosci kryja ziemie* [Darkness Covers the Earth] (Warsaw, 1957).

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the movement? In a fully socialist movement, nothing would be guaranteed for the party in advance. It would have to struggle for its influence by its example, by conviction and open argument.

As long as democratic social pressure is not articulated from below, any fundamental political reform will always dissipate like a mirage. Certainly, only a political movement can tear men out of their "practical inertia." In the party, many wish for a socialist movement but when such beginnings appear, they are gripped with fear of the new and of risk. Fear within the party caused the student movement of 1968 to be repressed. At that time, the party and state hierarchy encountered their first broad challenge from the democratic left only to smash it at the stage of Sartre's "fusing groups." Actions such as these support the thesis that blocking the leftist way out of the political crisis generally leads to a rightward swing. How else could the strong gains of the nationalistic rightists two years later be explained?

In reality, the question is not: why can't the workers as a class step onto the political stage? but rather, whose interests prevents this? In Yugoslavia, the party created the conditions for a more rapid development of the working class through forced industrialization. Yet, with the party's political monopoly, this process fragmented the working class. How are the workers to become a class if they are not politically organized or engaged? Plainly, it is not enough to have a worker-oriented ideology: one must also carry out a working class policy. The best guarantee for such a policy, however, is mass participation by the workers themselves in political decisions at all levels.

Insufficient development or the lack of education among the workers can no longer excuse the Yugoslav situation. There have been large industrial centers for quite a long time, but worker participation in political life in these cities is minimal. As for education, Yugoslav workers today on the average have much higher education than did the bourgeoisie at the time when it became the ruling class all across Europe.

Perhaps the democratic movement will ultimately gain enough strength in the Party, despite the defenders of the past and the present, to openly base itself on popular pressure and start developing a socialist movement. That will not happen either easily or quickly. Yet, how can it, if the goal is a far-reaching transformation? Preserving a modicum of stability is only one factor that concerns a small country located between the two world blocs. All the reasonable and progressive forces must develop and implement a realistic program of socialist democratization. Of all countries where Communist parties rule, Yugoslavia has the best chance for this.

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THE STATE AGAINST ITSELF: SOCIALIST TENSIONS AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE U.S.S.R. 1936-1938

by Gabor T. Rittersporn*

The primary concern of the present study is to analyze the internal conflicts within the Soviet ruling strata during the "great trials" of 1936-1938. By and large, historians have paid only scant attention to social and political conflicts during this crucial period in Soviet society, when they have not simply ignored them altogether. This is often due to a certain assumption concerning the nature of Soviet society. For the latter tends to be seen as a monolithic block in which nothing can move, dominated as it is by a bureacratic apparatus whose empire extends without exception over all activities — an apparatus that in turn was dominated for a long time by the will of a single individual, Stalin.

The present study, in contrast, seeks to demonstrate the existence of radical anatagonisms not only within Soviet society, but within the Soviet state and its ruling strata. It contends that this state, while claiming to define, inspire, organize and control all of society, tends on the contrary to generalize disorder, fragment the leadership, and fracture the country into quasi-feudal entities. As a result, an inevitable conflict emerges within the ruling strata. Those who would react against the very real deviations of the apparatus and its centrifugal tendencies oppose those who, benefiting from the arbitrary and uncontrolled exercise of power, end up representing a relatively coherent and structured, though paradoxically anonymous, set of interests. In our view, the "great purges" must be deciphered as a particularly acute phase in the struggle between these two tendencies, and ultimately in the struggle of the state against itself as situated within the context of its attempts to reproduce itself.

At the root of the antagonisms within the state apparatus lay the fear of antagonisms within society at large. In all probability, the stuggles of 1936-1938 were unleashed by popular discontent with the arbitrariness, corruption and inefficiency of the ruling strata. The proponents of the self-correcting state sought to maintain the leadership positions of the members of the state apparatus in the face of the masses' growing disaffection. On the other hand, the participants in the "centrifugal" tendencies wanted to preserve their privileged positions at any price, regardless of the social consequences. This struggle among the privileged that was in turn grounded in a larger social struggle could only result in an unstable but necessary compromise.

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* Originally published in *Libre*, 4, 1978, pp. 3-38. English translation by Brian Singer. The original version has extensive technical documentation, mostly from archival sources such as the archive of the party leadership of the Western Region (captured first by the German and then by the American army, and now to be found at Harvard University). Since these references are of interest only to a handful of experts who can readily consult the French original, they have been omitted from this translation.

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I.

If one reads closely the Soviet press of 1936, one has little difficulty in discovering traces of popular discontent, or in discerning the anxiety of certain ruling circles before the increasingly obvious disgruntlement of the masses. Following the publication in June of 1936 of the project for a new constitution, the dissatisfaction and demands of ordinary citizens appear even in *Pravda* — to the point where the newspaper's editorial staff felt obliged to discontinue the systematic publication of amendments proposed by its readers. For, aside from the inoffensive pieces occasioned by a naive enthusiasm, a number of these amendments tended to treat problems whose detailed discussion was definitely not among the initial intentions of those promoting the campaign for a "national discussion" of the new fundamental laws.

It was not by chance that many of the proposed amendments touched on questions of personal security, especially those concerning the individual's juridical guarantees. Many expressed the opinion that the education level of judges was extremely low. Some demanded that the electorate have the right to dismiss judges within the locality. Others underline the lack in the projected constitution of any mention regarding the rights of popular assessors, and of any precision regarding those of lawyers. And was it not characteristic to see the desire expressed for the clear imputation of criminal responsiblity of "all functionaries" who might be at the origin of illegal arrests, and for the exact determination of any extensions in the preliminary examination, along with the definition of sanctions for all wrong-doings committed during the course of the inquiry?

So many indices could not but alert the leadership to the masses' open lack of confidence in the functioning of the judiciary, in spite of all the regime's solemn assurances about the rights of citizens. An official summary of the "national discussion" did not fail to deplore the "excessive attention" paid to "juridical details".

Such distrust of the guarantees proposed by the constitution was evident in other domains as well. Thus, it was proposed that one pursue as criminals those responsible for refusing to hire workers, witholding wages and exercising improper lay-offs, as well as those guilty of "creating artificial conditions to fire workers". Some were upset at not seeing the establishment of free medical services assured. Others demanded guarantees for the inviolability of personal property and the secrecy of personal bank accounts. Or, again, it was recommended that an article be included specifying the duration of police functions. Finally, the demand was expressed for an imperative limit on deputies' terms of office, as well as for a limited extension of time for the nomination of functionaries by the supreme Soviet (the highest level of state power according to the new constitution).

The project was presented and discussed at innumerable meetings organized by local authorities. The latter did their best to contain the debate within the framework of a formal assembly where only chosen orators

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who unanimously praised the new constitution were allowed to speak. However, in spite of everything, a number of these meetings became forums for the severe criticism of the local administration's deficiencies. And sometimes, for example in the Western Region, the discussion of the project moved beyond the critical assessment of merely local problems. In the villages, peasants demanded equal rights with urban dwellers, i.e., social security, a guaranteed pension, and a work-day of eight hours on the kolkhozes. In addition, they protested against the high price of wheat sold by the state's commercial network, which, because of the forced deliveries, had been bought at a low price. There was one person who wanted to know if it was possible to proceed legally against anyone who had been formally honored by the state, while another judged the number of functionaries in the district soviets excessive. And finally, certain speakers, peasants as well as workers, proposed in all seriousness the authorization of opposition political parties.

It might appear strange, but the manifestation of these signs, suggestive of a profound discontent that sought only its own expression, did not discourage those promoting the "national discussion" from continuing the campaign and thus censuring the local authorities who were doing their best to disarm the critique. This must be seen as indicative of more general trends. In global terms, the year 1936 was marked by the growing attention of certain circles within the country's central leadership to the political sentiments at work within the masses. Moreover, as subsequent events were to demonstrate, these same circles tried to turn the increasingly manifest critical attitude of the populace to their own advantage.

The archives of the Western Region (better known as the Smolensk archives) contain materials essential to an understanding of the social and political conflicts of 1936-1938. Here are to be found five voluminous dossiers filled with complaints formulated by the region's citizens, addressed to different instances of the apparatus, and assembled by the party's regional leadership. A good number of these complaints are addressed directly to the first secretary of the region. Various indices suggest that the latter, a member of the Central Committee, was especially entrusted with examining the contents of the dossiers.

The authors of these documents are as diverse as the problems they raise. There are even traces of letters sent by detainees of labor camps and prisons. Nonetheless, a certain number of highly significant similarities appear in the tone employed by the different correspondents.

During the nineteen twenties and thirties, letters addressed to the editorial staffs of newspapers and above all to the party organs and soviets were officially considered to be of great importance. One had even gone so far as to set up a special network within the local press of "worker and peasant correspondents", which not only provided precious information to journalists, but sometimes allowed thorny social and political problems to be discovered in time by the party. The party organs were supposed to systematically follow

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the correspondence received by the newspapers and the complaints addressed to different instances of the state apparatus — a duty that in fact seems to have been somewhat neglected.

Already in 1934, two eminent speakers at the 17th Party Congress protested on the subject of these famous letters, claiming that they were often abandoned without even having been opened. And in June 1935 a resolution of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee condemned this negligent and all-too-prevalent attitude. From this date onward, signs begin to multiply of an unprecedented attention from above to the problem of these complaints. Thus, shortly after the Plenary Session, a directive from the Supreme Court provided protection for the "worker and peasant correspondents" by forbidding the names of authors of compromising information from being divulged.

In March of 1936, a decree from the Central Committee, denouncing the "political blindness" of the editors of two regional newspapers and pillorying their attitude to the letters as "bureaucratic" and "feudal", ordered all newspapers to publish the "politically most important" correspondences and to examine any allegations that they might contain. In addition, this decree severely condemned the practice of forwarding critical letters to those persons against whom the letters complained — a practice that had already been prohibited in 1932 by the Office of the Public Prosecutor. It would seem that this practice was no less widespread than before, and that the formulation of such letters was not without its risks.

The entire spring of 1936 appears to have been marked by warnings from the summit against any disinterest in workers' demands. For example, a decree from the leadership of the Western Region ordered the careful examination of all complaints received by the various party organs and local soviets. The dossiers in the archives bear witness to an unprecedented zeal in the analysis of all information coming "from below". The evidence clearly suggests that the initiative did not come from the regional leadership alone.

In May of 1936, a decree of the Soviet Control Commission, approved by the Council of People's Commissars (the government), and widely echoed in the press, severely condemned the abuse of power by leading officials of "soviet institutions", i.e., for all practical purposes, of the country's entire administrative and economic apparatus. Noting that most of the complaints concerned infringements by cadres, this decree heightened the responsiblity of officials for all that was answerable to examination and for the prompt rectification of the errors or shortcomings mentioned in the letters. It was followed several weeks later by another decree, this time coming from the Central Executive Committee (the supreme organ of state power according to the 1924 Constitution). However, this important legislative act was published after more than seven months delay (its original promulgation dating from December 1935), and even then it only appeared in the official compendium of the laws without being, in contrast to the decree of the Soviet Control Commission, widely commented on by the press. Perhaps this delay and the

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act's rather discreet publication must be imputed to its particularly severe tone and its unusually radical disposition.

This decree consisted of no less than an explicit condemnation of the soviet apparati for neglecting to execute the repeated directives of the party and government relative to the populace's claims and complaints. This decree did not limit itself to prohibiting the practice of forwarding the complaints to the cadres under accusation, or to defining the amount of time allowed for an examination and the measures that would eventually be taken, or even to specifying the individual responsiblity of those at all levels of the apparatus. It went so far as to serve notice of the legal prosecution of those who were remiss or who failed to execute the decisions taken to remedy the shortcomings signalled by the letters.

However, there is much evidence to prove that the forthcoming resolutions of the Central Executive Committee did not really have a chance of being implemented. In spite of everything, interest in these letters barely extended beyond the summer and fall of 1936. That said, it is not impossible, on the basis of several significant indices independent of the Western Region's archives, to go back to the origins of the considerable and sudden interest of a number of the most highly placed Soviet leaders in an orderly study and appraisal of what was at times a barely legible correspondence.

One of the most respected elder Bolsheviks commented on the decree of the Soviet Control Commission, of which he was a member: "The demands and complaints have a different character from those addressed several years ago... The workers are reacting sharply to isolated bureaucratic deformations, and in a number of cases they are posing questions whose social implications are of far-reaching consequence.... The demands of the workers demonstrate the large number of cases of administrative arbitrariness, and the irresponsibility of those directing the various institutions and organizations."

The letters from the archives of the Western Region concern practically all the problems of everyday life, from those of the kolkhozes to those of the industrial enterprises. These complaints are denunciations of the practices of those managing these organizations, as well of soviet officials, and even of party cadres. The archives also contain records from inquiries, reports from investigations, and other documents of this type, which suggest that the complainants did not always demonstrate the required objectivity and even proceeded by false allegations. But what is most important is not the truth or falsehood of the facts reported, but the "workers' sharp reaction", the type of argumentation to which they resorted, and the tone they employed.

It should be noted that all the authors of these letters sought to express themselves in the official style of the period. They claimed that they were defending the existing social order in order to appeal to its official principle of justice — principles that were being constantly violated in a striking and systematic manner by representatives of the same regime, in the name of its superior interests. The complainants were not necessarily convinced of the existence of this justice, but they realized that the best means of being heard

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by those theoretically entrusted with its defense was to speak loudly in its name. This is why, when protesting against arbitrary administrative methods or even against the brutality of local potentates, their corruption or princely leisures, they did their best to express themselves in the official language, imitating newspaper articles that were denouncing the same phenomena.

Perhaps they are speaking spontaneously when comparing the presidents of the kolkhozes, the functionaries of the soviets, and factory foremen and managers to the police and bosses of the old regime. But a more subtle utilization of the press's terminology is evident when twenty-four kolkhoz members denounce the abuses committed by their president under the cover of the local soviet's leadership, by speaking of "criminals at liberty with the party card". In a similar fashion another letter concludes: "Under the protection of the party's District Committee, there are communists who cannot be in agreement with the party's and government's policies, and who instead act like policemen with the party card in their pocket." And the application of official categories is even more deliberate when a complainant writes concerning the leadership of a district soviet: "The district's executive committee, instead of becoming the instrument of socialist construction, has become one of terror. Not one human word can be heard for the leaders of the kolkhozes called to the praesidium except 'saboteurs', 'band of kulaks', 'reprimand,' 'warning,' 'you are liable to prosecution' — these are the main points of the resolutions. . . Are not the true class enemies the president of the executive committee and the head of the district's agricultural department?"

In this correspondence there are suggestions of a certain confidence in the regime's justice. Undoubtedly, such sentiments are at work among the following group of workers: "we are writing for the sake of all the ignorant and unconscious workers who curse those in power because of such idiots." But on closer examination even the threats to appeal to Moscow, that is, to Stalin in person, are far from confirming any unconditional confidence in the regime's capacity to have its own rules respected. It is common for these writers to let it be known that the problem has been created or rendered insoluble by the fact that their adversaries belong to the state apparatus. It is even more common to see it openly noted that functionaries remain unpunished because of their party membership or official position, even in the case of offenses that would have led to the prosecution of ordinary citizens.

It cannot be doubted that the increasingly conscious and open manifestation of the antagonism between citizens and functionaries, between unprotected workers and the uncontrolled representatives of power must have attracted radical attention to the dangers of aggravated social tension. The increasingly radical expression of this conflict could only have led those in authority to respond politically to this rising exasperation before it found its own outlet. How could they not have been impressed by the often reckless affirmation of opposing interests between cadres in the state apparatus and the rest of society?

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For in these letters there was also talk of "sovereigns" protected by justice. And it was not simply impatience that showed through in such vehement questions as the following: "Up to what point will such bureaucrats, squanderers and drunkards make fun of and offend the honest kolkhoz worker?" Or when one alluded to cadres "comfortably installed in their niches...who have full license to enrage workers [and who] involutarily resemble those rotten manufacturers who would do nothing but drink and make scenes." Workers moved beyond the conflict over wages when they declared, while threatening to quit their jobs, that "the leaders care only about themselves, they receive appointments and bonuses...the sanatoriums and rest homes are for them, but for the workers there is nothing."

Obviously those within the ruling strata who, because of their functions, were concerned with the country's political stability, did not first discover the existence of mass discontent in 1936, even if at that moment it began to take on unprecedented amplitude. Nor was it at this time that they first began to confront the immense difficulties involved in the country's administrative and economic management.

In reality, the measures that we have related must be situated within the context of a larger series of attempts between 1933 and 1936 to establish efficient, centralized control over the state apparatus — attempts crowned with only modest success. The severe resolutions of the 17th Party Congress against the lack of discipline amongst functionaries did not result in any great change; logically speaking, it was easier to obstruct official discourse. Given the disastrous mess resulting from normal managerial practices, however, the need for putting things in order was great.

Not only did the economic apparatus squander primary materials and energy on a large scale, it established a system for the general dissimulation of the country's real productive capacity. To this should be added the tendency to circumvent the plan's requirements either by including an impressive quantity of malfunctioning parts in the production figures, or by limiting output to the fabrication of gross or rudimentary products, and thus allowing the proclamation of spectacular results, without in the least satisfying the country's real needs. Those responsible for agriculture usually delivered only erroneous or even totally false statistics and reports, directing their efforts more towards the often openly violent extortion of the products of kolkhoz members and independent peasants than to the rational organization of agricultural labor. The picture is hardly better as regards the functionaries of the soviets. They regularly resorted to brutal methods in order to collect taxes, or augmented their budgetary revenues with totally illegal supplementary collections. This does not include the occasional enactment of "local laws," in flagrant contradiction of the legal principles in force, which allowed them to cover up their arbitrary practices.

The relative failure of the campaigns to rationalize the economic and administrative apparatus and to reform its inefficient and politically disruptive methods was not surprising. Nothing could have been easier than to do nothing for these campaigns while hiding behind enthusiastic

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declarations and ostentatious measures; or to increase pressure on the workers and peasants instead of applying the recommended methods; or quite simply, to act as if the central directives did not exist. Still, it must be added that the functionaries' activities, beyond being uncontrollable, economically disastrous, and resulting in mass exasperation, frequently included corruption, embezzlement, and speculation.

How could such difficulties be surmounted? As party members and officials, or as cadres of the state apparatus, those at fault could be investigated and subjected to disciplinary measures — but the responsibility for the administration of these measures still fell on people belonging to the party. Thus the paralysis of the special organs of control. Three large campaigns for the individual verification of the party's adherents took place between 1933 and 1936 under three different pretexts: the purges of 1933-1935, the "verification of documents" of 1935, and the "exchange of documents" of 1936. In all three cases, the main objective was to eliminate the most compromised members. Most of the cadres, however, managed to protect their friends and produce ostensible proofs of their own vigilance, while deflecting the charges onto a large number of insignificant scapegoats, notwithstanding the protest of the party's central organs.

It should be understood that at all levels of the apparatus, the cadres, by their very position, were almost constantly forced to indulge in infractions and to resort to arbitrary, unpopular, and illegal measures. Entrusted with the execution of plans that were usually too ambitious, or overly vague and badly defined, and handsomely remunerated for the activity commensurate with their posts (which could be revoked in cases of incompetence), they had to demonstrate their ability to realize the impossible if they were to keep their positions. How, under such conditions, could they cut down on the deceit, double-dealing, and brutality for which they were reproached? But, although they collectively, systematically, and continuously violated the principles, rules and directives officially in force, the cadres did not represent any articulated political opposition, even if from the perspective of the state apparatus' logic their practices were the result of a general and quasi-organized sabotage or the regime's objectives.

Part of an immense system of management that integrated all economic, administrative and political activities at the national level, the majority of the cadres could not but be aware that only those policies capable of guaranteeing the integrity, smooth functioning and development of the state apparatus would assure them of their more or less privileged social positions. These policies — industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture — had been largely approved, even enthusiastically, by most of the cadres in the days following the victory over the factions that had opposed them during the years 1927-1932. Moreover, toward the middle of the 1930s, most of the old opponents ended up rallying behind their former adversaries. Even if they remained hostile to the brutal methods of collectivization, they had to acknowledge that it was a *fait accompli*, and that, in spite of everything, it was important to resume political activity. This was all the more the case as in

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the last instance they were just as convinced as their former adversaries that the egalitarian, collectivist society of the future, promised by the revolution, could only be based on modern industry.

Thus, there was no opposition, whether open or clandestine, among the cadres of the state apparatus to the ambitious policies of collectivization and industrialization. On the contrary, their fundamental community of interests lay in supporting these policies in the face of the rest of the population — that is to say, peasants who, while being hostile to the kolkhozes, were still the principal source of the revenues necessary for industrialization, and workers who, barely educated and even less motivated, for the most part were former peasants who had fled their villages because of collectivization.

As a result, the following contradiction emerged: on the one hand, the cadres owed their pre-eminent positions and social prestige to the apparatus. On the other hand, these concrete advantages depended on their maintaining their present posts. Whatever the sincerity of their adhesion to the policies that they had to carry out, they were forced, more or less unconsciously and sometimes in all innocence, to sabotage their practical realization. For if they wanted to retain their posts, they had to provide proofs of their success. And yet, because they often lacked any professional preparation and experience, because they were forced to work against the passive and sometimes openly hostile attitude of the masses, and because they were confronted with demands which certainly corresponded to the country's needs, but not at all to objective possibilities, the cadres often had no choice but to resort to improvised, brutal and arbitrary methods. As such, they were led to try and undermine any central supervision that would have unmasked them.

For those within the ruling strata who were concerned with the construction of an efficient centralized apparatus, the damaging and disruptive aspects of the cadres' activities could only present a formidable political danger. They could not but see in them "centrifugal" tendencies that had to be energetically opposed. And yet, at the same time, they were linked to these cadres — who, after all, represented them — by a fundamental community of interests that rendered any counter-measures extremely difficult. Being themselves functionaries of the apparatus, how could they not be directly concerned with its preservation and development? And being privy to the same environment, they were undoubtedly not ignorant of the fact that the recourse to such methods by their colleagues was almost inevitable. But then, how could they accept the idea that for a large number of those holding administrative posts, there was no other choice but to evade control from above, act with whatever means was available and, as a consequence, prevent the state from functioning in a coherent and codifiable manner? For then they would not only have to admit the impossibility of rational policies, but they would have to question the state's very *raison d'être*, as well as the privileged positions of its agents.

From this followed the precise imperatives that determined the conduct of the partisans of strict central control: they were to struggle against the

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"centrifugal" tendencies by separating as carefully as possible, at least in theory, the general course of state activities from the "harmful" aspects of the cadres' behavior, which were in turn presented as defects absolutely foreign to the normal universe of the existing system. Such a procedure was all the more necessary as, according to official discourse, the apparatus and its policies constituted the fundamental interests of the workers and peasants, i.e., of that part of society on which, in reality, collectivization and industrialization weighted most heavily. At a theoretical level, there was no problem in separating the apparatus from its inherent "centrifugal" tendencies: one could simply condemn such activities as criminal and impute them to the maneuvers of hostile elements. But, at a more concrete level, the discovery and neutralization of the actual carriers of the disease would prove to raise more formidable difficulties.

For, to whom could one entrust the task of pursuing those responsible for the administration's defects, if not to the representatives of the public authority's legal powers? And, as a consequence, who was better placed to render the task impracticable if not the guilty themselves? Given the distrust and discontent of the masses, any recourse to their mobilization against the apparatus' gangrenous members was highly problematic. One could resort to police measures. But here again a number of the administrative and political cadres had, as a result of their functions, quasi-police powers that allowed them to protect themselves in case of need, and if necessary to reply with counter-measures. And this is not counting on the fact that representatives of the "centrifugal" tendencies had support, and even spokesmen, within the central leadership.

One should not imagine two clearly delimited camps with standardized lines and slogans, and whose front-line men, at least in the upper rungs of the state apparatus, were unchanging. If the positions were relatively stable and coherent, the persons attached to them were not, even though one would think that a certain number of the properly political leadership posts would by their very nature lead their occupants into the camp of those upholding central control. About-faces from one camp to the other were frequent, and both positions tried to turn the slogans and measures advanced by their adversaries to their own advantage. As a result, once one has identified the different positions, it is extremely difficult to attach names to them.

In fact, there are only a few contradictory public declarations made at the end of 1937 which suggest that at that moment the intransigent proponents of strict central control were headed by I.V. Stalin, M.U. Kalinin, A.I. Mikoian, N.I. Ezhov, and M.F. Shkiriatov. The majority of their peers, grouped around V.M. Molotov, L.M. Kaganovick, A.A. Zhdanov, K.E. Voroshilov, A.A. Andreev, V.I. Chubar, N.S. Khrushchev, and G.M. Malenkov, advocated a more lenient treatment of the cadres. However, a few months earlier, most of those now advocating the cause of the "centrifugal" tendency, and above all Molotov, Kaganovich and Zhdanov, had upheld the "hard line."

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In summary, the situation can be characterized as follows: The state apparatus was being undermined by an incurable internal contraction giving rise to an opposition that, being both omnipresent and elusive, was not explicit, but nonetheless formidable. The apparatus was then forced to turn against itself and strike at its members, and yet it was incapable of truly naming their "crimes", comprehending the causes of these "crimes", and designating the guilty with any certainty. It is on this basis that the oscillations during the period of the "great trials" must be understood.

II

The attempts at the individual verification of the party's members between 1933 and 1935 had been officially motivated by the dangers to the country's political stability supposedly posed by the penetration of elements whose social origins were "foreign" to the working class, beginning in 1935, or "Trotskyist" elements. But far from eliminating even the most visible and suspect representatives of the "centrifugal" tendencies, these campaigns resulted only in the spectacular persecution of insignificant scapegoats in the name of either their bourgeois origins, or their past as members of the opposition, even if they had long since repented. The fact that 38% of all workers belonging to the party in the ten most important industrial regions were eliminated during the purges of 1933-1935 on the pretext of "political passivity" is only too characteristic of the methods used by party officials. One sees how the indispensable victims were chosen from amongst non-cadre elements, that is, from amongst those who were least able to defend themselves, who were the most troublesome, and whose critical remarks at local meetings must have most closely represented the anger of the rest of the population.

In all probability, a certain awareness of the purges' paltry results was responsible for the brusque abandonment in the first months of 1936 of allegations that the country's economic and administrative difficulties were due to "hostile" plots by "foreign" or "Trotskyist" elements. During this period, not only was "sabotage" not attributed to "subversive" activities, but one even began to see the beginnings of official reflection, marked by numerous positions, on the true causes of the political problems encountered. It is at this time that the severe warnings relative to the populace's complaints, discussed in the preceding section, were made, and that the decree of the Soviet Control Commission, whose importance we noted, was passed.

This decree did not concern merely the registration and examination of critical letters. In effect, it accused those managing the country's administrative and economic apparati of revolting abuses. It reproached them for having imposed severe penalties on workers within their "jurisdiction", and thus freeing themselves of all responbility by placing the blame on subordinates acting on their orders. Furthermore, the decree condemned both their refusal to hire workers of "suspect" social origins or "doubtful" pasts, and the periodic purges of these same workers, in order to

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assure themselves a semblance of irreproachability. Finally, the decree drew attention to the imminence of corrective measures "by a disciplinary path for matters of a manifestly criminal character (speculation, abuses of power, etc.)."

It is clear that the Soviet Control Commission had officially rejected the practices by which functionaries had until then warded off the blows. It was not the subalterns whose only crime was their "doubtful" extraction or past activities, who merited serious condemnation, but their superiors. In short, as an editorial in *Pravda* went so far as to emphasize, it was necessary to put an end to the tendency to supplant the laws "by the arbitrariness of some bureaucrat."

However, this episode did not last very long. It was inconceivable that a semi-realistic or non-complacent approach to the country's social and political problems could have been developed for any length of time. In effect, such an approach would of necessity have quickly led to the implication of important persons — old combatants of the revolution and civil war, illustrious participants in the struggles against the left and right opposition, and heroes of collectivization or industrialization. It would have required the recognition that, generally speaking, the cadre's activities inevitably blocked the state's normal functioning and created social tensions. Finally, it would have been necessary to squarely recognize that by reason of the apparatus' very structure, most of the executive tasks could be carried out only by dodging any attempt to enforce central control or planning.

Thus, the retreat was not long in coming. Soon after the Plenary Session of the Central Committee in June 1936, summary accusations against old opponents were again being made. This throwback to the struggle against "hostile" plots should probably be seen as a compromise between the two opposed "camps", although representatives of the "centrifugal" tendencies succeeded in exploiting the situation to their own advantage. Thus, they were able to stage a large political trial, loaded with symbolic weight, at which old members of the opposition who had already been dismissed and imprisoned for quite some time were prosecuted. This was the first of the Great Moscow Trials; the accused including L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Zinoviev, I.N. Smirnov, G.E. Evdokimov, and S.D. Mrachkovskii. The trial's main purpose was to anchor an "explanation" of the difficulties of Soviet management in aggressive acts external to the apparatus, by "proving" the terrorist intentions of the survivors of the old opposition. When translated into the facts, it became a veritable pogrom, involving the noisily orchestrated pursuit of a considerable number of perfectly inoffensive victims. Only during the fall of that year were the supporters of the "centralist" tendency able to stop this campaign.

The position of those promoting the campaign of the summer of 1936 was clear: all "subversive" activities were to be attributed to former Trotskyists. For the writers of the letters now in the archives, the interpretation of the origin of "sabotage" and of what constituted an "enemy", appears to have been both similar and somewhat larger. Thus, when the first allusions to the

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"hostile" activities of former members of the old opposition appeared in the press, the president of a village soviet, convicted of corruption, was accused of "Trotskyism." Similarly, shortly after the newspapers blamed "terrorist conspirators" for the assassination of S.M. Kirov in 1934, 21 workers wrote that such a crime could only be committed because of people like those managing their factory. Several days after the trial of Zinoviev, certain district officials were reproached by one of their victims for their "refined Zinovievist leadership." And, more generally speaking, after the purges of the summer, the complaints contain a number of allusions to acts of "sabotage" supposedly committed by cadres.

It appears likely that when the "centralist" tendency regained the initiative in the autumn, they paid a lot of attention to the temper of the masses, and were even directly inspired by a number of the ideas spontaneously expressed by the populace during the first trial. Undoubtedly it was this tendency that was responsible for the trial of Novosibirsk in November of 1936, in which the accused, all of whom were administrative and technical staff of a Siberian mine, were judged guilty not only of "terrorist conspiracy", but also, and more concretely, of "acts of sabotage" resulting in the deterioration of working conditions and in a number of accidental deaths. In the same spirit, those accused in the second "Great Moscow Trial" in January 1937, I.L. Piatakov, K.B. Radek, G.I. Sokolnikov, N.I. Muralov and their "accomplices," all old members of the opposition who had become important functionaries, were not only accused of "conspiracy" and "espionage," but also for the sort of abuses commonly committed by cadres presiding over the national economy.

How was the term "enemy" to be interpreted? This was the question around which revolved the political struggles of which the "Great Moscow Trials' were the most spectacular expression. One could either locate the source of all the regime's difficulties in the distant past, and thus clear the present cadres of all responsiblity, or one could implicate the suspect cadres of today along with opponents of yesterday. This was the choice.

It is important to realize that the proponents of strict central control could, to a certain extent, count on the support of those at the lower levels of the apparatus as well as on ordinary party members. This is because the former directly experienced the risks attendant on their superiors' actions. As for party members without rank, because they had in principle a certain right to control their leadership, they naturally bore the brunt of the local potentates' zeal when the latter decided to unmask "passive" attitudes and 'enemy" activities. Thus, it was tempting to mobilize the base of the apparatus and party against the intermediary echelons, especially when the official critique, once out in the open during the first months of 1936, was regularly taken up at numerous party meetings. Of course, the ritual denunciation of old opponents occupied the best part of these meetings. But attempts at actualizing the notion of "enemy" to which the "centralist" tendency adhered in the winter of 1936-1937 found an important echo in many agitated assemblies where speakers denounced their superiors and revealed their

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"subversive" activities.

To be sure, a number of these critiques were made by those who sought to separate themselves from "hostile" practices in which they were in fact implicated. Nor should it be forgotten that workers did not represent even a third of all party members; and in the rural areas the large majority of those in the party also belonged to the apparatus. Nonetheless, the Central Committee at the time of the Plenary Session of February-March 1937 decided to mobilize the party's lower ranks. This was to be accomplished by the subterfuge of re-elections within three months of all functionaries in the organizations of the party's base, the local and regional organs, and those of the republicans. Not only was criticism to be allowed, balloting to be secret, and the refusal of any candidate to be permitted; even the dismissal of officials who owed their positions to superior echelons, including the Central Committee, was permissible.

However, even if there were a number of tumultuous electoral meetings at which cadres were judged unworthy of their functions, most officials did not have too much difficulty in saving "their" apparatus, whether by ignoring the secret ballot, falsifying the results, intimidating those who protested the loudest, or by excluding potential dissenters from the assemblies. This proved to be all the easier as those top-ranking leaders who sought their elimination were forced into tolerating such practices because of the unexpected turn taken by the mobilization of the party's base. For one had expected that the slightest pressure would be enough to put an end to a good deal of the cadres' incompetence and corruption. But, instead of channeling the masses' discontent by demonstrating that bad leaders could not escape their just punishment, the campaign suddenly seemed to turn towards the practically open manifestation or social conflict between leaders and masses. During electoral meetings, a number of speakers took up the same indignant tone that had appeared in the critical letters received by the various party organs. The critical eruption from below must have appeared quite menacing for those promoting the radical attack against the "centrifugal" tendencies to renounce their offensive and allow their adversaries to save themselves. It had become necessary to choose the lesser evil in the face of an outburst that threatened both sides.

Such a favorable situation did not escape the attention of the cadres who were the target of the re-electon campaign and of their spokesmen within the party's central leadership. It even appeared that they could risk launching, towards the end of the campaign, an unequivocal counter-offensive against those upholding the "centralist" line, again, as always, by reinterpreting the term "enemy". This is clearly legible in an editorial in *Pravda*: "It is not a secret that the enemies of Bolshevism strive, not only in word but in deed, to use the secret elections for their own objectives. They were already comforted in the hope that the secret elections would weaken the party and lead to a rupture between the apparatus and the party masses."

It is quite possible that the imminent danger of a counter-attack led the supporters of the centralized state to resort, by virtue of an *ultima ratio*, to

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massive police measures in order to deal with their adversaries once and for all. The measures taken amounted to the institutionalization of a sort of generalized blackmail. It became obligatory for all party organisms, from the cells up to the regional leadership, to exclude from the party and denounce to the police (N.K.V.D.) all seriously compromised functionaries. Moreover, it was well understood — and the official declaration did not allow any room for doubt on this point — that all those who neglected their duty would be considered accomplices and would be pursued as such by the police. Members of N.K.V.D., to the extent that their activity was subject to the collective responsiblity of the party organisms to which they belonged, were themselves put under surveillance. Thus, as party members of cadres, they could be criticized by their subordinates and excluded for their "subversive" activities. In addition, in order to avoid the settling of personal accounts in the form of arbitrary arrests, and in order to prevent the police from trying to either cover for their friends or demonstrate their own zeal by detaining just any cadre who happened to bother them, the departments within the police organs were hierarchically separated so that the police could arrest only cadres at a lower level than their own, and never their peers. From the materials in the archives, it is clear that local functionaries of N.K.V.D. did not have the right to arrest local leaders even after the latter had been purged from the party.

It is this campaign, launched in June of 1937, that had by far the most victims among the cadres. (For reasons explained in the appendix, it is almost impossible to give accurate figures. Let us say that, if between 1936 and 1938 around 250,000 cadres were eliminated, the largest number of these were victims of this campaign.) There can be no doubt that quite a number of cadres who were purged had been responsible for the disorganization, corruption and general discredit of the state apparatus. But, even under these extreme conditions, it proved possible to protect oneself by "extraditing" simple scapegoats from the party, to dodge the blow by accusing cadres on the basis of their personal relations or "suspect" past, and to provide ostensible proof of one's exemplary vigilance by arresting perfectly innocent, ordinary citizens.

Typically, the terrorized cadres, instead of seeking the correct allocation of responsiblity, simply denounced their immediate superiors. This resulted in a considerable renewal of the leadership personnel without necessarily producing any significant improvement in their working habits. (Most of the important posts at the regional and local levels changed hands — involving about 30,000 people; as regards the economic apparatus, the rate of renewal is almost impossible to estimate statistically.) Party statutes, moreover, constituted a factor of blockage. For, according to these statutes, seniority within the party was necessary for the occupation of its more important posts. And since admission into the party had been practically suspended since the purges of 1933, no new promotion could offer guarantees of a faultless administrative past. Consequently, those placed in the pasts of recently "unmasked enemies" could, once installed, find themselves under accusation by virtue of the least pressure from higher organs or from the police. After

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several months, no one dared assume the least responsiblity. In certain distant districts of central Asia, the local leadership as such no longer existed.

The extreme confusion to which this campaign led is perhaps best characterized by the appearance at the outset of 1938 of thieves who robbed apartments by posing as policemen engaged in investigations. The economic results of the first months of 1938 were extremely mediocre. With the cadres no longer daring to make decisions or apply orders for fear of being accused of "hostile" methods, complete paralysis was imminent. This is why the third "Great Moscow Trial", which began in March of 1938, in which N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, G.G. Iagoda, N.N. Krestinskii, and Kh.G. Rakovskii were the leading accused, was enacted in such a way as to suggest that the uncovering of "hostile" practices was at an end. This trial generally returned to the implicit thesis of the first trials of 1936, defining "enemies" as old militants from the right and left opposition who had continuously fought the party's correct line and conspired, from the first days of the revolution, against the lives of its most respected leaders.

The renewal of the state apparatus' personnel and the promotion of a large number of younger cadres who were exempt from all suspicion of being in the opposition, hardly changed the "subversive practices" that constituted the apparatus' ordinary, and so to say, structural mode of functioning. Once the enemies had been purged, their successors immediately took up the same arbitrary and disruptive methods, and like their predecessors failed to follow through on the populace's complaints. Given the amplitude of the disorder created, it was completely out of the question for the proponents of "state control at any price" to renew their efforts in an attempt to tighten their grip over the state apparatus. The experience of two years eloquently demonstrated that the apparatus' internal struggles only resulted in increasing confusion. Threats and problems were accumulating; it was time to close ranks.

In effect, signs of mass insubordination had not ceased to multiply since the spring of 1937. Workers, profiting from the fact that cadres had become potential "enemies of the people", refused to execute orders and absented themselves from their place of work. As regards the peasants, in the first months of 1938 they managed to prevent the plans for obligatory deliveries and programmes for tax collection from being fulfilled. More generally, they tried to reduce the amount of labor they were required to put into the kolkhozes in order to concentrate their efforts on their private plots, whose land surface they had often managed to augment by illegal means. The authorities were quick to react. In the spring of 1938, the new Commission of the People's Justice made the judiciary responsible for "the mobilization of the masses . . . in the struggle to strengthen work discipline." Various industrial managers launched appeals against absenteeism, the lack of discipline, and the absence of working class consciousness at the work place — demands that sometimes curiously resembled the accusations of sabotage recently levelled against the regime's "enemies".

The real result of the confrontation of 1936-1938 was the promulgation of a

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series of severe legal measures that sought to reestablish or re-enforce labor discipline in the factories, and to force the peasants to abandon their illegally occupied private plots and consecrate more of their time to kolkhoz labor. It is in light of these measures that the scope and significance of the social and political struggles within the leadership and within the party must ultimately be judged. The state apparatus had been deeply divided, but not to the point where the antagonists forgot their common interests. In the end, they were able to safeguard their dominant and privileged positions. In the face of popular discontent and of a situation that threatened to escape its control, the state apparatus recovered its fundamental cohesion. Even for those elements most determined to impose strict central control, the defense of the ruling class' collective interests came before the elimination of the obstacles that prevented the emergence of efficient economic policies and of a leadership capable of receiving public legitimation.

The campaign for strict central control began because of the fear of the political dangers presented by the cadres' arbitrary and anarchic activities. It was supposed to put a lid on the social menace born of popular exasperation by punishing the excesses of the most visibly blameworthy. But when it turned out that the struggle against "centrifugal" tendencies resulted in even greater disorder and led to mass insubordination, yesterday's adversaries knew how to close ranks. The apparatus was welded together again, but not without having to renounce the elimination of the apparently insurmountable "subversive" methods of control.

One can thus speak of the Soviet state apparatus of the thirties as being a social entity in itself, structurally and functionally coherent, capable of surmounting its internal divisions and of safeguarding its fundamental interests in the face of the rest of society. As for the mass of the dominated, being incapable of organized resistance, they had no other defense than essentially passive resistance and individual challenge. Still, one should not underestimate the latter if only because, given the fact that the very weight and methods of the apparatus tend to convert them into relatively massive phenomenon, such challenges and resistance always pose a potentially open political problem. The same causes produce the same effects; the failures that the 1936-1938 events revealed to be insurmountable and uncontrollable, could not remain possible sources of future crisis.

Appendix

It is imposible to give precise figures of the purges' victims, or to give exact proportions in relation to the total number in the apparatus of those "several strata" of cadres that had to be "pulled out," to use the euphemism of L.M. Kaganovich at the 18th Congress. At best, one can proceed with approximate estimations. 500,000 young cadres were promoted between 1934 and 1939. But this does not necessarily mean that they all occupied the posts of "unmasked enemies." For industrialization and the expansion of the state apparatus created many new positions: the number of People's Commisariats managing industry doubled from three to six, that of the local territorial units

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of administration (districts and wards) increased from 2,573 to 3,982, while the number of regional administrations grew from 74 to 148.

On the other hand, 278,818 people were kicked out of the party in 1937-1938 during the high point of the leadership purges. It is interesting to note that, according to the uncommonly scrupulous research of A.L. Unger, the number of those excluded was 854,330 in 1933, 342,294 in 1934, and 281,872 in 1935. It is during these years that the cadres succeeded in turning the cutting edge of the purges "toward the base." Thus, paradoxically, those figures are larger than those of the "Great Purges" of 1937-1938. In 1936, 95,145 people were excluded from the party.

Among the 278,818 people excluded in 1937-38, around fifty thousand people worked in the industrial and transportation sectors in 1937 alone. But these last figures do not apply exclusively to party cadres. It should be known that there were more than 60,000 factory directors, and around 300,000 heads of departments and workshops in industry, while the number of functionaries in the political and administrative apparatus (from the president of the village soviet to the secretaries of the Central Committee) must have surpassed 70,000. The crosschecking of these different figures, the only ones on which we can count, gives us only a very vague idea of the amplitude of the purges, and if one sticks to the number of exclusions, limits us to party members.

Now tens of thousands of the cadres in the economic apparatus did not belong to the party. Moreover, we completely lack any statistics concerning ordinary citizens victimized by the hunt for "suspect elements." For the latter an estimation is almost impossible. It seems, however, that the number of ordinary citizens victimized by the purges was probably in the neighborhood of 800,000 to 900,000, while the number of cadres who were purged was perhaps more than 250,000.

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THE DE-AESTHETICIZATION OF ART: ON ADORNO'S *AESTHETISCHE THEORIE*

by Richard Wolin

The Concept of Autonomy

If in traditional societies, whose universe was governed by the notion of cyclical time, where the predictable and familiar position of the sun in the sky would prescribe the rhythm of daily life, the dominant category of aesthetics was that of *beauty*, in modern societies, where the flow of life has been all but reduced to a series of minutely subdivided instants, that is, to the calculations of time-clock and stop-watch, the predominant category of aesthetics has becomes that of dissonance. As if in direct response to the rationalized fabric of social life, the very concept of art today has virtually turned itself inside out, and all serious thought about art must take this fact as its point of departure. At present, the only true art is dissonant art, for it alone remains faithful to the present-day capacity for lived experience — a fundamental *incapacity*. As such its truth content is two-fold. First, by virtue of its 'sinister' qualities, dissonant art is the only art that retains the courage to call society by its actual name. It steadfastly refuses to pass over the anguish of existence in silence. At the same time, the concept of modern art does not rest contented at the level of mere identification. By simultaneously distancing itself from the conventions of society in an increasingly radical manner, by treating society as its adversary, its other, dissonant art stands at the living indictment of society. One of the essential traits of modernism is its *radical autonomy*, its firm refusal to participate in the utilitarian mill of social life. By virtue of this autonomy, modernism both saves itself from incorporation into the reifying network of commodity production and also polemicizes against this sphere as being inimical to spirit. By shattering the omnipresent semblance of well-being, a chief weapon in late capitalism's ideological arsenal of legitimation techniques, dissonant art lays bare the substratum of suffering and strife that lie beneath society's pretension to being Reason incarnate. In consequence of its growing need for autonomy, modern art increasingly takes leave of a mimetic, realistic approach to the representation of reality — the approach paradigmatic for the early Lukacs' so-called 'integrated civilizations' [1] — in favor of a more spiritualized, expressionistic orientation. The consequences of such development for the discipline of aesthetics are nothing less than 'world historical.' This is the situation with which Adorno commences his *Aesthetische Theorie*: "It has become self-evident that that which concerns art is no longer self-evident, neither in relation to itself, nor in relation to the whole — nor even in relation to its right to exist."[2] For in contrast to the essentially harmonious. rounded, totality-oriented great works of the past, modern art is distinguished by a decidedly *fragmentary, problematical character*. It is a

1. Georg Lukacs, *Theory of the Novel* (Cambridge, 1971).
2. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetische Theorie* (Frankfurt, 1974), p. 9. Subsequent references will appear in parentheses.

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difference that is perhaps best exemplified in the drastically altered fate of narrative structure from Homer to Joyce. As such, *Aesthetische Theorie* constitutes a monumental effort to vindicate modernism, to authenticate its 'right to exist' from a historico-philosophical point of view, however precarious that right might appear in contrast with the grandeur of classical works of art.

The expression 'autonomous art' serves to distinguish the relationship in which modernism stands vis-à-vis the social matrix from which it emanates as opposed to the more *integrated* relation of traditional works of art. As Walter Benjamin demonstrates in his pioneering essay, "The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction,"[3] until quite recently the production of works of art has been tied to a *cultic function*. The existence was, to begin with, linked to the legitimation of traditional cultural formations, e.g., in magic, myth, and religion. Today, art's relation to cult survives in the form of entertainment dispensed by the culture industry. As cult objects the being for self of art is sacrificed for the sake of the transmission of 'other-worldly' truth. Cave drawings (magic), Homer's *Iliad* (myth) and medieval Christian painting (religion) illustrate the succession of cultic guises art assumes in the course of the historical march of 'disenchantment.'[4] Only with the nascent radical secularization of life forms in the Renaissance, a process that is coincident with the world-historical turn to this-worldly concerns characteristic of the capitalist spirit, does art begin to emancipate itself from its embeddedness in religious world views and thus begin to discover its own inherent possibilities. The process of art's coming to self-consciousness or autonomy is vigorously renewed in the 19th century with romanticism and *l'art pour l'art*. Viewed from a socio-cultural perspective, both movements originate in rebellion against the increasingly unspiritual, prosaic nature of life under capitalism in its entrepreneurial phase, a life with which the 'beautiful soul' will tolerate no intercourse. Hence, the artistic consciousness seeks refuge in the sovereign, subjective power of the creative spirit, in the 'affirmative' preserve of culture where the positive values that are repulsed in reality itself can be realized, albeit in sublimated form. Such are the historical origins of radical aesthetic autonomy.

With the proliferation of avant-garde groups in the 20th century — cubism, futurism, dadism, expressionism and surrealism all originate within a 20-year period — the concept of autonomy is pushed to a new extreme. However, if originally the emancipation of art from its implication in cult appeared as an unleashing of possibilities seemingly infinite in scope, as a tremendous enhancement of potential, at the same time, as Adorno points out, this newly gained independence remains incapable of fully compensating for the loss of 'self-evidence' previously enjoyed by art, i.e., the disappearance of the secure and unproblematical relation in which it stood to society as a cult-object. For the avant-garde, this profound absence of traditional structure results in a

3. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (New York, 1973), pp. 217-253.

4. Max Weber was one of the first to observe the fact that the development of the forms of artistic creation in the West (in particular music) closely parallels the process of *Entzauberung* (disenchantment) or the rationalization of life forms in general.

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serious crisis of identity and direction. The unprecedented rapid succession of avant-garde trends in this century is indicative of this crisis, of the fact that art is no longer certain as to how it should comport itself. Ideally, in keeping with the global tendency toward secularization, post-cultic art would like to transpose the image of reconciled life it carries within itself from earlier *transcendent* point of reference to an *immanent* resting place. Yet, in the face of the manifestly unreconciled character of social life in this century, the idea of providing a false semblance of reconciliation becomes increasingly insupportable to it. Modernism recognizes the fact that the ideal of giving free reign to beauty, paradigmatic for 19th century *l'art pour l'art* (Impressionism, Mallarmé), becomes flatly incompatible with the congealed fabric of social life as the network of commodity relations becomes all-dominant. Given the horrors perpetuated by the so-called 'advanced' nations in this century, beautiful art risks irrelevance — embalmment in museums, the mausoleums of culture. In consequence, modern art falls victim to the following debilitating antinomy: if, on the one hand, it fetishizes its autonomy, it remains open to the criticism of privilege and aloofness vis-à-vis the condition of unfreedom that afflicts society as a whole; on the other hand, if it should renounce its autonomy and instead seek immanence, it finds itself implicated in a web of heteronomous, functional relations — a regression to cult. This is the labor of Sisyphus confronting modernism, art after the fall from its state of naïveté. It must remain far enough removed from the fray to prevent itself from being swallowed up by it, yet at the same time close enough to keep from appearing frivolous and self-indulgent in grave times.

The Benjamin-Adorno Debate

The antinomy receives its classical formulation in a series of letters exchanged between Adorno and Walter Benjamin in the 1930's.[5] Benjamin, whose position is set forth in his aforementioned "The Work of Art" essay, argues from a historical materialist standpoint for the necessity that art shed its autonomy, for it to become 'engaged'. Basing his position somewhat unreflectively on Marx's infamous specification of relationship betwen forces of production and relations of production, which shall lead to the inevitable attainment of socialism (once the outmoded relations of production, which have, unwittingly, become a fetter to the further development of the forces of production, have the good sense to make themselves accord with the latter once again), Benjamin attempts to attribute an identical dialectic to the domain of art, on the basis of revolutionary new developments in the sphere of the technical reproduction of works of art. Benjamin is thinking mainly of new techniques in printing and in the reproduction of paintings; but also of the fields of photography and film. Such unprecedented developments in the domain of the 'forces of artistic production' result, according to Benjamin, in monumental changes in the sphere of reception. Above all, the *aura* of the traditional non-mechanically reproduced work of art disintegrates, its special originality and uniqueness and thus its *hallowed* character. The aura is "the

5. The most important letters in this debate have been translated into English in an anthology *Aesthetics and Politics* (London, 1977), pp. 110-141.

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unique phenomenon of distance, however close [an object] may be."[6] "One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence."[7]

For Benjamin, the dissolution of the aura effectively undermines the condition of inimitable uniqueness which is the basis of the affirmative art of the 19th century. The result is the disintegration of the 'religion of pure art,' *l'art pour l'art* (perceived as an intra-aesthetic regression to cult), the necessary diffusion of art throughout the domain of everyday life. One no longer need go to a cultural shrine, a museum, to see an impressionist painting. By obtaining the print, it can be viewed in the humble surroundings of one's own home. But even more importantly, with the tremendously increased potential for viewing art on a mass basis represented by film — theoretically, tens of thousands of persons can view a film simultaneously all over the world — the ideal subject for the reception of autonomous bourgeois art, the solitary, isolated individual, is rendered superfluous. According to Benjamin, if the traditional aesthetic subject was passively absorbed by the object of contemplation, film, by virtue of the principle of montage, its shock-effect (notions Benjamin takes over from surrealism and Brecht's Epic Theater) *alienates* the viewer, thus forcing him to assume an *active* relation to the object. The changed conditions of artistic production described by Benjamin thus have the advantageous result of rendering traditional, *private* conditions of aesthetic reception obsolete and paving the way for a more generalizable, *mass* reception that is ideally suited to the dissemination of the political views espoused by Benjamin during this period. Thus, in 1936, he greets the phenomenon of the dissolution of the aura with great enthusiasm, even though this process signifies nothing less than the *end of art* as we have known it, i.e., bourgeois autonomous art, and its re-integration within the everyday sphere of utilitarian interests — a circumstance which paradoxically would eliminate the precondition for Benjamin's earlier theological, esoteric approach to criticism.

Adorno presents a many-sided penetrating critique of Benjamin's unswerving belief in the emancipatory potential embodied in the new means of mechanical reproduction. Paradoxically, his critique makes use of arguments set forth by the early Benjamin in an effort to counter his rigid employment of materialist categories.[8] Adorno not only takes Benjamin to task for his uncritical acceptance of historical materialist methodology ("God knows there is only one truth . . . [and] there is more of this truth in Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* than in Bukharin's *ABC's of Communism*"[9]), but especially for his failure to take into account the very real possibility of an *apocryphal* end of

6. Benjamin, *op.cit.*, p. 222.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
8. Cf. Andrew Arato's introduction to the Spring 1977 issue of the *International Journal of Sociology* (which is devoted to Benjamin), "The Antinomies of the Neo-Marxian Theory of Culture," pp. 3-25. For a lucid exposition of Benjamin's position at the time of "The Work of Art" essay, see Heinz Paetzold's "Walter Benjamin's Theory of the End of Art," pp. 25-76, in the same issue.
9. Adorno, letter to Benjamin of November 10, 1938; reprinted in *Aesthetics and Politics*, p. 131.

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autonomous art: that is, the fact that the new mechanical techniques lauded by Benjamin might equally lay themselves open to *manipulative* rather than *emancipatory* uses. In contrast to Benjamin's optimistic view, Adorno fears that the actual demise of autonomous art would also result in the elimination of the essential *critical* capacity which art retains only by virtue of having elevated itself above the domain of social interests. Given the extension of the reifying logic of commodity production (rationalization) to *all* spheres of bourgeois life in the 20th century — political administration, law, culture, etc. — the sources of qualitative opposition to that logic were already precariously few in number. An apocryphal end of art would entail the disintegration of the aura without the authentic transpostion of its utopian promise to the domain of social life itself.[10] Art would thereby prematurely integrate itself within the realm of practical ends, thus renouncing the auratic *promesse de bonheur*, its moment of transcendence and giving itself over to the manipulative abuse of dominant interests. In light of fascism's crass aestheticization of political violence, on the one hand, and the degeneration of art to the status of entertainment at the hands of the 'culture industry' on the other, Adorno's fear that the potential for a more generalized reception provided by the recent changes in techniques of artistic reproduction would have reactionary rather than progressive consequences would seem well-founded.[11]

Consequently, Adorno argues for the importance of the critical elucidation of the emancipatory potential embedded in 20th century autonomous art (for Adorno, essentially synonomous with the 'avant-garde'), as opposed to the notion of a 'mass art' which would have an immediate effect on social consciousness. Thus, in contrast to Benjamin, he remains satisfied with the more traditional bourgeois, private conditions of aesthetic reception — though this state of affairs presents itself as a necessity rather than a virtue, he claims, given the manipulative ends to which the more broadly disseminated use of culture succumbs. To be sure, this conception closely resembles the position of the 'theological' approach to criticism of the early Benjamin in his studies on the early Romantics (1919), Goethe's *Elective Affinities* (1922), and, most importantly, *Trauerspiel* (1925). In these studies, it was the necessarily esoteric, *redemptive* significance [12] of works of art — a concept secularized by Adorno as *reconciliation* — that stood out as most essential. The elevated task of the critic consisted in laying bare the 'truth content', which is found in the work of art itself only in a concealed, muted form, in order thereby to reveal the relation of the work to the sphere of redeemed life. In an analogous manner, Adorno's criticism seeks to unfold both the socially critical elements in present-day authentic works of art, and also those moments in the work which *transcend* the restricted nature of the contemporary universe of discourse by

10. This is the sense in which Herbert Marcuse speaks favorably of the *Aufhebung* of culture in his 1937 essay "The Affirmative Character of Culture." Cf. *Negations* (Boston, 1968), pp. 88-133.

11. Of course, Benjamin was not wholly unaware of these possibilities and does in fact mention them in his essay. In a large measure, the one-sidedness of his position is attributable to the desperation of the political situation at the time.

12. For an explanation of Benjamin's use of this notion, see Jürgen Habermas' fine essay "Bewusstmachende, oder rettende Kritik," in *Zur Aktualität Walter Benjamins*, Siegfried Unseld, ed. (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 173-223.

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virtue of which it expresses its affinities to a state of reconciliation.

According to Adorno, in its one-sided focus on mechanically reproduced works of art and the advantages to accrue from the destruction of the aura in such works, Benjamin's "The Work of Art" essay totally overlooks as analogous dialectic that takes place *on the plane of autonomous art itself.* That is, whereas Benjamin, at least in the essay in question, abstractly negates autonomous art insofar as it remains *auratic*, affirmative, and thus insensitive to any more generalizable, emancipatory concerns, Adorno shows that the revolution in reproduction techniques forces autonomous art itself to undergo a transformation in structure, in consequence of which it proceeds to *divest itself* of the traditional aura and most of its affirmative attributes. As he replies to Benjamin: "Dialectical though your essay may be, it is not so in the case of the autonomous work of art itself; it disregards an elementary experience which becomes more evident to me every day in my own musical experience — that precisely the uttermost consistency in the pursuit of technical laws of autonomous art changes this art and instead of rendering it a taboo or a fetish, brings it close to the state of freedom, of something that can be consciously produced and made."[13] In sum, Benjamin's essay conflates the aura of traditional works of art with the notion of autonomy per se, failing to take into account that the anti-traditional, radically articulated art of the modern avant-garde consciously aims at the destruction of the aura and its affirmative essense, the 'beautiful illusion' that distinguishes the religion of art. By recognizing the indifference of its own obsession with beauty in the face of the increasing devastation of society (a process of self-consciousness that crystallizes around the time of WW I), *l'art pour l'art* declares war on its own ostrich-like complacency. There is no surer illustration of this process than Dadaism's open mockery of affirmative art.[14] This insight constitutes the programmatic basis of Adorno's musicological studies, as he demonstrates superbly, above all, in relation to Schönberg's highly rationalized compositional methods and provocative use of atonality, techniques which prove inimical to all co-optation, all easy consumption.[15] The antinomy between autonomous, avant-garde art and committed mass art, which first took shape in the disagreement with Benjamin in the 1930's, subsequently

13. Letter to Benjamin of March 18, 1936; in *Aesthetics and Politics*, pp. 173ff. Hence, Adorno recommends that Benjamin complement his "Work of Art" essay with a study on Mallarmé, which would thus demonstrate the analogous effect of this 'dialectic of technique' as it operates on the level of *autonomous art.*

14. Benjamin demonstrates an incipient awareness of this phenomenon insofar as he views Dada as a 'transitional genre,' a precursor of film, which has not yet, however, fully made use of the technical means historically available: "The history of every art form shows critical epochs in which a certain art form aspires to effects which could be fully obtained only with a changed technical standard, that is to say, in a new art form. The extravagances and crudites of art which thus appear, particularly in the so-called decadent epochs, actually arise from the richest historical energies. In recent years, such barbarisms were abundant in Dadaism. It is only now that its impulse becomes discernible: Dadaism attempted to create by pictorial — and literary — means the effects which the public seeks today in film." Benjamin *op. cit.*, p. 237. In his letter of March 18, 1936, Adorno praises these insights and points out how well they accord with the sections on 'bombast' and 'horrors' of the 1925 *Trauerspiel* book.

15. For a clear statement of Adorno's early position on Schönberg, see his 1934 essay "On the Social Situation of Music," *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 129-165.

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became a cornerstone for Adorno's later reflections on aesthetics (with Adorno, of course, defending the former position), forming the point of departure for his future debates with Sartre's conception of 'engagement' and Lukacs' stubborn defense of literary realism.[16]

De-aestheticization, the Aesthetics of Ugliness and Enlightenment

In *Aesthetische Theorie* Benjamin's notion of the de-auraticization of art becomes the concept of *de-aestheticization* [*Entkunstung*], which signifies a final dissolution of the essential aesthetic qualities which have up until this century been inseparable from the concept of art itself. For Adorno, de-aestheticization is a consequence of art's avid utilization of new and advanced techniques (in both the spheres of aesthetic production and reception), its self-conscious destruction of traditional, classical aesthetic standards (beauty, harmony, symmetry, etc.), and the unprecedented distance it assumes via-à-vis its social origins, i.e., its autonomy. Adorno considers the legitimate representatives of the progressive side of this trend to be virtually synonomous with those of the avant-garde. For the most part, they have already been named: Schönberg in the field of music, Kafka and Joyce in literature, Beckett in theater, Kandinsky in painting, Giacommeti in sculpture and Mallarmé in poetry, to mention only the most prominent figures. Its retrograde side can be seen in the culture industry in the West and in socialist realism in the East. In both of the latter two instances, the recidivist consequences of art's premature relinquishment of its autonomous status and subsequent integration within the framework of the utilitarian ends of society in general are confirmed. This is the false *Aufhebung* of autonomous art. Both integrated and autonomous art make full use of the most advanced developments in the field of artistic production, with, however, very different consequences in relation to the question of liberation. This fact shows that the question of correct 'technique', in and of itself, is insufficient for determining the emancipatory potential of a work of art.[17] Through the process of de-aestheticization, avant-garde art contests the counterfeit aura of reconciliation projected by affirmative art, that is, the conciliatory notion that culture should serve as the *ersatz* domain where the ideals that are denied by a reified society can be realized. A trace of affirmation attaches itself to all art by virtue of its striving toward totality, its attempt to present the appearance of

16. For Sartre's position, see *Literature and Existentialism* (New York, 1969); for that of Lukacs, see *Realism in our Time* (New York, 1971). The English translations of Adorno's critiques, "Commitment" and "Reconciliation under Duress," can be found in *Aesthetics and Politics*, pp. 151-195.

17. The position taken by Benjamin in his essay "The Author as Producer" (1934): "By mentioning technique I have named the concept that makes literary products accessible to immediate social, and therefore materialist, analysis. At the same time, the concept of technique represents the dialectical starting point from which the sterile dichotomy of form and content can be surmounted. And furthermore this concept of technique contains within itself the right way to determine the relation between tendency and quality. . . . If, then, we were entitled earlier on to say that the correct political tendency of a work includes its quality because it includes its literary tendency, we can now affirm more precisely that this literary tendency may consist in the progressive development of a literary technique or in a regressive one." *Understanding Brecht* (London, 1973), pp. 87-88.

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completeness or self-sufficiency, whereby fulfillment in art can substitute for the lack of fulfillment in life. Adorno describes this tendency toward affirmation, as it develops in post-cultic art, as follows: "Through its inevitable break with theology, with the absolute truth of the claim of salvation, a secularization without which art would never have flourished, it is condemned to grant consolation to being, to existence; a consolation which, deprived of the hope of an Other, reinforces the spell from which the autonomy of art wanted to free itself. Even the principle of autonomy is suspected of providing such consolation: by affecting to posit an external totality, rounded, closed unto itself, this image is transferred to the world in which art finds itself, the world which produces it" (*Aesthetische Theorie*, p. 10). The fragmentariness of de-aesthetcized works of art originates in opposition to the concept of totality and the false reconciliation that concept implies. Radical de-aestheticization is the product of an era in which the contradiction between the symbolic reconciliation projected in art and actual unreconciled condition of the world as a whole has become intolerable. This contradiction, which goes far toward accounting for the sense of bad conscience that comes to haunt modern art — a product of the apparent injustice of art's freedom vis-à-vis the unfreedom of society — explains the unprecedented *extremes* to which modernism has recourse, its bombast, exaggeration and shock-effects, in the attempt to divest itself convincingly of its affirmative character. As Adorno remarks: "In face of that which reality becomes, the affirmative essence of art — ineluctable for it — has become insupportable to it. Art is forced to turn against that which constitutes its own concept and, consequently, becomes uncertain to its innermost fiber" (*A.T.*, p. 10).

Adorno's guiding intention in *Aesthetische Theorie*, to provide a justification for modernism, is very much indebted to the method of interpretation originally employed by Walter Benjamin in his great work, *Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels*.[18] In particular, Adorno's understanding of modernism in terms of the category of 'de-aestheticization' closely parallels Benjamin's analysis of the art of the Baroque era in light of the concept of the '*ruin*'. For the great artistic achievements of both epochs consist of *fragments* rather than perfect works. The production of perfect works is given over to epigones: both periods are eras of historical decline and therefore temperamentally unsuited to the 'noble simplicity' of classical works of art; yet, nevertheless, they are both characterized by a relentless 'will to art',[19] a fact which accounts for the unconventional form assumed by their creations. In the Prologue to the *Trauerspiel* book, Benjamin explicitly acknowledges the parallel between the era he is considering and the contemporary phenomenon of expressionism: "For like expressionism, the Baroque is not so much as age of genuine artistic achievement as an age possessed of an unremitting artistic will. This is true of all periods of so-called decadence. The supreme reality in art is the isolated self-contained work. But there are times when the well-wrought

18. English translation: *Origin of German Tragic Drama* (London, 1977).

19. *Kunstwollen*, the term developed by the German art historian Alois Riegl in *Die Spätrömische Kunstindustrie* (1901) — a work Benjamin later said had influenced him greatly.

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work is only within reach of the epigone. These are periods of 'decadence' in the arts, the periods of artistic will." [20] The fragmentary works of modernism represent the contemporary counterpart to the ruins of the Baroque era. Benjamin's analysis of *Trauerspiel* proceeds on the basis of a historico-philosophical perspective: in an era of decadence, in which meaning is no longer immanent to life and the world thus becomes colored by an overarching sense of confusion and uncertainty, the creation of beautiful, totality-oriented works of art can only appear illusory — a false consolation. From this perspective, he was able to indicate the important features which differentiate the profane nature of Baroque *Trauerspiel* from the sublime world of Greek tragedy — for until Benjamin's monumental study, Baroque drama was commonly misunderstood as a failed, inconsummate variant of classical tragedy — thereby demonstrating the historico-philosophical appropriateness of *Trauerspiel's* seemingly unconscionable excresences, i.e., the appropriateness of this genre in a historical age of decline. For the ruins of *Trauerspiel* are the conscious expression of the Baroque conception of history as *natural history*, that is, a history bent on an inevitable course of decay and decline: "Whereas in the symbol destruction is idealized and the transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed in the light of redemption, in allegory [*of the Baroque*] the observer is confronted with the *facies hippocratica* of nature as a petrified, primordial landscape. Everything about history that, from the very beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face — or rather in a death's head. And although such a thing lacks all symbolic freedom of expression, all classical proportion, all humanity — nevertheless, this is the form in which man's subjection to nature is most obvious. . . . This is the heart of the allegorical way of seeing, of the baroque secular explanation of history as the Passion of the world; its importance resides solely in the stations of its decline." [21] Benjamin's *Trauerspiel* study represents a watershed in the field of aesthetics, insofar as his compelling critical rehabilitation of that lost and forgotten genre, for all *Trauerspiel*'s bombast and extravagance, serves to validate the idea of fragmentary art in historical ages of decline, in opposition to the traditional aesthetic values of allegedly timeless, 'classical' standards. Similarly, in *Aesthetische Theorie*, Adorno attempts to provide a historico-philosophical justification of modernism by showing the irrelevance of classical standards for its fragmentary creations and the retrograde ideological intention of beautiful, rounded works in the 'problematic' era of late capitalism. In its struggle against the illusion of reconciliation provided by such works, de-aestheticized art, from Baudelaire to Beckett, embraces the manifestations of decline, society's ruins, as if in order to wake a somnambulate humanity from the nightmare of the always-the-same [*das Immergleiche*] to which it has fallen victim. Rather than willfully participate in the mass deception that parades in the guise of humanity — but which in truth is always a cover for inhumanity — today art must, according to Adorno, forsake the realm of beautiful semblance for the sake of the accumulated suffering that is

20. Benjamin, *op.cit.*, p. 55.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

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otherwise glossed over. In this sense, the grotesqueries of modernism represent a living testament to the present state of *non-identity*, that is, a state in which the 'rational' and the 'real' do not yet coincide. If "all reification is a forgetting," [22] modernism refuses to let society forget. The revulsion with which the partisans of high culture condemn the 'decadence' of modern art is, psychologically speaking, an act of resistance to a scar that runs deep. By seemingly revelling in the ruins and debris of social life, modernism seeks, in accordance with the idea of ideology-critique, to confront the appearance of reconciliation and well-being which society projects with the fetic underbelly that lies at its core in fact.

Adorno observes that one of the salient features of the process of de-aestheticization, which is decisive for modernism, is its rehabilitation of the concept of *ugliness*.[23] By making ugliness thematic, modernism emphasizes its solidarity with the oppressed, the non-identical, those elements of society that have been anathematized by the dominant powers of social control; it thus seeks to give voice to those forces that are commonly denied expression in the extra-aesthetic world. Perhaps nowhere does the significance of ugliness for modernism reverberate more clearly than in the title selected by Baudelaire for his major collection of poems, *Les Fleurs de mal*. The notion that something ugly can be 'beautiful', that in fact it can be beautiful precisely because it is ugly, opens immense, previously untapped horizons of experience for art and ultimately leaves its mark on modernism in all its forms. One of the great achievements of modernism has been not only a tremendous democraticization of the subject matter of art, but also an important extension of the boundaries of the permissible in art. At the same time, in comparison with the nobility of classical works, this phenomenon cannot help but appear as a detriment. Whereas, for example, classical tragedy dwelt on the plane of ideals and absolutes, the fate of its princely heroes being synonomous with the destiny of humanity in general, the common stock hero of the 19th century novel is consigned to the contingency of his own subjective particularity. In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel had already taken note, in the case of Romanticism, of the pronounced tendency toward the incorporation of increasingly ignoble, unrefined themes in art, in contrast to the consistently more exalted concerns of classical art. Yet, he perceived only the negative side of this development: "The actual configuration in Romantic art, in respect of external appearance, does not essentially get beyond ordinary reality proper, and it is by no means averse from harbouring this real existence in its finite deficiency and determinacy. Thus this means the disappearance of that ideal beauty which lifts the contemplation of the external away above time and the traces of evanescence in order to give existence to the bloom of beauty instead of its otherwise stunted appearance. Romantic art no longer has as its aim the representation of the free vitality of existence with its infinite tranquility and immersion of the soul in the corporeal, of *this life* as such in its own very essential nature; on the

22. Letter from Adorno to Benjamin of February 29, 1940. Cf. Adorno, *Ueber Walter Benjamin* (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 159.

23. Cf. *Aesthetische Theorie*, pp. 74-86.

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contrary, it turns its back on this summit beauty; it intertwines its inner being with the contingency of the external world and gives unfettered play to the bold lines of the ugly."[24]

On the other hand, by insuring that it is useless for all decorative purposes, the aesthetics of ugliness simultaneously polemicizes against the affirmative illusions of the culture industry and attempts to win back the serious intentions proper to art. In historico-philosophical terms, Adorno interprets modernism's thematization of ugliness as a reaction against the 'dialectic of enlightenment',[25] the logic of civilization. Enlightenment is synonomous with the principle of rational control. In order to elevate himself above the level of a merely natural existence and thus arrive at self-consciousness as a species, man must first learn to subjugate his own inner nature, i.e., become attuned to the renunciations demanded by the reality principle necessary for the level of cooperation required for the conquest of external nature. Yet, in the end, the logic of enlightnment backfires. The rigidification of the ego is ultimately so extreme that the original *telos* of the process, the pacification of the struggle for existence and the attainment of a state of reconciliation with nature, is eventually lost sight of; and the means to this end, the domination of nature, in enthroned as an end in itself. According to Adorno's philosophy of social evolution, the dialectic of enlightenment signifies the 'progression' from the domination of nature to the domination of men. For once the subject comes to perceive itself as absolute and its other, nature, as pure stuff of domination, this logic ultimately has its revenge on the subject, which forgets that the *other is a moment internal to it*, i.e., man, too, is part of nature and is consequently victimized by his own ruthless apparatus of control.[26] The aesthetics of ugliness, therefore, reminds civilization of the stage of development prior to the rational individuation of the species in face of primordial nature, the stage of its undifferentiated unity with nature, a moment of weakness civilization has attempted to repress from memory. This is the pre-historical stage when incliniation and desire were given free reign, faculties suppressed by the ego for the sake of the construction of civilization, and whose restoration to prominence would constitute a prerequisite for the attainment of a state of reconciliation. Modernism's recourse to ugliness thus signifies an *eruption of sensuality* in protest against its repression on the part of the rational ego. As such, the thematization of ugliness represents a direct assault on enlightened subjectivity's horror of the unformed, its aversion in face of that which has escaped the levelling, identitarian stamp of 'civilized' life. For civilization is seized by an overwhelming, *irrational* fear of relapse into that primordial, pre-individualized state against which it struggled so concertedly to free itself that, at present, it has become tragically incapable of releasing itself from its rigidified posture which has long since become historically superfluous. The aesthetics of ugliness thus also serves as a disturbing reminder of the acts of

24. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* I (Oxford, 1975), pp. 526-527.
25. Cf. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1973). In this work, Adorno sets forth his theory of social evolution, which remained unchanged in its essentials throughout the rest of his life.
26. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 54-57.

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barbarism and repression that were the price of civilization's 'advances', all too civilized acts from which modern society would like to think it has freed itself, but to whose survival modernism stands as a living testament. For Adorno, this function becomes an inalienable feature of genuine art, *viz.*, the role it plays in the *historical remembrance of accumulated suffering*: "In a better age, it would be preferable that art disappear, than that it forget the suffering that is its expression and from which form draws its substance" (*A.T.*, p. 387).

Art and Philosophical Truth

According to Hegel's philosophy of the evolutionary advance of human spiritual life, in the modern era art has forfeited its former role as the pre-eminent vehicle for the expression of spirit, the role it enjoyed in ancient Greece. Hegel defines art as the *sensuous* embodiment of the idea. The ideal balance between the moments of sensuousness and truth, represented in Greek sculpture, has been surpassed in the modern world in which the higher, more non-sensuous *intellectual* expression of truth, the *concept*, has come to prominence. For Hegel, ours is an age of inwardness and intellectualization par excellence, ill-suited to the restful simplicity of the sensuous representation of truth in classical antiquity. Consequently, art itself takes on a markedly cerebral, intellectualized guise that is fundamentally at odds with its essential formal, i.e., sensual and classical, requirements. Art itself becomes *philosophical*, a fact which underscores the urgent need for a science of aesthetics to interpret it. This is Hegel's thesis concerning the 'death of art'; it refers not to the literal disappearance of art, but rather to the fact that the classical symmetry of the 'Ideal' has been irretrievably lost, that the old guidelines of artistic creation have entered into a state of crisis, and thus the *problematic* character of the new art (Romanticism) and the superior form of spiritual expression represented by the philosophical concept. Hegel describes this phenomenon as follows: "In all these respects art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather been transferred into our *ideas* instead of maintaining its necessity in reality and occupying its higher place. What is now aroused in us in works of art is not just immediate enjoyment but our judgement also, since we subject to our intellectual consideration (i) the content of art, and (ii) the work of art's means of presentation, and the appropriateness or inappropriateness of both to one another. The *philosophy* of art is therefore a greater need in our day than it was in days when art by itself as art yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating again, but for knowing philosophically what art is."[27]

Hegel's significant advance beyond the formalism of Kant's aesthetics was his recognition of the fact that all art necessarily possesses a *truth content* that makes it receptive to the methods of philosophical contemplation. For Kant, all intellectual judgments concerning art are forbidden, insofar as such judgments constitute a regression to heteronomy, to the cognitive sphere of 'interest,' which gives rise to the possibility of subjecting works of art to ignoble,

27. Hegel, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

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utilitarian considerations, i.e., considerations that prove inimical to their *cardinal* status as formal, *aesthetic objects*. Consequently, according to Kant, the absolute canon for the 'judgment' of works of art (though, strictly speaking, *all* judgments are *cognitive*, and therefore inadmissible according to his criteria) is a feeling of 'disinterested pleasure' [*interessenloses Wohlgefallen*], a quickening of the faculties of the imagination and understanding vis-à-vis the aesthetic object which is, ideally, universally valid for every living subject who might encounter that object.[28] According to Hegel, however, the emphasis on the feeling of *pleasure* in Kant's aesthetics itself borders too closely on a relapse into heteronomy, insofar as it makes aesthetic judgment contingent on the 'lower faculties' of inclination or desire. Consequently, for Hegel, art becomes a full-fledged member of the domain of *absolute spirit*, alongside the spheres of religion and philosophy. Through his conception of the truth content of art, the important convergence of works of art with the notion of philosophical truth, the crucial realization that, in addition to being objects of pleasure or enjoyment, authentic works of art represent significant forms of *cognitive* experience, becomes firmly established in the annals of the history of aesthetic judgment.

Hegel's conviction that works of art possess an essential cognitive function forms an important point of departure for the reflections on the philosophy of art that make up *Aesthetische Theorie*. Nevertheless, according to Adorno's interpretation, the Hegelian hierarchy of the dimensions of absolute spirit incorporating art, religion and philosophy seems to undergo a reversal; with art, on the basis of its having incorporated the moment of sensuousness into the framework of its cognitive activity, supplanting philosophy as the preeminent dimension. By virtue of the *mimetic behavior* that is characteristic of all works of art, i.e., the fact that their representation of physical reality is always *sensual* as well as spiritual or intellectual, they serve as an important corrective to the ever-present tendency toward the hypostatization of abstract concepts inherent to philosophical thought.[29] Through their *somatic side* — precisely that aspect of works of art that Hegel deems impure and therefore burdensome — or the necessity that they receive embodiment in the form of colors, shapes, sounds or images, works of art acquire an intrinsic, *physical* affinity with the external world they seek to represent and thereby show themselves capable of counteracting the 'bad abstraction' that afflicts all pure theoretical conceptualization. For Adorno, the 'original sin' of philosophy is the fact that it seeks to grasp the non-conceptual through conceptual means. This is the identitarian bias inherent to all thought, which has its origins in the 'enlightenment' compulsion to make the dissimilar similar to itself in order to dominate it — the *ad infinitum* reduction of the other to 'mind' or 'subject' most clearly visible in the pan-logism of Hegelian idealism. For Adorno, if works of art can never serve as a substitute for the tasks of philosophical cognition, their ontic side provides them with an important advantage over the latter. Conversely,

28. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (Oxford, 1952).

29. Cf. Adorno's important exposition of this notion in *Negative Dialectics*, e.g., the section entitled "The Object's Preponderance" ("Der Vorrang der Objekts"), pp. 186-189.

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reflection on this disadvantage must become a prerequisite for all philosophical thought which wishes to free itself from the inequities of its intrinsic identitarian prejudices. Through their reliance on the mimetic faculty, works of art preserve the idea of a radically different relation of man to nature, a relation that ceases to be based on the principles of domination and control, and instead seeks to give expression to spirit in conformity with the delicate contours of nature. By virtue of their mimetic side, works of art *seek to meet nature halfway*, and therefore foreshadow the ideal of a non-coercive, reconciled relation of the species to nature.

Through their truth content, works intersect with the concerns of philosophy, and this fact above all confers validity on the field of aesthetics, the philosophical examination of art. In his detailed consideration of the complex and many-sided relation that exists between works of art and the notion of philosophical truth, Adorno follows a pathway originally illuminated by the researches of the early Benjamin. For Benjamin the critical interpretation of works of art signifies their completion and fulfillment. In no uncertain terms, the discipline of criticism, through its 'revelation' of the truth content, effectuates the *redemption* of works of art, i.e., their transposition from the *transitory* medium of beautiful appearance to the *eternal* sphere of metaphysical truth.[30] Adorno's reflections on this subject are nearly identical to those of Benjamin, though stripped of the pronounced theological overtones. According to Adorno, all works of art enter into contradiction with their 'appearance'; they inherently surpass their somatic side, and thereby give rise to a force that *transcends* the sum total of their individual moments: the idea of philosophical truth. This is their 'surplus' [*das Mehr*], the moment of abstraction [*Unwirklichkeit*] or purely physical side. As Adorno suggests, "Today, the metaphysics of art revolves around the question how something spiritual, something fabricated which, according to the language of philosophy, is 'simply posited,' can be true" (*A. T.*, p. 198). This is the 'enigma' that all criticism must address, the mysterious 'appearance of that which does not appear' [*Schein des Scheinlosen*],[31] the emergence of the truth from something that is merely 'posited' or 'fabricated,' from the work of art as a physical entity.

The 'surplus' is the spiritual element that arises from the interplay of tensions, the constellation of moments that comprise a work of art. It is because of this phenomenon that works of art seemingly contain the seeds of their own criticism within themselves. For as the element of abstraction which transcends the sensuous side of works of art, the 'surplus' bears an intrinsic affinity with the

30. Benjamin first elaborates his conception of the redemptive mission of criticism in his dissertation of 1919, *Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik* (Frankfurt, 1973). But see also his significant comments on the methodology of criticism in his important essay "Goethes *Wahlverwantschaften*" (written in 1921-22), in *Gesammelte Schriften* I-1 (Frankfurt, 1974), pp. 123-203. Cf. also the Prologue to the *Trauerspiel* study, where Benjamin speaks of truth not only as the essential content of beauty, but also, in accordance with Plato's views in the *Symposium*, as "the guarantor of the existence of beauty." *Origin of German Tragic Drama*, pp. 31-32.

31. This term *Schein des Scheinlosen*, is employed by Benjamin to describe the enigmatic relation in which truth content stands to the material content of works of art at the beginning of Part III of the *Wahlverwantschaften* essay. Cf. *Gesammelte Schriften* I-1, pp. 123-203.

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concept. Consequently, according to Adorno, the sensible appearance of all works gives rise to a configuration of ideas. It falls due to aesthetic reflection to give voice to this configuration (the truth content of works of art), which the 'mutism' of the works themselves, i.e., the fact that they are able to express themselves only indirectly by way of a *non-conceptual* language of signs and imagery, remains incapable of expressing. The objective necessity for the critical reception of works of art becomes all the more imperative under the impact of modernism, a variety of art whose self-conscious heremeticism seemingly implores critical elucidation.

Adorno refers to this peculiar interlacing of sensible and supersensible elements in works of art as their 'enigmatic character' [*der Rätselcharakter*]. It is the enigmatic origin of their truth content, the fact that it inexplicably issues forth from a determinate constellation of sensible elements, that differentiates the truth content of works of art from strictly logical, conceptual truth. For by virtue of its mimetic structure, aesthetic truth retains an affinity with the somatic side of things, with that *ineffable* dimension that remains occluded in pure conceptualization, the fact that truth can never be securely and totally grasped by thought. As Adorno remarks: "Works of art speak like fairies in tales: 'you want the truth, you shall have it, but it will be unrecognizable to you.' In discursive knowledge the truth is not disguised, but for this reason it fails to possess the truth; as a form of knowledge, art possesses truth but only as something that proves incommensurable to art" (*A.T.*, p. 191).

As objectifications of spirit, all works of art participate in structures of meaning, and therefore inherently suggest a relation to the problem of the truth or falsehood of such meanings.[32] It is at this point that the question of truth content emerges, and also the necessity for the examination of the work of art by criticism. The enigmatic character of aesthetic meanings, the fact that these are always intertwined with mute, sensible elements, necessitates their clarification on the part of criticism. As such, immanent criticism seeks to make manifest the meanings that exist only in implicit form in the works themselves. From this arises criticism's affinity with the idea of 'revelation.' At the same time, insofar as each individual meaning is always implicated in a more general, universal context of meaning, the critical reception of works of art inevitably must take into account those extra-aesthetic, social elements which play an essential role in the genesis of all works of art — in the language of Walter Benjamin, that side which constitutes their 'material content.' There is a dynamic potential to all significant works of art, such that the true expanse of hidden meanings they contain only reveals itself in the course of historical development, a process chronicled in the history of a work's reception. For example, the existential ramifications of Hamlet's indecision could only become fully apparent in the present era: for he stands as the historical archetype of the modern introverted consciousness. Ultimately, in the dramas of Samuel Beckett, the illusion of meaningful subjectivity is surrendered entirely (corresponding to the disappearance of the autonomous bourgeois

32. As Adorno observes, "Nothing is thought whose truth or untruth would not also be thought; and this is the concern of criticism" (*A.T.*, p. 194).

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subject under the constraint of monopoly capitalism), and thus it is the very real historical *absence of meaning*, the *absurd,* which becomes thematic for modernism in so many cases.[33] The discrepancy between the determinate, historical, material content of works of art and the indeterminate, trans-historical nature of their truth content further enhances their enigmatic character and attests to that dimension of a work which remains vital and living over the course of time. It also points to the imperative need for a fresh critical reception of important works of art in each successive historical era.

Art and Reconciliation

For Adorno, the emancipatory potential embodied in art is never realized in terms of the direct effect it has on society itself, but only indirectly, on the transcendent plane of aesthetic form. He remains the intransigent foe of all attempts to compromise the principle of aesthetic autonomy for the sake of extra-aesthetic, utilitarian ends — even when such attempts seek to further an allegedly 'progressive' political cause, as in the cases of Brecht and Sartre. According to Adorno, in principle, the employment of art for practical or pedagogical ends represents, in Kantian terms, its surrender to the heteronomous sphere of 'interest,' a relinquishment of the hard-won principle of aesthetic autonomy which almost always proves destructive to the delicate structure of the formal law of the works themselves. In practice, the didacticism of reception aesthetics, by its inevitable simplification of things, results in the degeneration of art to the level of a vulgar casuistry. In truth, "Art respects the masses by presenting itself to them as that which they might become, instead of adapting itself to them in their degraded state" (*A. T.*, p. 356). For Adorno, art polemicizes most effectively against a society based on the principle of utility, or universal being for other, by virtue of its *sheer uselessness,* by proving itself inassimilable to the prevailing technocratic logic of rational purposiveness. For by resisting utilitarian employment and uncompromisingly insisting on their right to autonomy, works of art simultaneously foreshadow a state of reconciliation: that condition of intentionless being in itself where things will no longer be prized for their pragmatic value, their being for other, and will come to be called by their rightful names.[34] As Adorno observes: "Once the life of the mind renounces the duty and liberty of its own pure objectification, it has abdicated. Thereafter, works of art merely assimilate themselves to the brute existence against which they protest, in forms so ephemeral (the very charge made against autonomous works by committed writers) that from their very first day they belong to the seminars in which they inevitably end." [35]

For Adorno, the 'social responsibility' of the artist is ultimately best fulfilled after the fashion of Schönberg, Beckett and Kafka, whose works become a

33. Cf. Adorno, "Versuch das Endspiel zu Verstehen" in *Noten zur Literatur* II (Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 187-236.

34. The idea of reconciliation, where things are restored to an 'intentionless' state of being and are called by their proper 'names' derives, of course, from Benjamin's conception of 'redemption,' a notion that, despite its overt theological resonances, Adorno seems to make his own on several occasions.

35. Adorno, "Commitment," in *Aesthetics and Politics*, pp. 177-178.

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horrific mimesis of reification, and not by way of resolving deep-seated social contradictions in the spurious unities of platitudinous nostrums or slogans: "Kafka's prose and Beckett's plays. . . have an effect by comparison with which officially committed art looks like child's play. Kafka and Beckett arouse the *Angst* which existentialism merely talks about. . . . The inescapability of their works compels the change of attitude which committed works merely demand." [36] If adherence to the principle of autonomy prevents modernism from direct participation in the process of social change, it remains at one with this project in its attempt to stir the reified sensibility from its condition of enforced stupefaction. As such, modernism strives for the effect of 'alienation' — a fact which Brecht knew well. It attempts to present the commonplace and familiar in a shocking, radically different light. Yet, its wondrous affinity to the idea of reconciliation consists in the fact that by multiplying the ruins of social life to the *second power*, it obtains, in accordance with the old mathematical axiom, a positive result. By shattering the complacency of the reified consciousness, avant-garde art seeks to combat one of the primary obstacles to emancipation: the phenomenon of introjected domination. Significant works of art struggle to restore humanity's waning capacity to perceive. In the words of Walter Benjamin, they are now-times which attempt to explode the continuum of the always-the-same.

With the eclipse of the hope for emancipation that formerly resided with the industrial proletariat, works of art assume an important function as the repositories of the collective hopes that are denied to humanity in reality at present. Not only do works of art play an essential role in relation to the past, i.e., as the 'writing of history,' the remembrance of historical suffering, but they also inherently drive beyond immediacy and serve as prefigurations of reconciled life by virtue of their 'desire content.' For the *symbolic character* of works of art always contains a claim to an immediate union with the universal; not, however, an *actual* union with the latter but merely a fictive, *aesthetic union*. All art, whether it chooses to acknowledge it or not, seeks to make a statement about man's relation to the absolute; even distance from the absolute constitutes a form of relation. This is what it *symbolizes*, i.e., an immediate relation to the absolute which it purports to carry within itself. It is by virtue of this claim that works of art constitutionally transcend the status of simple being-there, and yet inherently point the way to transcendence, to the existence of a not-yet-being (E. Bloch), which is nevertheless dimly perceptible on the horizon of the present. [37] As symbolic entities, works of art bear an important relation to the realm of objective possibility. The profound longing for transcendence evinced in authentic works of art, their attempt to embody the idea of a non-degraded, unprofane spiritual totality, places them in the forefront of the utopian impulses of thought. For in relation to the theory of knowledge, works of art stand as the living refutation of the Kantian

36. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

37. Cf. Ernst Bloch's very significant remarks concerning the utopian content of the symbol and the general relation between art and utopia, in *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt, 1959), pp. 199-203 and 929-982, *passim*. To say that Bloch's researches have pursued this relation to its furthest extremes would still be something of an understatement.

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proscription against journeying into the intelligible realm, against his claim that the concepts of our understanding "would mean nothing, were we not always able to present their meaning in appearance, that is, in empirical objects." [38] For through their rational use of the faculty of the imagination, works of art overreach the Kantian barrier of the 'objects of possible experience,' and present, nevertheless, coherent, meaningful and often compelling 'judgments' about objective reality; these judgments are often more 'valid' in relation to reality than the natural-scientific judgments Kant seeks to emulate, even if the former do not lend themselves as readily to methods of empirical verification. Consequently, works of art offer nothing less than a glimpse — albeit symbolic — of the intelligible world, a vision of reconciliation. As Adorno observes: "Works of art do not imitate reality as much as they exemplify its transfiguration. In the end, it would be necessary to reverse the theory of imitation: in a sublimated sense, reality should imitate works of art. The fact, however, that works of art exist signifies that not-being could be. The actuality of works of art testifies to the possibility of the possible. That with which the desire-content of works of art is concerned — the actuality of that which is not — is transformed by them into remembrance" (*A.T.*, pp. 199-200). Works of art thus serve as the repositories of the utopian visions of humanity which have hitherto been denied in reality, yet whose content would ideally fall due to humanity in a state of reconciliation.

For Adorno, the utopian content of art is conveyed indirectly through the moment of form, and never explicitly in terms of content or a 'message.' All art, even the most purely mimetic, stands in opposition to empirical reality as such, for the idea of the *reorganization* of reality is inherent to the concept of form itself. By absorbing the elements of empirical reality into the framework of the autonomous dimension of form, by giving these elements new life, art seeks to remedy the deficiencies of reality as simple being-there. All important art is socially critical: by virtue of its utopian moment, it serves as an enchanted mirror held up to a refractory reality that confronts the latter with the hiatus between its promises and its truth. By re-crystallizing the diffuse elements of reality into a coherent whole, art strips the veil of contingency from them in order that they might be apprehended in a more rarefied light. The totalizing, synthetic and constructive character art assumes in the face of the fallen nature of the empirical world lends it an affinity with the concept of redemption, for by providing a refuge for those aspects of reality which are commonly denied a home, by exposing those elements to the regenerative powers of aesthetic form, art symbolizes the condition of salvation to which they will accede in a better world. Through their non-violent transfiguration of the constituents of reality in a new, dynamic constellation, works of art embody an alternative notion of the principle of form. Where the whole subjugates the part in a rigid and mechanical fashion, art, like society, becomes sterile. Art's non-coercive organization of materials and elements places it in stark opposition to the dominant principle of social organization — identitarian thought, the elimination of differences — making it a cryptogram of reconciled life.

38. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (London, 1970), A240, B299.

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Because they do not proceed by way of the principle of identity, as concepts do in the reduction of the other to self, but rather in their reorganization of empirical reality remain always in part guided by the principle of *resemblances* to the 'other' — a fact necessitated by their sensuous or mimetic character — works of art incarnate the image of a resurrected relation of humanity to nature. This would consist of a state in which the forces of production would absorb the contours of nature into their own logic, a state in which the ratio of identity woul be supplanted by a dialectic of self and other (*A.T.*, p. 75).

Concluding Remarks

Some important criticism of Adorno's aesthetics have been formulated by Lucien Goldmann in the context of a panel discussion, in which Adorno himself was one of the participants, at the "Second International Colloquium on the Sociology of Literature" at Royaumont, France, in January 1968.[39] Both Goldmann and Adorno are in agreement in their receptiveness to the phenomenon of modernism, to the socially critical function of its necessarily fragmented and problematic character, in contrast, for example, to Lukacs' cursory dismissal of avant gardism (owing to its alleged fetishization of 'decadence') and his consequent dogmatic defense of the principle of artistic realism as the ideologically 'correct' alternative.[40] Yet for Goldmann, it is essential that the fragment itself ultimately develop into something more positive and concrete — the idea of the philosophical system: "There is a world which Adorno has not used — system — and this is the whole difference between us."[41] Both Adorno and Goldmann agree on the necessity for the individual work of art to transcend its immediate condition of speechless particularity in the direction of *philosophical criticism*. All art possesses a truth content. Criticism fulfills the muted intentions of the work of art by giving voice to that truth content and thereby elaborating the work's inherent connections with the extra-aesthetic world. But Goldmann, on the basis of his Marxist world view, still adheres to the traditional conviction that reality can be fully grasped in systematic terms,[42] an idea that Adorno has long abandoned as a delusion attributable to the identitarian compulsiveness of rationalism — a methodological delusion to which dialectical materialism falls victim by virtue of its Hegelian origins. Consequently, according to Goldmann, Adorno, by virtue of his emphasis on the notion of 'criticism' as opposed to that of 'systematic completeness,' stands as Bruno Bauer to Goldmann's Marx: "It is basically the same old discussion between Marx's critique and Bauer's *Kritische Kritik*, resumed on the contemporary level. Of course, Adorno poses the questions in a much more refined and subtle way, but, systematically and philosophically, the question is on the same level."[43]

39. "Goldmann and Adorno: To Describe, Understand and Explain," in Lucien Goldmann, *Cultural Creation in Modern Society* (St. Louis, 1976), pp. 131-147.

40. For a good summary of Lukacs' position on the question of modernism versus realism, cf. *Realism in our Time* (New York, 1964). But see also Lukacs' *Aesthetik*, 4 volumes (Neuwied and Darmstadt, 1972).

41. Goldmann, *op.cit.*, p. 137.

42. Cf. the methodological essays in Goldmann, *Recherches Dialectiques* (Paris, 1959).

43. Goldmann, *Cultural Creation in Modern Society*, p. 137.

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Goldmann's rejection of Adorno's approach is, to be sure, based in part on a misunderstanding. When in the course of his remarks Adorno states that truth content 'transcends' the work of art, Goldmann interprets this observation to mean that, in Adorno's view, the critic may willfully separate his insights from the objective structure of the work itself, that philosophical criticism need not remain immanent to the work, but instead the work comes to serve as the occasion for the 'critical critic' to vent his own idiosyncratic, negative judgments. Goldmann continues: "Adorno tells us that one must surpass the work of art to understand it, but surpass it in the sense of philosophy — of philosophical culture and critical knowledge. My position is exactly the opposite: I would say there is a close relation and a difference between the work of art and philosophy. The work of art is not philosophical: it is a universe of colors, sounds, and words, of concrete characters. There is no death, there is Phaedra dying, there is a table of a certain color; but when the critic speaks of the work of art he must have recourse to concepts."

Ironically, there could in truth be no more faithful statement of Adorno's position than the remarks by Goldmann just cited. For Adorno, the question of philosophical truth content is not one which is completely independent of the objective content of the work, but always derives from this content, even if ultimately it raises extra-aesthetic issues. The critical unfolding of the work's truth content is necessitated, as Goldmann suggests, by the work's non-conceptual, pictorial language, its colors, sounds, etc. Surprisingly, Goldmann fails to take into account the Hegelian connotations of the 'transcendence' of the work by way of philosophy of which Adorno speaks, i.e., a transcendence which is a 'preservation' as well as an 'abolition.' For Adorno, too, there exists 'a close relation and a difference between the work of art and philosophy,' a relation that is guaranteed by the truth content of art.

The real differences that exist between the two are to be found, as already suggested, in their contrasting assumptions as to which form, 'systematic' or 'critical,' the philosophical reception of works of art should take at present. For Goldmann, it is imperative that the philosophical articulation of the truth content of works of art be other than an isolated, merely critical insight. Instead, it inevitably develops into something more satisfying and universal, the idea of the philosophical system: "The work of art is a total universe which gives value, takes a position, describes and affirms the existence of certain things; when translated, its corollary is a philosophical system. It is not a philosophical culture [i.e., a critical critic] which translates the work of art; rather, it is a philosophy on the same plane of the work — and to be on the same plane, philosophy must take on a systematic form."

For Goldmann, it is not a question of the superior insight and shrewdness of the critic who single-handedly divines the truth content of works of art, but rather it is merely a process of translating the 'total universe' of the work of art to the correspondent 'total universe' of the philosophical system. It is ultimately the correctness of the Marxist world view that facilitates this process of 'translation.' Goldmann argues for the importance of what he refers to as a proper balance between the moments of 'dogmatism' and 'criticism' in philosophy.

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Whereas dogmatism (personified by the orthodox Marxism of Lukacs) prematurely asserts the identity of the 'rational' and the 'real,' emphasizing the moment of positivity to the exclusion of all negativity, criticism (the position represented by Adorno) discounts from the outset the possibility of qualitative social change and allows all substance and concreteness to evaporate before the Medusa-like gaze of the negative, which sees in everything mere deficiency.

Consequently, for Goldmann, the essential task of literary criticism consists in setting forth the *correspondences* that exist between the two complementary totalities, the work of art on the one hand, and the Marxist system or world view, on the other. The correctness of the Marxist conception of history insures that the world is comprehensible as a totality, i.e., systematically comprehensible. The socially critical elements of authentic works of art can be shown to intersect with the Marxist world view once they are 'translated' by the process of criticism. Goldmann's employment of this method is perhaps the most sensitive and reflective of all Marxist approaches to literary criticism, as he has demonstrated in superb analyses on the work of Genet and Robbe-Grillet. For Goldmann, criticism shows how the contradictions and tensions in authentic works of art ultimately coincide with the aspirations of a *collective subject*; in this way, he claims to transcend the isolated and potentially solipsistic position of Adorno's *Kritische Kritik*. For example, in reference to the *Hidden God*, he remarks: "I explain Racine by Jansenism, by Jansenism as a structure." In a similar fashion, Goldmann explains the narrative structure of Robbe-Grillet's novels in terms of the 'structure' of reification in a world in which things attain precedence over human beings to the point where even the flow of consciousness becomes congealed, thing-like."[44]

In the last analysis, then, the practicability of Goldmann's transcendence of Adorno's 'merely critical' standpoint hinges on his alliance to the world view of historical materialism and the concomitant belief in the proletariat as the legitimate agent of social transformation. For the claim to systematic completeness that Goldmann considers a necessary presupposition for philosophical criticism is based on his faith in the validity of Marxism as the most advanced and complete comprehension of the dynamics of historical change. In contrast, Adorno, to be sure, takes his stance on the other side of historical materialism. For Adorno, the manifest theoretical bankruptcy of orthodox Marxism in face of the predominantly monopolistic market structure, massive state intervention and the colonization of consciousness, which are distinguishing features of late capitalism's social structure, receives its 'practical expression' in terms of the incontestible integration of the proletariat within the languid world of capitalist fringe benefits and the replacement of a formerly oppositional with a reformist consciousness. These developments from the point of departure for Adorno's 'return' to the problem of philosophical contemplation, as he so eloquently expresses it in the opening sentences of *Negative Dialectics:* "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed. The summary judgment that it

44. Goldmann, "The *Nouveau Roman* and Reality," in *Towards a Sociology of the Novel* (London, 1975), pp. 132-141.

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had merely interpreted the world, that resignation in the face of reality had merely crippled it in itself, becomes a defeatism of reason after the attempt to change the world miscarried. . . . Perhaps it was an inadequate interpretation which promised that it would be put into practice. Theory cannot prolong the moment its critique depended on. A practice infinitely delayed is no longer the forum for appeals against self-satisfied speculation; it is mostly the pretext used by executive authorities to choke, as vain, whatever critical thoughts the practical change would require.[45]

Today, it has become indisputable that the summary nature of Marx's ban on 'interpreting the world' represents a fatal curtailment of the faculty of reflection altogether, a microcosmic instance of the brutal and systematic intolerance which has proven endemic to all socialist societies to date. The transformation of Marxism to the status of a 'science of legitimation' in those societies, such that it has become merely one more ideology of repression, is by no means at odds with the original formulation of Marxism as *doctrine*, i.e., as a closed system in which whatever does not conform of its own accord with the system's claim to totality must be *forcibly* made to do so. It is always a small step from the plane of *conceptual* coercion to that of *social* coercion, especially in cases where theory attempt to prescribe unilaterally the contours and content of society. Certainly the project of an adequate critique of historical materialism far transcends the scope of this essay. Let us conclude the present discussion of the dispute between Adorno and Goldmann by suggesting that since 1843, the viability of the system on which Goldmann relies has been predicated on a *metaphysical atavism*: the myth of the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history. For Marx, the attributes of the Hegelian *Geist* become embodied in the 'proletariat'; the proletariat *must*, in conformity with its own *essence,* realize the realm of freedom.[46] Because of this a priori metaphysical assurance, Marx prevents himself from articulating the full scope of mediations that would in reality be necessary in order to surmount the capitalist realm of necessity. Whereas Goldmann himself attempts to remedy this problem through adopting the Lukacsian distinction between 'actual' and 'potential' class consciousness, which differentiates significantly between the immediate and mediated levels of consciousness of the proletariat, the attempt to maintain faith in the orthodox conception of the genuine revolutionary potential of the proletariat in the face of real historical changes in class structure, consciousness, etc., that have occurred in this century can only seem hopelessly romantic, if not outright illusory. If the systematic world view on which Goldman bases his conception of criticism were to prove irreparably dysfunctional, he would in the end be left with a problematic very similar to Adorno's alleged 'Critical Criticism.' If Goldmann criticizes Adorno's conception of negative critique for its omission of the standpoint of a 'collective subject' and for its renunciation of the system's demand for a totalizing perspective, the Marxist truisms on which Goldmann's approach depends can

45. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (New York, 1973), p. 3.

46. Cf. Cornelius Castoriadis, "On the History of the Workers' Movement," *Telos* 30 (Winter 1976-77), p. 4.

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be shown to disintegrate rapidly before a concrete examination of the real historical forces at work. Confronted with the obsolescence of traditional working class politics and, more importantly, with the totalitarian usurpation of this political legacy — a product of the 'substitutionalist' logic of the Leninist bureaucracies — Adorno seeks to regenerate the waning powers of critical thinking, traditionally banned from the Marxist camp, which would constitute a prerequisite for the future realization of a free society.

Consequently, the common accusation that Adorno's methodological starting point forecloses a priori the possibility of locating potential forces of collective opposition would seem guilty of misplaced concreteness: it is not Adorno who has abrogated such possibilities, but the administered world itself. If the Marxian metaphysic of revolution has been rendered dysfunctional, the project of radical thought has, as it were, been thrown back to square one — to the task of interpreting the world. At a time when all conceptions of a 'collective standpoint' seem unavoidably contaminated by the bureaucratic dogmatisms and prejudices that have today become virtually inseparable from the very concept of 'socialism,' perhaps the most radical 'deed' is the admission of profound uncertainty as to how to proceed in the political field, and the attempt to think through the present negative constellation of social relations from the ground up. For in the administered world, not only has the notion of collective action been rendered problematic, but the inmost capacity of spirit to realize itself in forms qualitatively other than those of the dominant *ratio* has become decidedly perilous. This fact in no small measure accounts for Adorno's deep concern with the emancipatory potential embodied in aesthetic experience.

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

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GUSTAV LANDAUER

by Heinz-Joachim Heydorn*

I

"Post bellum, ante bellum, in bello" ("After the war, before the war, during the war"). These words of Gustav Landauer adequately describe his life. Born in Karlsruhe on April 7, 1870 into a middle-class family, Landauer rebelled against the "indifferent environment" of bourgeois society at an early age. An unusual youth, he won the Fichte prize in high school, severed relations with his father and teachers and often suffered from severe psychological stress. Both the chaotic and creative elements in Landauer are interconnected and indicative of contradictions of a society characterized by inner emptiness. As he put it many years later: "The man of spirit lives in the desert." Under such conditions of increasing isolation, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Wagner significantly shaped his intellectual experiences, although Ibsen exerted the most influence on the young Landauer. "It was Ibsen who, with fascinating power, forced me not to ignore the real foundation, society and its ugliness, but to oppose it with the revolt and struggle of the individual.... I was an anarchist before I became a socialist, that is why I am one of the few who did not find their way via Social Democracy. I was filled with disgust for the whole thing at too early an age."

After graduation Laudauer left Karlsruhe to begin the study of philosophy and German literature which, however, he did not finish. A later plan to take up medicine also failed. Instead, he was attracted to Berlin which, with Munich, became an intellectual center after 1870. Here he found other people unable to endure life in imperial Germany who were exploring all possible forms of anarchism. First, he was fascinated with Johann Most, whose call for direct action attracted him for a while. In Berlin he also met Benedict Friedländer, one of the most independent and intelligent anarchists whose critique of Marx left a lasting impression on him. He also became a friend of Moritz von Egidy, a Prussian officer who had broken with his caste to work for the "unification of mankind." This first period of Landauer's development, characterized by constant struggle and rebellion, coincides with his editorial for *The Socialist*, which lasted from 1891 to 1899, when, in Landauer's words, it was hounded to death.

For Landauer, the years 1891 to 1899 were filled with exhausting political activity in a city of unbridgeable contradictions growing as fast as American cities. In Berlin, the ostentatious middle class of the Wilhelmine era mingled with the barracks of the oppressed, the pride of the military and the despair of the homeless. Here he first witnessed the prison uprisings at Moabit and Friedrichshain, and people beaten without justice or defense.

In November 1893, Landauer was condemned to two months in prison for civil disobedience. Shortly thereafter, he received an additional nine-month sentence, which he served in Sorau. He was arrested again in 1896. He stood

* Originally published as the "Vorwort" to Gustav Landauer, *Aufruf zum Sozialismus* (Frankfurt and Vienna, 1967), pp. 5-46. Translated by David J. Parent.

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trial once more in 1897, but was released for lack of evidence. In 1899 he was condemned to six months in prison and assigned to Tegel. Landauer, however, attended both the 1893 International Congress of Socialists in Zurich, where Bebel publicly accused him of being a government informer and where he was physically mistreated, and the London Congress in 1896, where anarchists were excluded. He reported extensively on these congresses and produced his detailed psychological studies of the leaders of the labor movement. During these years he also began a series of deep meditations. His first novel, *The Preacher of Death* (1893), already contains traces of his subsequent thinking: the quest for an understanding of spirit as the point of departure for all renewal. As he wrote from prison in 1899: "I once experienced in prison incomparable hours of delight, and there the power of suffering was proven to me. No one who has not lived through something of the sort knows what the joys of memory and feasts of the soul are." It soon became evident that Landauer defied classification and that he stood outside all groups with his own unmistakable powers.

The last stay in prison that began on August 8, 1899 at a moment of severe internal crisis provided him the opportunity to review his previous life, his eternal unrest and daily political struggles. In prison, he also acquired the necessary perspective on the direction of his future work. As early as 1890, Fritz Mauthner, his lifelong friend, had given him the opportunity to publish his early work *On Epic and Dramatic Literature*. Collaboration on Mauthner's critique of language during his prison term was decisive for Landauer's own thinking. In 1903 he published *Skepticism and Mysticism,* without which it is impossible to understand his later views. At the same time, Landauer edited Meister Eckhart's works, which appeared in 1906 and, in addition to Spinoza, greatly influenced his views. After his release from prison, Landauer sought to recreate a community for lonely people who had become detached from old communal bonds. However, Landauer's outlook became clearest in his contribution to *Realm of Fulfillment*, a series of pamphlets published by the Hart brothers, in an article entitled "Through Separation to Community." "Now we who went among the people, have returned from our journey. Some have been lost by the wayside, to a political party or to despair. But we have brought something with us: individual human beings. Individual human beings — that is all we found." Because the world had fallen to pieces, he suggested that "we must flee to mystical separation to become one with it." Yet, here, despite an undertone of resignation, it becomes clear how closely mysticism and activism are connected. "Let us exert our whole energy to live as a whole. Out of the depths of the world community which we ourselves are, let us create the community of human beings." To Landauer, the question of a new foundation for human life came to the fore with his new awareness of the ideological narrowness, inner impoverishment and tactical cynicism of leftist groups which he had come to know. "Just picture it," he writes in a letter to Julius Bab in 1903, "remember your most sublime feelings, your deepest attraction; perhaps that is a goal, an achievement for you. For me, it was a means, a way to the world." It is not a question of the conceptual formulation, Landauer argued.

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Instead, life should become a means of grasping and shaping the world. The critique will have to begin here. In his personal life, Landauer sought to retrieve the fullness of being not only for the moment, but for humanity as a whole.

Landauer relaunched *The Socialist* in 1909. This time, however, it was his own operation and continued until it folded in 1915 because of the war. After Landauer's death, Martin Buber described it as "Germany's best journal." This was a time of reflection. He kept a wide correspondence which remains a treasure trove in German epistolary literature. Among his correspondents then are Dehmel, Beer-Hofmann, Mombert, Hoffmanstahl, Herman Bahr, Rudolf Leonhard, and Karl Kraus. A series of smaller works appears in journals such as *Schaubühne* (*The Stage*), *Gesellschaft*, and in Maximilian Harden's *Zukunft*. During this time Landauer also met other important intellectuals. In 1902 he went to England with his young wife for almost a year to avoid difficulties resulting from the marriage since he had hardly the credentials of an upstanding character. In Bromley (Kent), the Landauers lived close to Kropotkin. His friendship with Erich Mühsam is also relevant. Most important, however, was his friendship with Martin Buber, who influenced Landauer just as Landauer's ideas had an extraordinary impact on Buber's works. It was no accident that Buber published Landauer's correspondence after his death and also was the only person who tried to protect Landauer's literary estate. Landauer also met Max Nettlau, the historian of anarchism, and Leo Wertheimer (Constantin Brunner), whose book *The Teaching of Spiritual Men and the People* had a significant impact on him. Such a rich exchange of ideas with these leading intellectual figures led to a temporary lessening of direct political activity, but it was never given up completely, just as his literary side was never completely repressed. But Landauer's economic livelihood always remained tenuous. For a while he worked in a bookstore and many of the translations that he did with his wife helped him to survive. Disinherited by his father, separated from his family — the only remaining links were with his mother and a cousin — he had no possibility for additional material help. Still, he found time to write a great work: *The Revolution* (1905), a brilliant study of revolutionary activity, followed in 1907 by *Thirty Socialist Theses*. With the latter, he resumed his political activities. In 1908 the Socialist Federation was formed and 10,000 copies of its first pamphlet were published. According to it, "These groups are united into communities of groups and into smaller or larger general conventions, as needed. All can be united with all; federation; no central authority."

From 1909 to 1915, *The Socialist* dealt with all the significant political, social and literary themes of the period, and groups of the Socialist Federation were established in Germany and Switzerland. At their peak there were over 20 of them, and their meetings attracted up to 800 people at times. The Federation sought to establish new human relations in the midst of capitalist society by rejecting any cooperation with capitalism and condemning it to its doom by prefiguring a new mode of life. Landauer did not look on this as politics, which he considered a crippling link to a yesterday in which

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humanity's face had been destroyed. Landauer's aim was to establish the future in the present. This is why, in 1911, he listed "anti-politics" as one of his main activities in *Kürschners Literatur-Kalendar*. The goal was to free man from extraneous encumbrances. This awakening of the spirit can be achieved in a new common life, for spirit is not awakened by words, but by action. Before 1914, attempts to establish communal socialist settlements and free cooperative community schools were well under way when the war curtailed further developments.

Between 1909 and 1914, Landauer completed the decisive political preparations for his short-lived activity in the November revolution. In 1911, he published *For Socialism,* which presented his ideas to broader circles as a series of lectures. In the same year, the question of preventing the coming war became the dominant theme in his thought. He issued a call for an "active general strike," leading out of capitalist society via cell-forming socialist management. Then, the mass strike acquired another decisive function. As the September 1, 1911, pamphlet edition of *The Socialist* stated, although the strike cannot bring socialism, it is "the dcecisive means through which the strike workers can, in times of danger to life and morals, force the governments to adjust their decisions to the true will of the people." The objective is "to prepare for decisive future intervention." Landauer always sought to prefigure the future, knowing that everything is too late once the events begin. The immediate danger of war in 19111 had taught him this. So before the war's outbreak he made a desperate attempt to prepare the masses for its coming and to ready them for action. In 1911 he called for a special German Workers' Day organized along the lines of workers' councils, at which this "decisive future intervention" was to be the subject of negotiations. More than 100,000 leaflets were distributed, although the state's attorney sought to prevent their dissemination by all means. The "abolution of war through the self-determination of all people" was the goal. Neither governments nor party bureaucracies, Landauer argued, should do the thinking for the people. Only the people, he believed, could prevent war; "the workers must prepare a systematic work-stoppage in the event of a provocative militaristic policy of the government, and indeed prepare it in such a way that the governments know what is in store for them in the given eventuality. Efforts to gain influence in this way, however, failed completely. A wild nationalism was lurking just below the surface of international proclamations and proletarian rhetoric — even in the working masses and their leadership. When the war broke out, Landauer found himself almost alone. Even his closest friends broke with him. "I see my task growing like my solitude," he wrote on November 2, 1911, and "I know the human race is alive in men, and need to give up nothing that causes me to want to live on." On August 10, 1914, during the first days of the outbreak of war, already under censorship and constant watch, he stated in *The Socialist:* "Who knows whether we lonely and scorned men, when the hour comes for the primeval love to erupt beyond all hatred, whether we were not the preservers of the seed? Faith is everything. Whoever is not faithful now does not just betray himself." Here one recognizes the personality which, beyond all fear and death,

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provided a model, from the days of the Munich Workers' Council Government until his murder. As he argued: "That the spirit dies willingly is heresy." On Easter 1915 *The Socialist* finally ceased publication, even though the censors had already made open statements impossible. In one of the last issues, Landauer said farewell to his readers with a pledge for the future: "We want to carry out our duty, even when we repeatedly tend to lose hope; we want to be ready to do our duty, as before, better than before."

It is astonishing that during these years, marked by dark premonitions of death, when Landauer was desperately attempting to gain political influence, he wrote a series of highly significant literary and socio-psychological works. *On Marriage* and *God and Socialism,* both written in 1910, present well-conceived essays characteristic of his world view; in 1911 *The Suicide of Youths* presents the nature of adolescent suicide at that time with brilliant lucidity; in 1913, two important treatises on the Jewish question appear: *Martin Buber* and *Are These Heretical Ideas?* In 1913 *Dolls,* a deep psychological masterpiece based on Kleist's "Marionette-Theater" also appeared. In those days, he was also deeply moved by the death of Tolstoy who, with his last wild attempt to escape existing society, helped Landauer to a shattering self-awareness. In one of his finest works, *Leo Nicolaevich Tolstoy,* Landauer saw Tolstoy demonstrating that the goal of non-violence "is at the same time a means to achieve this goal, that all coercive domination collapses and all tormenting injustice ceases when the slaves cease to exercise force — force against themselves."

Until Kurt Eisner called him to Munich to lead the revolution, the war years were characterized by inner monologue. "Now the time is coming when this war will end, when the spirit wishes to come into existence." His personal harshness increased, the rigorous dedication to his purpose remained, and the war inflicted deep inner wounds. In 1917 Landauer moved to Krumbach in Swabia close to his wife's homeland where he lived a life of absolute withdrawal, interrupted only by literary lectures. He did not find it hard to say farewell to Berlin, which he had always hated as an abstract city. For him, Berlin is the center of the barbaric Germany he had experienced there — the government and police, centralism, the emptiness and atomization of man. This experience can be clearly seen after the defeat, when he called for a federation of German republics that should seek a new capital. He loved the multiplicity of tribes and traditions, and the federative principle was also mirrored in his empathy with men and regions. In Southern Germany the world seemed more conciliatory, with a richer culture and a greater variety of people. In Krumbach he found the concentration necessary for a compendious work. Here he wrote his classic two-volume work on Shakespeare, his studies on Strindberg, the "Fragment on Georg Kaiser," "Goethe's Politics," and especially his masterpiece on "Friedrich Hölderlin in his Poems." Never has there been such a quiet intoxication, he wrote of Hölderlin's poetry, "never have the powerful cosmic, horrible and joyous community of God and the world been bathed in such a subdued light." The late Hölderlin reminded him of the language of the prophets; he proclaimed no mythologies, but only the reality of our time.

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Landauer's rich literary production was concentrated into a very few years, although the material foundations almost always had to be created in the form of lectures. These literary writings led to him being offered the position of playwright at the Düsseldorf playhouse, although he was no longer able to accept it. The work from this brief time showed his potential and variety of creative talents. He felt the changing of the times, but he waited for the day when man would heal his destructive face. For him the war spoke to itself: "I am the last of all wars." The idea that Germany, as the land of the greatest contradictions and of the greatest human humiliations, was also the land that would make the leap into a human future, appeared to him as the path to light leading out of darkness. The fiction of human life is greater in Western democracies because people consider themselves subjects. Landauer's view is tinged with skepticism: "Germany has had no Encyclopedists, no Voltaire and no Rousseau and no English and French revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries." Thinkers and poets have almost all fallen, he wrote as early as 1914, and later on: "Only those who pursue their cause totally without expectations are free of individual disappointments, because they have assimilated disappointment and despair into their innermost soul and made it the foundation of their vital energy and actions." Thus, for Landauer, "there is no room for hope, only for action."

Still, during these years, the only thing possible was to wait, despite contrary feelings and thoughts. Although he was convinced that the German *Reich* bore the primary responsibility for the war and considered the invasion of Belgium and U-Boat warfare to be flagrant violations of international law, he refused to side openly with the Allies or to continue his struggle from a foreign country. When invited to Sweden on a lecture tour, he wanted to go "to give testimony of the German spirit." In 1916, a few weeks before Wilson announced his peace manifesto, he sent a letter to Wilson through secret channels. The letter stated clearly: "Germany did not, like other nations, achieve its unity by means of inner liberation and renewal, but by war against a neighboring people; its leaders then believed they could continue to assert the position of the German *Reich* in the complex of powers only through threats of violence." Germany had brought guilt upon itself. Yet, not a new injustice, but a better world should arise out of defeat. The closing lines of Landauer's appeal, which contains proposals for a future international order, assert: "I ask you to keep in mind that this plan comes from a German who is firmly convinced that the German people will do their duty toward mankind and carry out the vows which the great representatives of German spirit have made in their creations if others trust them and assist them with the solidarity that constitutes the birth of mankind out of the races and nations."

Landauer's position is well calculated. He wished to come forth only when the objective conditions would permit resolute action with some hope of success. In 1915, he claimed, "Whoever is sure that reason motivates all his actions has the right and duty not to take a decisive step according to his principles immediately, but to wait until the end and leave everything to the decisive moment." But when the moment came, Landauer was sick in bed. His

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wife's death, material hardship, struggle, prison and injuries from youth onward had brought his sensitive body to the limits of its strength. When Kurt Eisner wrote on November 14, 1918, "Come as soon as your health permits," the last period of his life began. "To be happy and rejoice just for a moment: but now we must go on..."

During the months preceding his murder, Gustav Landauer's life was clearly linked with those events that shaped subsequent German history. "Great decisions must be made, the revolution has begun, and so the purification and uplifting will come at long last. We are very fortunate to see it. All old things must be removed. Completely new men, of whom no man has any idea, will now come." But his initial enthusiasm for Kurt Eisner, who had become the leader of the Bavarian government, soon gave way to a growing skepticism. The sensitive and highly cultured Eisner, who could look back on a life of great moral consistency, had run into a coordinate system of political constraints from which he could not escape. Ultimately, he did not dare to take the step into the unknown. The rapidly regrouping forces of the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats called for safeguarded parliamentary institutions, a move that Landauer considered regressive. The Communists, at first only a weak faction, but strengthened under Levine's leadership, advocated revolutionary centralism. Yet Landauer considered them representatives of a "Robespierre-principle," or a new form of state slavery and state capitalism that could not overcome the capitalist pauperization of man. So, along with a few friends, he was from the beginning the consistent advocate of workers' council parliamentarism, which might replace the traditional parliamentary forms and introduce a fundamental reconstruction of society. In Landauer's eyes, socialism should win its human freedom from below, through councils of workers, peasants and soldiers. These councils should become institutions leading into the future and the Federation of German Republics was to be based upon them. During the revolution, Landauer rejected socialization of enterprises and wanted to give them the form of cooperatives. However, he clearly saw that the necessary preconditions did not exist for that and he would have to push for them in a vacuum. "For the Germans everything has to come from above," he wrote to Louise Dumont and later to his daughter. "So we stand before the great change, while most men are not internally ready and changed." So, even in these days, Landauer was by no means a Utopian. By November 22, he characterized the situation as "very serious. It will be a miracle if the revolution comes out of this liquidation safe and sound." Above all, the considerable mass of organized labor remained outside the revolutionary movement: "It feels only annoyance at it." The victorious powers, so he believed, were trying with the Social Democrats to save capitalism once again from collapse. "The capitalist governments, fearing to lose their power," would come to the assistance of German capitalism. "The only support of the revolution now is indeed the councils of workers, peasants and soldiers."

The last weeks of his life were dominated by this thought: amid the political contradictions and the growing threat of counterrevolution, Landauer still sought a new mode of freedom. Thus, he became an unaffiliated member of

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the workers' council in the provisional national assembly of the Bavarian republic and, at times, he actually seemed to gain influence with the masses. Delivering eulogies for Kurt Eisner, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, he incessantly presented proposals for reconstructing society from its very roots because "every continuity with the old *Reich* must cease." He did not see parliamentary democracy as a historical possibility for Germany. "When the conditions became so unsatisfactory for the working force that it cannot calm down, then Caesarism results and some even more abhorrent Napoleon III takes power, his name being Ludendorff or whatever." The German situation is recognized with ghastly clarity; the German revolution would sooner or later slip into barbarities unless its emancipated content could be salvaged and men who are totally unprepared to live their own lives can be won only by a direct experience of happiness offered to them by the revolution. "In every way, the revolution must provide happiness. It must be a reality: a presence and redemption for men. For us, the revolution was great and real for a few hours or days because it brought liberation, physical happiness and redemption to the soldiers." In this undecided struggle, Landauer tried to transfer all power to the workers' councils, calling on the people to revitalize their self-determination. In a report on the meetings of the workers' councils from February 13 to 20, the Munich *Neue Zeitung* writes: "With convincing, passionate words, Landauer calls for a constructive democracy of the working masses actually applied day by day. Only the constant activity of the workers' councils can guarantee this." These councils are the only means of achieving a classless society. Everyone, including former factory owners, the members of the technical intelligentsia, scientists and intellectuals, must work for this cause. On February 17, Landauer led a demonstration of 80,000 people to support the power of the workers' councils. After Eisner's murder by counter-revolutionaries, however, the contradictions became extreme. Still, Landauer lived with a deep sense of destiny and was ready to risk his own destruction. "Don't worry about my life," he wrote on March 14 to a friend, "of the three dimensions, length has always meant the least to me." The "heroic Jew" had always been one of his ideals and, at this time, he lived by it.

In this phase, Landauer once again thoroughly reviewed the situation. In an essay "On Workers' Council Democracy and the Path of Revolution," he pointed to the extraordinary difficulties of the situation. The world of late capitalism, in which the workers' councils are to be established, is a fragmented world in which man is crippled. Everything remains to be done and nothing is prepared. "Every attempt to find solutions amounts to developing the new economy and the new community together. A provisional government is called to direct this process. Although I would never call it a dictatorship of the proletariat, it is characterized by its inability to seek the formal codetermination of all, but rather it can only concern itself with content, spirit and the course which must be followed energetically. This entails the tremendous danger of abuse and confusion. However, this course can be pursued only if its leaders are both pure and strong people. This is the point where every revolution is endangered by the greatest corruption. But mankind

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cannot avoid its destiny of having to prepare good from bad material. One must see all these dangers, yet dare to move onward."

On April 7, the Workers' Council Republic was proclaimed, and Landauer became the people's representative for public information. The origin of the proclamation is disputed, as is Landauer's role. "We have to live through this time," he wrote to his daughter. "Hold firmly, with me, in your innermost soul, to what we are trying to do. It is for the good and salvation of mankind." The government lasted only a few days. After a counterrevolutionary putsch, in which Erich Mühsam was arrested, the Communists took power. Here Landauer put himself at their disposal. "The Workers' Council Republic has been saved by the powerful intervention of the proletariat in Munich. I recognize and welcome the transformation which followed." But the Communists rejected his collaboration. The new Workers' Council Republic posed as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and a Red Army was organized. Levine, who had practically taken power, fought to the end. Shortly before the fall of Munich on April 30, the dictatorship of the Red Army was also proclaimed after some of the revolutionaries had already gone over to the enemy. On May 2, Munich fell after bloody battles.

It was 1934 before Erich Mühsam was strangled in a lavatory in Oranienburg. Alfred Fischer, an old associate of the Federation, who hid in Landauer's home for two days, was also murdered in Stadelheim. Landauer was offered a chance to flee to Switzerland, which certainly would have succeeded. He did not want to flee, even though he knew what was in store for him. On March 20, 1918, he had written to his daughter Gudula: "The most intimate and precise fidelity thus attains the character of complete freedom. But no arbitrariness. Nothing is more horrid and wrong than arbitrariness." In the middle of the revolution, on January 12, 1919, he wrote: "I believe I am the only person remaining calm and joyous during it. Only a person who has already experienced all this in advance long ago and risen above it can look on in the midst of it like a person from another planet."

On the afternoon of May 1, Landauer was arrested in the Eisner household. On May 2, he was murdered. There are conflicting reports about his death. Ernst Kiekisch, who had played a leading role at the beginning of the revolution, observed: "Gustav Landauer was one of the most important intellectual personalities I have ever met. He did more than pay lip service to the idea of humanity. After the collapse of the Workers' Council Republic, he lived in the apartment of Eisner's widow. Invading Free Corpsmen hunted him down there. They loaded him onto a truck and transported him to Stadelheim. When he arrived, excited uniformed students attacked and mistreated him. In his calm, superior and cool manner he told them bravely and candidly how misled they were and how they were letting themselves be used as tools of a very bad cause. A Major von Gagern, who was listening, became enraged. He incited the students to murder the man, who was already within the custody of prison walls. The mob pounced on Landauer and threw him to the ground. A sergeant set his rifle to his chest and shot him to death. Then the Free Corps people plundered and stripped the corpse and threw it naked into the wash

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house. This deed revealed what a great deal of bestiality the German soul contains and it foreshadowed the later atrocities of the Third Reich."

In his edition of Landauer's correspondence, Buber reports something different, based on reports of the *Weltbühne*: "On the morning of May 2, he was transported to Stadelheim together with three Starnberger workers' council representatives. According to existing reports of his murder, including official ones, from the time of his arrest Landauer was exposed without protection to soldiers who were not dissuaded by their officers from this bloody deed. Rather, they were even incited to it. An officer shouted to the squad of soldiers surrounding Landauer: 'Halt, Landauer is to be shot at once.' Another officer, Freiherr von Gagern, struck him on the head with the butt of his riding whip. This signalled the soldiers, who now pounced on him like a pack of dogs. They shot and beat Landauer to death. The last words which he called to his murderers were, according to a witness's report, 'Go ahead and kill me! Be men!'

II

In a letter to Constantin Brunner in June 1909, Landauer wrote: "I am not in the least disposed to forget the joy in my Judaism even for one day." This personal reflection is, at the same time, objectively very significant. Landauer's spiritual world cannot be understood without comprehending its Jewish point of departure. The story of salvation and the purification of man, covenant as *Bund*, or federation and rule of the spirit stem deeply and consciously from the Jewish heritage. The prophets of the Old Testament, with their relentless persistence, set a standard for all times: "the prophetic books of the Jews in the Bible are more important for true knowledge for Jews living yesterday, today and tomorrow than all momentary experiences of fragile existences." Jewish spirit is the best thing one has, not what one condemns in others. There is nothing new that does not have its past roots in this spirit and does not point to its origins; "rather, the new will lead no pure life at all if it does not stand in the sacred tradition." Here, the Jewish tradition is the sacred tradition, and with its progressive self-understanding, the Jewish problem became more important for Landauer. He sought to clarify its meaning in a systematic context. And, it is no accident that toward the end of his life he was moving close to Zionism. Shortly before his death, he had already agreed to participate in a meeting of German socialist Jews with Nahum Goldmann. Yet his Zionism is restricted to a demand for inner renewal. The idea of a separate Jewish homeland was far from his thoughts. A personal event shows the importance of his Jewish self-understanding. In 1915, his wife, Hedwig Lachmann, had written a poem in which a key passage says: "Yet into the dust I will suffer debasement with the defeated." Landauer, who otherwise never commented on any poems by his wife, was extremely moved by it. "I am deeply touched that just this very feeling sought perfect expression in you for so long. Thank you, Hedwig, woman, Jewess, my own." Here Landauer's Judaism clearly is depicted as humanity: to suffer debasement with the defeated, to fight to the end on the side of the lost, the crippled and the injured.

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In 1913 Landauer clarified his ideas concerning Judaism. He polemicized against the "masturbatory self-satisfaction" of Jews. Judaism should have a "full, beautiful, flowing life that fulfills our being." The true and valuable is only what is self-evident, not what must constantly be held and grasped consciously. One is least a Jew when one stresses Judaism for oneself alone. Instead, one is a Jew when one is so in one's spiritual and psychic feelings. Judaism, so conceived, points beyond itself, "from the depth of one nationality one works for a cause which is the cause of mankind." The Jews are a nation, though "one that becomes in struggle," but precisely because they are one, they exemplify a new concept of nation that abolishes all traditional boundaries. There is a deep connection between Judaism and the idea of humanity. "A preponderantly great number of Jews are found in the vanguard for a new mankind;" these Jews consider themselves "a federation (*Bund*) with a calling to fulfill for mankind, and the more they feel this, the more Zion is already alive for them." The restoration of a Jewish nation thus should not be separated from the restoration of humanity. Zion can be alive in Judaism only if a new Jerusalem is also built for mankind. The national concept here is equated directly with the concept of "federation." "Federation," he writes in *The Socialist* of June 15, 1910, is a "spiritual person," and where "federation" exists, mankind experiences a special task. As in the Old Testament, here the establishment of the federation should finally bring all people together in an alliance. Therefore, it is not by chance that this Old Testament concept of federation or covenant lives on in all revolutionary, egalitarian movements up to and beyond the present day because its Messianic perspective is directly effective. This applies to the Hussites, to Thomas Münzer "with the sword of Gideon," to Gerrard Winstanley, who considers the Chiliastic group of the English revolution to be the people of Israel. So Landauer's concept of federation stands within a broad context. Having at an early age broken with the Judaism of imperial Germany, he was perfectly aware of this context: "Rebellion as constitution, transformation and revolution" or "as a rule provided for all times." In *For Socialism,* he writes: "Order through the spirit as a resolution; that was the great and sacred aspect of this Mosaic social order." When the Jewish People's Home (*Volksheim*) was opened in Berlin in 1916, he chose as the introductory lecture's theme: "Judaism and Socialism."

The Messianic mission expresses historical destiny, but its theological origin remains unmistakable. "We Jews," he says, have "become Jews-in-becoming." The future can be nothing but what the past has left as a task. The depiction of this task provides the key to Landauer's whole intellectual world. The more Judaism becomes will and transformation, the more it is aware of its own essence. The more it understands itself as objective orientation to a fulfillment, the more that which has been developing since ancient times becomes the path of "humanity in becoming." There is nothing else in the martyred hearts, according to tradition, means nothing else "but the revolution and regeneration of mankind." Essence and urging, knowledge and preparation are placed under this goal. In his essay "Strindberg's Historical Miniatures," he takes up this theme of salvation, which had first been expressed in the

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"Heretical Thoughts" of 1913. The idea of mankind is entrusted to the Jews: it was rescued from Egypt, and should be preserved through the ages. The two great ways of understanding the human mission are here contrasted: Rome and Jerusalem, the *Imperium Romanum* and the coming of the Messiah in a renewed world. Rule by force is replaced by rule of the spirit as Isaiah's prophecy is fulfilled. Strindberg's providential faith, "precisely the belief that mankind is one in this spirit that stems from Judaism, will redeem mankind," is also Landauer's deepest belief.

Finally, an almost masochistic element is added, which is proclaimed as a purification of life or the continued sanctification of existence. When *The Socialist,* in a special issue dated November 5, 1913, took a position concerning the Kiev ritual-murder trial, Landauer used the occasion to reiterated the nature of Judaism as a longing for purification. Since Moses, "war for the conquest of God, war for purity and sanctity has been transposed into the heart of the people, the community, and into the heart of every Jew, a war that is left *to no representative, no vanguard, no redeemer or saint, no priest. This war is* waged by means of renunciation, purification of the soul, turning inward, supplicant prayer, a community united in groaning and penance. This is no fetishism. Only where fetish-worship remains can remnants of cannibalism remain hidden. That Jews wage war for the salvation of their soul or inflict wounds on men other than themselves has long since become impossible." In the "struggle for the sacred," they shall regain themselves. At a moment when mankind has taken responsibility for every corner of the earth and the possibilities of an unprecedented catastrophe increase, this will purify life and will decide its future. Out of it, a new people should arise. "Mankind does not mean equality; rather, it means the federation of various people and nations." This love for the diversity of living beings led him to Goethe, to the richness of the historical and individual existence of humanity. In this diversity, Jewish life or the Jewish nation are to have their place as the expression of a common history and a common spiritual language, right in the midst of mankind. Landauer greatly feared an abstract, undifferentiated socialist world in which Judaism also would be condemned to destruction. Instead, its calling was to establish reconciliation in diversity. "The Nations that have marked themselves off as states have outside neighbors who are their enemies; the Jewish nation has its neighbors in its own breast and thus neighbor-cooperative [*Nachbar-Genossenschaft*] is peace and unity in each person who is a whole and confesses himself to it." He saw himself both as a first-born and a Benjamin. He was both Jew and a German: "I accept the complex entity that I am."

Landauer's Judaism has decisive consequences for his whole work. Among important Jewish German socialists he was, together with Moses Hess, the only one who understood himself as Jewish and who wished to lead Judaism as a specific, essential force into the coming mankind. Thus, Landauer's deep distrust of all one-sided rational culture is his distrust of emancipated Judaism which has lost the fullness of life that was alive in the old community. This explains his overemphasis on emotions, which occasonally crossed the

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boundary to irrationalism, as well as his absolute rejection of Marxism and psychoanalysis.

Besides Judaism, Landauer was decisively influenced by Mauthner's linguistic philosophy. In his *Contributions to a Critique of Language* and *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Mauthner de-emphasized the purely analytical and conceptual mode of communication as a means of grasping the world. This account led to an atheistic mysticism and prompted Mauthner to write his classical history of Western atheism. The world's substance cannot be grasped through concepts, but only through inner experience. *Skepticism and Mysticism* is the crystallization of Landauer's spiritual encounter with Mauthner's works.

Similarly, Meister Eckhart's works deeply influenced Landauer, whose strong Spinozistic element fits without contradiction with these influences. Eckhart "totally abolishes the universe by pulling it back into the soul; then he abolishes God by unveiling him as a materialistic concept, and finally he abolishes the soul and comes to the original, undifferentiated solitude of the self, which is the Divinity, although nothing can be said about it: neither self, nor Divinity nor being." Spinoza himself says that materiality [*Dinglichkeit*] is only the product of our thinking." He was the only one who had the right to speak of the depth of the world in the language of concepts. He was Landauer's "prince and leader" just as he had been Goethe's. The parallel attributes, God or nature [*deus sive natura*], make it possible to experience the world both in its externaltiy as a causal context, as well as mystically and unseparatedly. This Spinozistic internalization led directly to German Classicism and Romanticism. Absolute idealism and absolute materialism turn out to be equivalent. The materialistic externalization of the world in Spinoza is only the outward-projected experience of being, a conceptual reflex of the psyche: "there remains only the attempt to take the material world as a symbol of psychic life."

Given these assumptions, the individual's inner experience becomes the important dimension. In relation to the question of universals, Landauer assumed a unique position between realism and nominalism. He rejected the abstract individualism and the violation of man through the abstract concept. "The nominalists carried out a necessary purge; they deprived mental entities of their reality and sacredness. The last great nominalist was Max Stirner, whose radical thoroughness swept out the ghosts of abstract terms." "God is not the arch enemy," Landauer wrote, "but the concept. All actual repression is ultimately exercised by concepts that are considered sacred: God, morality, the state, society, love. It leads to the deification of the pure, abstract, isolated individual in antithesis to the abstract concept. The last nominalist set the concrete single being, the individual, as a reality on God's empty chair, which from then on was owned by the individual and his property." Thus, nature at work [*natura naturans*] is grasped by Landauer not directly, mystically or ahistorically, as an externally self-existing unseparated unity. Instead, it is the world that reveals itself as becoming — as countless prehistorical and historical strata. Through the self-immersion of the individual, all forms can be located

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only in its depths. This access becomes possible only with the individual who is a microcosm in relation to the macrocosm. Man can express what he finds in his own depths only in metaphors and not by conceptual reproduction.

Abstractions are "similes for real equalities and unities, ideas in the Platonic sense." The "great hereditary communities" are rediscovered by man's immersion into himself because "paleontological relics" still live in us. But we know little of "ancestral life, of the great ancestral domination in us." Thus, the mankind discovered in us through introversion is an infinite world across infinite generations; "the individual men, shadow-images perpetually appearing, changing and disappearing, through which mankind becomes visible." The purely individual being-for-itself is thus the most fleeting thing there is, insofar as it represents consciousness, the momentary reflection of the idea, while the genuine person, on the contrary, is the "deepest, oldest and most eternal stratum: the instinctive drives of the community which spring from the individual." In this sense, Meister Eckhart says, God is not one with the individual man, but with mankind; Landauer places these words of Eckhart's at the beginning of his study: "Therefore I ask God to rid me of God, for unessential being [*unwesenhaftes Wesen*] is above God and above differentiation; there I was myself, there I wanted myself and recognized myself making this man, therefore I am the origin of myself according to my essence [*Wesen*] which is eternal, and according to my essence which is temporal. And therefore I was born, and can, according to the nature of my birth, which is eternal, never perish." Thus, the world subject to knowledge, which is expressed by words and within spatio-temporal objective dimensions, is subject to analysis and, for that very reason, is unknowable, i.e., the world of positive systems, of religious and secular theologies is one thing. Quite another thing is the world of heretics, sectarians and mystics — the world of a constantly new inner experience and unrest, of the experience of the human race. It longs passionately for rest and must forever be without rest.

Landauer belongs to this history of the sectarians and mystics. "There is a line, which certainly does not begin with the neo-Platonists, but can be discovered there for the first time, which then finds its first peak in the 5th century in Dionysius the Areopagite, its second in Scotus Erigena in the 9th century, and which then enduringly affects the Scholastics, Realists and pan-psychistic sects of the Middle Ages, until it reaches its third and highest peak in Meister Eckhart." From there the line proceeds slowly, but is never lost, to Pico de la Mirandola, Molinos and Jakob Boehme, to Angelus Silesius. The pantheism of the Middle Ages, the mystical communistic communities of the European past are always close to Landauer's heart. In them, he recognizes the spirit at work amid all heterogeneous elements. For Landauer, the "inner light" precedes reason as in the writings of the English revolution of the 17th century when the terms "inner light" and "reason" are interchangeable. Mysticism is the preliminary stage of revolutionary reason, or rather it accompanies it and repeatedly surpasses it as this reason turns inward to be experienced as a world foundation. Landauer knows about this: he sees this tension in Fichte's work, between the *Addresses to the German Nation* and the

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Instructions for a Happy Life, and also in great existential form in Tolstoy. "Tolstoy, who arrived at his mysticism through rationalism and at his communism through individualism, and who found God in the soul and needed absolutely no other world beyond." Deep within himself, man finds his origin, a link with the generations, and finally to the whole, to nothingness, which is a totality in which all contradictions fall together.

The world as a community thus lies in the individual himself. It is a "primeval stock of community" which the individual rediscovers in himself as something ancient — a forgotten reality manifested in his soul "as something new." The individual finds in himself "the most primeval and general community with the human race and with the universe." This unique possibility of the individual, to open up beyond himself, the supra-individual, the entire boundless world that it is free to assume a new form, is outlined in a 1915 letter to foreign friends: "Individuals have a narrow solitary life. Somewhere in deep shafts of their unfathomable being, permeated by the infinities of time and space, they have all possibilities. The possibility for every change is there, because it is never a learning of something new, but a remembering or a forgetting, because every change of a man is a finding or a losing of his own self. The possibility is there; but life is short, the force of the link between inherited background and social world is strong, and the transforming strength of those who influence the individual is limited." Society alienates men by abstracting man's behavior from himself. "I know that acts of hatred have long been happening between men, without any feeling of hatred. I know that we have invented organizations and mechanical bureaucratic apparatuses whose functioning takes away from us any need for feeling."

The critique of civilization that results is not free of the antinomy of culture and civilization typical of subsequent German ideology. Man, whose being is buried and is torn out of the direct relation to himself, becomes neurotic: "Neurosis and hysteria are social diseases." They are the results of a sick society. Yet, as Kropotkin discovered, man survives, helpless and silent, within all this dehumanization, as does his original nature in the form of bond (*Verbundheit*). In a 1910 essay entitled "Policemen and Murderers," this contradiction is clarified by immediate experience; "The fault for the harm we do one another is that we do not keep our promises; that we are not what we really are." The clothes we wear fight to the death; in disguise men murder one another; under a mask they bleed to death. "Know yourself as you really are behind all the plunder you have draped around yourself and do not act according to the laws of plunder, but according to the essence of man. Recognize yourself, your neighbor and equal, in the person who stands before you; recognize him in the mask he has put on just as you have. We are, one and all, just naked human bodies and we let ourselves be tormented deep into our flesh."

History becomes man's antithesis. The strange self-created abstract world which weighs down on him should be taken back into human concreteness. The new society in which man's original condition is to be restored can be expressed only in images. Since it resists abstraction and because it is the regaining of a

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direct naturalness, language provides no concept for it. Subjectivity (*Innerlichkeit*) must unfold its own symbolism. "I wish to know in order to form" and "what I give should not be the truth but a symbol." The image which "the spirit has created" should be lifted to the form of human life, "as some perfect pictures of thought and of creative feeling are to be transformed into flesh and blood."

It is a myth-creating force which is shown here. Landauer rediscovered it for his time in the writings of Alfred Mombert. The age of myth gave the Greeks the particular gift to take and experience symbols as something corporeal. Myth-creating force is based on faith; it was lost in Christianity through scholastic theology. In the Reformation, he says, God was preserved into abstraction, in the book, and so was placed as a force above men. Now there as no longer a people, only a mob. Creativity is put in direct relation to "chaos and myth-making power." "Consciousness" is contrasted as something doomed to death with the sense of life hidden under the blanket of rational itemization, "feeling is killed by consciousness, as love is by morality, and sanctity by dogma."

This conception is expressed most clearly in the 1910 study "God and Socialism." Everything that takes place in our consciousness in words and concepts touches just our surface, "our last acquired, unsure, still not embodied and spiritual stratum." Our true being lies below the delicate shine of awareness. All life is guided by consciousness "because all our life is superficial": nothing comes out of the depths as fate without being interpreted or known. "But in all this knowledge, we know that we do not know our best side." No doubt, Landauer's ideas concerning a collective, archaic, prerational myth-producing depth below the surface of consciousness are not without irrationalistic ambivalence. They trace back to before the turn of the century and they reflect the cultural disintegration of bourgeois consciousness. The step from myth to logos promises the end of cannibalism. Thus, his unique blend of mysticism and activism is not an *élan vital* or Sorel's ideology of action, but is unconditionally committed to humanization.

Even if the whole man is always present under concealment, a society characterized by mutual aid still has great value. Abstract society does not permit this. Man himself becomes abstract in it, and becomes separated from his essence. Landauer developed his ideal-typical social conception — a conception tinged by Romantic elements — on the model of the Middle Ages. Here people are in direct, unconscious creation, as *natura naturans* (creative nature) in contrast to *natura naturata* (created nature), and reification has not as yet taken over. The social structure of the Middle Ages is a structure of "stratification": a multiplicity of corporations, cooperatives and federations as expressions of the binding spirit. The nation is not yet identical with the concept of state. Rather, it is a natural community. "Nation is part of the individual — a feeling and a reality, which brings itself to unity and federation in free spirits. Each nation is anarchical." This medieval world of social cells is socialism's age-old heritage: an eternal thing from yesterday that is to be retrieved into today's reality. What Landauer calls "culture" applies fully to the

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medieval world: "A stage of great culture comes about where the unity in multiplicity of forms of organization and supraindividual structures is not an external bond, but rather a spirit living in individuals." Following Kropotkin, Landauer also sought the remnants of a past communal culture of human cooperation which have been preserved in communal property or originally communistic, agrarian orders. The Reformation marks the cut-off point in which modern state authority was established and the right of the abstract person was introduced. It was the beginning of the structural impoverishment of society, the atomization and isolation of individual, increasing loneliness, and the rise of the abstract spider web of domination as the exercise of power over men. Creative man becomes isolated and must maintain his fullness within himself in the midst of poverty, apart from the social world. In him the signs of the future and the symbols of the past coexist in the face of an empty present. The intellectual is coming into existence as a new nobility "which can even for those earlier centuries be called a nobility of decadence," a nobility "without people, without power, and soon without class-estate." Spirit and sensuality, which in the Middle Ages had been combined into one and had reached their highest expression in art, fell apart.

The development to modern society is characterized by "the separation of life from faith and the replacement of spirit by organized authority." Absolute authority, abstract legality and, finally, absolute nationalism, are the characteristics of the modern state. "In external matters," he writes in the "Address from the Gallery of the Reichstag," in 1911, "the state is and can be nothing other than a military organization of conquest toward other states; while in internal matters the state can be nothing but the most miserable and poorest substitute for a natural free federation of order, and it must repeatedly take the form of the military organization of the rich against the poor and rebellious." The state deals with relations and objectives and the interests it is supposed to satisfy are not local, but abstract. The question of a revolution in the social conditions is not separable from the concept of the state. Thus, the capitalist state could be replaced by a socialist one without effecting the liberation of man.

In states, men have replaced life with death: man becomes separated from the earth and its products, from his means of labor and from the joy of his work. The question of land ownership becomes the decisive economic question to Landauer and his agrarian-socialist tendencies must be understood from this perspective. The capitalist state perfectly expresses the atomization of the people, as "economic-technical progress is (arranged) into a system of social decay." He writes in *Revolution* and later in *For Socialism* that "civilization moves forward very quickly, along with physical and physiological decadence." Parliamentarism is only the "last step in the atomization and isolation of mass individuals." Capitalist society, represented by the existing state, however, adapts marvelously to the changing conditions, integrating the proletariat through the development of social legislation and causing it to degenerate rather than leading to a socialist society. Rather, it absorbs the socialists, thus making their ideology superfluous. The fall of capitalism can take forever as it

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uses socialist means to preserve its vitality.

Revolutions are the decisive historical stages for a renewal of mankind. "Revolution is what we call the span of time when the old topos no longer exists, the new one has not yet been established." Revolution is the way from one topos to the other, from one period of relative stability via chaos and tumult, heroism and bestiality, solitude and massification, to another period of relative stability. Every Utopia consists of two elements: the reaction against the topos and the memory of all former Utopias. "Utopias are always only apparently dead, and at the least jostling of their coffin they revive." So Utopia reawakens again and again, and though it always dies again it lives an underground existence even in times of stability. "The revolution in this sense is not a span of time or a boundary, but a principle that proceeds even farther through vast periods of time." The revolutions are "summarizing and preceding, ever recurring microcosms." Spirit lives only in the revolution, but it does not come to life through it. When the revolution ends, the spirit returns to latency. This rebirth of mankind fails in modern revolutions because they unite "with war, acts of violence, with dictatorial-organizations and authoritarian repression." The modern revolution is, moreover, bound to its historical goals. It is revolution for the constitutional state and for absolute law, i.e., "for the absolute state, its expansion and democratization." In it freedom and property are identified under the concept of state, but it does not lead out of this hermeticism (*Verschlossenheit*).

The coming revolution presupposes these revolutions because through them the continuity of the spirit is preserved, but it also extended as "regeneration," radical and complete renewal of life. The time will come when men see more clearly than today what the greatest of socialists, Proudhon, stated: that the social revolution has absolutely no similarity to the political one, but that without political revolution it cannot come about." The old revolution had its strength in negation and rebellion, although for a moment men also rid themselves of their solitude and were able to experience their alliance. Still, it could not move on to a new content. Only when the important distinction is made between state and society can the true revolution become possible as a distinction between coercion and the spiritual unity (*Geistesbund*) of men.

Socialism restores the people by expressing numerous relationships of common ownership of land and of the means of production. The revolution which brings about socialism is not the final one, but a beginning. It is anticipated even in the midst of the individualistic age. Socialism is a new way of life. With it, centralism and bureaucracy, by which the old history maintains itself, die out. It is the "discovery of society," of the free and voluntary action of the forces of communal life. It is anarchy and federation, and differs qualitatively from capitalism in its forms of organization and work. Here Landauer draws a very sharp distinction from Marxism. Marxism is only a consequence of "state, capitalist, technical civilization," whereas society is the "multiplicity of small interrelations, a structure of communities." With it the "people" is regained. This regaining can be only the result of a free inner decision for a common life. It excludes the "state proletarians." All nations are

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to be included in this society, in concrete diversity in accordance with the respective harmonies of peoples." Also, the "brotherhood of nations is not something that comes vaguely for all mankind, but something that must be created with determinism, with color and diversity." The "people renovated by revolution" are expressly included in this federation and with equal rights, protected from every exploitation and repression. Landauer gives numerous suggestions for regulating the inner order of a new society. A free understanding will be revealed between communities, cooperatives and national centers by the system of representation regulated by delegations. The delegations would remain in constant contact with their constituents and could be dismissed and replaced at any time. A public, legal form of international congress would be created, whose decisions would be obligatory. Workers' council democracy and a system of cooperatives are set out as the form of political and economic representation appropriate to this new society.

Before his death, Landauer wrote that the councils must not be constructed in an *ad hoc* manner; there must not be a transition to a dictatorship of the proletariat, but they are the decisive instrument of the future. His constant struggle during the Munich days was to preserve and expand the workers' council democracy. He sees these forms as suited to realizing a socialism such as "all the world seeks," a socialism that can be realized without diminishing freedom.

No absolute goal can be attained once and for all. The spirit of the race never stops. Ultimately, all historical movement is understood in terms of the concept of spirit. It is something present in all men, "a combination of the experiences of many generations that have become a feeling of interests and of reason." It is reason that "dissolves only what is dying and doomed to decay, but it also organizes the living." Spirit is by nature an inner compulsion and where spirit is, there is society. In spirit man has command of himself, but without coercion. It is concrete in the active community, for all abstraction remains non-binding. It is a way out of previous history and a way that must be begun immediately. "For us there is only a way, only the future; the past, too, is future which ensues as we move ahead, changes and was different." Everything is a way and preparation of the way. But this way must be practiced and one can practice it only by stepping onto it. "As walking already exists before the legs exist, and as this walking builds and shapes the legs, so it will not be the spirit that sends us on our way, but it is our way that causes it to come about in us." Finally, out of this spirit a new religion will arise, out of life itself, out of "long since vanished ecstasies." Bearers of this spirit are men and not anonymous historical principles. "For us the bearers of history are persons."

Socialists want to make the spirit sensual and corporeal; they want to let spirit get to work. "We will spiritualize the senses and earthly life. But we in truth need the ever-recurring renewal, we need the readiness for a violent emotion; we need the spring, the madness, the intoxication and frenzy." This was said ecstatically in 1918, but it says nothing more than the closing lines of Landauer's great Shakespeare book: "The road upward from drive to spirit, Shakespeare's hard and dangerous road, is also the road from war to peace,

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from death to life — I believe it, no matter how long and winding this may yet be."

III

Gustav Landauer deserves to be remembered not only for his person, but also for a few of his ideas. As already indicated, the romantic imagination, the irrationalistic collective element which his philosophy of society contains is not without danger and is latently connected with decay. His agrarian-socialist emphasis misses the central problem of a technological society. Landauer's style is too expressive, his subjectivisms have become too strange and unfamiliar to us; it is the style of his companions, Toller, Kaiser, Rubiner. These critical reservations, however, do not apply to Landauer's mysticism. Absolute mysticism and rationality do not contradict one another.

The idea remains that there can be only so much humanity in the future as already exists today or that the future must emerge from us. Landauer makes it clear that there can be a more humane future only if there is a more human present. There is no place for a view that reduces man to a means even temporarily and gives way to inhuman constraints. Only where man *is* the end, can he become the end. "Beginning" is a real Utopia and without it, there will be no topos of man. Landauer remains a conservative thinker. At times, his work recalls Theodor Lessing's remark that the Jews love the revolution the most because they are the most conservative people.

The view that one must begin with humanity here and now is combined with a clear-sighted analysis of capitalist reality. Capitalism does not generate socialism. Capitalism adopts socialist methods to protect itself. It forces men to progressive demoralization, while at the same time improving material conditions. With it, the whole world has entered a stage of historically unparalleled danger. The step out of necessity into freedom must therefore be taken immediately, even if only a few take it.

There remains the idea of decentralization and "mutual aid" as Kropotkin formulated it in the idea of workers' councils as an example of democracy from below. Landauer already clearly saw something that has become evident today; that the problem of human alienation cannot be solved by formal socialist conditions alone. Under the present conditions, the problem of alienation is the problem of an abstract world. Alienation is a result of anonymity, and of living in a world whose rationality has become unreplicable. Man does not become free via an abstract property. Rather, he himself becomes an abstraction. Stirner's "unique one" is the corollary to the Hegelian concept as its last consequence. The human reality which is to be regained needs another quality. Landauer here showed a way which no doubt will acquire increasing importance: the idea of workers' councils based on a cooperative of men. He first discovered it himself; and his acquaintance with Proudhon's works only confirmed it. The absolution of domination over men, direct or indirect, is announced in this new socialist structure of society.

Finally, spirit must make itself permanent: everything attained must be subjected to radical doubt. Nothing is certain because the metaphysics of

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history wants it so. Where men are involved, nothing remains established forever. Only a constant beginning, a will to sanctify life by perpetually cleansing man, counteracts the constantly impending decay.

Landauer, who held to the principle of non-violence to the end, teaches us by his rare harmony of thought and being. He was a martyr of the German left on its centuries-long sacrificial path (*Opfergang*), and it is not exaggerated to say, a great Jewish martyr. He, who incorporated German spirit so deeply into his affirmed Jewish fate, who incorporated Hölderlin's language into his own, sensed at the edge of death that this was a terrible mistake. Not because of Hölderlin nor his broken life nor because of his few friends, but reality itself, with its horrendous power, began immediately to refute him. Only because there was this deep and unique combination of German and Jewish spirit was there also Auschwitz: paradox is here reality. This is what gave the founding of a separate Jewish homeland its final justification. Landauer is one of its witnesses.

He, whose life was lonelier than that of many other pioneers of socialism, saw this loneliness as a necessary renunciation for the future. "Therefore there is for us no more wonderful spiritualization of what we mean here by revolution than Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, which after hard experiences of the individual soul, after the futile attempt to be happy in solitude, flows into the massive chorus to joy." He wanted to incorporate the past taking along everything hopeful out of the depths of yesterday into the future, in which man recognizes man. A word that he loved best characterizes him: *aedificabo* — I will build.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

SCIENCE AND "SCIENTIFIC" IDEOLOGIES
by Antonio Gramsci*

§36. Eddington's claim that "if in a human body we were to eliminate all the space without matter and to gather its protons and electrons in a single mass, man (his body) would be reduced to a corpuscle barely visible under a microscope" (cf. *La Natura del Mondo Fisico*, French edition, p. 20), has struck and moved G.A. Borgese's imagination (cf. his booklet). But what concretely is the meaning of Eddington's claim? If you reflect a little, it means exactly nothing, aside from its literal meaning. Even if the above described reduction were carried out (by whom?), even for the whole world, no relations would change and things would remain as they are. Things would change if only men or particular men were to undergo this reduction, so as to have hypothetically an actualization of certain chapters of *Gulliver's Travels*, with the Lilliputians, the giants, and Borgese and Gulliver among them.

Actually we are dealing simply with a play on words, with fictional science, with a way of treating questions good only to make empty heads exercise their imagination, not with a new scientific or philosophical thought. Is matter seen with a microscope perhaps no longer objectively real matter, but a creation of the human mind which does not exist objectively or empirically? We could recall for this purpose the Jewish story of a girl who has suffered a little, little malfunctioning...such as a handnail scratch. In Eddington's physics and in many other modern scientific views, the surprise of the ingenuous reader is due to the fact that the words used to describe certain phenomena are bent to arbitrarily suggest completely different phenomena. A body remains "massive" in the traditional meaning, even if the "new" physics shows that it consists of one part per million of matter and of 999,999 parts of vacuum. A body is "porous" in the traditional sense, and it does not become "porous" in the sense of the "new" physics, even after Eddington's declaration. The position of man remains the same; none of the fundamental concepts of life is shaken in the least, let alone overthrown. The glosses of people like Borgese will in the long run serve only to render ridiculous the subjectivistic conceptions of reality which allow such banal play on words.

Prof. Mario Camis (*Nuova Antologia,* November 1, 1931, section on "Biological and Medical Sciences") writes: "In thinking about the unsurpassed minuteness of these methods of investigation, we recalled the statement of a participant at the last Congress of Philosophy in Oxford. According to what Borgese reports, this person, speaking of infinitely small phenomena which nowadays are the subject of much attention, remarked that 'they cannot be considered independently of the subject who observes them.' These are words which lead to many reflections and which reopen, from completely new points of view, the great problems of the subjective existence of the universe and of the meaning of sense data in scientific thought."

Apparently this is one of the few instances of diffusion among Italian scientists of the grotesque way of thinking of certain scientists, especially English, in connection with the "new" physics. Prof. Camis should have reflected that, if the remark reported by Borgese leads one to reflect, the first reflection should be this: that science as conceived so far can no longer exist, but it must change into a series of acts of faith in the assertions of the individual experimenters because observed phenomena do not

*Translated by Maurice A. Finocchiaro. Originally published in Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere*, ed. V. Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 1451-59.

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exist independently of their mind. Has not scientific progress consisted so far in the fact that new experiments and observations have corrected and extended previous experiments and observations? How could this happen if a given experiment could not be reproduced and extended and give rise to novel relationships, even though it might in some sense not be controllable upon the changing of the observer?

The superficiality of Camis's remarks can be seen directly from the context of the article from which I have quoted, since in it Camis implicitly explains how the claim which aroused Borgese's imagination so much can and must be interpreted in a merely empirical rather than philosophical manner. Camis' essay is a review of the book *On the Principles of Renal Function* by Gösta Ekehorn (Stockholm, 1931). The topic is one of experiments on elements so small that they cannot be described (relatively speaking) with words that are valid and accurate for other observers, and that therefore the experimenter is unable to dissociate himself from his own subjective personality and to objectify; every experimenter must arrive at the act of perception by his own means, directly, minutely following the whole process. Consider the following hypothesis: that there are no microscopes and that only some men have a natural visual power equal to that of the normal eye equipped with a microscope. Given such a hypothesis, it is evident that the experiments of the observer with the exceptional eyesight cannot be separated from his physical and psychical personality and cannot be "repeated." Only the invention of the microscope will equalize the physical conditions of observation and will allow all scientists to repeat the experiment and to develop it collectively. But this hypothesis makes us notice and identify only part of the difficulty; in scientific experiments we are not dealing only with visual power. Camis says that Ekehorn pricks a frog's liver glomerulus with a cannula "whose construction is the result of such refined workmanship and is so *tied to the experimenter's indefinable and inimitable manual intuitions* that even Ekehorn, in describing the procedure of the slanted but by the glass capillary, says that he cannot give the precepts in words, but he must be satisfied with a vague indication." The error is to believe that similar phenomena occur only in scientific experimentation. Actually, in every workshop there are, for certain precise industrial operations, individual specialists whose talent is based exactly and only on the great skill of their eyesight, sense of touch, and rapidity of movement. We can find relevant examples in Ford's books: in trying to overcome friction and in producing surfaces without the smallest roughness and imperfections (which allows a noticeable saving of materials), one has made incredible strides with the help of electrical machines, which test the perfect adherence of materials as man could not do. It is worth recalling the case, reported by Ford, of a Scandinavian technician who is able to give steel such a smooth surface that several hundred pounds are needed to separate two such surfaces touching each other.

Thus, what Camis is talking about has nothing to do with the reveries of Borgese and of his sources. If it were true that the infinitely small phenomena under discussion cannot be considered as existing independently of the subject who observes them, then in reality they would not even be "observed," but "created," and they would be in the same domain as an individual's pure intuitive imagination. One should then also ask the question whether the same individual can create (observe) the same fact "twice." We would not be dealing with "solipsism" but with diabolical art and witchcraft. The object of science would then not be the (non-existing) phenomena, but these imaginative impressions, as works of art. The herd of scientists, which does not possess

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diabolical faculties, would scientifically study the small group of great thaumaturgic scientists. However, if instead, despite all the practical difficulties stemming from individual differences, phenomena reoccur and can be *observed* objectively by various scientists independently of one another, what is the meaning of the claim reported by Borgese other than that one speaks metaphorically in order to indicate the difficulties inherent in the objective description and representation of observed phenomena? Nor does this difficulty seem hard to explain: (1) in terms of the literary inability of scientists, till now educated to describe and represent only macroscopic phenomena; (2) in terms of the inadequacy of ordinary language, also devised for macroscopic phenomena; and (3) in terms of the relatively little development of these microscopic sciences, which await a further development of their methods and criteria to be understood by *the many* by means of literary communication (and not only by means of direct experimental work, which is a privilege of a very few); (4) one should also remember that many microphysical experiments are indirect observations, involving chain reactions that are seen in their results rather than in act (for example, Rutherford's experiments).

At any rate, one is dealing with an initial and transitory phase of a new scientific epoch. This phase, joining forces with a great intellectual and moral crisis, has produced a new form of "sophistry" that is reminiscent of the classical sophisms of Achilles and the turtle, the heap and the grain of sand, the arrow that has left the bow but which must be standing still, etc. Nevertheless, these sophisms have characterized a phase of the development of philosophy and of logic, and they have served to refine the instruments of thought.

§37. One should collect the main definitions that have been given of science (in the sense of natural science). "The study of phenomena and of their laws of similarity (regularity), of coexistence (coordination), and of succession (causality)." Others consider the convenience of the order that science establishes among phenomena to facilitate mastering them in thought and dominating them in action; they define science as "the most economical description of reality." The most important question to resolve concerning the concept of science is this: whether and how science can give the "certainty" of the objective existence of so-called external reality. For common belief the question does not even arise; but what is the origin of the certainty of common belief? Essentially from religion (at least from Christianity in the West); but religion is an ideology, the most deep-rooted and widespread ideology, not a proof or demonstration. One could contend that it is an error to ask science as such for a proof of the objectivity of reality, since this objectivity is a world view, a philosophy, and it cannot be a scientific datum. What can science give in this direction? Science makes choices among sensations, which are the primordial elements of knowledge; it treats certain sensations as transitory, apparent, and fallacious because they depend on special individual conditions, and certain others as lasting, permanent and above special individual conditions. Scientific work has two main aspects: one that unceasingly corrects the means of knowledge, corrects and reinforces the organs of sensation, elaborates new and complex principles of induction and deduction, that is, it refines the very instruments of experience and of its control; the other that applies this instrumental network (of material and mental instruments) to distinguish what is necessary in sensations from what is arbitrary, individual and transitory. In science one establishes what is common to all men, what all men can control in the same way, independently from one another, as long as they observe equally the relevant technical procedures. "Objective" means exactly and only this: we consider objective that reality that is ascertained by all men, that is independent of every point of view, be it merely

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particular or that of a group. Actually, even this is a particular world view, an ideology. However, this view, as a whole and for the direction it indicates, can be accepted by the philosophy of praxis, whereas one should reject the view of common belief, even though it reaches the same material conclusion. Common belief affirms the objectivity of reality insofar as reality, the world, has been created by God, independently of man, before man; it is thus an expression of the mythological worldview. On the other hand, in describing this objectivity, common belief falls into the crudest errors, has largely remained at the stage of Ptolemaic astronomy, and does not know how to establish the real connection between cause and effect; that is, it regards as "objective" a certain anachronistic "subjectivity" because it cannot even conceive that there could be a subjective view of the world and what this could mean. But, is everything that science affirms "objectively" true? In a definitive manner? If scientific truths were definitive, science would have ceased to exist as such, as research, as new experimentation, and scientific activity would reduce to the diffusion of what had already been discovered. Fortunately for science, this is not true. But even if scientific truths are not definitive and final, then science too is a historical category, a movement that develops continually. The only thing to remember is that science does not propose any form of metaphysical "unknown," but it reduces what man does not know to an empirical "non-knowledge" that does not exclude knowability but makes it dependent on the development of physical and instrumental elements and of the historical intelligence of individual scientists.

If this is so, what interests science is therefore not the objectivity of reality, but man, who elaborates his methods of research, who continually improves his material instruments that strengthen his sensory organs and the logical (including mathematical) instruments of analysis and of proof; that is to say, culture, one's view of the world, and the relation between man and reality with the mediation of technology. In science, too, to look for reality outside men, in the religious or metaphysical sense, amounts to nothing but a paradox. Without man, what would the reality of the universe mean? All of science is tied to the needs, the life, the activity of man. Without human activity, which creates all values, including scientific ones, what would "objectivity" be? Chaos, that is, nothing, a void, if we may say so, for in reality if we imagine that man does not exist, one cannot imagine language and thought. For the philosophy of praxis, being cannot be divorced from thinking, man from nature, activity from matter, the subject from the object; if one makes such a separation one falls into one of the many forms of religion or into senseless abstraction.

§38. To place science at the base of life, to regard science and the worldview *par excellence*, as the one that clears the eyes from every ideological illusion, and which places man in front of reality as it is, means to fall again into the idea that the philosophy of praxis needs philosophical props outside of itself. But in reality science, too, is a superstructure, an ideology. Can one say, however, that in the study of superstructures science occupies a privileged position, on account of the fact that its reaction upon the structure has a particular character, of greater scope and developmental continuity, especially after the 18th century, from which time science had a place all its own in general culture? That science is a superstructure, is shown also by the fact that there have been entire periods of eclipse, for example, when it was obscured by another dominant ideology, religion, which claimed to have absorbed science; thus the science and the technology of the Arabs seemed pure witchcraft to Christians. Moreover, in spite of all the efforts of scientists, science never presents itself as naked objective information; it always appears coated by an ideology, and concretely science is the combination of the objective fact with a hypothesis or a system

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of hypotheses which surpass the mere objective fact. It is true, however, that in this domain it is relatively easy to distinguish the objective information from the system of hypotheses, by a process of abstraction that is inherent in scientific methodology itself, in such a way that we can accept the one and reject the other. That is why a social group can accept the science of another group without accepting its ideology (the ideology of vulgar evolutionism, for example), so that the relevant objections by Missiroli (and by Sorel) fall apart.

§39. It is to be noted that, side by side with the most superficial infatuation for the sciences, there is in reality the greatest ignorance of scientific facts and methods, which are very difficult and which become always more difficult through progressive specialization into new branches of research. Scientific superstition carries with it such ridiculous illusions and such infantile ideas that even religious superstition is thereby ennobled. Scientific progress has given birth to the belief in and the awaiting of a new type of Messiah, who will turn this Earth into the fabulous Cockaigne; without any intervention by human labor, but through the work of ever more perfect machines, the forces of nature will abundantly give to society all that is necessary to satisfy its needs and to live comfortably. The dangers of this infatuation are evident, for the superstitious abstract faith in the miraculous power of man paradoxically renders sterile the very bases of this power, destroys all love of concrete and necessary work, and makes one daydream as if one had smoked a new type of opium. We must fight against this infatuation by various means, the most important of which should be a better knowledge of the essential elements of science, making sure that scientific knowledge is spread through the work of serious scientists and scholars and no longer by all-knowing journalists and presumptuous self-taught persons. In reality, since one expects too much from science, one conceives it as a superior witchcraft, and thus one does not succeed in realistically evaluating what science concretely offers us.

FOR BENJAMIN: THE *THESES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY*

by Harvey Blume

The "Theses..." is evidence that for a long time Benjamin had seen himself as living in eschatalogical tension, that is living in a time when the old cultural forms were accumulating at the edge of a precipice. The European tradition had lost its aura of permanence; it was no longer reproducing itself.

Benjamin could conceive the idea of compressing that tradition into quotations, quotations that could gather at the edge. The system of quotations can be seen as the last muster of the elements of a tradtion that had come to a halt, a final count before the plunge.

It has been said of Benjamin that, writer of prose that he was, he lent himself to a poetic rather than rational form of cognition. If that is so his poem was built not out of individual words, but out of discrete chunks of the intellectual tradition and the poem as a whole announced as eschatological break.[1]

1. It is this, disguised or rather, transformed into a disagreement about Marxism that

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What Benjamin actually does in the "Theses..." is weave Marxism and Judaism together. The first thesis puts a theology inside Marxism. It is this theology with which historical materialism must stay in touch in order to win. At the same time, Marxism is the outside of any theology that stays true to its original foundation of messianic hope. Issac Deutscher has given us the category of the non-Jewish Jew. Benjamin goes a step beyond in the "Theses." He gives us the Jew who is non-Jewish in order to be a Jew.

As understood by Benjamin, the traditions of Judaism and Marxism enrich and reveal each other. Judaism is the religion of the memory of oppression, which is of course different than saying that Jews are everywhere and always oppressed. Judaism does not forget, which is to say that even in times of calm for the Jews themselves, Judaism does not forfeit either its own history, or the corollary, that the history of all peoples is the history of injustice. Judaism keeps its secret, a secret the oppressors want to deny circulation. For with complete unforgetfulness goes complete expectation. Judaism is the symbiosis of total memory and total hope. It is the religion of a people that remembers and preserves itself not only in its own name, but in the name of all people.

Here a sidelight is thrown on the question of European anti-Semitism. How could a Christianity which, in its ruling form, declared all oppression to have been annulled with the coming of Christ, all hope fulfilled, tolerate in its midst a people whose memory, encoded in religion, remained intact? It is no wonder that messianic outbreaks among the Christian masses were often attributed by the rulers to the influence of the Jews. Anti-Semitism can be seen in this light as the attempt to cut the flow of uninterrupted memory, joined as it was to uncooptable hope.

This is the Judaism Benjamin coordinates with Marxism in the "Theses..." If Judaism expresses the possibility of the "Messianic cessation of happening," historical materialism recognizes "a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past." The "Theses..." is directed against everything that robs the oppressed of its ability to make a revolutionary leap, in particular the notion that history moves inevitably toward progress. Thus Benjamin's interpretation of the Klee painting "Angelus Novus" in the ninth thesis. With a continuous view of the debacle that is the past, the angel is about to move into action. But his wings are caught in the storm called progress. The past recedes into the distance along with the chance of its being redeemed. In such a way the notion of progress distracts the working class.

Benjamin's articulation of the messianic-revolutionary moment has been accused of fetishizing the irrational.[2] But Benjamin's search was for the lost element of the German left without which the revolutionary leap could not take place. If for Benjamin such a leap is not reducible to an immediate material cause, it does not, on the other hand, come out of nothing. It comes out of the unextinguished vision of human suffering and the belief that action holds out a promise adequate to that quantity of suffering. The oppressed know they have always lost. What else could explain where they find themselves today? The question then, is when, if ever, can they win? Can they win now?[3]

Gershom Scholem ironically failed to perceive about Benjamin. The life-long student of Kabbalah could come to terms with messianism more easily in its 17th century manifestations than in the rather different form it assumed in the life of his contemporary.

2. See John Fekete, "Benjamin's Ambivalence," *Telos* 35 (Spring 1975), p. 197.

3. If this owes something to Judaism's eschatology, it is not Judaism's only possible eschatology. A Martin Buber would probably have criticized Benjamin for his over-emphasis of the unique and privileged messianic moment. Buber regarded such a focus as an apocalyptic and hence not truly Jewish messianism, since it did not rely on humanity's ongoing and continuous role in preparing its redemption. [See for instance, Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia*

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Benjamin's criticism is that the left of his day did not go to the pith of this question. Reformism was obviously not adequate to it. Today, browsing among the ruins of that era, we can perhaps fit together the fragments of an answer: sexual liberation as formulated by Reich; a theory of transcendance as formulated negatively by the Frankfurt School: the promise of economic rationality held out by the parties of the left. If these fragments do not fuse smoothly today, how much less did they in Benjamin's time?

Benjamin's concept of messianism, while not necessarily reducible to these elements, is a code word for all that for which the oppressed will put a stop to history as it has gone on. The revolutionary moment is a delayed reaction to history as a totality as much as it is an immediate responce to immediate circumstances. In this conception of the immanence of all history in the revolutionary moment, Benjamin is obviously distinguished from most revolutionary thinkers. To suggest an equivalence for the scale of this conception would mean referring to the work of Freud and Jung for whom, in any case, it is no longer history as such that is involved (if it has not already disappeared as a category of reality, as in Jung), but rather its translation into structures of the mind. On the other hand, it could be argued that this concern with history in toto, rather than with capitalism alone, returns Benjamin to the ambition of the early Marx.

The weakness of Benjamin's concept of messianism lies in its failure to make critical distinctions between messianic movements. For example, Benjamin does not give us the tools to distinguish the messianism of a Martin Buber (and a Brit-Shalom) from that of Gush Emunim. Benjamin's is too purely the messianism of justice to recognize its counterpart — the messianism of power. It is then understandable, if still ironic, that Benjamin does not see in Nazism a version of the messianism he is trying to evoke.[4] This weakness admitted, the strength of Benjamin's metaphorical, theologically tinged language is that it speaks better than many a more conventional description precisely to the quality of eschtalogical break and break-through that attends our experience of revolution.

Finally, to return to an earlier point, the "Theses...", like much of Benjamin's work, has been described as better suited to a poetic rather than rational form of cognition. This points to both its virtue and its enigma. Vulgar Marxism, Stalinism, has demanded that art be the continuation of the political struggle by other means. Critical Theory has attempted to rescue art from its deployment as high propoganda by allowing it an autonomy within which can be glimpsed the harmony that foreshadows utopia and thereby subverts reality.

Benjamin opens up a third way. He neither reduces art to politics nor segregates it from the immediately political. The "Theses..." admits of neither such a reduction nor such a separation. It is built out of and itself functions as poetic image, rooted and referring to the present in which it was composed. As poetic image it negotiates an horizon between the political and the religious. It raises the question for us of how much is abandoned by attempts to understand society which restrict themselves to being on this side of art, the other side of the irrational. But with this observation we are referred back to the "Theses..." itself, with its implicit and explicit critique of the consequences of such a severance.

(Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 8-11.] But it must be noted that Buber's messianism already assumes the sort of historical rupture to which Benjamin refers, since it rests on Zionism, which, whatever the consequences, was such a rupture.

4. This would accord with one reading of the history of messianic movements, as per Norman Cohn in *The Pursuit of the Millennium*.

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MARCUSE'S FEMINIST DIMENSION

by Joan B. Landes

Recently, Marcuse identified the women's liberation movement as "perhaps the most important and potentially the most radical political movement that we have."[1] He denied that feminism is *simply* a body of ideas about women's equality, intended "for women only." Rather, in his view, feminism recovers certain unfulfilled, utopian visions within the socialist tradition. Feminism contains an image "not only of new social institutions, but also of a change in consciousness, of a change in the instinctual needs of men and women,"[2] freed from the requirements of domination and exploitation. Feminism also challenges the classical theory of the revolutionary subject. Marcuse, therefore, regarded feminism as a critique of socialism, but one which can be incorporated within a more advanced socialist perspective. Calling for a qualitative change in socialist practice, Marcuse, along with many feminists, has labeled this "feminist socialism."

The critical theory of the family regards classical bourgeois patriarchy in a favorable light, emphasizing its more liberatory dimensions.[3] Although the Frankfurt theorists recognize the damage suffered by women and children within the patriarchal family, their awareness has been eclipsed by a greater concern for the decline of individual autonomy accompanying the loss of paternal authority. The fact that the strong bourgeois (male) ego is created at great psychic cost to mothers and daughters is not given sufficient weight. Likewise, the emancipatory possibilities for women and children created by the decline of paternal authority are overlooked because of the attention devoted to the decline of ego autonomy. It is within this perspective that we must situate Marcuse's efforts. Without abandoning the Frankfurt School's understanding of the possibilities for greater domination and illusory freedom, he admits of the chance for human emancipation that accompanies the decline of the patriarchal family. Nevertheless, his views are marred by an excessively romanticized image of women, an overly passive conception of feminist practice, and a limited comprehension of the relation between family and economy within capitalist society.

A feminist socialist project would be committed to two basic principles: first, the overthrow of institutions and values shaped by centuries of patriarchal domination; second, a recognition that the political struggle must be waged by women as well as men on behalf of freedom for all. Marcuse suggests that this kind of political struggle

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1. "Marxism and Feminism", *Women's Studies* 2 (1974), 279-288; 279. This article, a reprint of a lecture which Marcuse delivered in 1974 at Stanford University, was widely circulated among feminists in the U.S. as well as Europe. It also helped to stimulate discussion among socialists on the feminist issue. See Nancy Vedder-Shults, "Hearts Starve as Well as Bodies: Ulrike Prokop's 'Production and the Context of Women's Daily Life" in the Special Feminist Issue of *New German Critique* 13 (Winter 1978), 5-17, for one account of the impact on women within a socialist collective of Marcuse's article.

2. "Marxism and Feminism", p. 281.

3. See Max Horkheimer, "Authority and the Family" in *Critical Theory* (New York, 1972); Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1974); Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1972); *Aspects of Sociology*, by the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (Boston, 1972). Consider also Russell Jacoby's criticism of one-dimensional attacks by feminists on monogamy and marriage in *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing* (Boston, 1975), and Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Beseiged* (New York, 1977), for an attempted restatement of the original thesis of the Frankfurt School.

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would require "the liberation and ascent of *specifically feminine* characteristics on a social scale."[4] The qualities of receptivity, sensitivity, non-violence, and tenderness have acquired a feminine cast as a result of the long historical development of patriarchal civilization. Marcuse is specifically concerned with the division between masculine and feminine from the vantage point of the reasoning subject — a dominating, commanding, and aggressive subject: "The ego which undertook the rational transformation of the human and natural environment revealed itself as an essentially aggressive, offensive subject, whose thoughts and actions are designed for mastering objects. It was a subject *against* an object. . . . Nature (its own as well as the external world) were 'given' to the ego as something that had to be fought, conquered, and even violated — such was the precondition for self-preservation and self-development."[5]

Marcuse emphasizes the masculine traits of the individual subject by developing Horkheimer's earlier observation that the Western ego principle is a product of the patriarchal epoch and of class domination; it is not found in matriarchal societies or subjected classes.[6] Marcuse argues that Western culture's polarization of reason and passion and of individuality and nature expresses a deep antagonism between masculinity and femininity. Men represent the claims of reason, self-consciousness, and ego identity. The reasoning subject (ego) is a male subject not only because historically women have been denied access to the material bases of individual self-consciousness, but also because the characteristic posture of the ego — aggressiveness and antagonistic opposition to other subjects — is the very definition of masculinity in Western culture.[7] In contrast, women are regarded as passionate, emotional, unreasoning, and sensuous creatures. Even women's subjectivity is considered to be of a different order: femininity and individuality are opposed at a fundamental level.

Nevertheless, Marcuse remains committed to the critical force of reason. While he rejects an irrational alternative, he also denies that reason alone can liberate the senses. He asks how critical consciousness can be retained without reproducing the connection between reason and domination. The recovery of the sensuous roots of individual autonomy through the critical faculty of memory, in particular the memory of gratification, is one of his central themes.[8] Memory emerges as a decisive mediation between the psychological and political spheres of human life.

Feminists agree with Marcuse that women have a privileged access to memory. Yet, it is not woman's *nature* but woman's intimate involvement in the social activities of childbearing and childrearing which opens to door to the realm of gratification, pleasure, happiness, and desire. Women's activities have varied from society to society, and among historical epochs, but the universal experience of women's mothering has everywhere called forth a set of nurturant and relational capacities in women[9] which militate against the requirements of aggressive activity and divisive individuality that Marcuse has referred to as the constituents of a male-dominated, class-based Performance Principle. If the desire to overcome the centuries-old antagonism between instinctual gratification or freedom, on the one hand, and the realization of community, on the other, is to be made the guiding principle of human practice,

4. Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism," p. 282.
5. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (Boston, 1966), pp. 109-110.
6. Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, *op.cit.*, pp. 105-106.
7. See Herbert Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972), pp. 74-78; and "Marxism and Feminism", *op.cit.*
8. See Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, *op.cit.*, especially ch. 5 and Part II, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969), and *The Aesthetic Dimension* (Boston, 1978).
9. See Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (Berkeley, 1978).

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Marcuse is correct to assert that this practice must be feminist as well as socialist.

The link between self-consciousness, reason and masculinity is a historical product of the division of private life and public existence, the extreme form of which is achieved in the isolated family of industrial capitalism. Even when women enter the labor force, they remain subordinate to men because of their continued ties to child-rearing and housework. Thus, Marcuse speaks of woman's surplus exploitation.[10] In other words, the sexual division of labor in the family is a key feature of women's position in society, even when women are "free" to participate in social production outside the home.

Women's position in capitalist society is further determined by the opposition between time and desire.[11] As a result of their dual position within the paid labor force and within the family, women are able to experience two distinct organizations of time. In housework "time passes" whereas in the world of work "time is spent." A sharp demarcation is established between "work" and "life," between social intercourse and labor. Within the family, the woman experiences the contradictions between desire and reason, sexuality and temporality. Caring for children is a task that resists the quantification of clock-time or the total commodification of labor power appropriate to the sphere of labor. On the other hand, childrearing and housework are nonetheless transformed both because of capitalism's need for alienated subjects and because these tasks are permeated by market relations and commodities. It is not that women within the family have access to a natural or biological sphere as against a social sphere of domination, but rather that there continue to exist two antagonistic principles of social existence, even under late capitalism where the divisions between private life and public existence are increasingly eroded. Insofar as an alternative form of social life is preserved within the family, it can provide the basis for resistance to domination.

According to Ernest Schachtel — to whom Marcuse is indebted for his psychoanalytic appreciation of the individual and social function of memory — because women's social self-ideal is centered around children, kitchen, and home (as against man's which is in direct opposition to these features, stressing independence and impersonality), women have greater access to the memory of instinctual forms of gratification accessible in early childhood but repressed in the social maturation process consistent with surplus-repressive civilization.[12] Marcuse has interpreted these features to result in a consciousness of resistance to the most oppressive aspects of late capitalist society. A reading of Marcuse's arguments suggests that feminism as a potentially radical force is fortified by women's less-than-complete subjugation to the Performance Principle. Therefore, we might well expect that women would have a unique potential to develop a new form of non-aggressive or relational subjectivity. The incompletely socialized, incompletely individuated, more oppressed half of the human species is the more truly human. The Hegelian dialectic of self-consciousness and freedom of the master-slave section of the Phenomenology, which Marx restates in terms of the greater humanity and universality of the proletariat, is reinterpreted by Marcuse in terms of the relation between men and women. The liberation of women contains the key to the liberation of the whole. This liberation would involve "the emancipation of the senses and of the intellect from the rationality of domination,

10. Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism", *op.cit.*, p. 284.

11. For a suggestive discussion of the opposition between time and desire which follows Marcuse, see Joel Kovel, "Therapy in Late Capitalism", *Telos* 30 (Winter, 1976-1977), 73-92.

12. Ernest G. Schachtel, "Memory and Childhood Amnesia" in *Metamorphosis: On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention, and Memory* (New York, 1959), pp. 318-319.

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creative receptivity versus repressive productivity."[13]

The question, however, must be asked whether Marcuse's argument contains an idealization of women based upon a denial of their real participation in the social world. Women, in fact, are not pure, wholly positive creatures who inhabit a negative world – a spurious argument that was advanced by 19th-century bourgeois feminists. Women's isolation within the family also promotes a conservative, security-oriented consciousness.[14] While women are victims of the prevailing order, there is no assurance that they will become self-conscious. Marcuse seems to want to ascribe a particular type of consciousness to women – a theoretical strategy which he has otherwise rejected when it has been applied to the working class.

Another difficulty arises from Marcuse's idealization of feminine qualities like receptivity, sensitivity, non-violence, and tenderness. These qualities are, for the most part, abstract ideals. They deny all aspects of women's actual social behavior which conflicts with this ideal and Marcuse obscures the extent to which passivity borne out of oppression may be more a product of ego weakness than of quiet strength. His sentimentalized portrait of women amounts to what Rowbotham describes as an elevation of "powerless people into innocents."[15] While Marcuse, like other members of the Frankfurt School, has criticized the fundamental connection between reason and aggressive masculinity, he remains committed to a theory of individuality deriving from Freud in which ego development requires the internalization of paternal authority. This tension in Marcuse's work means that the promise of an alternative form of ego identity and individuality rooted in communal forms of mutuality and solidarity – an individuality for which women appear to possess a potential – remains theoretically ungrounded. Therefore, we are left with no other basis for individuality than the present one. Following his logic, if women act assertively, they risk falling into patterns of aggressive masculine individuality. And yet, the only other choice seems to be political ineffectiveness. In an unwitting manner, Marcuse celebrates traditional modes of female experience in which women are subjects *manqué*, acted upon rather than conscious creators of their own history. As a consequence, feminist praxis almost becomes a contradiction in terms. The romanticized feminine pacification of the Performance Principle's aggressive world, to which Marcuse adheres, denies women an active role in social change. Indeed, it is not actual women but feminine *characteristics* that would activate aggressive energy against domination and explolitation."[16] On Marcuse's terms, if women are to continue to embody in their nature (in an almost spiritualized form) a critique of capitalism, they must remain resigned to passivity, for to act is certainly to risk compromise.

This problem can be illuminateld further by relating Marcuse's view of women to that of the Enlightenment of the Romantics.[17] Enlightenment thinkers argued that male and female qualities are the product of socialization. As a result, the earliest intellectual formulations of the political demand for the emancipation of women –

13. Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism," *op.cit.*, p. 286.
14. See Horkheimer, "Authority and the Family", *op.cit.*, pp. 118-128.
15. *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World* (Baltimore, 1973), p. XII.
16. Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism", *op.cit.*, p. 286.
17. For discussions of these views of woman, see: Richard J. Evans, *The Feminists* (London and New York, 1977); Sheila Rowbotham, *Women, Resistance and Revolution* (New York, 1972); Erich Fromm, "The Theory of Mother Right and Its Relevance for Social Psychology" in *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (Greenwich, Connecticut, 1970); and Silvia Bovenschen, "The Contemporary Witch, The Historical Witch, and the Witch Myth: The Witch, Subject of the Appropriation of Nature and Object of the Domination of Nature", *New German Critique* 15 (Fall, 1978), 83-120.

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only articulated in a concerted fashion by the 19th-century feminist movement — were laid by the Enlightenment insistence on women's intellectual, social and political equality. However, what Enlightenment thinkers really demanded of women was that they emancipate themselves from their female natures, since the latter were thought to be the result of their peculiar socialization and the reason for their continued social inferiority. In contrast, the Romantics believed that women possessed distinctive qualities which allowed for an authentic experience of "humaneness" that remained inaccessible to men. The early romantics celebrated woman's special quality as lover. However, the developed Romantic position became identified with a conservative interpretation of woman's nature which turned upon her bond with "nature" through her natural (indeed, biological) capacity for motherhood. In other words, the Romantic assertion of difference was given a conservative ahistorical twist by positing that woman's nature was a biological fact, an "essence" that could never change. "Woman" came to be associated with "mother."

Marcuse understands that the Enlightenment position would produce a species of female-men, a new form of domination of women by men. He objects to contemporary versions of the Enlightenment view when he notes that the "equalization of male and female would be regressive: it would be a new form of female acceptance of a male principle." Against this abstract equality, Marcuse upholds the Romantic imagery of femininity as a counterforce within the given society that "may still become one of the gravediggers of patriarchal society."[18] Woman — or rather, the female image — embodies the promise of liberation for Marcuse just as the Romantics believed that woman held the promise of humanity (even though in reality women were only afforded this luxury because of their real isolation and oppression within the burgeoning industrial world of the 19th century). The point of this parallel is to show the homologous structure of the argument. Marcuse, of course, does not endorse the conservative implications of the Romantic view. Indeed, he demands as a necessary first step the full equality and participation of women in the world of capitalism as the basis for a more radical transformation in the direction of a wholly liberated society. Furthermore, he forcefully criticizes the identity of woman and mother — another Romantic notion — and argues that women's social inequality has been fortified historically by the social use of their biological constitution: bearing children and being a mother has been attributed to woman's nature. Still, Marcuse has not sufficientiy distinguished his own perspective from that of the Romantics. He borrows their formulation of the female principle which remains tinged with the previously mentioned conservative notions. Therefore, the content of Marcuse's female counterforce is difficult to distinguish from the Romantic meaning of a universal female essence or principle. The reference to a female principle in each case leads to the analysis moving away from an understanding of woman's real social character. To understand this would require an analysis of how woman's primary care of infants contributes to the observable inequalities in the social organization of gender in different societies.[19] In addition, woman's position in the social division of labor requires a concrete investigation. Recent Marxist feminist analyses have demonstrated that women's activities in the family are an aspect of social labor, contributing to the

18. Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt, op.cit.*, p. 78.

19. See: Nancy Chodorow, *op.cit.*; Dorothy Dinerstein, *The Mermaid and the Minotaur* (New York, 1976); Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Note on the 'Political Economy' of Sex" in Rayna Reiter, ed., *Towards an Anthropology of Women* (New York, 1975), pp. 157-209; Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds., *Woman, Culture, and Society* (Stanford, 1974).

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production and reproduction of human labor power in a commodity form. Marcuse, however, overlooks this fact and regards the family only as a site of consumption, thereby denying the real ties which bind women and their labor to social production.[20] Marcuse's failure to discuss women concretely undercuts his own effort to preserve the independence of women's struggle within the broader socialist movement. If the political dimensions of women's needs and interests within the sphere of personal life or the public realm are not accurately understood, it is likely that these same interests will be sacrificed to an imposed and abstract unity between women and the working class within the socialist movement. The relation of women to the socialist struggle must begin from an understanding of their specific historical situation, not by a metaphoric appeal to a female counterforce within patriarchal society. Only then can we account for the fact that feminist practice arises historically within capitalist societies or understand the conflictual but enduring relation between feminism and socialism.

Marcuse attempts to explain the emergence of a women's liberation movement in advanced capitalist societies by expanding upon a more orthodox Marxist analysis. He accepts the Marxist premise that women's increasing participation in the industrial work force is a precondition for their emancipation because participation undermines the material foundations of male hierarchy and because it also increases the surplus exploitation of the woman as housewife, mother, servant, and worker.[21] Marcuse even suggests that entry into the sphere of production is required before women can achieve full individuality. However, he also comprehends the potential under late capitalism for women's emancipation to be arrested, manipulated and exploited. Liberating tendencies in a manipulated form are continually engaged in the reproduction of the established system. Thus, female sexuality becomes an exchange value which sells the system as it is sold by the system. The female body is commodified; it becomes a factor in the realization of surplus value. In other words, the sexual revolution that Marcuse has seen as an aspect of the phenomenon of repressive desublimation threatens female emancipation. Female equality, he recognizes, can be incorporated in such a way that it promotes the degradation and oppression of women, expanding rather than eliminating their exploitation.

On the other hand, the desublimation of bourgeois morality and the universalization of the commodity form release contradictions which cannot be contained easily by capital and from which a more radical feminist alternative arises. Aesthetic sensuous needs (long associated with femininity) are stimulated, even when they are released in a repressive form. Such needs, according to Marcuse, are fundamentally incompatible with the transformation and exploitation of the body as an instrument of alienated labor. Feminism, therefore, expresses the revolutionary possibilities within a society of expanding reification and commodification. Feminism revolts against the tendency toward total domination within society and within the instinctual structure of the individual.

Paradoxically, feminism arises in the context of capital's increasing need to create a "social individual" whose most intimate existence is administered and manipulated. For Marcuse, while the subjective world becomes an additional object of control by capital, emancipatory possibilities are also released as direct patriarchal control is supplanted by a process of objectification. By appreciating this contradiction, Marcuse reverses the judgment of the Frankfurt School — his own position in earlier

20. For a discussion of this issue see my "Women, Labor and Family Life: A Theoretical Perspective," *Science and Society* XLI:4 (Winter, 1977-78), 386-409.

21. Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism", *op.cit.*, p. 284.

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writings [22] -- that the expanded integration of formerly autonomous and private arenas of social life only increases social domination. Following such an account, the rebirth of feminism becomes difficult to explain, unless it is merely regarded as one more illusion of freedom in a society of total domination. By discriminating between bourgeois and socialist forms of feminism, Marcuse now demonstrates that both possibilities are present, increased domination and expanded human freedom. [23]

But if Marcuse correctly recognizes the radical potentialities within the feminist movement, what remains difficult to explain following his account are the sources of a liberated feminist subjectivity; the erosion of the boundaries between private and public would also seem to destroy the more subversive sources of feminine personality. In fact, one implication of his argument is that women are most subversive when they are most bound to their traditional material roles within the patriarchal family. But it is precisely then that they are least effective politically. A partial way out of this enigma has already been suggested. We need to retain Marcuse's insights into the utopian impulse of feminism, but locate that consciousness in the contradictions between time and production, on the one hand, and gratification and desire, on the other, as they are reflected in the division between private life and public existence. To the extent that women have a privileged access to memories of unrestrained gratification and happiness, to a sensibility that rejects the domination of the present society, or to communal forms of intersubjective relationships, this is a result of the practical character of their activities within the family rather than of some universal, transhistorical female principle.

The problem that confronts the women's liberation movement is whether this feminist sensibility can provide an orientation to praxis. Marcuse's formulation does not contribute to such a goal, for the feminine subject of his writings is a passive ideal rather than a concrete human subject. Although he envisions a future in which this ideal is realized within a human community where existence has been pacified, he gives no indication of how this will be accomplished. For women, in particular, the problem is that their most positive qualities are embedded in a passive and receptive mode of experience. In this respect, Marcuse seems to be at odds with the feminist movement which he celebrates, for it is precisely this passive posture that feminists reject. It is not only feminine consciousness or feminine ideals that can make a contribution to the socialist project, but women themselves who will reshape the future by their own autonomous activities.

Nevertheless, Marcuse's perspective on the essential connection between feminism and utopian socialism is in concert with recent efforts by feminists to explore in greater depth the past history of the relation between feminism and socialism. According to Marcuse, the charge that both feminists and utopian socialists raise unattainable goals represents nothing more than an effort to freeze the present and prevent any movement toward an alternative socialist future. Marcuse has insisted that feminine values do not pertain only to personal life. Rather, he regards them as relevant to the organization of socialist society as a whole. No longer can socialism justify itself

22. See Herbert Marcuse, *Five Lectures* (Boston, 1970) and *Eros and Civilization, op.cit.*, especially pp. 95.ff.

23. Although bourgeois feminism need not always result in increased domination, Marcuse recognizes that in some cases this may be its unintended result. For example, he writes: "In other words, the movement becomes radical to the degree to which it aims, not only at equality *within* the job and value structure of the *established* society (which would be the equality of dehumanization) but rather at a change in the structure itself (the basic demands of equal opportunity, equal pay, and release from full-time household and child care are a prerequisite)." *Counterrevolution and Revolt, op.cit.*, p. 75.

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primarily on the economic principles of rationality and productivity. [24] Feminist concern with personal life, child care, the sexual division of labor in the family, sexuality, and non-hierarchical forms of organization has in the past been regarded as impractical or foolhardy. It is only now that these demands converge with the critique and revision of the socialist tradition that socialists have begun to undertake in the face of the shortcomings of contemporary socialist societies.

The feminist recovery of the history of women and socialist tradition suggests that the left has inherited an impoverished conception of revolutionary organization and struggle. Feminists have begun to question the way politics is structured. They have criticized the left for its failure to allow the autonomous organization of women. The women's liberation movement, in its own practice, protects this autonomy against all renewed efforts at unity which presuppose the subordination of feminist interests. What is at issue is not simply self-interested efforts by leftists to recruit all feminists to their own organization, but instead a false theoretical understanding of the revolutionary subject. Traditional socialist organizations and parties have attempted to deny the fragmentation, competition, and antagonism which exists within the revolutionary movement and to order these contradictions in a sterile fashion. [25] Thus, women's movements within revolutionary party organizations in the past have been predicated on the analysis of women as a backward (or more conservative) strata of the working class, on the need to subordinate women's interests to family concerns, and, finally, on the restriction of the women's movement to the "woman question" and thereby to a subordinate or secondary status within the party as a whole. Theoretically, the result of such political developments has been to reinforce an important strain in classical socialist thought which denies autonomy to sexual oppression or personal life, reducing each to an epiphenomenon of material production. Sexual matters of deep concern to women like birth control and abortion have been considered (at best) as private not political matters. In short, the proletarian revolutionary subject has been understood solely from the standpoint of its male members. Differences between men and women have been suppressed on behalf of class unity.

Socialist feminism cannot, as in the past, be contained within a women's commission of a revolutionary party, nor can the demands it makes be deferred without risking loss of the chance of creating a qualitatively new form of society. Marcuse recognizes the significance of feminism in the present epoch: a movement that prefigures in its practice an authentically new society. He acknowledges that this movement cannot be contained within traditional left organizational forms. Rather, he believes, "a separate women's liberation movement is not only justified, it is necessary." [26] Feminism requires an autonomous organizational expression, even as it works to effect more democratic practices inside left organizations. At stake is not only an end to class society but the destruction of male domination in its many historical forms.

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24. As Horkheimer once remarked, "To make labor into a transcendent category of human activity is an ascetic ideology.... Because socialists hold to this general concept they make themselves into carriers of capitalist propaganda." In *Dämmerung*, cited in Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston, 1973), p. 57.

25. This was especially the case in the SPD women's movement and the Bolshevik Zhenotdel (during the first ten years of the Russian Revolution). See my "The Feminist Challenge to Socialist Thought and Practice", paper presented at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 19-21, 1979.

26. Marcuse, "Marxism and Feminism," *op.cit.*, p. 280.

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THE IDEOLOGICAL SOURCES OF WITTGENSTEIN'S ETHICS: REPLY TO LEVI

by Ulrich Steinvorth*

Levi has argued that there are two enigmas in Wittgenstein's work and life that can only be explained by his sense of guilt caused by his homosexuality. Enigma 1 is why Wittgenstein advocated a transnatural, two-world ethics; enigma 2, why he accused himself to be a swine in the Engelmann letters. Presented this way, Levi gives little offense or reason for criticism. In particular his solution for the enigma of Wittgenstein's self-accusations seems quite plausible. In spite of all irrationality we might ascribe to Wittgenstein it would have been too irrational even for him to accuse himself of being a swine because of despair of the failure to make the *Tractatus* understood, as Rudebush and Berg suppose. And, in a sense, Levi's solution to the first enigma is quite plausible, too. *If* Wittgenstein advocates a transnatural, two-world ethics that is as "quixotic" as Levi says it is, it would indeed be "less explanatory than itself in need of explanation"; in need of explanation because we do not expect a transnatural ethics, which gives a prominent place to ideas of a punishing god, in someone whose "presuppositions are far from those of orthodox religion."[1] Therefore, a strong feeling of guilt seems to be a psychological precondition for advocating such an ethics, and since we cannot see a better reason or motivation for this feeling in Wittgenstein than his homosexuality, Levi's explanation seems acceptable.

But the questions are: Did Wittgenstein champion a two-world ethics? And whether he did so or not, is his ethics so quixotic as to need the kind of explanation Levi proposes? My theses are that it is not; that it is not transnatural, either; and that Levi's explanation by homosexuality prevents us from seeing what in Wittgenstein's ethics is symptomatic, influential, and wrong. To show that Wittgenstein's ethics is neither transnatural (or Platonic) nor quixotic (or the product of an *individual* paranoid consciousness),[2] I shall compare the ethics of the *Tractatus* with the ethics of two Viennese contemporaries, Karl Kraus and Adolf Loos, as Engelmann[3] and subsequently Janik and Toulmin have done. I will also show why Wittgenstein's philosophy, *including* his ethics, has been so influential — something Levi does not take into account, but which makes Levi's treatment of Wittgenstein implausible. Lastly, I shall locate Wittgenstein's ethics in the developments of ethics and social science methodology at the turn of the century.

Before turning to Kraus and Loos, two comments are in order concerning the *Tractatus* thesis stating that there cannot be propositions of ethics (Tr. 6.42). This thesis, crucial for Levi's interpretation, is connected with Wittgenstein's distinction of saying and showing and with his suggestion that the ethical (and the aesthetical, mystical, and logical), though it cannot be *said*, can be *shown* or shows itself (cf. Tr.

*Albert W. Levi, "The Biographical Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics," in *Telos* 38 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 63-76. Cf. also Thomas Rudebusch and William M. Berg, "On Wittgenstein: Reply to Levi" and Steven S. Schwarzschild, "Wittgenstein as Alienated Jew," in *Telos* 40 (Summer 1979), pp. 150-160, and 160-165.

1. Albert W. Levi, "Wittgenstein once More," in *Telos* 40 (Summer 1979), pp. 165-173.

2. I do not want to deny, however, that Wittgenstein's ethics is the product of a *general* paranoid consciousness.

3. Paul Engelmann, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Oxford, 1967), part VII: "Kraus, Loos, Wittgenstein."

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5.62, 6.43, 6.522). In spite of Engelmann, Janik and Toulmin and Levi, neither thesis implies the transcendence of what is shown. Indeed, Wittgenstein does not say that ethics is transcendent, but, transcendental. Yet Levi interprets 'transcendental' as 'transcendent,' thereby rebuking him for incorrect word usage; what is shown, whether as logic or ethics, is not a fact of the world, but a structure, frame or limit of the world. Wittgenstein does not call such a frame something in the world, but *outside* it. For the world has been defined as the sum of the facts. Hence the frame, being no fact, cannot be in the world. Of course Wittgenstein's definition of the world is not a conventional one. But it cannot be taken as evidence of a two-world theory. Monism seems to be favored by Wittgenstein both in the *Tractatus* and in the *Investigations*. Just as his *Tractatus* can be read as a criticism of theories maintaining the existence of non-physical entities in a Platonic heaven of logical and moral ideas, so the *Investigations* can be read as a criticism of theories maintaining the existence of non-physical entities in a realm of consciousness or mind. To see what Wittgenstein's definition of the world means, we must return to the ideological problems of his time, which I shall try to do after discussing Kraus and Loos.

When turning to Kraus and Loos, we can start from their agreement with Wittgenstein regarding an attitude to values. Both Kraus and Loos admitted it, and there is sufficient evidence of Wittgenstein's agreement with their ideas [4] — in spite of his sharp criticism of Loos expressed in a letter to Engelmann.[5] We cannot be sure about the extent of this agreement, but since Kraus and Loos do not advocate a transnatural, two-world ethics or aesthetics, Levi's interpretation begins to sink.

Kraus demands the strict separation between the description and the evaluation of facts, rejecting in particular the feuilleton journalism. To Kraus, as Janik and Toulmin rightly comment, "the feuilleton destroyed both the objectivity of the situation described and the creative fantasy of the writer, since while distorting the news as facts, it prevented the writer from coming to terms with the depths of his own personality by demanding a response to a ready-made situation."[6]

This attitude corresponds to Wittgenstein's separation of facts and values, but it does not imply a two-world ethics. On the contrary, Kraus rejects the feuilleton because he presupposes that a pure description of facts including the verbal and non-verbal behavior of men evaluates itself, *shows* its moral (or immorality) better than any verbal evaluation. Nothing transnatural or transcendent is shown, only aspects of facts to which we can only respond morally, i.e., by consenting or rejecting. Kraus, it seems, does not hold that the morals implicit in a situation can only be shown and never verbalized. Nevertheless, he rejects such verbalization because he considers language the means of *hiding* aspects of facts eliciting moral response. Thus, Kraus does not deny the existence or possibility of moral or evaluating language, but he maintains its corruptness or corruptibility, implying a criticism less of language than of the society using it.

Similarly, we may conjecture that Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* does not want to maintain that there is no evaluative language or that it is meaningless, since everybody at some time experiences, and suffers from, evaluating language. Wittgenstein maintains that an *ideal* language — a language that is only a means for information — neither needs nor can have evaluating sentences, and that what we normally call

4. See the ample evidence provided in Engelmann.

5. Sept. 2, 1919. Presumably Wittgenstein's indignation with Loos was caused by a misunderstanding, since Loos was not so pious and reverential to state and church as Wittgenstein seems to have inferred from his remarks.

6. Alan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (New York, 1973), p. 79.

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moral language is only a means for influencing, and not informing, each other. That is a means of *hiding* aspects of facts eliciting moral response. Justifying the distinction between informing and influencing is not relevant here. What is relevant is that not only Wittgenstein but also Kraus disqualified evaluating language, and that Kraus is motivated by a distrust of society. We may also conjecture that Wittgenstein is motivated by such distrust. If this is true, Wittgenstein's ideal language is the language of an ideal society, a society not using language to hide the self-evident and influence each other under the pretense of providing information.[7]

Our conjectures will be corroborated when turning to Adolf Loos, the revolutionary architect. Like Kraus' rejection of the feuilleton, or mixing of description and evaluation, Loos rejects the ornament as mixing art with utility. "Everything that serves an end is to be excluded from the empire of art."[8] This separation corresponds to Wittgenstein's exclusion of values from facts. But it implies as little a two-world aesthetics as Kraus' separation of description and evaluation. Loos' criticism of the ornament relates to a criticism of his society in the same way as Kraus' criticism of the feuilleton. Loos is explicit about this. The rejection of the ornament applies only to his society, not to all times and circumstances. Art has begun with the ornament, and even today, producing or enjoying an ornament is, for some, the only form of experiencing art: "I tolerate the ornaments...of the Slovak peasant woman, the ornaments of my cobbler," he writes, "because all of them have no other means to arrive at the culminating points of their lives. But we have art which has followed ornament. We walk after a day's burden and troubles to Beethoven and attend the Tristan, which the cobbler cannot. I must not take away from him his joy, having nothing else to offer as a substitute. But whoever attends the Ninth Symphony and then sits down for drawing a wallpaper pattern is either a swindler or a degenerate."[9]

Thus Loos rejects the ornament only because it does not fit into the life of a society. One argument for its not fitting is that its production implies a waste of social resources. More important, that argument presupposes the ornament's hiding the real use of things: Loos rejects the ornament as a façade. Janik and Toulmin have rightly stressed this when, describing Loos' argument: "Only a society which no longer desired to see things as they really are could possibly be so enamored of ornament."[10] This does not imply that true aesthetic values are beyond everyday life. On the contrary, if things are functional, that is an aesthetic value. That is why Loos as an architect and designer aimed at functionalism. It is true, though, that he did not consider a functionally designed object a work of art. But that does not imply that works of art must lead to some sphere outside the world of facts and functions. Rather, Loos seems to understand a work of art as a thing with a special function representing the real world. That seems to be the reason why Loos recommends to the average middle-class man Beethoven and Wagner, but condemns drawing wallpaper patterns.

7. When Herbert Marcuse, at the end of chapter 7 of his *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), contrasted the language analysis of analytical philosophy to a true philosophical language analysis, he took Karl Kraus as a model, saying that a true philosophical language analysis ought to make language itself speak out what it hides. In contrast to his intention, he thereby formulated what not only Kraus but also Wittgenstein aimed at: showing something that shows itself (because we cannot but consent to or reject it if only we see it) by showing the use of language, not by using language.

8. Adolf Loos, "Architektur," in: Adolf Loos, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. by Franz Glück, 2 vols., vol. 1, p. 315.

9. Adolf Loos, "Ornament und Verbrechen," in: Adolf Loos, *Sämtliche Schriften, op.cit.*, p. 287.

10. Janik and Toulmin, *op.cit.*, p. 98.

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For this reason, Loos assigns art a revolutionary task. But the new must be troublesome and uncomfortable, because insights into new possibilities that will eventually bring more comfort are troublesome to the extent that they threaten long-loved habits and customs.[11]

Hence, if there is agreement among Kraus, Loos and Wittgenstein, it is in their opposition to hiding what shows itself in facts and functions. This opposition implies a disgust at efforts to stress what may not be evident to everybody. The opposition also implies a reverence for facts and functions, presupposing given facts and functions have an unequivocal meaning, and therefore allowing only one reaction toward them. Thus they laid the groundwork for what became in art and literature the movement of the *Neue Sachlichkeit*.[12] This movement sheds light on questions Levi uses to argue for the idiosyncrasy of Wittgenstein's ethics: "What is ethical about 'wondering at the existence of the world'? How except in paranoid consciousness could the feeling of absolute safety be identified with the highest value? And why should guilt...rather than obligation...be the essence of the ethical?"[13]

These three aspects of experience, which Wittgenstein makes into an experience of absolute value, are presented as absolutely valuable by the *Neue Sachlichkeit*. Everyday facts are nevertheless shown in a surrealistic light, giving the impression that everything, oneself included, is safe and stable, yet tinged with some doom that raises feelings of guilt. Wittgenstein expresses this style by wondering of the world's existence, wondering about a tautology.[14] His wondering about facts is the kind of awe cultivated by the *Neue Sachlichkeit*. This attitude contrasts to attitudes neglecting facts. In the same way that *Neue Sachlichkeit* rejects expressionism, Wittgenstein rejects Shakespeare[15] and Karl Kraus rejects Heine.[16] Even Wittgenstein's foolish remarks on Freud seem nourished by his reverence of facts which is incompatible with Freud's analyses.

In spite of their reverence for facts, Wittgenstein, Kraus, and Loos did not regard themselves, and in fact were not politically conservative. Without their claims to have gone beyond conservatism, they would not have been as popular as they were. For their reverence of facts does not simply mean reverence of *established* facts. As Loos ascribed art's revolutionary task, Wittgenstein seems to hope his philosophy will change men by making them see connections never before seen. But the new connections must show themselves. The change must not be a process where men, led by some moral or interest, consciously create new institutions, i.e., by *speaking*, but a process where facts, functions, and forms of life change men: a process similar to Hegel's development of Spirit and to Marx's materialistic logic.[17]

Now Levi may say that my comparison of Wittgenstein with Kraus and Loos does not change the paranoid character of Wittgenstein's ethics. Maybe so. But referring to a broader movement to which Wittgenstein belongs renders Levi's explanation by

11. Compare Loos' essay 'Architektur,' *op.cit.*

12. Though they were not themselves champions of that movement, Loos opposed the architects of the Dessau Bauhaus, as Engelmann reports, *op.cit.* To him, they were too shallow and simple. In a similar way, to Wittgenstein the Vienna Circle, in particular Carnap and Neurath, and later most of the analytical philosophers, were too simple and crude to be recognized by him as his pupils, though in fact they were.

13. Levi, "Wittgenstein once More," *op.cit.*

14. "Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics," in *Philosophical Review* 74 (1965), p. 9.

15. See L. Wittgenstein, *Vermischte Bemerkungen* (Frankfurt, 1977), pp. 95, 159, 162.

16. Kraus criticized Heine in his essay 'Heine und die Folgen.'

17. I have discussed the relation between Wittgenstein and Marx and Engels in my "Wittgenstein: Sprache und Denken," in *Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen,* ed. by Josef Speck, vol. I: "Philosophie der Gegenwart" I (Göttingen, 1972), pp. 98-150.

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guilty homosexuality superfluous. This broader movement needs elaboration, which can be provided by considering the ideological situation in Europe at the turn of the century and, more generally, since the 17th century. The fundamental theoretical and ideological problems of that time are the result of the rise and success of modern science. In 1937 Max Horkheimer outlined the dilemma into which modern science has led the class that gave rise to science. The bourgeoisie needs science as an instrument of mastering nature and society. Yet, it is incompatible with metaphysics and religion, which are necessary for individual and social health as long as the masses cannot attain happiness in this life.[18] Bourgeois solutions to this problem vary between two extremes: rejecting, in favor of metaphysics and religion, the claims of science to be more than just an instrument manipulating nature, or rejecting, in favor of science, the claims of metaphysics and religion to be more than a preliminary stage of scientific knowledge.

Nevertheless, solutions put forward at the turn of the century do not exhaust possible attitudes toward science and metaphysics. What is common to all of them is the renunciation of mundane happiness as a universally recognized aim and criterion for moral values. That is, the rejection of science in favor of a metaphysics that promises man transnatural happiness outside the world does not correspond to a rejection of metaphysics in favor of science, which promises mundane happiness within this world. The reason is that the rejection of metaphysics in favor of science gives science only one of the functions that the early bourgeoisie or its intellectuals claimed for it, i.e., recognizing facts, but not recognizing what makes men happy. This second function was claimed for science by most philosophers from Hobbes to Bentham and Mill, but renounced at the end of the 19th century.

Two reasons have been offered for the renunciation. Hume stated that rational knowledge and, hence, science, can only be knowledge of facts, not of propositions implying an 'ought' or an appeal to the will, as propositions about what happiness is and how to attain it. The second reason, without which the first would have been insufficient, is that mundane happiness can be neither a universally recognized aim nor a criterion for what is good, since it is unattainable anyway. This argument, propagated first by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, was taken up and used in combination with the first one by the most influential and most learned social scientists of his time, Max Weber. His arguments in favor of *Wertfreiheit* (value-freedom) in social science are only in part the same as Hume's argument for the distinction between 'is' and 'ought' statements, i.e., that there is a difference between them such that one can never deduce an 'ought' statement from an 'is' statement. What distinguishes Weber from the tradition that recognized both Hume's distinction and happiness as a criterion of morality is the view that there are other criteria of morality to which we cannot rationally prefer the traditional criterion of happiness. In other words, ther can be no rational or reasoned consent as to what happiness, or a universally recognized aim, is.[19] But Weber is well aware that there is a conception of the good, "peace and the enjoyment of life,[20] that would have universal consent (even by science) if only there were not empirical conditions that hindered its realization:

18. Max Horkheimer, "Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik," in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 6 (1937), pp. 4ff.

19. Compare Max Weber, "Der Sinn der Wertfreiheit der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften," in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Wissenschaftslehre*, ed. Joh. Winckelmann (Tübingen, 1973), in particular p. 508.

20. Max Weber, "Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, Akademische Antrittsred," in *Max Weber, Gesammelte politische Schriften*, ed. Joh. Winckelmann (Tübingen, 1958), p. 12.

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any individual or nation that tries to enjoy happiness will soon be unhappy because of all kinds of national and international, military and economic competition.[21] This kind of competition, though it makes happiness unattainable, is the precondition for culture that Weber thinks, in contrast to happiness, cannot be renounced. Therefore, he rejects efforts for abolishing competition.[22]

The result of Weber's criticism is not only value-freedom or giving up science's commitment to happiness for all. Rather, science's restriction to investigating facts and facts hindering happiness' attainment results in a world viewed as a totality of facts that are absolutely free from an affinity to human needs and wants, hence from value. The *Tractatus* expresses this view. The world is no longer various things (including men) behaving in their specific ways in certain circumstances that are more or less adapted to other things or can be made to become so: it is a collection of facts without value.

Now, the change of the world-view did not change men very much. Men continued to strive for happiness and to consider some things bad and others good or valuable. Hence, there arose within the new world view the effort to find a concept of a value that is 'beyond' the facts without being part of another world or, as Wittgenstein says in the *Tractatus*, a "limit" without changing the facts. But since knowledge can only be of facts, we are not only unable to argue about the choice of values, but also unable to know or describe them; hence, there are no ethical propositions. However, there is a difference between accepting or rejecting a fact, and since this difference has a special importance that mere factual differences do not have, we must say that the will changes if not facts then something else for which Wittgenstein has the word "limit." But this limit is not transcendent, since there are only facts and the relations between them, functions.

I think Levi is right in claiming that Wittgenstein did not change his ethics. He did, however, change his philosophy of logic, language, and psychological states.[23] He replaced the one logical form, the mystical, ethical and aesthetical by the structures or grammars of the many language games. Yet, there is as little room for rationally discussing moral questions or using moral concepts like 'progress' as before.[24] Wittgenstein now calls his way of looking at things the 'anthropological method,'[25] taking any moral attitude we can imagine as a fact of nature that we must consider as given.[26] The veneration of facts, whatever is the case, is replaced by the veneration of patterns of culture or forms of life, whatever they are. This development corresponds to social science's change from the factual registration to the search for patterns and structures.

Back to the question of homosexuality. Whatever the answer to this question may

21. Cf. Max Weber, "Wissenschaft als Beruf," in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, op.cit.*, p. 598. Cf. also Max Weber, "Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftslehre," *op.cit.*, pp. 12-14, and Max Weber, "Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Russland," in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tübingen, 1924), p. 515.

22. See his criticism of the Russian revolution and of Trotsky in his "Der Sozialismus," in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1924), p. 515.

23. See Levi, "The Biographical Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics," *op.cit.*, pp. 73f.

24. See in particular his prohibition of the use of the concept of progress in sociology which is a reiteration of Weber's prohibition, "Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics," *op.cit.*, p. 13.

25. "Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics," *op.cit.*, p. 25.

26. For example, Göring's slogan "Recht ist das, was uns gefällt," see "Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics," *op.cit.*, p. 25, and the tribe's behavior whose upper class treat its lower class as automata, as reported by Norman Malcolm at the end of his "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations," in N. Malcolm, *Knowledge and Certainty* (Englewood Cliffs, 1963).

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be, it can only mislead, if we want to know something important about Wittgenstein's ethics. Wittgenstein's ethics is too symptomatic for our times to look only at biographical sources. Maybe it is no chance, as Schwarzschild suggests, that it has been an alienated Jewish son of a bourgeois family pending between Austria and England, between logic and art, who expressed a world view that gave ethics a place fitting into science's needs and the resignation of happiness. But since there are so many philosophers who are not guilty homosexuals but nevertheless adhere to this world-view, and since there will be philosophers who are guilty homosexuals but reject Wittgenstein's world view, Levi's explanation is at best inadequate.

PETER CHRISTIAN LUDZ (1931-1979): FOREWORD AND FAREWELL

by G.L. Ulmen

Peter Ludz was a divided man in a divided world and the search for an understanding and reconciliation of those divisions gave both structure and meaning to his life and work. He was, in a sense that perhaps only a German could be, a representative post-war intellectual. Nazism had destroyed the old Germany. Communism had divided the new Germany. Moreover, even though these ideologies pursued to their logical conclusions would spell the end of politics, they nevertheless embodied specific political theories and practices that had far-reaching consequences for the structure of economy and society and the role of ideas and intellectuals. As a student in the physical and spiritual carnage that was post-war Berlin, Ludz became interested in ideology and politics. At the Free University, he found in "Western" Marxism a means that might overcome the gross perversion of the Communism that he rejected. Americanism without Imperialism, Marxism without Communism: These were the avenues that Ludz travelled throughout his life. His attempt to straddle them was first evident in his doctoral dissertation, "The Ideological Conception of the Young Marx and its Further Development in the Thought of Georg Lukacs and Karl Mannheim" (1955, unpublished).

In his student and early teaching years, Ludz focused on the connections between ideology, social structure and aesthetic theory. As Lukacs, in spite of his *partiinost* and occasional subservience to Soviet ideology, was the leading thinker of "Western Marxism," Ludz undertook a study of Lukacs' life and work and edited two representative volumes of Lukacs' writings, *Schriften zur Literatursoziologie* (1961) and *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik* (1967), to which he wrote introductory monographs: "Marxism and Literature: A Critical Introduction to the Work of Georg Lukacs" and "The Concept of 'Democratic Dictatorship' in the Political Philosophy of Georg Lukacs." All of the later contributions to political sociology and social science that Ludz was to make grew out of his early intellectual concerns.

For Ludz, man is not only a social and political animal, he is also a spiritual being. Thus, the aesthetic dimension is at least as important as the social and the political ones. Although, for the most part, Ludz wrote sociological and political treatises because these spoke more directly to the present circumstances of divided Germany and the divided world, he was intimately concerned with the deeper problem of the precarious situation of man as a spiritual being.

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Born in Stettin, Pomerania, on May 22, 1931, Ludz attended elementary and high school in Berlin and Ingolstadt (Bavaria) and in 1949 made his *Abitur* at the Humanistische Gymnasium in Berlin-Zehlendorf. From 1949 to 1956 he was educated at the universities of Mainz, Munich, Berlin and the Sorbonne, where he studied economics, philosophy, sociology and political science. Between 1957 and 1969, he held various positions at the Free University of Berlin, where he became professor of political science in 1967. At the same institution, he was head of the department of East German and East European affairs in the Research Institute for Political Science from 1960-1969. From 1970 to 1973, he was professor of political science and sociology at the newly founded University of Bielefeld and, since 1973, professor of political science at the Geschwister-Scholl Institut für politische Wissenschaft at the University of Munich.[1]

Throughout the world, Peter Ludz was known primarily as a specialist on East German and Communist affairs and in his more than 200 books, articles and reviews he wrote about these problems. But even in these writings, and particularly in his classic 1968 study of the Communist party elite in East Germany, he forged a new and highly original methodological approach. In his introduction to the American edition, *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany* (1972), Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that Ludz's "pioneering" study "was immediately recognized as a contribution of lasting importance not only to our understanding of East German politics but to political science and political sociology itself." Less known in the English-speaking world is that Ludz wrote essays on utopia and utopians, on Montaigne, Lamettrie, Helvetius, Holbach, Feuerbach, Marx, on alienation, on secret societies in the 18th and 19th centuries, on convergence theory, anarchy and anarchism, the history of German sociology, Kuhn's paradigm thesis, concept analysis, etc.

Some of Ludz's important essays on ideology and Marxism were published under the title, *Ideologiebegriff und marxistische Theorie. Ansätze zu einer immanenten Kritik* (1976). His stated intentions reflected both his own concerns and the present state of European social thought. Indeed, this book evidenced the attempts of one of Europe's leading political sociologists to assimilate and integrate the major post-war West European and American trends in sociological and political theory into "West European Marxism" and to relate it to and contrast it with ideological and sociological

1. From 1968 on, Ludz held positions as guest lecturer or visiting professor at various universities outside the Federal Republic of Germany: at the University of Santiago de Chile, Harvard University, Columbia University (where he was also a senior fellow in the Research Institute on Communist Affairs), the New School for Social Research (where he was Theodor Heuss Professor at the Graduate Faculty), at several other universities in the United States and Canada, in Japan, in Yugoslavia and in Denmark. In 1976, Ludz was elected a member of the Program Committee for the XIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Moscow in August 1979, the last professional meeting he attended. But Ludz's professional activities went far beyond the academic world. He was a member of the board and director of studies of the government-sponsored Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen (1975-79); a member of the advisory commission to the Senate of West Berlin and co-author of the Commission's report, *Studien zur Lage und Entwicklung West-Berlins* (1969); director of studies and co-author of the three-volume *Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation* (1971, 1972 and 1974), published by the Ministry of Inner German Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany; acting chairman of the Arbeitskreis für vergleichende Deutschlandforschung (1975-1978). During the last years of his life, his scholarly interests had begun to prevail again over his other commitments. The most obvious sign of this personal development was his advancement to the position of co-editor (together with René Koenig and Friedhelm Neidhardt) of the *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, for which in earlier years Ludz had edited two groundbreaking special issues, *Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der DDR* (1964) and *Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte* (1972).

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trends in East European and Soviet Marxism. In so doing, he attempted to investigate systematically certain perspectives of the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology together with a historically and sociologically oriented functionalism. He sought to place the thesis of the socio-historical conditioning of theoretical constructions on a more precise basis than the earlier formulations of the sociology of knowledge and to lay new foundations for historical convergences through empirical research. From this standpoint, he also sought to bridge the gap between normative and descriptive research methods in the social sciences.

Ludz considered these collected essays as efforts toward a "metatheory" of ideology — "metatheory" understood as "the systematic theoretical joining of the epistemological and categorical levels of the concept of ideology as well as their conversion into research programs. They were prolegomena for three planned projects: (1) a comparative study of "political secret societies" in terms of the relations between ideology, utopia, and organization; (2) an analysis of "European Marxism" and those facets and nuances which converge with and overlap the Marxian and post-Marxian theories of ideology in the light of East-West conflicts, the perspective of political science, and the critique of ideology; (3) the systematic consideration of aesthetics and politics, i.e., an essay-like study on *Politische Theorie und Aesthetik*. He did succeed in editing and contributing to a volume on secret societies, *Geheime Gesellschaften* (1969), but his interests were also turning in a different direction — away from ideology and Marxism, in fact away from Germany and Europe — to America. With a grant from the Volkswagenwerk Foundation, in 1975 he began a project on "Political Theories in the United States" that attempted to encompass all the new trends that were rapidly developing in the U.S. It was his understanding, expressed again and again in lectures and talks, that major developments in the social sciences today were taking place in the English-speaking world and particularly in America.

Yet Ludz's close contact with European intellectual and political life past and present continued to weigh heavily on him and found expression in other endeavors, such as writing an afterword to *Arnold Hauser im Gespräch mit Georg Lukacs* (1978), published here in translation. In this short yet remarkably perceptive piece, Ludz not only concerned himself again with Lukacs, but with that relation between that aesthetics and political theory so close to his heart. The immediate background of the essay stemmed from his conversations with Lukacs' political and aesthetic antipode in the German language, Arnold Hauser, shortly before the latter's death in 1978. Moreover, the dialogue between Hauser and Lukacs was the perfect vehicle for Ludz.[2] Because of his strong affinity with the times and personalities of pre- and post-war Europe and his understanding of the intellectual and political issues involved, Ludz succeeds at once in conveying that feeling of spiritual isolation and in indicating those political and aesthetic issues that gave form to the substance of thought and action of both Hauser and Lukacs and, by the same token, gives form to our own.

2. Beginning with an extraordinary *Radiogespräch* between Hauser in London and Lukacs in Budapest, like an intellectual tightrope stretched across the face of Europe and the years separating the spiritual unity of their youth and the political alienation of their old age, ending with Hauser's essay on variations in Lukacs' search for the *tertium datur*, and in between Hauser's discussions of the struggle against "mechanistic positivism and materialism," of the ethical impulse and problem, of Marxism as a theory of social science and history, the concept of structure, the dominant influence of sociology, the *freischwebenden Intellektuellen* (above all, Lukacs, together with Mannheim, the "Frankfurt School," *et al.*), the relation of the individual to society, and of the communication problem of aesthetics in an age of aggressive alienation, the book is a kind of existential metaphor of the spiritual odyssey of the West in the 20th century.

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Early in 1979, with an agenda of promised manuscripts to complete for several journals and institutions in Europe and the U.S., Ludz put all aside to write a book which, like a man possessed, he completed in less than six months. Titled *Mechanismen der Herrschaftssicherung. Eine sprachpolitische Analyse gesellschaftlichen Wandels in der DDR,* this book, the last he penned, will be published later this year. Returning to that manifest and multifaceted problem that had shaped his life and work — the division of Germany — he succeeded in synthesizing his wide-ranging knowledge and bringing it to bear on the most fundamental problems of the post-war period.

The book can be read on several levels. On the most immediate level, it is a study of the possibilities for innovation, modernization and change in East Germany and addresses itself to these possibilities in general in our time. Ludz places it in line with his earlier research in the foreword: "As a sociologist and political scientist who has been engaged in research on the GDR and in comparative studies of the two Germanys and who was also in a position to apprehend the political dimension of his field of study, this author feels almost duty-bound to write a few words about the political and scientific aspects of this book. Since the early sixties, when I began to publish about the GDR, I have attempted to examine this society and its characteristic features realistically. Analyses in science, and particularly in the social sciences, should reveal what exists; they should seek to explain why things that exist are such and not otherwise; they should offer interpretative models that are plausible."

On the personal and perhaps most important level, Ludz's last book can be read as the odyssey of a post-war intellectual, in particular a German intellectual, attempting to come to grips with the existential divisions of our time by drawing upon all the means at his disposal. He dedicated his book "to the dreams on which our lives depend" (*den Träumen, an denen wir hängen*). This motto had less to do with the book than with its author. On September 2, 1979, in a forest near Feldafing, Germany, where he made his home, Peter Ludz gave up his life. Reality could not sustain him; the dreams were not enough.

HAUSER AND LUKACS

by Peter C. Ludz*

Born in Hungary to Hungarian-Jewish parents, Arnold Hauser and Georg Lukacs have had much in common. Both men are identified with German culture and their work, which encompassed a wide range, was originally written in German. Some basic differences, however, set them apart from the beginning. Lukacs was born in 1885 in Budapest, the son of a wealthy banker who was raised to the nobility in 1899. Hauser,

*Originally published as the epilogue to Arnold Hauser, *Im Gespräch mit Georg Lukacs* (Munich, 1978). Translated from the German by Judith Tar.

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born in 1892 in the small town of Temeswar, grew up in modest circumstances. In his father's house, Lukacs met the famous and the rich, among them Hugo von Hoffmannstahl. As a young man, he traveled to Berlin, Paris, Florence and Heidelberg. He was one of the most distinguished and favorite pupils of Simmel in Berlin in 1909-10, and he subsequently attended the lectures of Windelband and Richert. In Heidelberg, he formed a close professional and personal relationship with Lask, the most talented of the neo-Kantians, and became a junior member of the Max Weber circle. Hauser, on the other hand, had to make his own way; his intellectual development started in earnest only when he became a student at the University of Budapest. It was here that he first met Mannheim, and they remained friends through their years in exile in London. As a young man, Lukacs had a well-deserved reputation. Since 1906, he had been a contributor to two leading Budapest journals representing radical-liberal views: the *Twentieth Century* and *The West*. In 1908, Lukacs was awarded the prestigious Kisfaludy Prize for his monograph *History of the Development of Modern Drama*, which had been published in Hungarian in 1911 (this pioneering work in the sociology of literature was not translated into German until 1978).

Hauser and Lukacs had many common friends such as the poet and literary critic Béla Balazs, who was a pioneer in the sociology of cinema. Their personal contact started in 1917 after Lukacs returned from Heidelberg, and the so-called "Sunday Circle" was begun at Béla Balazs' home. Many of its members later organized and lectured at the "Free School for Humanities", which, as an unofficial university, attracted hundreds of the best young Budapest intellectuals such as Karl Mannheim, Béla Fogarsi, the Marxist scholar and syndicalist Ervin Szabo; the art historian Frederick Antal (who also became an émigré in London); and the art historian and philosopher Lajos Fülep, with whom Lukacs founded the short-lived periodical *Spirit*.

Both Lukacs and Hauser called attention to the fact that neither the Sunday Circle nor the Free School was solely devoted to the study of Marxism. According to Hauser, Marxist ideological problems — not to speak of Marxist activism — were at no time a central concern of these groups. Many members of the Sunday circle regarded Marxism as a new socio-historical perspective; Marxism as they understood it was to be anti-formalistic and was to stand against the then-dominant positivism in theories of literature and art. For Hauser, the art historian, and Lukacs, the philosopher of art, these Marxist perspectives and sociology together constituted a new "method" which was neither formalistic nor "immanent" (*werkimmanent*).

Members of both groups were politically indifferent, although they all held progressive or left-liberal views. They found a common ground in criticizing the mechanistic materialism and the often empty positivism of their time. Their lengthy discussions, beginning in the early afternoon and continuing well into the night, evolved around Meister Eckhart, Dostoyevsky, and Kierkegaard, even Plotinus. In the spirit of the times, these thinkers and poets were revered as the great "mystics". A strong moral impetus characterized these discussions: Aesthetics and ethics were considered inseparable. Art and philosophy were to form a harmonious whole; life and spirit were thought to be reconciled. The discussants opted for neither the passivity of the melancholic attitude nor for the expressionistic-activist demand for radical reassessments; they looked for a middle position: for the *tertium datur*.

The young Hauser's and Lukacs' philosophy of the *tertium datur* was existential; the aesthetic, the present-day-only existence of man à la Kierkegaard was to be overcome. They envisioned as an ultimate end the existence of the "ethical man", who would become the creator of history and who would leave behind Dostoyevsky's and

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Kierkegaard's "demonic" man.

The basic differences between Hauser and Lukacs came to the surface when the time came for the realization of this vision. Lukacs, who was influenced by the Weberian type of neo-Kantian ethic stressing the will and the responsibility of the individual, joined the Communist Party of Hungary in December 1918 and went on to become the Deputy People's Commissar of Public Education for Béla Kun's Hungarian Soviet government. In the case of Hauser, the discussions about Kierkegaard produced different results: he came to regard his writing career as self-legitimating although, for a limited period of time and under Lukacs' influence, he took part in the cultural politics of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Like Kierkègaard, Hauser viewed his writing not as an end but as a means of going beyond himself to something high above, as a process of spiritualization.

Hauser succeeded in achieving a careful, extremely readable style, while Lukacs' early works, *The Soul and the Form* (1911), *The Theory of the Novel* (1920), and *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), although replete with visionary passages, are sometimes obscurely written.

Lukacs was undoubtedly *the* philosopher of the Sunday Circle. Hauser used to talk about him as his "teacher" and intellectual "mentor", partially because of the moral impetus of Lukacs' personality. Nevertheless, Hauser described Lukacs as being "dogmatic", a born polemicist, not a warm human being, and often a bad judge of men and of artistic accomplishments. As an example, Hauser cited the case of Lukacs' overestimation of Paul Ernst, a mediocre German playwright. Hauser also took issue with Lukacs' portrayal of Walter Scott as the progenitor of literary realism.

Hauser loved Vivaldi's and Bach's music, which he often played. He had an ear for the fine points of poetry and an eye for the visual arts. Lukacs' real talents lay in the realm of the abstract. His intellectual strength was in logic, philosophy of history and art. Hauser calls attention to the fact that during the Sunday Circle discussions, Lukacs showed his genius in recognizing the historical, literary and sociological significance of the modern novel and drama. Since Lukacs' intellectual domination determined the topics under discussion, the Sunday Circle often dealt with the problem of literary genres within a historical and philosophical framework. During this time, Lukacs had completed the first draft of *The Theory of the Novel*, which he had begun in Heidelberg in 1915, and started working on a foreword for it. The foreword evolved into a monograph about the connections between ethics and the philosophy of history illustrated by Dostoyevsky's work. This manuscript was supposed to serve as Lukacs' *Habilitationsschrift* for the University of Heidelberg; but it remained incomplete and was never published.

Hauser was deeply hurt by Lukacs' hostility toward Mannheim after their initial rapport in the years 1916-18 went sour. Lukacs' dogmatic rigor and coldness were all the more puzzling for Hauser since he himself was often the beneficiary of Mannheim's help. It was through his enduring professional friendship with Mannheim that Hauser found the strength to work in his London exile years on his *magnum opus, The Social History of Art*. Still, Hauser found some of Lukacs' personality traits admirable — his readiness for sacrifice, his asceticism, his disdain for personal comfort and, last but not least, his considerate, even affectionate, attitude toward the members of his immediate family. But Hauser's ambivalence contributed to the ever-present distance in their personal relation.

Throughout his life, Hauser retained the fond memories of his own participation in the Sunday Circle. He went to Italy (1919-21), to Berlin where he befriended Troeltsch (1922-24), to Vienna (1925-38), and finally to England, the place of permanent exile.

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During his years of wandering, Hauser experienced considerable hardship. He found stability, however, in the knowledge that he once belonged to the group called the Sunday Circle and thus helped to develop the sociology of art and literature.

All his life, Hauser proudly claimed that he was responsible for making Lukacs aware of Konrad Fiedler's work. He maintained that Fiedler, using Raphael as a hypothetical case, answered the question whether an artist "without hands" is possible more convincingly than did Lessing (in his *Laokoon* essay) and later Marx. The problem was whether a work of art is a mere embodiment of an artist's vision or whether it becomes one through the process of giving it form (*Gestalt*). In his early work, *Writings on Art* (1913), Fiedler elaborated the close connection between the artistic vision, the "content" of the work of art, and the form which is influenced by the material and the medium of representation. Today, this problem is still hotly debated within the sociology of knowledge and history of science. For Fiedler, as well as for Hauser and Lukacs, it is not the vision, but the execution of the work that constitutes the "creative act." The vehicles of representation are thus more than just "neutral instruments"; they become the constitutive elements of the act of creation. The execution of the artistic idea in a given medium is, in Hauser's opinion, "identical with the actual artistic production in terms of sensuous forms." In the *process* of creation of the work of art, the artistic vision, content, form and the medium melt into a synthesized whole.

Beyond aesthetic theory, these reflections have relevance for the modern sociology of science in its search for an explanation of the creative process in art and in science. Specifically, in regard to the theory of art, Hauser's and Lukacs' view of the creative process corresonds to their consideration of the essay as an art form. It also guided them in their investigation of how far and in what way social factors "intrude" upon the supposedly autonomous world of art and literature.

For Hauser and Lukacs, these reflections are but means of arriving at the *tertium datur*, i.e., at a synthesis of the critic's experience, judgment and interpretive powers, and even more so, a synthesis of content and form, of life and work, of artist and critic, of *actio* and *contemplatio*. In Lukacs' case, the yearning for the *tertium datur* gained political significance: in the *Blum-Theses* (1928),[1] in Vienna, Lukacs proposed a "democratic dictatorship" for Hungary.

It is quite instructive to compare Hauser's clear yet insightful passage about the essay as an art form, written in London at the age of 85, with the hymnical outpourings of the young Lukacs, written in Budapest and Florence at the age of 23, from such essays as "On the Nature and Form of the Essay" and "Platonism, Poetry and Form," collected in the volume *The Soul and the Form*. Hauser claims that the essay is "one of the earliest variations" of the *tertium datur*. When so specified, the essay becomes an object of analysis and, at the same time, a form of expression and a means of self-revelation for the art critic.

Through the medium of the essay which allows both distance and intimacy, Hauser and Lukacs tried again and again to place the work of art or the artist himself in the center of different perspectives and configurations in order to unravel the universal connections of the work of art or the person of the artist. Any such attempt is wrought with the dangers of experimentation. In Walter Benjamin's footsteps, Hauser rightly points out the experimental and hypothetical character of the essay. In affirming the actuality and timeliness of the essay as a new 20th-century art form, Lukacs and Rudolf Kassner often refer back to Plato, Montaigne, Plotinus and, of course, to

1. Blum was the pseudonym chosen by Lukacs for the duration of his undercover activities in Budapest, Hungary, in the 1920s.

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Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Both men also talk of the "intermediary experience," that is, of the loneliness and melancholy of the critic and essayist. Thus, we encounter for the first time the concept of the homeless, classless and "free floating" intellectual as exemplified by the essayist — a thesis later elaborated by Alfred Weber and Karl Mannheim.

At the same time, Hauser, Kassner and Lukacs as well as Georg Simmel and Samuel Lublinsky emphasized the "aristocratic stance" of the critic who retains an objectivity that derives from the position of being in the "middle" between the creative process, the work of art and the reception by the consumer of art. Rooted in skepticism and doubt, the questioning and weighting activities of the critic-essayist are properly pedagogical-critical and represent the actual intellectualization of the work of art but remain, nevertheless, subordinated to the absolute power of artistic expression. A work of art only becomes art through the proper interpretation.

It is also true, states the young Lukacs, that the critic becomes conscious of his own self by "dissecting the soul," that is, through the analysis of life and work that had previously been created by a poet or a painter. The critic-essayist will find *his* material, his reality in the experience that has already been given form: he is denied the absolute experience of a poet. In *The Soul and the Form*, the young Lukacs argues that "The poet says either 'Yes' or 'No'; the critic believes and doubts all at once, at the same moment." Such remarks derive from Lukacs' idealistic-romantic yearning for the world of the Greeks in which the forms of art could be felt as a living thing, as a reality. "The modern essay," states Lukacs, "has lost that backdrop of life which gave Plato and the mystics their strength." The young Lukacs then describes the critic as basing his criteria of judgment on his experiences in a world that has become problematic and on his perceptions of man's alienation — man's loss of naïveté under the pressures of an increasing rationality. More importantly, the critic is viewed as having had "the energy to rise above the vulgar level of given facts and experiences." Thus, Lukacs elevates the critic to a "stylized figure," to a model for the spiritual-creative man of the present time. In the 20th century, aesthetics and art theory which have the function of explaining the work of art as well as the connection between art product and reception, cannot exist without the critic, the essayist. Writing in the stylistic fashion of his time, the young Lukacs, much more eloquently than Hauser, evokes the concept of the synthesis — the *tertium datur*, the "mystical-mathematical" union, the "sum total of Platonism and poetry." Both Hauser and Lukacs are in substantial agreement, however, judging from remarks that Hauser made in 1976 in a conversation with the author. Hauser adopted a theory of the Romantic period that makes the essayist the real artist because he formulates the aesthetic principles.

There is, in addition, a basic agreement between Hauser and Lukacs about the *"intrusion" of social factors into the artistic sphere*. In the "Foreword" to his very first study, Lukacs formulates the following question: "Is the socio-historical aspect significant in regard to the structure of the work of art and if so, to what extent?" Or: "Is the sociological aspect of the dramatic form just incidental in the realization of the aesthetic value — or does it determine the value itself?" Although Lukacs does not emphasize the alienation of value and the realization of value, he draws a sharp epistemological distinction between them. He, on the other hand, refuses to make any such distinction. He emphasizes in his *Sociology of Art* the absolute analytical unity of value and realization of value. The work of art represents for Hauser "the aesthetic value itself." In his opinion, there is no universal aesthetic form outside the concrete-artistic realization of values.

Hauser's asssertions about the problem of *genesis and validity* belong to this context.

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The same problem was tackled by the Heidelberg Neo-Kantians as well as Benjamin, Mannheim and Adorno. Hauser analyzes the concept of validity true to his common-sense thinking. He remarks that validity is often merely conventions. Otherwise, the validity has nothing —or not necessarily anything — to do with the genesis of a statement or assertion.

The problem of genesis and validity is of importance because of the opposition between the logical structure of the truth content of an assertion and the psychological conditions of the finding of the truth. Hauser sees more clearly than many of the thinkers influenced by the Neo-Kantian Lask the side-by-side position of the normative meaning of truth that is objective and timeless and the truth content of an assertion that is individually colored and varied. Hauser cannot bring himself to accept the concept of artistic values which claim validity separately from the work of art.

Nevertheless, just as Lukacs did in his essay "The Subject-Object Relation in Aesthetics" (1917-18), Hauser raises the question whether and in what sense we can speak of an aesthetic validity outside the logical one. He had to admit, though, that the work of art too has its own "peculiar objectivity." Still, the receptive subject cannot judge the truth of the work of art — and consequently its validity — without coming to grips with and experiencing the tensions inherent in its objectivity. For this reason, every great artistic achievement "puts the demand on us to honor the validity of logical judgments"; great art equals the assumed or real necessity of its recognition. In these psychological-sociological terms Hauser thus approves the aesthetic validity with only slight limitations. On the other hand, he rejects categorically aesthetic validity in Lukacs' terms, that is, that the artist has to look for universal principles of form, for universal laws and norms, i.e., to apply the laws of logical validity to aesthetics and to the actual creative process. The peculiar quality of the work of art and its artistic creativity would be destroyed by such transference.

In spite of these reservations, Hauser dealt with the same basic problems as Lukacs, but he wrote with considerably more clarity and without Lukacs' logical and epistemological extremism. Hauser's lifework contains numerous discussions on these problems with literary references. He used the German dramas of Lessing (*Nathan, the Wise Man*) and Kleist (*The Prince of Homburg*) to illustrate the "intrusion" of social factors into artistic forms. Had *Nathan* not been written in the 18th century, the play's formal qualities would have been different. In the spirit of the liberal-minded, enlightened 18th century, a pacifist tone and the avoidance of a tragic outcome prevailed. It is thus proven that the social climate of the times influenced the outcome of the play and consequently also the formal elements. The same is true of Kleist's *Prince of Homburg*; only a prince of the Romantic era would have looked at suicide as the only possible solution. This solution testifies to Kleist's acceptance of the vital consciousness of Romanticism.

Hauser is superior to Lukacs in that he is able to evaluate specific developments in modern art and literature that Lukacs, adhering to Marxist-Leninist aesthetics, simply neglects or condemns. Hauser acknowledges the significance of psychological factors. Dealing with Ibsen's and Strindberg's works, he found out that, in addition to social factors, psychological ones intrude upon artistic form. In Ibsen's case, the psychological is even stronger than the social element. Thus, for Hauser, modern art demonstrates that psychological factors set limits to the influence of social factors on art forms.

Beginning with his work, *The Social History of Art and Literature* (1951), Hauser has shown the originality of his thought. Despite similarities and even agreements with Lukacs concerning the theory of art, Hauser's tendency to go his individual ways is best

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represented by his works *The Philosophy of Art History* (1958) and *Sociology of Art* (1974). In a conversation with the author, Hauser emphasized that his *Sociology of Art* is only a "collection of impressions;" he did not intend to write a textbook nor conceived this book to be his *magnum opus*. Nevertheless, this work is Hauser's most mature one.

In order to comprehend fully the originality of Hauser's theory of art, we should recall the stages of his intellectual development. He started his career in Budapest as an art historian. During his travels in Italy, he studied the problem of style, stylistic transformations and interruptions in the history of art. All his life, Hauser strived to come to grips theoretically with the works of two thinkers: Heinrich Wölfflin and Karl Mannheim. Georg Simmel and Max Weber also exercised great and lasting influence on him. Furthermore, Hauser's primary experience with works of art, his sensual contact with them, and his work for a film company in Vienna and later in London are to be emphasized. Not to be forgotten is his passionate involvement in music. Lukacs' influence in Hauser's formative years, between 1917 and 1919, faded away in the following decades, partly because of the physical separation of the two men, the different paths they chose and the great differences in their temperament.

Hauser could never accept a dogmatic Marxism of any variety: dogmatism and orthodoxy were anathema to him. Unlike Lukacs, Hauser would never succumb to the intellectual fascination of Hegel, Simmel and Marx and did not take advantage of the intellectual possibilities they offered to construct a "dialectical subject-object totality" for art, society and politics. He was even farther away from the temptation to transfer intellectual "truths" in political statements, as Lukacs did after 1918. Still, Hauser insisted that he was a *critical Marxist* all his life. He claims to have developed his own version of Marxist methodology which he successfully applied in his own works. Thus, we can speak of Hauser's unhappy love affair with Marxism, so obvious in his reflections about the "concept of dialectics," which take up more than a hundred pages in his *Sociology of Art*. For him, history is *not* the final aim; it has no end, it is "open." Therefore, there is no foreseeable end to art. Because conflicts and "opposites" ("contradictions") are firmly embedded in the interplay of continuity and discontinuity, they are in principle and at all times surmountable. In opposition to Lukacs, Hauser stresses the *connections* between phenomena instead of dwelling on their polarity. For Hauser, "dialectics" means "dialogue, question and answer, challenge and rejoinder, tension and relaxation, dispute and decision." Nowhere do we find the definition of capitalist society as a chain of ever sharpening socio-historical "contradictions." Hauser's common sense makes him realize that while many processes in art, history, politics and society can be explained "dialectically," others cannot.

His non-dogmatic approach to questions of Marxist methodology is exemplified by his reluctance to discuss the ontological structure of matters. He is also skeptical about the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the reflection of the dialectical structure of reality in human consciousness; in short, he is distrustful of the "dialectical conceptual apparatus." He is, however, deeply involved in the possibilities of applying the Marxist categories of the dialectic in the history of art and style. Characteristically, Hauser often uses the concept of "interplay," borrowed from Simmel, as a synonym for "dialectics." He emphasizes the interplay, or dialectic, of form and content in the work of art; although the art theorist has to be conscious of this, he can never quite pinpoint the transitions. Hauser also applies the dialectical principle to the history of style. He states in the *Sociology of Art* that each new approach to the history of art supersedes the existing stylistic forms, that is, it "disintegrates them, makes them outmoded, while preserving some of their progressive elements."

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There are contradictions in Hauser's work. On the one hand, he rejects Hegelianism and Hegelian Marxism; on the other, he finds Marxism inspirational: the historical and sociological theses of Marxism help him to prove that "art does not exist in a vacuum." As previously mentioned, Hauser tries to explain certain phenomena in art such as the tensions between continuity and discontinuity, spontaneity and convention, "tranquility" and "dynamics," tradition and anti-tradition, mainly with the help of such Marxian concepts as "dialectic," "negation," "contradiction," "annulment," or "preservation," and "reconciliation." While Hauser draws on the actuality, on the empirical facts of forms of art, forms of breaks in style, he has many disagreements with most Marxist art theorists who display a deep cultural pessimism rooted in the concept of alienation.

In agreement with Marx and Lukacs, Hauser recognizes the concept of *alienation* as a valid expression of the "crisis in inter-human relations" and of placing in jeopardy the individual's roots in society. At the same time, he is deeply distrustful of the latent and manifest demands of dogmatic-universal art that have underlaid this concept since the time of Marx and Hegel. At this point, Hauser disassociates himself from Lukacs' now famous thesis of "reification." Alienated society corresponds, according to Hauser, to the unattainable utopian idea of the totality of a harmonious, organic world, which makes the grasping of the whole truth possible. Although Hauser finds such a totality desirable, he does not believe that any theory can deal adequately with it and in the *Sociology of Art* he writes: "the extensive knowledge of the world shall forever be unexplored."

But Hauser disagrees with Lukacs concerning the interpretation of the concept of alienation for other reasons: as an art historian he knew that romanticism had discovered "estrangement" in the mode of expression, i.e., the alienation of form and content. As a *critical* art historian, he often called attention to the fact that this distance between form and content in the arts at times not only proved to be irrelevant but it even enhanced the "quality of expression." Without mentioning his name, Hauser was in complete agreement with Gottfried Benn: both believed that the suffering due to estrangement often helped to intensify the power of expression and the formal qualities of art instead of destroying them.

Finally, in order to arrive at an accurate understanding of his relation to Marxism, we have to examine critically Hauser's views on *ideology*. In agreement with Marx, Hauser accepts the notion of ideology as "false consciousness." But he rejects the Marxian notion of the relation between "false" and "true" consciousness, i.e., between ideology and truth in the historical totality. Similarly, Hauser is against the admission of this notion in the theory of art. He writes in the *Sociology of Art:* "In the strict sense, a work of art cannot be termed either true or false." Instead, he emphasizes that the concept of ideology can be employed only in relation to a class or a certain social group. In Mannheim's footsteps, he analyzes the ideological character of thought within the framework of the new 19th-century trends. Leaving questions of details aside, Hauser attempts to demonstrate with concrete examples the effect of ideologies in the history of art. Here again, he follows Mannheim. Hauser thus argues that styles are influenced by socio-economic causes: to illustrate, he mentions 16th- and 17th-century Flemish and Dutch art. However, Hauser objects to Marxist ideological claims that derive the "source of artistic quality, the individual talent and the unique expression" directly from socio-economic facts.

Although sketchily presented, these views of Hauser attest to his unorthodoxy. His very personal adaptation of certain Marxian ideas touches on the very kernel of his aesthetic theories. No other Marxist art theorist reflected more often on Marx's

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"Introduction" to the *Grundrisse*, in which Marx deals with the connections between artistic and social values, the material conditions of the creation of works of art and the conditions of their reception by a later generation. Complementing Marx as well as Lukacs, Hauser states that: "Even if works of art outlast the socio-historical conditions of their origin," they are "not at all times current." The appreciation of the artistic achievements of the past is as historically conditioned as their creation. Although Hauser insists on the *historical* aspect of interpretation, he defends the existence of psychological autonomy in experiencing art against Lukacs' theory of consciousness. According to Lukacs, if a person contemplating art is capable of rising above the "spontaneity of mere impression," he will automatically classify the work of art as belonging to a certain genre and thus go beyond mere individual experience. Hauser proposes that such conscious classification within the process of reception does not belong to the "original aesthetic essence of experience"; it can even lead to the abandonment of the norms of "concrete sensual impressions." Hauser thus develops his own theory of the appreciation of art in that he distinguishes between the appreciative act of an art connoisseur and that of the naive consumer of art.

The discussion of Marxist notions does not, however, constitute the essence of Hauser's aesthetic reflections. More often, he tried to come to grips with the art theories of Heinrich Wölfflin and Alois Riegl. Hauser himself might have emphasized the formal features of the work of art and of the artistic expression; his opposition to Wölfflin's ahistorical and anti-individualistic thinking remained unflagging. He tried instead to prove the inseparable unity of the individual and the social. In this connection, Hauser was predominantly interested in the individual personality of the artist, its fate, its versatility and its irrationalism. In his *sociology of Art* he writes: "The individual is a dynamic complex, embodying the antinomies of the inner life and environment, originality and conventions and permanence and change, and providing the setting for the conflicts and battles that go on." Hauser goes even further and asserts that even to ages with absolutely no conception of the individual and individualism, the perception of individuality in artistic creation was in all probability "nothing strange."

Hauser thus condemns Wölfflin's art-historical "determinism" and his "art history without names"; he also finds unacceptable Riegl's doctrine of the "artistic intention" (*Kunstwollen*), maintaining the absolute uniqueness and incomparability of artistic achievements. Hauser tries to navigate between these two "poles." He effectively attacks Wölfflin's "art history without names," this "history of seeing," which supposedly operates according to an inner logic and inherent law of evolution as a theory rooted in a mechanistic conception of history, derived from Comte's *histoire sans noms* on one hand, and as a theory of the self-movement of some superindividual principle such as can be found in Hegel's philosophy of history on the other. Although he is in agreement with Wölfflin's assumption that "not everything is possible at all times," Hauser categorically rejects Wölfflin's formula of an anonymous art history, that is, a history of means of expression (*Darstellungsmöglichkeit*) and of "modes of seeing" which excludes both the artist and the receptive spectator.

Mannheim's influence is evident in Hauser's criticism of Wölfflin. Hauser remarks in his *Philosophy of Art History:* "The kernel of the organismic doctrine is the thesis that if an evolution is to bring forth valuable and vital forms, it must always remain in contact with the past; it must seek to unfold the new form from the old and to 'surpass' (in the sense of the Hegelian word *aufheben*), i.e., to overcome and yet to preserve it." But Hauser's main concern remained the peculiarity of the creative individual and its role in art history. The situation of the artist he deems open; it is to some extent the

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product of two independent sets of conditions: internal and external, i.e., the psychological and the sociological. Hauser mentions the contention of psychoanalysis according to which neurosis might play a role. But for him, all theories claiming universal validity were suspect, and thus he cannot accept Freud's proposition that art is simply a "substitute for direct gratification." Hauser always kept in mind the versatility of artistic processes and modes of artistic expressions. The most precise formulations of his own perspectives are to be found in his *Philosophy of Art History*, and one of its passages reads like a "credo" of its author: "Every step in the evolution of art requires an alogical decision, unaccountable in terms of any self-contained system and going beyond the aesthetic sphere — an act of will that chooses among the available possibilities. Art is form and expression conditioned in part internally, in part externally, at no times simply going its own way, at no time quite at the mercy of external circumstances." In opposing Lukacs and in disagreeing with Wölfflin and Riegl, Hauser developed his own concepts of style, stylistic changes and interruptions in the history of art and literature — which we might call a *concept of interactions* — because he believed that the formalistic and idealistic point of view of Wölfflin and Riegl made the limits of art history too narrow. One cannot overemphasize Mannheim's influence, which extended even to Hauser's choice of words. Also, to some extent, Max Dvorak's unorthodox interpretation of the evolution of art history has also found resonance in Hauser's own views.

Hauser discusses his conception of style under a number of names and ascribes to it different meanings, such as "flexible sociological category" or "paradigm." It also has a number of features in common with Max Weber's "ideal type." Hauser agrees with Weber that the concept of style should be distinguished from a metaphysical idea on the one hand and from a logical category on the other. For Hauser, the chief attraction of Weber's "ideal type" construct is its element of "utopia." Each style has its own "utopia" which, *by definition*, the reality, that is, the particular work of art, never reaches. Yet, by the time Hauser wrote *Sociology of Art*, he was pretty far from Weber in that he regarded artistic style as a dynamic concept in contrast to Weber's ideal type. Hauser emphasized the tensions inherent in the realization of the artistic intention as an evolutionary process, thus advancing simultaneously a conception of form. In art history, Hauser observed that representatives of a certain stylistic trend behaved as if they had a special goal in mind. But he maintained that this collective attitude could not be classified as an "anonymous force." What is in evidence here is mutual intentions and artistic "will" of creative individuals who are susceptible the same way to influences of "traditions, conventions and institutions" and the internal logic of their inner dynamics, but react to them according to their peculiarities and choosings.

Hauser and Lukacs have often asked the same questions and were interested in the same problems. Their answers, however, show marked differences. Lukacs had a more penetrating mind; he was also more dogmatic. Hauser's answers are never definitive and they often seem vague and eclectic. Hauser almost never loses touch with the empirical world. He achieved scholarly eminence in three fields: literature, painting and music. We should not be surprised, therefore, that his accounts of "realism" are more open and forward-looking than those of Lukacs and enabled Hauser to grasp modern artistic phenomena such as surrealism. By means of his criteria developed on the genre of the "great epic art" and of "critical realism," Lukacs could come to terms only with "socialist realism," his methodological and theoretical stand effectively obstructing his understanding of modern, post-1945 art.

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MARCUSE AND FEMINISM

by Margaret Cerullo

Not the least of the ironies and interesting paradoxes that constitute the significance of Marcuse for us is the fact that an 81 year old man, and product of one of the most deeply patriarchal and authoritarian of modern cultures, turned and returned consistently in his writings of the last decade to the subject of feminism. He explained his reasons in a lecture he gave at Stanford in 1974. Simply: "I believe the Women's Liberation Movement is perhaps the most important and potentially the most radical political movement that we have — even if the consciousness of this fact has not yet penetrated the Movement as a whole." Marcuse's serious engagement with the feminist project is both a testament to his enormous historical openness, his refusal of political resignation, and also a moving gesture of respect and solidarity, which may turn out to be the most important part of his legacy to the male left in the United States today.

I want first to explore why Marcuse thought that the Women's Liberation Movement was the "most radical" political movement we have; and then, in a Marcusean spirit — evident always in his dialogue with Marxism — interrogate the tradition of critical theory itself, confronting it with the development of feminist theory and practice, in hope of its emancipation from its own patriarchal bias and male-modelled assumptions.

What Jacoby wrote in relation to the New Left may be even more apt here: with the emergence of the Women's Liberation Movement, the gap closed between Marcuse's texts and the writing on the wall. So many recurrent Marcusean dreams and themes found their embodiment in the movement for women's liberation that came to be called socialist feminism: his vision in *Eros and Civilization* of love as revolution; his insistence on the possibility of a new reality principle, as the promise of a socialism which could no longer be understood as a change in social institutions but had to be deepened to include a vision of a change in consciousness and the very instinctual structures of human beings deformed by exploitation and domination; his understanding of socialism as a qualitative leap to a new system of needs which are sensuous, ethical and rational in one. The movement of our recent history revealed the power of eros which Marcuse invoked against a repressive civilization to be the power of women at work and in the community — a power which found its most concerted and political expression in the women's liberation movement.

Marcuse saw the women's movement at its most radical in precipitating a rupture with the Performance Principle, the Reality Principle of industrial capitalism and of a socialism which continued and even extended the Performance Principle and its values. Underlining the demand for the *liberation* of women thrown up by the Movement itself, Marcuse insisted that equality with men is not yet freedom. He understood women's liberation as a subversion of the Performance Principle, not an invitation to participate. Marcuse saw finally that what was at stake was a new morality, a feminist morality, a reversal of the values of profitable productivity, repression, efficiency, aggression, competitiveness, of an instrumental rationality severed from emotion — in the name of receptivity, tenderness, non-violence. It seems to me that remembering our own dream, our own vision, our own morality, whose terms Marcuse had so eloquently anticipated, is of critical importance to our Movement today — in a period in which instrumentalism, competitiveness,

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self-assertion, aggressiveness and individualism are starkly revealed and even cynically embraced as the name of the game, particularly the academic game. To challenge any and all of these, to stand against the instrumentalism which has come to infect the Movement that once stood on the basis of another morality; to propose, to think, let alone to envision and establish the alternative structures and modes of intellectual activity that would concretize a different vision of intellectual engagement — sounds as romantic, as naive and utopian as anything Marcuse ever proposed.

Marcuse himself stood outside — irritating, critical, romantic, utopian, outrageous: a model of a critical politically engaged intellectual, against the grain, the trend, the fashion. The political, intellectual, and cultural position he claimed for himself is one known to few men and fewer women. Even to put together the words, critical, politically engaged, intellectual — woman breaks the sequence and reminds us that we are dealing with a phenomenon virtually unknown in this country. What kind of life are we talking about and for whom is it possible? What kinds of assumptions, decisions, struggles, sacrifices constituate, enable, paralyze, or deny the life of a political intellectual? Where do family, sexuality, parenting, love fit within it? (All these are issues which in other contexts Marcuse insisted had to be taken into political account.) When he proposes as the terms of such a life the fusion of eros and reason, he is implicitly talking about the feminization of male intellectuals. The identification of the feminine, of woman, with eros, with pleasure, with sensuality must seem more ambiguous to us; the eroticization of our intellects a possibility with which we are all too familiar. As women, our project must be to create the space of study and solitude, of intellectual intensity and assertion, of confidence and challenge — and still to think, to act, and to be like women, To begin might be to salvage and to renew a critical intellectual tradition too long deformed and distorted by our absence. And that would be a radical and subversive project in the Marcusean spirit.

HERBERT MARCUSE (1898-1979)

by Jeremy J. Shapiro

> "Men can die without anxiety if they know that what they love is protected from misery and oblivion. After a fulfilled life, they may take it upon themselves to die — at a moment of their own choosing."
> — Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*

What men and women love has probably never been less protected from misery and oblivion than during the time when Herbert Marcuse, who wrote those words, lived and died. Part of his greatness, in which he took after his own culture hero, Orpheus the liberator, who with geniune philosophy "responds to the fact of death with the Great Refusal," is to have affirmed this possibility of both life and death without anxiety at a time when even life *with* anxiety has been rendered probelmatic by the technology of domination. I do not know whether Marcuse died without anxiety at a

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moment of his own choosing. But I know that he did live a fulfilled life, in which he was able to relate to what he loved — the earth, its people, their creations of beauty and intellect — as though they *were* protected from misery and oblivion, seeing them in the light of "The Orphic and Narcissistic Eros (that) awakens and liberates potentialities that are real in things animate and inanimate, in organic and inorganic nature — real but in the un-erotic reality suppressed. These potentialities circumscribe the *telos* inherent in them as: just be what they are, being-there, existing." (*Eros and Civilization*)

Marcuse's contributions as a liberator, as a critical theorist concerned with understanding and transforming our society in the light of its historically specific emancipatory (and repressive) potential, were nourished from a deep core of humanity, dignity, imagination, tenderness, and humor that also characterized his life and personality. Humanity's dream of a non-repressive civilization, which Marcuse attempted to interpret, to ground materialistically, and to help realize, was also his personal dream. It informed his character and the direction of his thought: "the image of joy and fulfillment; the voice which does not command but sings; the gesture which offers and receives; the deed which is peace and ends the labor of conquest; the liberation from time which unites man with god, man with nature" (*Eros and Civilization*). The power of Marcuse's concepts and the uncompromising nature of his commitment to freedom, happiness, rationality, truth, and justice are intimately linked to his Orphic and Narcissistic inspiration. To understand the real in the light of the possible that inheres in it and defines it is at the same time an intellectual, a moral, and an erotic achievement.

For those who grew up or lived within Marcuse's sphere of influence and activity, the manifestation of these characteristics in daily life were part of the "meaning" of Marcuse. People told Marcuse stories the way Hasidim told tales of their *Wunderrebbes*; not so much because of hero worship as because, just as with Hasidic rabbis and pre-Socratic philosophers, everyday life, conversation, and, especially, humor were the place where wisdom, reflection, and critique took life, the original locus of the unity of theory and practice. A colleague sent Marcuse a Soviet review of his *Soviet Marxism,* entitled "Bourgeois Philosophy and its Impotence.' Marcuse sent it back with the inscription, "How do they know I am impotent?"A student said to Marcuse, "I'm happy in American society." Marcuse replied, "You tell me you are happy, and I tell you you are unhappy." In a course on the history of political theory that covered, among others, Rousseau, Burke, and Hegel, Marcuse finished two weeks of lectures on Rousseau in the middle of class. Students awaiting his lectures on Burke heard him say, "We have come to the end of our discussion of Rousseau. We come next to Edmund Burke, who is guilty of objective crimes against humanity. We pass on to Hegel, with whom political theory begins and ends." During a question period at a large lecture on ideas which were later to be included in *One-Dimensional Man*, an angry Stalinist student says, "Prof. Marcuse, have you ever heard of imperialism?" Marcuse replies, "No, I have not." Marcuse refers to our then not-yet Secretary of Sate as Mr. Asskissinger. Marcuse, about to sit down to dinner in Europe during the height of the Cold War, gives an abbreviated Nazi salute to the words, "Heil Willy Brandt?" Everyone who had much contact with Marcuse knows dozens of such stories. All of them bespeak an attitude of irreverent, critical and sometimes almost obstreperous humor that was not merely a personal idiosyncrasy but rather linked Marcuse's spirit with that joyful transcendence, beyond all *ressentiment,* of surrealist pranks, Nietzsche's gay science, and Marx's question and answer: "Why this course of history? In order that humanity *cheerfully* take leave of its past." Marcuse's

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humor was an everyday manifestation of his thinking everything in the light of its determinate negation and in the interest of what he called the "*logos* of gratification."

Four encounters with Marcuse that were personally important to me stand out in my mind as also revealing of his nature. Shortly after graduating from college in 1961 I visited the Marcuses at the *hôtel privé* where they were staying in Paris. It was in the afternoon and we were seated in the courtyard. Obsessively hyperintellectual, I was hoping and expecting to hear Marcuse make some pronouncements about Hegel, Marx, or advanced capitalism. Instead, he looked up at the sky and said, "Look at the blue of that sky! This particular shade of blue can be seen only in the Ile de France." I remember feeling, as a hyperintellectual student, shocked that Marcuse would be wasting his time on the blue of the sky when he should be thinking about Hegel. At the same time I was delighted by his vivid, detailed relation to nature, which put my narrow intellectualism to shame. I realized how directly he lived that relation to the earth captured in the Sean O'Casey quotation in *Eros and Civilization*: "Were it but to give us simple shelter, simple clothing, simple food, adding the lily and the rose, the apple and the pear, it would be a fit home for mortal or immortal man."

In 1963 or '64, while Marcuse was visiting Frankfurt, he accompanied me to a session of the Auschwitz trial, which I was covering for an American magazine and which consisted largely of survivors recounting tales of the camp. I remember being struck that the social scientist who had spent most of his professional life concerned with the implications of Auschwitz and Nazism could respond at the same time with the naive immediacy of one encountering such horrors for the first time.

Recently I asked Marcuse a question that had been on my mind for over 15 years. When I was in college, a friend told me that Marcuse had given the students in one of his classes the assignment of listing everything that was wrong with society. I was impressed with this focus on detail and once even tried to draw up such a list myself. I hasd always wanted to know what Marcuse's class had come up with and what he had done with their lists. When I finally asked him, he exclaimed, with slight irritation: "I completely forgot about that! Do you know that those students never handed in that assignment?"

In the last encounter I shall mention, Marcuse and I were sitting in the back of an ambulance, holding hands, singing Yiddish folk songs, and crying. This encounter occurred in a dream, but to me it feels not only as though it could have occured, not only as though it did occur, but as though it is occuring still and, for me, may occur forever.

Shortly before Kant's death in 1804 he was visited by his doctor. Kant, who was very weak and could scarcely talk, would not sit down before his guest, who could not understand his behavior. Kant mustered all his strength and declared, "The feeling for humanity has not yet left me." These words of Kant hold, I believe, for Marcuse. The feeling for humanity never left him, and is embodied in his works and what we know of him as a person.

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REVIEWS:

Paul K. Feyerabend. *Against Method*. New Left Books: London, 1975.

Paul K. Feyerabend. *Science in a Free Society*. New Left Books: London, 1978.

The question of science has become rather important from several perspectives. The disintegration of the positivist model of science and the scientific community seem objective, progressive and rational.[1] The question of science also arises in the developing struggle between the technocratic elites and populist intellectuals. Such debates may have a role in the development of genuine mass movements which undercut the priviledged position of such elites, as happened in some phases of the Cultural Revolution in China. More generally, the technocratic society has turned into a leaky ship, sailing a dangerous strait bounded by the possibility of nuclear holocaust on one side and massive ecological collapse on the other. The growing realization of the dangers of science and technology may lead people to see that leaving things up to the "experts" is very unwise. In this way, science and its elite may come to be seen as part of the problem, rather than an institution likely to solve the problems humanity now faces.

An adequate understanding of contemporary science requires that it be located within the network of science-technology social system-ecological niche. This network has many feedback loops and any attempt to understand one part in isolation from the rest of the system is likely to lead to misunderstanding. Consider how nuclear technology secures the role of the technocratic elite in controlling society, for one example of mutual relations between technology and elites. Nuclear power is essentially centralized and requires extensive security measures. Especially with the advent of breeder reactors, which use bomb grade materials, the threat of terrorism brings with it the response of the state, one form being monitoring the populace's behavior. One need only remember how easily body searches become standard practice upon boarding planes to see how easily the state can insert itself into daily life under the guise of "security," and with no significant resistance. Couple electronic monitoring of communication with computers which can understand spoken language and two technical "successes" can synergistically solidify the power of the state.[2] When one realizes that nuclear plants must be "guarded" for up to 10,000 years, the tendency of this technology to preserve the power of elites becomes immense.

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1. For two recent examples, cf. Larry Laudan, *Progress and Its Problems* (Berkeley, 1976), and Harold Brown, *Perception, Theory and Commitment* (Chicago, 1977). Just to give the flavor of these attempts, Brown winds up claiming that "it is the trained scientist who must make these decisions (i.e. choices about paradigms, which lines of research to follow), and it is the scientists, not the rules they wield, that provide the locus of scientific rationality." (p. 149.) For a critique of Laudan, see my forthcoming review in *Philosophical Inquiry*.

2. "Granted that a speech-recognition machine is bound to be enormously expensive, and that only governments and possibly a few very large corporations will therefore be able to afford it, what will they use it for? There is no question in my mind that there is no pressing human problem that will be more easily solved because such machines exist. But such listening machines, could they be made, will make monitoring of voice communication very much easier than it is now. Perhaps the only reason that there is very little government surveillance of telephone conversations in many countries of the world is that such surveillance takes so much manpower. Each conversation on a tapped telephone must eventually be listened to by a human agent. But speech-recognizing machines could delete all "uninteresting" coversations and present transcripts of only the remaining ones to their masters. I do not for a moment believe that we will achieve this capability within the future so clearly visible to Newell and Simon. But I do ask, why should a talented computer technologist lend his support to such a project? As a citizen I ask, why should my government spend approximately 2.5 million dollars a year (as it now does) on this project?" pp. 271-72, Joseph Weizenbaum, *Computer Power and Human Reason*, (San Franscisco, 1976).

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Moreover, as the corporate and governmental response to the meltdown at Three Mile Island exemplified, the elites are apt to respond to crisis by the management of information to protect themselves, rather than re-examining the system which is threatening calamity. Seen in this context, the alternative technology movement is quite important in developing a counter-image and counter-reality to the future currently under construction by corporate, governmental and technical-scientific elites.

Such considerations can motivate a re-examination of the technocratic ideology. Without trying to be at all complete, three presuppositions seem readily discernable: 1) Science is objective and rational; 2) more is better; 3) the world is infinite. These ideas are not usually put forward explicitly— their hegemony is much more secure if they are left as part of the background, since they can thrive there without requiring justification. But such ideas underly more popular slogans put forward by corporate ideologists — e.g. "Progress is our most important product" and "Better living through chemistry." Ecologists have a lot to teach us about the fateful dangers of thinking that the world is infinite.[3] For a good critique of the idea that more is better, Schumacher's essay on Buddhist economics is excellent.[4] Powerful critiques of science have been developed by Husserl and Heidegger, among others. Happily, the discussion of science as a whole has now entered the Anglo-Saxon tradition in the latest work by Feyerabend, particularly in the two books under review here.

In a way, the discussion of the rationality of science within the rather provincial circles of the contemporary philosophy of science began with the publication of Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Written at a time when the field was almost completely absorbed in trying to solve the problems generated by the positivist model of science, Kuhn looked at the history of science to provide the basis for the claim that science necessarily proceeded by what he then called paradigms. The important aspect of his theory for my purposes here is to note that paradigms provide the framework for the justification of scientific belief and cannot themselves by justified by appeals to evidence, unsuccessful attempts at falsification or the like. Revolutions were understood as akin to conversion experiences, making the history of science appear to be epistemologically discontinuous. Many attacked Kuhn because he did not provide a "reasonable" model of scientific development — that is, a model which fit the current philosophical models of rationality. Kuhn's own understanding of his work was that he

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3 See Barry Commoner's *The Closing Circle,* (N.Y., 1971)and William Ophuls' *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity*, (San Francisco, 1977), for good entries into the subject. Ophuls has a very useful bibilography.

4. Cf. his *Small is Beautiful,* (N.Y., 1973). Consider also the following by Tolstoy: 'Seek among men, from beggar to millionaire, one who is contented with his lot, and you will not find one such in a thousand. Each one spends his strength in pursuit of what is exacted by the doctrine of the world, and of what he is unhappy not to possess, and scarcely has he obtained one object of his desires when he strives for another, and still another, in that infinite labor of Sisyphus which destroys the lives of men. Run over the scale of individual fortunes, ranging from a yearly income of three hundred rubles to fifty thousand rubles, and you will rarely find a person who is not striving to gain four hundred rubles if he has three hundred, five thousand if he has four hundred, and so on to the top of the ladder. Among them all you will scarcely find one who, with five hundred rubles, is willing to adopt the mode of life of him who only has four hundred... Today we must buy an overcoat and galoshes, tomorrow, a watch and a chain; the next day we must install ourselves in an apartment with a sofa and a bronze lamp; them we must have carpets and velvet gowns; then a house, horses and carriages, paintings and decorations, and then— then we fall ill of overwork and die. Another continues the same task, sacrifices his life to this same Moloch, and then dies also, without realizing for what he has lived." From *My Religion,* quoted in *Less is More,* ed. by G. VandenBroeck, (N.Y.,1978).

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was showing the inadequacy of such philosophical models, since he takes it as *analytic* that science *is* rational. For him, the net result of the history of modern science is "the wonderfully adapted set of instruments we call scientific knowledge."[5] This approach did not satisfy many philosophers, wishing to explain why science is progressive on the basis of a philosophically grounded model of rationality, while Kuhn defines reason (or at least scientific rationality) as what the scientific community does. (Notice how neatly Kuhn's position fits with the interest of the scientific community to be free from outside interference, yet free for outside funding.) Much of the work in the last 15 years by philosophers of science has been directed towards finding a model rationality (or criteria of scientific change) which fits, at least roughly, with the history of certain treasured moments in science. The puzzle has been "how does science progress," and that puzzle has been nested within the presupposition that science *is* progressive. The current work of Feyerabend is to be praised for trying to raise the more basic question — *is* science progressive?

Against Method is an extended discussion of some issues which Feyerabend has been developing over a long time. His basic position *seems* to be what he calls epistemological anarchism, a view which claims that *no* method guarantees scientific progress and that the adherence to any of the rules proposed by philosophers would have prevented the development of science as we know it. I say 'seems' because *Against Method* is really "a long and rather personal *letter* to Imre"[Lakatos]. Without understanding that his argument is directed to a certain group of people who *already* believe in the progressiveness of science, one might infer from the book that Feyerabend himself was committed to the progressivity of science. What Feyerabend does is to take a *very* few examples, especially Galileo, and tries to show that the "methods" of science proposed by even sophisticated and "liberal" Popperians would have hindered the very developments which they canonize as great truimphs of scientific reason.

Once the central importance of paradigms, cosmologies, research programmes (call them what you like) is recognized, then the basic logic of Feyerabend's position becomes quite clear. If some such perspective forms the background for any particular scientific theory, delimiting a cosmology, methodology and infusing the evidential base, then one *might* take Kuhn's tack, divide science into "normal" and "revolutionary" periods, and counsel scientists to conform to the accepted ways until there is a "crisis." But one might just as easily adopt the position that such perspectives themselves are in need of constant critique, which can best be done by developing perspectives radically divergent from the accepted global theory. Such is the stance advocated in many articles preceding *Against Method* and in the book as well. What is noteworthy in this book (besides bringing these claims into one neat and rhetorically spicy package) is that Feyerabend discusses the program put forward by Lakatos, and he deepens the idea of incommensurability by using an example which predates modern science.

The basic problem which leads to the exchange between Feyerabend and Lakatos is whether or not there is *any* sort of map which can provide guidance for the practicing scientist. That is, can a scientist get his bearings and know what he should (rationally) do at any moment? Those who approach science as if there is a complete map must first distinguish sharply (and rather artifically) between the "context of discovery" and the "context of justification." No one claims there is a map for discovery. Then one can proceed to try to construct a map — be it based on confirmation, falsification or

5. Cf. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 1962), p. 172.

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some logic cookbook such as Carnap's system. No need here to recount the dismal history of such attempts, but it is important to see what is given up if it is conceded that there is no map — or better, that there are as many maps as there are theoretical perspectives.

With no complete map, scientists must always be making their decisions *within* a framework which gives directions, but that framework itself is not on the map. It is the map. This means that scientists must adopt a framework within which to do their science, but that they can provide no overarching rational justification for that frame. But how can one know which map is best? It was to this question that Lakatos addressed his methodology of research programmes. [6] He proposed that one could see that certain research programmes were "degenerating" by looking at their performance over time. In this way Lakatos thought he could avoid the trap of claiming that one could have "instant rationality," yet not be left with nothing to say. But the matter is a little tricky, since Lakatos recognized that programmes could always be resuscitated, that backward shifts were not necessarily fatal to the worth of the programme.

So what is to be done? Precisely here Feyerabend claims that Lakatos has entered his camp as a fellow anarchist, since without standards which function as *rules* and tell the scientist what to do *in particular cases,* there is no *rational* way of criticizing any scientist's decision to follow a (degenerating) research programme. It would have been fun to read Lakatos' reply to this argument. What it seems to establish is that if one admits the importance of cosmologies and methods in the practice of science, then only one's subjective attitude can determine what programme to pursue. "What remains are aesthetic judgements, judgements of taste, metaphysical prejudices, religious desires, in short, *what remains are our subjective wishes.*" (*Against Method,* p. 285) The argument is important, since one of the few results of the past decade within the philosophy of science has been to establish the importance of such overarching frameworks for the conduct of science.

The other interesting development in *Against Method* is the expansion of the notion of incommensurability. Most of the discussion of this issue has been whether incommensurability characterizes the development of "modern science." The question can be put thus: can one devise criteria whereby the transition from, say, Ptolemy to Newton can be made to *seem* rational? How the change actually appeared to the participants is not taken as central (though it is for Feyerabend), because the main interest is not good history, but rather the solidification of the image of science as reasonable. Thus, Kepler's mysticism gets distinguished away as unimportant — even though it clearly was very important for Kepler. What Feyerabend has done is to raise the level of the discussion of incommensurability one notch by developing an example of an incommensurable theory using archaic Greece, looking at its art, literature and other features to discern a cosmology which is logically distinct and which does not share a common perceptual world.[7]

On the face of it, such a discussion of ancient Greece might seem quite irrelevant to the question of incommensurability, but that is to make a fairly serious error. Once the importance of global frameworks for science has been granted, then the

6. For example, cf. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Lakatos and Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,* (Cambridge, 1970).

7. It is interesting to note the congruence between Feyerabend's discussion and that of Julian Laynes, who explores the idea that a *wholly* new experience of self and the world developed after Homeric Greece. Cf. his *The Origin of Consciousness and the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* (Boston, 1976).

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illumination of the presuppositions of *a particular variant* of science can be carried out by looking at changes of global frameworks *within* science, but the presuppositions of modern science *as a whole* can best be revealed by looking at a radical alternative to science. So Feyerabend looks to myth, which he thinks is not so far from science in terms of worthiness. For instance, it is deeply ingrained in the cosmology and enculturated experience of the Western world that the individual human is an autonomous "I" which initiates action and to whom things happen. There is theoretically and experientially a unity to the person. But for the archaic individual one can infer from a variety of sources, such as the Homeric epics, that there is not this sense of mental unity — that "his 'mind' is composed of a variety of events, some of them not even 'mental' in our sense which either inhabit the body-puppet as additional constituents or are brought into it from the outside. Events are not *shaped* by the individual, they are complex arrangements of parts into which the body-puppet is *inserted* at the appropriate place" (*Against Method*, p. 244). This result concurs with many other studies, including Jaynes' mentioned above. It also coheres with the image of the ego developed in much greater depth by Buddhism, which indicates that divergent traditions have arrived at a position quite at odds with the modern Western "ordinary" experience of the self.

Two things should be noted. In the first place, such a notion of the experience of the self is so radically divergent from the one which infuses Western thought and experience that it is hard even to imagine what such a form of life would be like. The sense of self is so deeply embedded that discussions about which view — the archaic or the Cartesian — is more adequate are hard to conceive. What "evidence" might be summoned? One could, of course, dogmatically reaffirm the "truth" of one's own experience, but that simply signals a refusal to think about such issues, hardly counting as an argument in this context. Worse, the whole notion of knowledge and acceptable forms of argumentation are presupposed by each view, so that "knowing" which view is correct is already to beg the question. This is an example of incommensurability which points to the deep gulf between forms of life. The second point to notice is that the response that archaic Greece is irrelevant to discussions of science misses the point that it is the whole tradition of science which is being examined. To show that science is a "better way" requires constructing arguments which are nowhere to be found in the literature of the philosophy of science. The advance that Feyerabend makes with his example is that the level of discussion about scientific rationality must now be raised to discussions of cultural traditions.[8]

8. This sort of discussion is rather hard to have within any cultural tradition and it is unlikely that philosophers will respond at the appropriate level. Why this is so could make an interesting essay on the sociology of philosophy. Here I can only note that one of the tasks which falls to philosophy is to act as the guardian of "acceptable" thought forms. Since those are implicitly defined by the culture, a genuine critique of them involves going beyond the edges of the culture within which one exists. A casual glance at philosophers will readily reveal that they do not form a nonconformist club and most seem to live cautious lives, not questioning the foundations of their work situations, much less the culture within which they live. Witness the opportunistic development of "medical ethics" when grant money becomes available and publishers seek new texts. The problem at hand is the justification of science at the level of thought. This project is not part of science itself and has been largely ignored (though presupposed) by philosophers. At the level of practice, science and technology provide certain "comforts" whose real cost is often hidden. The "issue" has been resolved practically in the form of electric toasters, televisions, sugar pops and nuclear power plants. In theory, the question is rarely broached beyond the justification of "science" tirelessly "proved" by teaching assistants in introductory philosophy courses to alienated and captive audiences.

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So the issue of incommensurability lives! A few points should be noticed. First, everything can be compared by making up a ruler. To carry out any comparison you like, just cook up a standard -- but that standard remains open to controversy. [Money becomes a universal rule in capitalism.] Apples and oranges can be compared by using a scale, but asking the question which tastes better makes the scale useless. The domains of the eye and the ear are incommensurable until a central nervous system integrates them, "Primitive" societies, Homeric Greece, Plato's world and ours are incommensurable until they are brought together by some standard of comparison. Our society uses more energy, has the telephone and DDT in large mammals — but is it a better society? Have we progressed? Are we healthier, happier?

With this notion of incommensurability, we are driven to rather deep questions about the evaluation of ways of living. These are broached in *Science in a Free Society*, but before going into them, the ideological force which differing histories of science come to have in this context should be noticed. If you want a story about science which portrays it as the supreme achievement of the human mind, thus justifying the ideological hegemony of the "Modern Mind," then a linear, incremental view of slow and careful improvements on a mathematical world will do well indeed. But if one wishes a story which makes science just one way of being among many, a story which undermines science's hegemony, then tell a tale which involves the dogmatic adherence to unfounded belief, leaps of faith, rhetorical argument, and perceptual, methodological, theoretical and cosmological discontinuities. This latter version is the one Feyerabend is playing with. But there is another story one might wish to hear. Starting from the question of what makes science so successful in capturing the hearts and minds of so many, one might ask what preconditions underlie this success, thereby illuminating the sorts of limits which may be inherent in the scientific project. This is the sort of story which might be constructed out of Husserl's *Crisis* and Habermas' *Knowledge and Human Interests*. This, too, is a story which is important and I'll return to it below.

If *Against Method* is incomplete in that it begs for Lakatos' response, *Science in a Free Society* is incomplete in a different way. While the book raises the questions of evaluating forms of life, Feyerabend's treatment of these questions is not very deep. The book has three parts: Reason and Practice, Science in a Free Society, and Conversations with Illiterates. The first deepens the discussion of *Against Method*, the second is a shallow discussion of social theory, and the third part (40 percent) consists of reprints of replies that Feyerabend wrote to reviews of *Against Method*. This last section, though peppery, could just as well have been left in the journals. The basic aim of the book is to "remove obstacles intellectuals and specialists create for traditions different from their own and to prepare the removal of the specialists (scientists) themselves from the life centres of society" (*Science in a Free Society*, p. 7). The most interesting view put forward here is that "rationality is only one tradition among many rather than a standard to which traditions must conform." In the postscript to the *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn likens the history of science to a large tree, and progress was discernable in the same way that one could know that one branch was higher than another. Feyerabend's proposal, in a nutshell, is to consider all traditions as trees, and his current complaint is that science is crowding out the other trees and should be pruned back.

The precise meaning of 'tradition' is not spelled out. One the one hand, they are world views, including a language, history, etc., yet in one place Feyerabend talks as if traditions can be created by any scientist, artist, or "citizen" (p. 38). This latter "voluntaristic" idea of traditons seems to not understand the overwhelming force of

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the injection of culture into the infant becoming adult. Each person can creatively extend their native language, but to think that anyone can simply make up a language, if they want to, is to fail to understand the inherently intersubjective nature of language. In any case, the real bite of Feyerabend's position is the following: "*Traditions are neither good or bad, they simply are.* 'Objectively speaking' i.e. independently of participation in a traditon, there is not much to choose between humanitarianism and anti-semitism." Rationality "therefore is neither good nor bad, it simply is" (p. 27). According to Feyerabend, traditions are *only* desirable or undesirable when they are compared with other traditions. Such comparisons "*are subjective* because they depend on the tradition chosen" (p. 28). When traditions interact, the standards for choice may not yet exist and have to be invented. Given this, a "free society" is defined as one "*in which all traditions are given equal rights, equal access to education, and other positions of power*" (p. 30).

The roots of this social philosophy, if you have not guessed, are to be found in Mill's *On Liberty*. Given this framework, the question of justifying the epistemological hegemony of science is easily dissolved. Since in Feyerabend's "free society" no tradition can have hegemony, science obviously cannot. This leads to a restatement of a theme of *Against Method*, namely, that the state should intervene to stop compulsory science education. It is worth noting that the notion of freedom here propounded fits nicely into the intellectual's pattern of life. Nowhere in this book is there any substantial discussion of other images of freedom, such as freedom from hunger or from surplus repression. Even to discuss such views, Feyerabend would have to go much more deeply into the nature of human society, the dynamics of exploitation and agents of change than he does — in fact, he does not address these sorts of questions at all.

To say that all traditions are equal implies relativism. He opts for a sort of relational relativism, political rather than philosophical. He does not want to say that "Aristotle is as good as Einstein" but rather that to say " 'Aristotle is true' is a judgement that presupposes a certain tradition, it is a relational judgement that *may* change when the underlying tradition is changed.... Value judgements are not 'objective' and cannot be used to push aside the 'subjective' judgements that emerge from different traditions" (p. 83). It is important to notice that this argument depends upon a certain contrast between 'objective' and 'subjective' which Feyerabend assumes, but does not argue for; in the context of this book it is a rather important lacuna which seems to be a holdover from the positivist separation of fact and value. For Feyerabend, values are tradition-bound, but so are "facts". There are no "tradition"-free facts — indeed, there is no tradition-free world. "We certainly cannot assume that two incommensurable theories deal with one and the same objective state of affairs...unless we want to assume that they deal with nothing at all we must admit that they deal with different worlds and that the change (from one world to another) has been brought about by a switch from one theory to another... Speaking in this way we no longer assume an objective world that remains unaffected by our epistemic activities, except when moving within the confines of a particular point of view" (p. 70).

There is an important fudge in this position between saying that all images of the world are affected by our "epistemic activities" and saying that the switch from one theory to another can bring about a new world. The first seems quite on target, in line with numerous studies in perception and neurology and so on, while the second seems to give goo much ontological power to theories. On the second view, one wants then to know how theories stumble on "the world," and why certain ideas do not survive.

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Thus, whether a society which has the internal combustion engine can survive is a question which will be determined in part by ideas, but it will also be determined by the limits of the ecological niche of that society. There are several rather important and deep issues in this area, but they are not really developed in *Science in a Free Society*.

The problem of how to conceive of the relation between the human organism (and collections of organisms) and the world remains. To notice that the human animal has lots of thoughts, to see the pervasive influence of global perspectives, the shaping power of languages, and so forth, raises a problem for anyone who thinks there *is* any relation between ideas and action. The issue acquires a particular urgency in our epoch when it begins to look as if certain ideas that humans have may lead them to take actions which will radically lower the likelihood that the species will survive. To think one has dealt with such issues merely by calling for the treatment of all traditions as equal is simply to fail to come to grips with the "nestedness" of ideas within the world (however we speak of it), and the importance of ideas in relation to the survival of the species.

This consideration leads us back to the question at which Feyerabend hints in *Against Method* and discusses directly in *Science in a Free Society*, namely what is so great about science? He is correct that the question is rarely asked, and it is important. What he argues is that science can be supervised by laymen, that methodological arguments do not establish the excellence of science, and that science is not preferable because of its results. Ultimately, he seems to accept the idea that the results of science have been a "good thing," saying that science "has made marvellous contributions to our understanding of the world and that this understanding has led to even more marvellous practical achievements" (p. 101). His theory is that science has achieved its hegemony by utilizing its past successes (nowhere enumerated) to gain institutional power and suppress alternatives. The "marvellous" results have not been due solely to science, rather other traditions have fed science and the achievements of nonscientific cultures have been under-rated.

There is a double weakness in the position Feyerabend tries to stake out here. On the one hand there is no explanation as to *why* science *is* successful; and there is very little critique of the dangers of viewing the world scientifically. His explanation of the power of science in today's world is that science "reigns supreme because some *past successes* have led to institutional measures...that prevent a comeback of rivals" (p. 102). First, there is nothing here to explain just what those successes were, how they were achieved, and why they are successes rather than merely events.[9] In fact, there are much more compelling reasons why science has achieved the hegemony it has — science and technology, nestled within certain social formations does bring home the bacon, alas with nitrites too. That is, science has opened the doors for the rapacious exploitation of nature and filled peoples' homes and minds with transistor radios, tomatoes in the winter, and electricity to run whatever gadgets they have managed to acquire. Science coupled with technology has invaded every aspect of human existence

9. Consider the ambiguities in the following passage, and this is as close as Feyerabend gets to saying whether science is or is not successful and why: "Scientists do not solve problems because they possess a magic wand — methodology, or a theory of rationality — but because they know the situation fairly well, because they are not too dumb (though that is rather doubtful when almost anyone can become a scientist [almost anyone?]), and because the excesses of one scientific school are almost always balanced by the excesses of some other school. (Besides, scientists only rarely solve their problems, they make lots of mistakes, and many of their solutions are quite useless). (AM, p. 302.)

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and nowhere as thoroughly as in the Western world. This is surely one principal reason why people today will look to the scientist as a god, much as the ancient Mayans looked to the priests as gods because they could tell them when to plant crops and give them tales about what was happening in the heavens.

To understand *why* science has been successful, one should realize that it is an institution which looks at the world from a particular perspective, i.e., that of instrumental action. The work of Habermas here is most illuminating in that he provides a way of seeing the continuity of science with prescience, yet gives an understanding of the communicational framework underlying modern science which contributes to its success in apprehending the world under the interest of technical control, *and* he points to the limits of the scientific project. Such a powerful tool carries with it the necessity of wisdom. Science now is like a sword in the hands of a child." The users and consumers of science and technology are so tightly locked into their narrow vision of their situation that the use of science has allowed us to overstep the carrying capacity of our ecological niche. Feyerabend, too, recognizes that science may "create a monster", seeing that it may "harm man, turn him into a miserable, unfriendly, self righteous mechanism without charm and humor" (*Against Method,* p. 175). But he does not at all explore the reasons for science's success as a way of apprehending the world, nor why it becomes so dangerous when it becomes the *only* way nature and humanity are perceived.

Since Feyerabend's diagnosis of the situation does not really get to the heart of the problem, his cures remain superficial. He sees the situation from an intellectual's perspective, renegade though he may be. By attributing too much power to the realm of ideas, he is led into finding the cure in intellectual reform. Consider the following as a diagnosis of the problems of Blacks, Chicanos and American Indians: "Much of the spiritual misery of the remnants of non-Western cultures in the United States is due to this uninformed intellectual facism of most of our leading philosophers, scientists, philosophers of science" (*Science in a Free Society*, p. 207). The fact is that these thinkers could "reform" themselves, become pluralists, help introduce educational measures such as the legitimation of the teaching of astrology, support the development of Puerto Rican studies departments, etc., and the misery which the poor of the United States would not significantly change. The roots of the problem go much deeper and the cure must go to the roots. But these are depths which Feyerabend gives no indication of understanding, although he feels free to make nasty remarks about thinkers who have tried to discern the deeper causes of human misery. Though his critique of science does go to some basic issues, Feyerabend's excursion into social theory is painfully superfical. One can find pleasure in some of his rousng rhetoric against the smugness of intellectuals who so easily identify their own small projects with "big issues," and the ideal of loosening up the domain of legitimate inquiry (and this is what his anarchism amounts to) seems fine.

But there are far more basic causes for the general misuse of literacy to cultivate ignorance and control the populace, the careful structuring of the realm of political discourse, the ways people are manipulated and the modes of suppressing dissent than the "uninformed intellectual fascism" of many university teachers. If one wants to spout Mill, then one should go on to ask seriously why such an attractive doctrine has remained unimplemented in the world. Given what I can discern of Feyerabend's demonology, I suspect he thinks that the Popperians are more responsible than the generals for what goes on in the world. The interesting work of Habermas on the social preconditions for free communication seems to have completely escaped Feyerabend's attention. It would be more interesting to see him grapple with the questions of social

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theory than to watch him fire rhetorical mortar shells at other intellectuals. It is excellent that he has come to understand that a significant element of his role as university teacher is to act as a "slavedriver" (p. 119). But the next steps should be to look at the *social function* of the modern university, to understand one's role there and *act* on that perception. University teachers are actually not closely regulated and can simply stop acting out their part of the problem. The only personal options Feyerabend seems to perceive for himself, once he sees the repressive nature of education within an unfree society, it to try to reform the philosophical tradition or become an entertainer. He simply cannot see that he might try to become a catalyst in helping his students see their real position within the society they endure. Instead he complains about the pigheadedness of other intellectuals. To Feyerabend I would say, read Friere and try to help those who appear before you become agents in creating a new social reality. They may teach you that there are a wider range of options than you seem able to perceive for others. The limits of his political advice are that others should work towards the maturity necessary for living in a free society, which "can be acquired by participating in citizen's initiatives. This is why the *slow* progress, the *slow* erosion of the authority of science and of other pushy institutions that is produced by these initiatives is to be preferred to more radical measures: citizens initiatives are the best and only school for free citizens we now have" (p. 107). Really! How do you know this? Have you pushed the limits of the university? This problem of how we can change society requires more thought than you have given it.

There is another story one could tell about these books. It would not be hard to pluck out a few of his rhetorical flourishes, string them artfully together and paint a picture of the author as cranky, dogmatic and utterly unreasonable. Just two examples — "Marxists no longer try to learn from those they want to liberate, they attack each other about interpretations, viewpoints, evidence and take it for granted that the resulting hash will make fine food for the natives" (p. 121). *All* Marxists? So much for Allende? the Sandinistas? "Is not the soul more important than the body? Should not the same or an even greater punishment be extended to our 'teachers' and our 'intellectual leaders' than is extended to individual and collective murderers? Should not guilty teachers be found out with the same vigor one applies to the hunting of Nazi octogenarians? Are not the so called 'leaders of mankind' — men such as Christ, Buddha, St. Augustine, Luther, Marx, some of our greatest criminals..." (p. 140). This way of dealing with the book overlooks the important questions broached and functions to bury them. Ultimately, I suppose the question is how effective such rhetoric is in arousing people to think more deeply about our situation. What I do think is important is that such rhetoric cannot substitute for social analysis. Feyerabend has clearly drawn out the social implications of the philosophy of science; he now needs to go into the social questions with care, not simply trot out Mill with fierce pen in hand.

The real weakness of these books is their dependence upon social theory and the poverty of the perspective on which they stand. In this context it is useful to juxtapose them with the work of Habermas. In his critique of positivism, Habermas develops an analysis of science which comprehends the strength of science — its apprehension of the world from the point of view of technical control — while also revealing the limits of this perspective. Habermas goes on to look at the structure of communication which underlies the scientific project, showing that science depends upon communication. When this model of communication is applied at the social level, one can then see the context of the struggle between intellectual elites and others in society, thereby pointing (at least theoretically) to the transformation necessary to arrive at a rational

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society. Thus, the normative ideal of undistorted communication leads one to look at the power relations which underlie distorted communication and indicate the sorts of changes needed. When we look towards the necessary preconditions for the creation of an enlightened public capable of arriving at a free consensus for social action, we begin to develop a significant social theory. Without falling into the trap that one can know what an enlightened public will decide for itself, a broad spectrum of reforms can be seen as needed. So, *Science in a Free Society* is a start towards an understanding of science and society, but it has not gotten beyond Mill.

The real issue turns out to be the status of values. For Feyerabend, all traditions are equally "objective." Any claim about worth is "subjective" because it comes from within a tradition. Here the ambiguity of the notion of tradition becomes important. On one reading, we are always "within" a tradition — we grow up in a specific culture with its language, cosmology, art, literature, etc. One may grow up within a tradition which never recognizes others, or one might be marginal, never quite fitting in and having a clear sense of alternative ways of being. But by the time one arrives at the stage of critical thought, each person is deeply "within" some tradition and cannot get out. This is the sort of view well developed by Gadamer and others.[10] Sometimes it seems as if this is the sort of thing Feyerabend means by a tradition. But if this is so, to say that value judgements are "subjective" because they are within a tradition is to say very little indeed, as there can be no "objective" judgement at *all* about *anything*. The terms objective and subjective lose their force on this reading of Feyerabend.

On the other hand, he sometimes talks as if traditions are like hats that one can change at will. He uses the metaphor of a traveler in different countries to suggest the process of trying out different traditions. In another place he speaks as if anyone could create a tradition if they wanted to. This less global sense of tradition seems to imply the possibility of being outside of any tradition, thereby giving the terms objective and subjective some force. But if it is possible to make *objective* judgements, why are (at least some) value judgements not also objective? No answer here, Feyerabend just *says* they are subjective, and does not argue for his position. Ironically, he cannot invoke the tired old distinction of fact and value, as he recognizes the "tradition laden" character of judgements of fact. Some philosophical traditions have recognized the power of culture in determining perception and thought, but have also recognized the possibility of seeing things independently of traditon — i.e., as they "really are". Thus, Plato's recognition of the necessity of rigorous training for those who aspire to see reality.

The idea of "precategorical experience" points to such a possibility. The traditon of Buddhism involves a strenuous training process that may enable one to see without imposing categories on the world. Feyerabend does not consider the possibility of such a tradition free space. Such a space also points to the *experience* which Habermas tries to name as emancipatory. To become free from repression is an experience, not a theory. Once the question of values is approached this way, we are not left in the murky sea of unmitigated and unmediated subjectivity on which Feyerabend repeatedly falls back. In *Against Method* the basis for theory choice is finally our "subjective wishes," in *Science in a Free Society* this resurfaces as the claim that every tradition is as good as any other. Such a view may be rhetorically useful in attacking the hegemony of science, but it is a very weak foundation for social theory. I cannot accept that Fascism is as good as any other tradition and I can give good reasons for thinking so. Does Feyerabend *really* want to debate such questions? Is he serious that

10. See, for instance, Gadamer's *Truth and Method*, (N.Y., 1975).

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anti-semitism and humanitarianism are equally good? Or has he just gotten himself tied up in some unworkable dichotomy between "objective" and "subjective"? If it can be shown that humanity's current use of science and technology within the context of geopolitical anarchy and nuclear weapons will lead to ecological collapse, massive starvation and disease — or to the war which *will* end all wars — is this to be seen as just one traditon among many? Or is a tradition which mutilates the human potential and threatens extinction open to reasoned critique? And the appropriate object of transformation?

In sum, these books are a welcome addition to the developing discussion of science and its hegemony over the modern mind. To his credit, Feyerabend is learning to talk in a language which can reach and amuse many who should be drawn into this discussion. And he clearly sees that the philosophy of science cannot proceed without discussing social issues. Unfortunately, when he does get to the social issues, his discussion is stuck within 19th century liberalism. It is certainly true that an enlightened public is essential for the creation of a rational (or what Feyerabend calls a free) society. But why has it not arisen? What stands in its way? Why is there poverty amidst plenty? What forces, *beyond* self-serving intellectuals, stand ready to thwart efforts at self-determination? How are the means of communication controlled? Who will take it upon themselves to endure the risks of the creation of a reasonable world? Alas, such questions are not recognized here. It is ironic that the author, who has been a force in the development of the clear recognition of the tremendous importance of theoretical frameworks in the conduct of science, should propose such a theoretically poverty-stricken social program. Maybe he will go deeper some other time.

Andrew McLaughlin

Carl Sagan. *Broca's Brain: Reflections on the Romance of Science*. New York, 1979. 327 pages.

Carl Sagan is the most effective popular science writer on the scene today. His recent book on the human brain, *The Dragons of Eden,* was a best seller and won him the Pulitzer Prize. He is David Duncan Professor of Astronomy and Space Sciences and director of the Laboratory for Planetary Studies at Cornell University as well as a leading participant in and spokesman for various NASA projects, including the Viking Mars landers. He is known to millions of TV viewers from his appearances on Johnny Carson's Tonight Show. His own TV science series will be aired on public television in the near future. His latest book, *Broca's Brain*, a collection of his essays, provides a thorough overview of his ideas and, most significantly, a look at the role that science may play in reshaping society.

This book has profound implications for society as a whole. In these pages a new and powerful scientism backed by the power of the corporate state makes its appearance under the guise of the wonder and awe of scientific endeavor. Philosophy and most other human failings are leveled by the steamroller of scientific objectivism. The God of Technology emerges in all its power in Sagan's chapter "In Defense of Robots."[1] In *Broca's Brain* we can glimpse one possible future for the human species. It is NASA's blueprint for a brave new world.

1. For example, Sagan dismisses Hegel in a footnote: "In 1799 or 1800 Hegel confidently stated, using presumably the full armamentarium of philosophy available to him, that no new

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In many ways *Broca's Brain* is a curious book. It effectively dispenses with the nonsense of mysticism past and present (under the term of Paradoxers, the 19th-century word that described the snake-oil salesmen of another era). Sagan argues that science cannot afford to ignore the irrational cults of astrology, pyramidology, astral projection, religious lunacy, emotionally sensitive plants, U.F.O.'s, the Bermuda Triangle or whatever else turns up in the pages of the crackpot tabloids. He devotes a long chapter to refuting Immanuel Velikovsky's book *Worlds in Collision*. And, though restrained, Sagan's critique of traditional theology is courageous for a person in a public position.

At the same time, however, *Broca's Brain* is strangely apocalyptic in tone. While on the one hand Sagan suggests that we are at the threshold of a new age of enlightenment (where the secrets of the universe will finally be revealed to us), the sum of his conclusions about human society seems deeply pessimistic. What else are we to conclude from the metaphysical suggestion that the only event likely to save our planet is contact with an extraterrestrial civilization? Sagan believes that contact with a civilization more advanced than our own will prove that it is possible to survive the Earth's present crisis. Failure to make contact, Sagan suggests, would indicate that civilizations reach a technological stage similar to our own and then destroy themselves. Therefore, if we do succeed in making contact, it will be a tremendous inspirational event. "The beings more advanced than we will have capabilities far beyond our understanding. In some very real sense they will appear to us as godlike. There will be a great deal of growing up required of the infant human species. Perhaps our descendants in these remote times will look back on us, on the long and wandering journey the human race will have taken from its dimly remembered origins on the distant planet Earth, and recollect our personal and collective histories, our romance with science and religion, with clarity and understanding and love" (p. 314).

There are several similar passages in *Broca's Brain*, equally beautiful and awesome. But in the context of our political and social world, these are truly nightmarish visions. Sagan professes to believe in a democratic and popular science, but in fact NASA's technology is controlled by a scientific elite with close ties to the military-industrial complex. (Sagan often functions as a public relations representative for NASA, especially in his TV appearances.) In *Broca's Brain*, Sagan argues that modern science can find the answers that will save our world from destruction. Incredible as it seems, he suggests that these answers are to be found in deep space. It should also be noted that in Sagan's paragraph quoted above, the ultimate solution seems to involve leaving the Earth itself, from which Sagan often seems anxious to depart as fast as possible.

Unlike some other scientists (including a group at MIT who issued a public warning), Sagan is not concerned about the rapid growth of computer technology, including the gradual replacement of human decision-making by computers. Such worries he calls nothing more than "primitive chauvinisms" (p. 249). But I wonder if it has ever occurred to Sagan that his geniuses in deep space may choose to bypass contact with mere humans and attempt to communicate with our computers instead? Is it not possible that other civilizations have succumbed completely to computer technology? The possibility has at least to be entertained when you consider that the topic of computer dominance is already being discussed on Earth and the science is

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celestial objects could exist within the solar system. One year later, the asteroid Ceres was discovered. Hegel then seems to have returned to pursuits less amenable to disproof" (p. 200). Perhaps Sagan cannot forgive Hegel for saying to Heine, "The stars, hum! hum! the stars are only a gleaming leprosy in the sky." Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, Commentary* (New York, 1965), p. 358.

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only in its infancy. Perhaps the extraterrestrial computers would communicate to their earth-bound cousins information necessary for them to overcome the irrational behavior exhibited by the "infant human species." This would not be the first time that the scientific promise of a new dawn turned out differently than expected.[2]

It is apparent from his writings and personal appearances that Carl Sagan is a scientist who has at least some concern for the social problems of the day. He is not afraid of appearing silly or of taking unpopular stands. In *The Dragons of Eden* he defended the idea that chimpanzees should have civil rights and on the Tonight Show he rose above the usual chit-chat to note the absence of minorities from the film *Star Wars*. Thus it is paradoxical that the essays in this book have themes that reify the human subject. In the opening essay on Paul Broca, the founder of modern brain surgery, Sagan describes how, while exploring the backrooms of the Musée de l'Homme, he came across the preserved brain of Broca himself. This led him to speculate on whether any of the thoughts of Broca still existed in the bottle of formalin. Perhaps in the future, he suggests, science will be able to reconstruct the memories of the dead. Though he is concerned that this would be "the ultimate breach of privacy," he concludes that "it would also be a kind of practical immortality, because, especially for a man like Broca, our minds are clearly a major aspect of who we are" (p. 9). This suggestion is not dehumanizing as much as it is simply rather pointless. But his proposal that we develop "a network of computer psychotherapeutic terminals" (p. 243) to engage in psychiatric counseling is coldly scientific in the extreme.

It is ideas such as this that remind the reader that Sagan has a singular and all-consuming scientific vision and goal. "Centuries hence, when our very real political and social problems may be as remote as the very real problems of the War of the Austrian Succession seem to us, our time may be remembered chiefly for one fact: this was the age when the inhabitants of the Earth first made contact with the cosmos around them" (p. 159). To the present inhabitants of the Earth, Sagan's vision is just more pie in the sky, and very expensive pie at that.

Shortly after the U.S. astronauts landed on the moon in 1969, a popular poster appeared featuring a photograph of the two heroes on the lunar surface with the caption: So What! That same public skepticism has persisted into the 1970s (witness NASA's tight budget, due also to inflation), but now there is more interest developing in space project and technology in general.[3] This is due in part to the absence of a large popular movement for social change and also to the rapid pace of technological innovation as well as the ecological crisis. Thus Sagan's discussion of a "healthy and stable society" (still with space exploration as the top priority, of course) has to be examined closely, particularly insofar as some of his ideas parallel those expressed by environmentalists.

My own vision of Sagan's future society (which he never really describes in any detail) is of a passive and dull citizenry that rides to work on bicycles dressed in colorful jumpsuits, eats synthetic "health foods" and returns in the evening to government-approved energy-efficient dwellings to watch the latest reports on the exploration of outer space. All this would be taking place inside orbiting space cities if some scientists

2. The physicist Freeman Dyson has described how the knowledge from a peaceful project he was working on to create a nuclear-powered space vehicle was interchangeable with the project to create a neutron bomb. "The Making of a Scientist," Part III, *The New Yorker* (August 20, 1979), p. 56.

3. "The Science Boom," *Newsweek* (September 17, 1979), pp. 104-105. This article reports on the marketing of a number of new popular science magazines.

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get their way — although Sagan still has a few doubts about this widely discussed fantasy (p. 37). Personally, I find this idea too horrible to contemplate. The irrational people of the present seem much perferable to the scientifically managed citizens of the future even though they insist on their right to gas-guzzling mobility, have paranoid beliefs about the government and the oil companies,[4] and write letters to their daily newspapers saying that the Viking's photographs of Mars do not look any different than the local rock quarry.[5]

Sagan writes eloquently that science has a vital role to play in contemporary society, citing as an example the recent discovery that an ingredient in spray cans breaks down the ozone layer of the Earth's atmosphere. How many other issues of grave concern are not being attended to at present, Sagan wonders? His concerns in this area are similar to those of the environmental movement, particularly his emphasis on the ecological short-sightedness displayed by the private sector.

Unfortunately, science cannot be let off the hook, even when its goal is the protection of the environment. In the last few years environmentalism has changed from being simply a popular movement to protect the Earth into a state-supported science that attempts to restructure the environment by means of laws and official edicts. It now fits into the larger plan of corporate state social engineering. As a result, it has sparked resistance rooted in right-wing populism and a class based resentment that perceives ecologists as upper class. In the West the current target of this resentment is the Bureau of Land Management, which controls vast sections of Western states.[6] As usual, whenever right-wing populism is involved, there are powerful corporate forces behind the scenes, which would like to develop BLM-managed land. But the Carter administration also has plans to develop the areas' vast energy reserves. Off-road recreationists who consume the land in their own way are facing increasing BLM restrictions on their activities. One of the social functions of the space program may be to open a new safety valve for the frustrated desires of a populace "imprisoned in urban life," to use the expression of an off-road vehicle enthusiast.[7] The vast open spaces of the West are being eroded by developers

4. Most Americans, rich or poor, regard car ownership as a basic right. But as usual we are caught in the worst of dilemmas. The private car, in its present technological form, is a very weak line of defense against increasing social control of the citizenry by the state. It is hard to name a single invention that has had a more destructive impact on society. The carnage from accidents alone defies description and yet it has become an accepted fact of daily life. Sagan and others who call for low-speed cars and rapid-rail systems as the primary means of mass transportation for the future have a strong case. But mass transit in the U.S. almost always carries a lower-class stigma with it. In many cities only the poor, the elderly and the indigent rely on "mass transit." The private car exists as a myth which promises independence and power. The attack on this myth by social planners and profit-hungry oil companies has met with considerable anger by the public. The ultimate implications of this conflict need to be carefully considered. While it would be encouraging to suggest that only a socialist society can create an efficient mass transit system that also respects the dignity of the individual, this may not be the case. West Germany, France, and Japan have efficient rail systems, and pollution-free cars that run on alcohol or other energy sources may eventually even be developed by Detroit (although I'll believe it when I see it). Blimps and redesigned clipper ships have also received discussion. In an Oregon coastal town a garbage company recently abandoned its truck for a horse-drawn wagon.

5. As an amateur astronomer, my own view is that the planets are definitely worth exploring and that it makes sense to listen for messages from other civilizations. But I do not believe these projects will provide us with the answers to our social and political problems. As astronomy alone, Sagan's book makes for fascinating reading, especially his essay on Saturn's moon Titan.

6. "The Angry West vs. The Rest", *Newsweek* (September 17, 1979), pp. 31-40.

7. "Gas Shortage Merry-Go-Round," by Jean Calvin, *Four Wheeler* (July, 1979), p. 12. Richard MacPherson summed up the mood of BLM critics when he said, "The BLM wants us to

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and public utilities. In Southern California, Los Angeles' smog reaches far out into the desert. Even the night sky is disappearing due to the alarming spread of light pollution.[8]

A pollution-free and tightly controlled future has recently been graphically illustrated in colorful advertisements placed in *Newsweek* and *The New Yorker* by the Champion International Corp. The ad depicts a futuristic rapid transit train (whose passengers look like they belong in an animated version of *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*) against a background of ultra-modern skyscrapers with roof gardens. This is not just an animator's imagination. As the ad says, "No matter what you may hear to the contrary, the future is coming. And soon." [9]

In a recent article based on his forthcoming book, *Accumulation Crisis,* James O'Connor has described the forces that are propelling us toward a "capitalist utopia" (as he calls it). "In brief, the purpose of modern state planning is to improve production and reproduction conditions for capital by restoring and reinforcing capital's domination of the labor market and workplace and lowering the reproduction costs of labor power. The gist of this analysis is that the normalization of capital accumulation requires not only the traditional restructuring of production conditions but also the restructuring of the reproduction conditions of the work force: i.e., planning of social life organized by social-industrial capital armed with the financial support and political legitimations which the national state alone is able to provide. The planned reduction in the reproduction costs of labor power appears to be the most effective way of expanding surplus value and profits without antagonizing the working class by mass unemployment, systematic wage reductions, etc., while at the same time retaining the loyalty of the 'middle class,' i.e., salariat. Ideally for capital as a whole (although not the individual capitals considered separately), the U.S.A. would be transformed into regional and subregional 'high wage' company towns with housing, education, health service, transportation, etc., under the control of state planning bodies associated with social-industrial capital." [10]

The "capitalist utopia" described by O'Connor seems compatible with the technological super-state that would be required to fulfill the scientific objectives promoted by Carl Sagan and the NASA lobby. As the deterioration of the environment intensifies alongside wildfire inflation and our continuing dependence on fossil fuels, there may be a growing tendency to gamble on purely technological solutions. It may not be a coincidence that the governor of California, Jerry Brown, who has spoken out against the dangers of nuclear energy, is also an advocate of the most fanciful plans of the space industry. Sagan's book may contain the outline for a new technological state that can absorb the programs of the environmentalists, streamlining capitalism in the process, while sharing with the population the wonders and adventures of planetary exploration and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.

Tom Good

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stay in campgrounds instead of camping out in isolated places. They want us where they can manage us. We don't want to be managed", quoted in Paul Pierce, "The Great Desert Dispute", *Off-Road* (October, 1979), p. 45.

8. Robert Pike and Richard Berry, "A Bright Future for the Night Sky", *Sky and Telescope* (February, 1978), pp. 126-129.

9. Champion International Corporation advertisement. *Newsweek* (September 17, 1979), pp. 58-59.

10. James O'Connor, "The Democratic Movement in the United States", *Kapitalistate* (Number 7-1978), p. 16.

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Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno. *Aesthetics and Politics*. Edited by Ronald Taylor. Afterword by Fredric Jameson. New Left Books: London, 1977. 220 pages.

Is it not a grim irony that what the publishers proclaim as an incomparable tradition of major aesthetic debate among German Marxist intellectuals should take place during some of the blackest moments in the political history of the left? Except for two postwar contributions by Adorno, the documents collected in *Aesthetics and Politics* were written between 1934 and 1938, when the Nazis had already smashed the German working-class movement, Stalin was conducting the Moscow trials in the only "homeland of socialism", and the "Western democracies" demonstrated their principles by capitulating to Hitler at Munich. In Russia, the doctrine of Socialist Realism was being institutionalized into an instrument of party control, while in Germany Hitler and his fellow aestheticians institutionalized their condemnation of modern art as "degenerate". That serious debates on aesthetics could take place under such circumstances is a tribute to the integrity of the participants; seen from a different angle, however, the intensity of the debates over aesthetics at such a moment reveals how problematic, even for professed Marxists, the relationship between aesthetics and politics becomes once it is removed from the institutional regulation of the Party.

Unlike conventional anthologies of Marxist writings on art, *Aesthetics and Politics* has the form of an intellectual epic, presented as a series of mutual confrontations between its protagonists (Bloch, Lukacs, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno) over such issues as realism vs. "modernist" technique; popularity, mass media and traditional "autonomous" art; political commitment, and perhaps most important of all, questions concerning Marxist critical method. Just over half the translations have been published previously; three documents appear for the first time in English: the contributions of Bloch and Lukacs to the debate on Expressionism in the exile journal *Das Wort* in 1937-38, and "Reconciliation under Duress", Adorno's 1958 attack on Lukacs' *Meaning of Contemporary Realism*, which, though hardly Adorno at his best, is long overdue in translation. Each of the volume's four parts is prefaced with a critical background "presentation" by the editors, and the whole concludes with an essay by Frederic Jameson that attempts to assess the debates from the viewpoint of the present. Part I contains the previously mentioned contributions of Bloch and Lukacs: "Discussion Expressionism" and "Realism in the Balance", respectively. The following section, devoted to Brecht, includes excerpts from his posthumously published writings on realism (largely attacks on Lukacs originally intended for the debate in *Das Wort*, of which Brecht was an editor, but withdrawn), and Benjamin's record of his conversations with Brecht at Svendborg in 1934 and 1938. In Part III, the theoretical high point of the collection, Adorno, in correspondence with Benjamin, offers pointed critiques of the latter's methodology, while in the final section he attacks Lukacs' book and criticizes the notion of committed art in Brecht and Sartre from his comfortable position as head of the Frankfurt *Institut* in Adenaur's Germany.[1]

Since *Aesthetics and Politics* is largely metacommentary, it does not really stand on its own; the editorial presentations, useful if sometimes one-sided, do not replace familiarity with the material the various authors discuss and criticize. Fortunately, most of this material is now available in English, the major exceptions being Bloch's

1. As a sequel, *New Left Review*, 110 (July-August 1978), pp. 81-92, has allowed Lukacs, the author most frequently attacked in *Aesthetics and Politics*, to present his final word on Benjamin's concept of allegory and Brecht's conception of the *Verfremdungs-Effekt* through translated excerpts from his *Eigenart des Asthetischen*.

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Heritage of Our Time, Lukacs' 1933 essay "Grandeur and Decadence of Expressionism," an instructive, if dubiously ingenious exercise in reductionism, and his polemical thrusts from the early thirties against "proletarian" literature.[2] The full value of Adorno's critique of Benjamin is especially lost without the relevant texts ("Paris, Capital of the 19th Century", "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," and "The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire") at hand. When read in conjunction with the primary texts, however, the challenges and counter-challenges in *Aesthetics and Politics* clarify the major issues of the German Marxist aesthetic tradition, throw light on its weaknesses, and open up the possibilites of going beyond the positions represented there.

Since a brief review can hardly do justice to the thematic richness of the volume, only a few points can be touched on here. It is remarkable that in the bleak atmosphere of a time which, on the onehand, permitted no meaningful political practice outside a generic anti-fascism, and had cut off the exiled intellectuals from any possible contact with the German public on the other, the politics of the protagonists should have played such a decisive part in shaping their theoretical and critical positions, while they themselves remained unwilling to confront the problematic character of their own political roles as intellectuals. The exception here is Adorno,[3] who justified not only his own aloofness from direct political activity, but the autonomy of art as well, through a curious twist of Lenin's position on the role of intellectuals in *What Is To Be Done?* Responding to the populism of Benjamin's "Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" by noting that the "further development of the aesthetic debate which you [i.e., Benjamin] have so magnificently inaugurated depends essentially on a true accounting of the relationship of the intellectual to the working class", he goes on to argue that intellectuals (and artists) can best serve the proletariat by preserving the truth "in full knolwedge and without mental prohibitions" over the inadequacies of the emipirical consciousness of the proletariat (125).

If Adorno's highly problematic stance at least has the merits of clarity, Lukacs' brand of activism was full of contradictions and illusions behind the facade of apparent consistency which, in 1938, arose from the coincidental conjunction of his own popular front politics with the official position of the Party. The only party member among the protagonists of *Aesthetic and Politics*, he had been forced, after the condemnation of the *Blum-Theses* in 1929, to pursue a surrogate politics through literary criticism. This course allowed him to avoid confronting the fact that in a Stalinized party, real politics were impossible in any case, even during the time of the Popular Front, whose German version was little more than the paper politics of literary intellectuals and served to obscure the fact that, even in exile, the parties of the German left were unable to achieve any real unity against fascism.

At the same time, Lukacs continues to prescribe the tradition of bourgeois realism as the only valid mode of creation for the "progressive" writer. His tendency to draw immediate political consequences from literary works contradicted his own theoretical stress on the complex mediations between literature, society, and politics. But even

2. For a discussion of the latter, see Russell Berman, "Lukacs' Critique of Bredel and Ottwalt: A Political Account of an Aesthetic Debate of 1932," *New German Critique,* No. 10 (Winter 1977), pp. 155-78.

3. Another exception might be found in "Avantgard Kunst und Volksfront," a statement Bloch and Hanns Eisler published in *Die neue Weltbühne*, admitting that avant-garde art and the politics of the German Popular Front did not form a united opposition to fascism. See Ernst Bloch, *Vom Hasard zur Katastrophe* (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 318-25.

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misguided attempts by a critic to direct literary creation make sense, if at all, only within the context of a highly structured politico-cultural apparatus, something which surely did not exist among the German exiles. As Bloch pointed out at the time, denouncing other "modernist" modes of creation was an odd way to build a popular front (21). Lukacs' support of the realist tradition could build bridges to only part of the bourgeois literary world. Only within the context of the Stalinzed party does Lukacs' position take on a meaningful political aspect: his concentration on German bourgeois literature from Geothe to Thomas Mann at the moment which the Stalin-Zhdanov position was gaining ascendency has been seen in retrospect as a "partisan" struggle against the total Stalinization of aesthetics; the editors note that Lukacs' silence on the Moscow trials can only be interpreted as a refusal to declare his support (15).

Brecht feared that Lukacs' criticism would eventually turn into attempts to direct his own work. As a cultural producer, he saw his didactic theater as a form of political activity that attempted to raised the consciousness of the working-class audiences towards which it was directed. But after the Nazi takeover, Brecht became a playwright without an audience, with the result that his polemics against Lukacs, expressing a "utilitarian" practice no longer possible, became abstract, a point Brecht himself recognized (79-80). His politics, based on a belief in a revolutionary working class and party, suffered under a double illusion; in the pre-Hitler period they were undercut by the practice of the KPD whose "third period" line proclaimed the immanent revolution while in fact neglecting to unite the working class against the fascism that would destroy the most revolutionary wing of the working class along with all else.

If Ernst Bloch was able to avoid many of the contradictions of the other protagonists, it was because his utopianism allowed him a high degree of activism--as a journalist writing on political and cultural issues of the day[4]--while maintaining a critical and theoretical perspective that pointed beyond the immediate present. Thus, despite a serious lapse of judgment on the Moscow trials, which the editors contrast to Lukacs' silence, Bloch's belief in the revolution at a time of defeat kept him from the error of seeing the literary and artistic conflicts between realism and the classical tradition on the one hand, and the avant-garde on the other, as a decisive moment in a struggle between "civilization" and "barbarism". He was also among the first to recognize the inadequacy of Marxist orthodoxy in dealing with fascism as a mass phenomenon. Bloch's viewpoint has several important implications for aesthetics. The critical nature of his utopianism means that the present is always "incomplete"; reality, always inadequate, is open-ended and can never form a closed totality. Hence his rejection of the closed form, the "classical" realization of aesthetic totality advocated by his friend and antagonist Lukacs, and his openness toward avant-garde forms that overturn traditional modes of perception. At the same time, he was willing to accept the partial character of the underlying utopian-critical tendencies in the art without demanding that they be realized as a whole. Thus, he defended the oppositional movement of Expressionism while accepting Lukacs' judgments of its negative aspects. Art, one might say, cannot be expected to overcome ideological and political problems that have been proven intractable in practice.

It is, however, with Benjamin that the contradictory condition of the radical intellectual becomes most problematic, and this no doubt explains Adorno's demand

4. Bloch's political writings from 1934-39, articles written mostly for the Prague-based *Neue Weltbühne,* are now collected in the thick volume *Von Hasard zur Katastrophe, op.cit.*

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for greater clarity. The conditions of Benjamin's exile, independently of his own personal inclinations, forced him to keep his distance from political activism, so that the revolutionary perspective he shared with his friends Bloch and Brecht, together with his need to express his solidarity with the proletariat, had to be expressed in his theoretical and critical work, where he took relatively uncritical views of the actual consciousness of the proletariat. Hence his postulation, in the summary of the *Arcades* project, of a collective consciousness that attempts to fulfill its desires through the wishful fantasies he called "dialectical images". Even more radical is the general line of the "Reproduction" essay, where the liquidation of traditional "autonomous" art by the new mass-media (especially film) is seen as a revolutionary development.[5] It was this positive evaluation of mass culture, together with its corollary, the rejection of autonomous art as reactionary, even proto-fascist, that provoked the response from Adorno.

One of the more important characteristics of *Aesthetics and Politics* is the rapidity with which superficial positions are thrust aside to make way for the more fundamental issues that a Marxist conception of art must confront. To state the matter differently, if somewhat crudely--how politics must make way for aesthetics--only to emerge later in questions of cultural politics and political culture. Thus, the original provocation that touched off the debate on Expressionism, the attempt to stigmatize Expressionism as one of the forerunners of fascism, develops into the larger, but less easily resolved issue of the political and ideological function of avant-garde techniques, and leads Bloch to quesion Lukacs' version of the Leninist reflection theory, without, unfortunately, questioning the theory itself.

For Lukacs, the tendency toward fragmentation, montage, and abstraction expressed an ideology which was incapable of, or unwilling to, see the world as a unified whole and thus reified the individual moments and their form of appearance. For Bloch, the same techniques were the reflection of the very real fragmentation of modern life; the differences between them lay in the interpretation of reality. But Bloch, at least in the contribution published in *Aesthetics and Politics*, fails to take the next step and consider how the distinction between art and reality might prove fatal to any theory of reflection.

Such questions were of little interest to Brecht; for him, technique was neutral--its validity lay in the ends it served. Modern techniques could in fact serve the ends of a "realism" whose task was to reveal the contradictions of capitalist society, "unmasking the prevailing view of things as the views of those who are in power" (82). For Brecht, Lukacs' reduction of realism to a formal category had to be challenged: "We must not derive realism as such from particular existing works, but we shall use every means, old and new, tried and untried, derived from art and derived from other sources to render reality to men in a form they can master" (81). His argument that: "Reality changes; in order to represent it, modes of representation must also change" (82), was a thrust at Lukacs' apparent insistence that what was good enough for Balzac and Tolstoy was good enough for the 20th century novelist as well. In retrospect, such a charge is partially unfair; Lukacs, at least in his later writings, accepted a limited number of new techniques, including those of Brecht's own later plays.[6] His differences with

5. Walter Benjamin, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century," in his *Reflections,* ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1978), pp. 146-62, especially p. 148; "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in his *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), pp. 217-52. See also Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 143-150.

6. See Georg Lukacs, *Solzhenitsyn,* trans. William David Graf (Cambridge: MIT Press,

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Brecht are to be found in their respective conceptions of the ends to be served by technique and by the aspects of reality to be represented in artworks than by the question of innovation as such.

For Benjamin and Adorno, the question of modern artistic techniques were to be viewed more dialectically, as mediated through the economic, social, and cultural developments of modern capitalism, particularly those that produced the mass media, which in turn transformed the social relationships of art, in both its production and reception, and threatened to "liquidate" art itself. But their shared aims and point of departure developed into antagonistic positions whose clash resulted in a debate whose themes, according to the editors, "have yet to be surpassed by any general progress of Marxist aesthetic theory since that time" (109). Benjamin's address, "The Author as Producer" (now in his *Reflections*, pp. 220-38), delivered in 1934 at the Communist-sponsored Institute for the Study of Fascism in Paris (a rare venture into activism for Benjamin, whose sponsorship must have appeared suspicious to Adorno). argued for a Brechtian transformation (*Umfunktionierung*) of the artistic "means of production" as the only way a "tendentious" (i.e., politically committed) writer could effectively join the struggle of the proletariat. Traditionally-created works, whatever their "message" and their authors' intention, accept the given modes of production and thus defend the status quo.

It is perhaps characteristic of the nature of their debate that Adorno was to use these very arguments of Benjamin more than a quarter century later to attack committed art in general and Brecht in particular. In the thirties, his differences with Benjamin came primarily over the issue of the mass media. In "The Author as Producer", Benjamin, following Brecht, saw the transformation of technique as a means of overturning the traditional relations of reception as well as of production, by bringing the audience into active participation, thus breaking down the traditional separation of "creator" and "public". In "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", he went further: traditionally (i.e. individually) produced art appealed through a magical "aura" that was irrational and hence reactionary. Progressive art would only come with the decline of "aura" and its replacement by the unmystified productions of technology, in particular the film, with its technique of montage. Diversion, not concentrated attention, would be the progressive form of artistic reception (see *Illuminations*, especially pp. 234-41).

Adorno saw that it was his own position, favoring the most advanced forms of "elite" art, that was under attack, and wrote Benjamin on March 18, 1936[7] with the hope of holding Benjamin's "arm steady until the sun of Brecht has once more sunk into the exotic waters" (126). For Adorno, Benjamin's position was "disquieting", an undialectical view of both "autonomous" and "dependent" art. The center of the "autonomous" work, he argued, "does not itself belong on the side of myth,...but is inherently dialectical; within itself it juxtaposes the magical *and* the mark of freedom" (121, italics added). Benjamin, he maintained, neglected the "technical" aspect of modern avant-garde art; his essay "disregards an elementary experience...that precisely the uttermost consistency in the pursuit of the technical laws of autonomous art changes this art and instead of rendering it a taboo or fetish, brings it close to the

1971), pp. 36-37, and *The Meaning of Contemporary Realsim*, trans. John and Necke Mander (London: Merlin, 1963), pp. 87-88.

7. This letter was apparently accompanied by a copy of Benjamin's MS with Adorno's comments (see p. 125). The MS, now lost, was most likely a copy of the German text that served as the basis for the French translation, eventually published in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* after a number of controversial emendations by Max Horkheimer.

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state of freedom, as something consciously produced and made" (122). At the same time, Benjamin understated the reactionary potential of mass "utilitarian" art as a product under the domination of what was later to be called the "culture industry" (124). Montage, the technique that, for Benjamin, opened up the revolutionary potential of the film, was in fact less used in the film industry than an "infantile mimetism"; the supposedly progressive and democratic elements of mass art were in fact "facades of something that is in truth quite reactionary" (125), a position Adorno was developing in his study of jazz.[8] But he saw "autonomous" art threatened as well by the culture industry and later tried to show in his essay "On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Hearing"[9] how the huckstering of a fetishized "classical" music as "high culture", the "product of inspired genius", etc., by providing surrogates for the experience of compositional form, in fact produced the "regression of hearing", i.e. the growing incapacity to apperceive that form itself, since the latter demanded concentration, not the distraction Benjamin celebrated as "progressive". Thus, for Adorno, only the most technically advanced and difficult art, like Schönberg's music, which offered nothing that could be easily consumed, was capable of resisting commodification and integration into the structure of domination. Here, his defense of the avant-garde joins the arguments cited earlier on the relation of intellectuals to the proletariat: if Picasso, Schönberg, and Kafka offer a more instransigent form of opposition than do Chaplin, jazz, and Brecht, then neither the inaccessibility of the former to the masses, nor the intellectual's own commitment to the proletariat, should force him to deny that fact.

Adorno's polemical defenses of the avant-garde in the postwar period are quite uneven in quality. The article on "Commitment" still deserves serious consideration by those who have joined what the editors refer to as the "quest for revolutionary art" in the West since the sixties (150). His critique of political commitment in art, unlike that of conventional aestheticism, is less concerned with maintaining a supposed purity of art against "contamination" by politics than with the question of whether any political art can ever be adequate to the politics it professes: "Even if politically motivated, commitment in itself remains politically polyvalent so long as it is not reduced to propaganda, whose pliancy mocks any commitment by the subject" (178). Because any content that enters art is by that very process transformed, art becomes a dubious means of presenting a clear political "message". At the same time, as Adorno argues with respect to Brecht, committed art cannot claim "aesthetic dispensation for the accuracy of what it teaches" (183).

"Reconciliation Under Duress", while remaining perhaps the most important single critique of Lukacs' *Meaning of Contemporary Realism*, has lost much of its theoretical force, and since the publication of Lukacs' massive *Eigenart des Ästhetischen* (1963), appears superficial and undeveloped in the very places where its attacks should have been most telling. Far too much of the article aims at denouncing Lukacs as a philistine whose allegiance to the Soviet bloc has destroyed his capacity to recognize the essentially formal character of art. Brecht's denunciation of Lukacs' "formalism" is much closer to the truth. When Adorno says (to take a typical example) that "Lukacs would doubtless depreciate as idealistic the use of terms like 'image' and 'essence' in Aesthetics" (159), he is obscuring the fact that the distinction between the two terms is precisely what characterized Lukacs' attempt to differentiate realism from naturalism

8. Originally published in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 5 (1936), 235-59, under the pseudonym Hektor Rottweiller.

9. Reprinted, now in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Arato and Gebhardt (New York: 1978).

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and its avant-garde descendents. Adorno's statement, that "by structuring his work, the writer can hope to master the arbitrary and the individual against which Lukacs so passionately inveighs" (162), would hardly have provoked the assumed protest from Lukacs. Their difference is more fundamental: for Lukacs, structure or form produces a totality that "reflects" the underlying order of the world, while for Adorno artistic form, which reconciles subject and object, stands in contradiction to the "actual unreconciled object in the outside world", and "confers on the work of art a vantage point from which it can criticize reality" (160). By refusing to acknowledge that Lukacs has a conception of artistic form at all, Adorno is unable to point to the basic contradiction involved in a theory of realism that atttempts to reconcile the formal laws of art with the objectivist requirements of orthodox reflection theory.[10]

Fredric Jameson's afterword provides both an assessment of the various contributions and a view of the realist-modernist debate from the standpoint of the present, stressing the importance of the specific historical moment to any consideration of the realism-modernism controversy. To redress the imbalance of a collection in which Lukacs is attacked from three sides (Bloch, Brecht, and Adorno), while Adorno fires intellectual salvoes at several targets (Benjamin, Sartre, Brecht, and Lukacs), Jameson attempts to salvage what he considers valuable in the former, while warning against succumbing excessively to the attractions of the latter. He notes that "structural differences in medium and genre may play a larger part in comprehending the dilemma of the realism-modernism controversy than its earliest participants were willing to admit" (197). Recognizing the contradiction involved in the claims of realism to both a cognitive and an aesthetic status, he points out that it is "extremely difficult to do justice to both of these properties of realism simultaneously", while admiring the "adeptness" with which the later Lukacs "walks this particular tightrope" (197-98). Lukacs' most important contribution was "the development of a theory of mediations that could reveal the political and ideological content of what had hitherto seemed purely formal aesthetic phenomena" (200), which, for all its crudeness, is "a precursor of the most interesting work in the field of ideological analysis today" (201). Brecht's attacks on Lukacs are best taken "as a therapeutic warning against the temptation of idealism present in any ideological analysis as such, the professional proclivity of intellectuals for methods that need no external verification" (200).

For Jameson, recent developments in capitalist culture reveal the limitations of both Lukacs and Adorno. Lukacs' cultural popular frontism, with its championing of a "progressive" bourgeois realist tradition, suffers particularly, since "under the hegemony of the multinational corporations and their 'world system', the very possibility of a progressive bourgeois culture is problematic--a doubt that obviously strikes at the very foundation of Lukacs' aesthetic" (203). Still, the basic contradition in Lukacs: his insistence on the importance of genre and mediation on the one hand, and "ultimate possibility of some full and non-problematic 'representation of reality' " on the other, may, according to Jameson, "prove to be two distinct and equally indispensible moments in the hermeneutic process itself"; first, a "naive 'belief' in the density of novelistic presentation", and secondly, a "later 'bracketing' of that experience in which the necessary distance of all language from what it claims to represent--its substitutions and displacements--are explored" (203-04).

On the other hand, while the growth of the consumer society has borne out Adorno's

10. For one account of the differences between Lukacs and Adorno see Fritz J. Raddatz, "Der hölzerne Eisenring — Die moderne Literatur zwischen zweierlei Aesthetik — Lukacs und Adorno," *Merkur*, 31 (January 1977), pp. 28-44.

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belief that the "culture industry could coopt and defuse even the most potentially dangerous political acts by transforming them into cultural commodities" (Jameson, 208), Adorno's championing of the "classical stage of high modernism" and of Samuel Beckett in particular is not a satisfactory solution. What Jameson sees as fatal to Adorno's position is "very precisely the fate of modernism in consumer society itself", where Schönberg's pupils "used their advanced techniques to write movie music", and the major works of the most recent American painting are "now sought to embellish the splendid new structures of the great insurance companies and multi-national banks."; the once scandalous art "has found a social and economic function in supplying the styling changes necessary to the *société de consommation* of the present" (209). This sociological excursion shares with Lukacs a certain lack of differentiation in that Jameson disregards his own cautions about both the historical moment and the importance of genre by conflating various forms of modernism (and post-modernism) in a manner foreign to Adorno's impulse. If Lukacs is done a disservice by viewing him solely as a content-analyst (203-04), so Adorno must be dissociated from the image of an uncritical advocate of a generic high modernism; Beckett's *Endgame*,[11] not the "theatre of the absurd"; certain works of Schönberg, not the "twelve-tone school", and certainly not Schönberg's "Hollywood pupils" were the objects of his investigations. Indeed, no one was more aware of the conformist possibilities of "modernism" than Adorno himself; so much so that his own essay, "The Aging of Modern Music", furnished Lukacs with evidence to demonstrate the "loss of substance" in modern music.[12]

Jameson's objection might be clarified by an explicit reference to the current political context of ideology itself: with Vietnam, Watergate, and the current economic crisis, it is no longer possible for a liberal ruling class to assert its legitimacy openly by proclaiming the justice and prosperity of the existing order; that would be a situation where the "wordless polemic" of Adorno's cultural heroes could in fact preserve an area of negativity. Rather, the tendency is to proclaim in anguish the insolubility (without "sacrifice") of very real problems that are felt in the everyday life of the population. Here, the ideology of fragmentation and helplessness promotes apathy and inaction: a new context, where what Lukacs stigmatized as the "ideology of modernism" can well serve the existing order. Thus, it is not surprising that Jameson's path "beyond" the positions represented in *Aesthetics and Politics* leads back tentatively to Lukacs and realism, this time to a supposedly new Lukacs whose "concept of realism has been rewritten in terms of the categories of *History and Class-Consciousness*, in particular those of reification and totality". It can be inferred from other remarks that Jameson would abandon the reflections theory that props up Lukacs' claims to objectivism. Still, the new realism would "subvert the dominant ideological tendency to obscure the antagonistic class character of the social structure"; its function would be "to resist the power of reification in consumer society and reinvent that category of totality which, systematically undermined by existential fragmentation on all levels of life and social organization today, can alone project structural relations between classes as well as class struggles in other countries" (212-13). But at the same time, this realism would "incorporate what was always most

11. Adorno's lengthy study of *Endgame*, "Versuch, des Endspiel zu verstehen" (1961), in *Noten zur Literatur*, II (Frankfurt, 1965), 188-238, has received little critical attention from those who have attacked his support of Beckett.

12. Theodor W. Adorno, "Das Altern der neuen Musik" (1956), in *Dissonanzen: Musik in der verwalteten Welt* (Göttingen, 1972), pp. 136-59, and in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, XIV (Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 143-68. Cited in Lukacs, *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*, p. 87.

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concrete in the dialectical counter-concept of modernism--its emphasis on violent renewal of perception in a world in which experience has solidified into a mass of habits and automatisms" (213).

Until they are developed further, with more detailed reference to the specific problems of radical cultural production today, there is reason to greet Jameson's prescriptions with reservation, because of his apparent tendency to avoid the problematic of the literary and artistic intellectual so apparent in *Aesthetics and Politics*. Aside from his failure to heed his own strictures about the importance of genres. Jameson appears to reassume what he approvingly calls Lukacs' old "meddling interference" in literary matters (200), but without the latter's relatively clear sense of the type of writers he was addressing ("proletarian-revolutionary" in the early thirties, "socialist" in the fifties, "progressive bourgeois" throughout the post-1933 period); nor is it clear how Jameson wants us to distinguish between elite art and mass culture, to say nothing of a to-be-invented popular revolutionary culture; each of these functions differently within the ideological institutions of contemporary society. The undefined "we" implicit in his remarks reflects a situation in which the sophistication of theory and criticism within the university has so outstripped that of politics and culture on the outside that the relation between them threatens to be severed completely. Yet, if the version of the "ideology of modernism" which Jameson takes over from Lukacs has now spread from a rebellious and isolated avant-garde to become a component in the dominant ideology imposed on the entire society, then the projection of a "subversive" alternative would have to account for that split between mass media culture and elite art which Jameson himself views as the "stark alternative" that has invalidated Benjamin's and Brecht's conception of mass media as revolutionary (207-08). If, for example, it is in the mass culture that the reification of consciousness has its most devastating political effect, then the elite art which forms the object of nearly all disciplines of academic criticism might, for the moment at least, be of only marginal interest in the kind of social and political transformation Jameson wants along with the rest of us. But apathy and helplessness cannot be overcome by a new (and problematic) "totalizing vision" without the development of a corresponding *praxis* that could begin to answer the inevitable question: "Yes, but what do we *do* about it?" It is to be hoped that Jameson, like the contributors to *Aesthetics and Politics* whose ideas he judges with such sureness, but working under political conditions incomparably less desperate than those of the thirties, will bring his often brilliant insights out of the academic ghetto and test them against the realities confronting present-day political and cultural practice.

James Cowan

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Laura Boella. *Il Giovane Lukacs: La Formazione Intellettuale e la Filosofia Politica, 1907-1929*. De Donato: Bari, 1977. 313 pages.

In his 1967 preface to *History and Class Consciousness,* Lukacs' admission of a crucial confusion concerning the Marxian concepts of reification and objectification and his consequent failure to provide a concrete foundation for the notion of "imputed" class consciousness simply confirmed a problem whose broad outlines had been diagnosed and were already forming the critical backbone of 'Western Marxism'. In the attempt to reformulate Marxist theory to oppose to the ossified dogmas of official "orthodox" Marxism, critical Marxists were generally agreed on Lukacs' 'abstract dialectics', 'subjectivistic voluntarism' and 'objectivistic idealism'. Consequently, as Laura Boella's references amply demonstrate, there is a wealth of literature focusing on the principal lacunae associated with Lukacs' concept of reification and its relation to aesthetics, his theories of labor, alienation, totality, consciousness and of the dialectic.[1]

But, as Boella's book shows, a unifying view of Lukacs' early period was sorely lacking. One of the virtues of this book is that it shoves aside strict thematics or historical 'periodizations' of Lukacs, thus avoiding the pitfalls of linear discussion of his 'evolution' or his *coupures*. The outcome is a subtle and sensitive synthesis of the thought of a man whose "truth," i.e., the way he intimately perceived both himself and the world, is best expressed in his works. Boella weaves together the profound philosophico-existential anxiety of his aesthetic preoccupations with the pure, 'un-rationalized' enthusiasm with which he experienced the Russian revolution and later led him to join the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP). *The Young Lukacs* presents an excellent portrait of Lukacs as a "concrete universal," as Sartre would say. Boella herself uses less grandiose terms to describe the book's goal: it undertakes an "analytical reconstruction of diverse phases of Lukacs' early formation" in order to demonstrate "in what mode specific 'gaps' or 'shortcuts' or simply 'historico-objective' contradictions enter into and become internal components of his theory" (9-10). And she succeeds in depicting Lukacs' own definition of man as a "being responding to his possibilities."[2] According to Boella, this is the key to understanding how "stimuli from objective reality" together with "choices" and "alternatives" translate into the "idea of philosophy" that accounts for the "impact and uniqueness" of *History and Class Consciousness* (8).

The book focuses primarily on the 1907-1924 period with a brief exposition of the years 1924-1929. It begins with Lukacs' trajectory "from aesthetics to the philosophy of praxis" during World War I, Boella goes through all of the major aesthetic works indicative of Lukacs' idealistic-historicist formation, and locates the form of the essay as a key to the Lukacs of *Soul and Form* and *Aesthetic Culture*. The essay's "open, experimental form" is matched by an unsystematic content and mirrors Lukacs' dilemma. On the one hand, he refuses to construct a closed "truth system" like Kant, Simmel, Dilthey or Kierkegaard which would only perpetuate the epoch's "crisis", understood as the inability to "attribute a practical function to Knowledge" (7). On the other hand, Lukacs longs to provide life with an ethical form, a sense of system that would endow it with unitary meaning (22). From this starting point, says Boella, his growing sensitivity to the world slowly leads Lukacs to abandon strict aestheticism as an "authentic" form of existence and gradually shapes his "practio-idealism" — an

1. For extensive material on these subjects, cf. *Telos* special issues on Lukacs, No. 10 (Winter 1971) and 11 (Spring 1972), frequently cited by Boella.
2. Cf. Theo Pinkus, ed., *Conversations with Lukacs* (Cambridge, 1975), p. 129.

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attitude that draws its practical directives from the Hegelian dualism between "absolute" and "objective" spirit (23). For Boella, these two ideas, referring respectively to the realm of a-temporality vs. that of descriptive sociology, define Lukacs' epistemological and ethical framework at the time. Consequently, in trying to analyze it, it is important to capture the interaction between the long-ranging "metaphysical-existential" dimension and the "socio-historical" one (23).[3]

Accordingly, Boella works through the partial surpassings and assimilations of ethical, aesthetic and sociological themes that move Lukacs to his early (1910) Simmel-inspired rejection of Marxism. As she explains, the absolute is the major theme behind Lukacs' view that Marxism is just another sociological method that discards creations as mere ideologies and reduces them to socio-economic causes. Boella argues that, in addition to attacking Second International mechanistic relations of structure and superstructure, Lukacs' position is indicative of his acceptance of the Weberian distinction of Marxism into heuristic norms vs. *Weltanschauung* (24). Having thus set the stage for introducing the Simmel-Weber connexion as a catalyst for Lukacs' later development, Boella discusses the concepts of (Hegelian) "absolute" and *Weltanschauung* that, filtered through Weber's sociology, will find a prominent place in Lukacs' Marxism. Thus his *Zur Theorie der Literaturgeschichte* (1910), while definitely opposed to Marxism, discards as mere "social product" everything whose origin lies outside the purview of the "absolute"--to be later replaced by the concept of "form". For Boella, Lukacs' negative usage of "social product" prefigues his subsequent adoption of the Marxian definition of "ideologies" (23-4).

Next, Boella details the Heidelberg years, Lukacs' relation to Bloch, Weber, and Lask and how their problematic found its way into his own aesthetic output culminating in the *Aesthetics*, *The History of the Development of Modern Drama* and *The Theory of the Novel*. Lukacs himself describes this period as a transition from Kant to Hegel, still bound with "youthful enthusiasm for the work of Dilthey, Simmel and Max Weber"![4] Yet, the list of influences on Lukacs' early profile is far from finished: in the next fifty pages, Boella recounts Lukacs' relation to Ady, his favorite poet, and the cultural and political encounters with Bela Balasz and E. Szabo; while probing into the *History of Modern Drama* and the *Philosophy of Art*, she discusses some key ideas such as Lukacs' use of Hegelian phenomenology and his intellectualist, still anti-Marxist conception of praxis on the eve of the 1917 revolution. Thus, the socio-historical dilemmas of subjectivity, objectivity, temporality and the role of science as the background of Lukacs' "demonic" search for the practical realization of ethical values are treated in detail (52-73). But, precisely at this point, Boella misses a unique opportunity to explore Lukacs' rejection of Husserl's concept of "objectivity" (73-4) and to advance a hypothesis concerning the 'causes' or 'determinations' of this rejection. In fact, in the context of Lukacs' entire philosophical edifice, the absence of a Husserl critique becomes a serious omission — especially since, throughout the work, Boella reports — but does not investigate — Lukacs' philosophical problem with reality. Surely, his "subjectivity without object" from the *Heidelberger Aesthetik* (74) must be at the root of most that has proved unacceptable in Lukacs' subsequent thinking: the failure to distinguish objectification from alienation and reification, the refusal to deal with empirical reality and consciousness and the ensuing distortion on the theories of

3. Here Boella emphasizes the one-sidedness of Lucian Goldmann's existentialist approach and agrees with the methodological scope of works such as Arato's, Breines', Markus' and Perlini's.

4. "Preface," *The Theory of the Novel*. (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1971); p. 12.

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labor and praxis.

This is not to suggest that Boella is unaware of these problems. Her critical exposition of *History and Class Consciousness* as well as of Lukacs' politics, Council's activity, pamphlet writing, and aesthetic production repeatedly conclude with the above adages. Nonetheless, tracing this problem historically does not substitute for discussing its probable genesis. Some basic aspects of this problem have been recently analyzed by Vajda. Having related Lukacs' and Husserl's critiques of science and subjectivity, Vajda concludes that, while they both polemicize against a reified concept of science, the real difference between them is their views of false consciousness.[5] Husserl, says Vajda, calls for a "true philosopher" to restore a holistic viewpoint, while Lukacs calls for a "class, the proletariat". But then Vajda proceeds to call this difference "inconsequential" because Husserl does not discuss "the sociological relevance of this philospher's standpoint" and does not "specify the sociological composition of this circle of philosophers" while, for Lukacs, "the proletariat's standpoint is also formulated theoretically in a philosophy". But that's just the *problem*: "formulated" and dangling in the air all the same!

In the first place, "specifying the sociological constitution" of a class does not guarantee its actual ability to draw from a philosophical system--as demonstrated by the illusion of "ascribed" class consciousness. On this score, Boella convincingly shows how Lukacs' Weberian ideal-type classifications of a rigidly defined proletariat and bourgeoisie are entirely unrelated to the deep sociological changes affecting all classes in the wake of World War I and the failed revolutions (80-90; 110-120). Moreover, Boella is absolutely right in describing Lukacs' concept of class as "corporativist" insofar as it abstracts completely from the problems of the rising aristocracy of labor, the ideological alliances of feudal and petty bourgeois strata, and the changing nature of capital (120-5; 130-5). An example of this is Lukacs' interpretation of the 1921 Saxony strikes as genuine socialist movements instead of localized resistance against further massification. Afterwards, when the "March Action" also fails, Lukacs blames it on inadequate anti-opportunist campaigning! (141ff.) In a nutshell, Boella shows that Lukacs' theory of the proletariat's "ideological crisis" has nothing to do with problems of its empirical existence. Rather, it translates exclusively in terms of Weberian-inspired anti-institutionalist attacks on the intelligentsia's "putschism" and "opportunism", both under the Councils and later during the Horty regime (108-118; 131-141). Yet, none of this offers explicit reasons for Lukacs' peculiar blindness to reality nor does it equate his view with Husserl's. For, however incomplete, Husserl's idea of theory and action *presupposes* a constant opening and deepening of reality, not its aprioristic dismissal.

In this context, Boella fails to entertain the possibility that, even though Lukacs was aware of the problems posed by scientific rationality, he was unable to connect them to their root--real people and their *telos*--because he had already 'chosen' to live within the *unproblematic* world of the *epic*. Thus, while the rejection of Husserlian subjectivity and the Weberian interpretation of Marxism and capitalism may be determining factors in Lukacs' subsequent development, here they seem to derive from an intrinsic existential 'choice'.

Boella's analysis stresses the Simmel-Weber connexion which defines (among other more personal factors) Lukacs' decision to join Marxism as a result of an *actualized* "objective possibility" to transcend bourgeois rationality (Ch. 4). But she does not confront the fact that, from all indications in the *Theory of the Novel*, the existence and-or realization of an un-rationalized society coincides for Lukacs with an *epic*

5. M. Vajda, "Lukacs' and Husserl's Critique of Science," *Telos*, 38 (Winter 1978-9) p. 113.

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world where reality--empirical and-or pre-categorical--is a *non-problem*. This is to suggest that Lukacs' voluntarism was as genuine as it could be precisely to the extent that it was unburdened by the problems (e.g., *needs*) of a reality that he considered already abolished through the success of the Russian revolution.[6] In this light, the Soviet Union coincides with a spontaneously-made *Gemeinschaft* whose *telos*--the over-throw of bourgeois antinomies--had already eliminated all *problems* by erasing the processes and institutions of rationalization. Lukacs rejected the implications and uncertainties of the 20th century reality when he rejected its form in *The Theory of the Novel*: his reading of Weberian sociology provided him with another confirmation of the superiority of epic society, essentially defined by the inexistence of an exchange-value economy, the lact of institutions instrumentalizing formal rationality, and the consequent absence of a duality between the individual and social conceptions of human functions and teleology.[7] Thus, insofar as the Russian revolution occurred, it seems to have realized these conditions and, with them, the non-problematic, unlacerated reality of the epic.

Thus Husserl's and Lukacs' critique of **obj**ectivistic science reach opposite poles. Lukacs uses Weber's partial capitalist-defined critique of rationality in order to justify his total refusal to deal with existing empirical reality--a position resulting from his *ab initio* existential inability to live outside the 'reality' of the epic.[8] This attitude would not make his Stalinism more palatable but perhaps more understandable. Moreover, it might explain his somewhat disturbing way of thinking while preparing his *Ontology of Social Being* (1971). With important segments still awaiting publication, the *Ontology*[9] was to introduce an *Ethics* that Lukacs never had time to start, and it was intended as Lukacs' only 'genuine' denunciation of *History and Class Consciousness*. As Heller explains, this would be the only substantive way for him to deal with the "shock" he experienced at the discovery of Marx's concept of generic human nature (*Gattungswesen*) in the *Paris Manuscripts*. In Heller's words, " 'class' cannot take the place of 'species'--that is how he now came to conceive Marx's position".[10] Nevertheless, the thrust of critical notes by his students as the initial version progressed indicates a persistently high degree of confusion and abstraction on Lukacs' part with respect to those very same concepts of labor, needs, reproduction, ideology, and

6. After a very incisive analysis of Lukacs' voluntarism, A. Arato implies that Lukacs *did* consider the lack of a dialectic of needs but, since the times seemed sufficiently revolutionary, he somehow opted for a "general dose of voluntarism." See "Lukacs' Theory of Reification," *Telos* 11, p. 65.

7. For an articulate discussion of these themes, see F. Fehér's "Is the Novel Problematic? A Contribution to the *Theory of the Novel*," *Telos*, 15 (Spring 1973) pp. 47-74. In bringing out the crucial elements of reality rejected by Lukacs in the novel, Feher's work illuminates the critical nodes of Lukacs' subsequent conception of Marxism — anti-institutionalism, critique of bourgeois rationality, anti-subjectivism, etc.

8. Implicitly supportive of this view is also Markus' "The Young Lukacs and the Problem of Culture," *Telos* 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 95-116. Elsewhere, Feher emphasizes that "by age 32 (1917) Lukacs' sociological culture had already been completed through his first great work [*History of Modern Drama*] and could hardly grow richer later"; thus, while neither a "bourgeois intellectual who opened up to a socialist ideology" nor a Marxist, Lukacs' "sociological culture had assimilated everything assimilable from the socialist ideology of his time and also used it to attack the bourgeois world." Feher, "Filosofia della storia del dramma, metafisica della teoria del dramma del giovane Lukacs" in *Aut Aut*, Nos. 157-158 (Jan.-April 1977), pp. 117-118.

9. Merlin Press, London 1978, has issued sections "1. Hegel" and "2. Marx" from the *Ontology*'s Ch. I "The Present Situation." "Part II: The Most Important Problems" have still to appear.

10. Agnes Heller, "The Philosophy of the Late Lukacs," MS of a lecture delivered at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., January 22, 1979. p. 2.

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alienation![11]

The foregoing considerations move a step further in the direction of Boella's thesis, i.e., that *History and Class Consciousness* is inseparable from both *The Theory of the Novel* and the *History of the Development of Modern Drama*.[12] Focusing on *History and Class Consciousness* on an almost page-to-page basis and on themes from *Tactics and Ethics* and *Partei und Klasse*, Boella's chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate Lukacs' growing voluntarism in the face of slackening revolutionary spirit and the historical and theoretical route that drives him increasingly farther from Luxemberg's thought toward an unquestioning acceptance of Lenin. By 1922, Lukacs' idealization and mechanistic injection of Lenin's theory of the State into an objectivistic view of Luxemberg's theory of capitalist crisis produce his anti-spontaneism and the conception of the party as a "depository of the historico-philosophical function of united subject-object" (145). Thus, as class becomes de-emphasized as the prime revolutionary agent, the "moral mission of the party" coincides with its obligation to "suppress the lacerated forms of phenomenal existence" (spontaneism and opportunism), and, through revolutionary praxis, to "mediate men and history" (141-55).

As expected, the theories of reification and of the constitution of class consciousness comprise the core of Boella's philosophico-existential and socio-historical investigation. She discusses how Hegelian logical and phenomenological categories, Marxian political economy, and cultural-sociological elements from Rickert and Weber define the background of Lukacs' concept of totality--the principal category of his revolutionary dialectic (160-70). Working through Lukacs' critique of science and the dialectic of appearance and essence, Boella exposes the economistic concept of the proletarian class as a crucial element of his ideal-type consciousness. The latter emerges as a postulate without content because of Lukacs' persisting gnoseological difficulties with the theory of ideology that translates essentially into anti-opportunism and anti-institutionalism (170-80).

The distance from reality, argues Boella, is exacerbated by Lukacs' misunderstanding of the use of Marx's "abstraction" in the historical study of capitalism: failing to grasp the interconnexion between Marx's genetic vs. specific-scientific research, Lukacs treats capitalist reality as an abstract "appearance" which, by means of his critique of science, leads him to discount the specificity of capitalist forms (141-3). Hence, Marx's heuristic approach to history through categories of political economy becomes absolutized; moreover, the concept of "crisis" externalizes Marxian, i.e., classical categories and the contents of capitalism in general are construed by Lukacs as historically unchanged and true for all stages (175-88; 194-5).[13] Therefore, stresses Boella, Lukacs extends the commodity form to a-historically dominate the history of capitalism as a whole, while, in Marxian terms, *capital* is the dominant category which takes different forms (193-5).

Thus, Boella's major contention is that the 'ontologization' of reification — the

11. Cf. Feher, Heller, Markus and Vajda, "Notes on Lukacs' Ontology," *Telos* No. 29, (Fall 1976) pp. 160-81.

12. In this sense, Boella implicitly disagrees with the view that *History and Class Consciousness* (HCC) stands as an unconnected "exception" between the "subjectivistic utopianism of the early Lukacs and the objectivistic realism of his maturity" because "revolution, not art or culture, is the only means of reconciliation between man and world." In Asor Rosa, "Il Giovane Lukacs teorico dell' arte borghese," *Contropiano,* No. 1, (1968); S. Federici, "Notes on Lukacs' Aesthetics," *Telos* No. 11 (Spring 1972), p. 143. The point here instead is that revolution *becomes* an *ex post facto* means and mediation for the further expansion of the "epic" beyond Russia.

13. Cf. *History and Class Consciousness* (HCC) (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 27-28; 249ff.

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content of commodity production — results from Lukacs' Weberian reading of capitalism as an ideal-type abstraction (175-9). Noting the by-now-established connection between Weber and Lukacs' theory of reification, she distinguishes her position from Arato's,[14] e.g., by considering Weber as more than an "external addition" insofar as his impact radically transforms *Marxist* theory (188). For Boella, the essential change consists in Lukacs' reversal of Marx's view that commodity fetishism is an end product of the process of labor abstraction (193-4). Since Lukacs failed to recognize that, for Marx, "the commodity is a double abstraction from use value as well as from concrete labour" (193), he posits a "priority of the global phenomenon of reification and alienation with respect to the economic phenomenon of abstract labor" (190).[15] Taking into consideration Lukacs' casual juggling of priorities further in the text, Boella hastens to add that this priority is not temporal but one of essence instead: calculability and quantification — the essence of Weberian rationalization — are at the heart of the phenomenon of reification which Lukacs identifies with the parcelization of time to contrast capitalist society *as a whole* to small scale artisan economies (190). She reminds us here that the analysis of time quantification continues on Lukacs' pre-Marxist preoccupation with the *morcelage de la durée* — the disenchantment over the break-up of the epic *continuum* by the form of the novel (191-2).[16]

The obvious effects of Lukacs' distortion of the theory of labor are his confusion over the man-nature dialectic (194), and, above all, his concept of "second nature" that, in additional to restricting Marxism, also impoverishes and trivializes Weber's theory of domination: for Lukacs, domination pertains primarily to the tyranny of commodity production, not to political, ideological, and institutional processes of manipulation and atomization (196).[17] In this context, Boella concludes correctly that the historical force of Marx's notion of ideology evaporates since it becomes a formalized emanation of reification which lacks the concrete foundation of institutional processes — e.g., the function of the State (195-6). Consequently, Lukacs' economistic emphasis on a de-historicized capitalist content precludes a theory of knowledge capable of changing the object and eventually drives him into the theory of reflection. (197ff.) The overcoming of reification becomes the ethical responsibility of a transcendentally identical subject-object whose "spiritual human essence" remains mysteriously unaffected by the very processes it is called upon to reverse (200-215). Having thus ontologized "class" as a "species", Lukacs fails to substantiate its subjectivity since the "we" derives precisely from its ability to be revolutionary (217-9).

In pursuing Lukacs' thought to its logical conclusions — the Leninist theory of party and organization — Boella illuminates the instrumentality of Weber's "objective possibility" in Lukacs' theory of reflection (218; 222).[18] Finally, after a brief account of his post-1923 'reconciliation' with Soviet reality, she concludes on the irony of his passionate campaign against fascism: Lukacs' genuine anti-institutionalism and voluntarism had veiled him and blinded him to a major contradiction in *History and Class Consciousness* — the oversimplification of capitalist institutions and the role of the State.

Eleni Mahaira-Odoni

14. A. Arato, "The Theory of Reification," *op.cit.*
15. HCC, pp. 86-87.
16. *Ibid.*
17. For an excellent discussion on the importance of Weberian categories for Lukacs' thought, cf. Jean Cohen, "Max Weber and the Dynamics of Domination," *Telos* 14 (Winter 1972), pp. 63ff.
18. Cf. also HCC, pp. 75, 78-79.

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Carole Pateman. *The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory*. John Wiley and Sons: Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto, 1979.

Carole Pateman leaves no doubt regarding the *addressees* of her book: "My larger aim," she writes, "which is both more substantive and more controversial, is to show that political obligation in the liberal democratic state constitutes an insoluble problem; insoluble because political obligation cannot be given expression within the context of liberal democratic institutions" (p. 1). Further: "The term 'liberal democracy' is sometimes used as if it were a combination or synthesis of liberalism and democracy; it has also, and most importantly, become popularly and academically identified with 'democracy' itself. It is widely assumed that 'democracy' can be nothing other than our existing liberal democracies. Part of my argument is that this identification is mistaken, and that, from the time of the classic contract theorists, a democratic as well as a liberal account of political obligation has been available to us" (p. 5). Pateman's addressees are the radicals who do not keep squaring the circle, i.e., who no longer look for the "greatest possible democracy" in a dictatorship (as did generations under the spell of Marxism-Leninism), but for whom the liberal system is *not* a naturally given feature of the universe.[1] In other words, the addressees are those who want to transcend the liberal democratic system in a democratic direction.

Carole Pateman is not a Marxist. She rejects the Marxist thesis of the "withering away" of the state. She writes: "It is often assumed that the 'political' refers to power relationships.... A democratic transformation of the liberal democratic state can then appear to presage an end of the political itself. However, philosophical anarchism notwithstanding, the collective dimension of social life cannot disappear; rather, the aim of democratic political change is, as far as possible, to transform power relationships into relationships of authority in which citizens collectively exercise political authority" (p. 175). Since Marxism's single major contribution to the theory of democracy had been the sterile and in some respects dangerous discussion of "formal" and "substantive" democracy, Pateman is justified in refraining from participating in this debate; she draws fundamentally on a three-century-long tradition of British political thinking. Yet, her theoretical perspective ("authority" as free association instead of reified "power") is surprisingly close to the Marxian concept of the "society of associated producers."

Instead of recycling the well-known problem of "democracy as dictatorship," Pateman raises some basic questions about the liberal theory of democracy with the intention of reopening the allegedly settled case of democratic theory. The first question runs as follows: is liberal democracy a "natural feature" of the political cosmos, a *non plus ultra* beyond which there is only anarchy or tyranny? In her words: "the result is that the liberal democratic state is 'naturalized.' It is regarded as if it were a natural feature of the world that individuals can do no other than accept as they find it. A critical and questioning stance towards the state is entirely misplaced and there can be no prospect of further democratic development or change" (p. 6). Pateman's intention is *not* the unification of certain "extra-political" changes within the presently given liberal democracy, but the promotion of a *new form* of democracy.

1. Here we have to deal with Pateman's militant feminism. This is expressed in semantic efforts. She uses the couple he-she for very legitimate reasons, but she also toys with the practice of calling the individual *he* when he-she is possessive, bourgeois, etc., and *she* when he-she is the emancipated subject of the participatory system. This feminism, of course, goes much deeper than verbal games; it simply states that as long as one half of humanity lives under tacit consent — at best! — and not under the sign of self-assumed obligation, then the world of liberal-democratic hypothetical voluntarism remains an alienated one.

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Secondly, and more specifically, she is raising questions about political obligation: "A central part of this [liberal] claim is that the appropriate way to characterize the relationship between citizens and the state is in terms of 'political obligation.' The practice of political obligation, it is usually accepted, is institutionalized in the liberal democratic state. This is the specific claim that I shall be questioning" (p. 6). Pateman asks whether *promise* is the counterpart of obligation as it is embodied in the liberal state, promise being "the clearest and most explicit example of *self-assumed* obligation" (p. 13); or whether it is *passive acceptance* of the conditions given by birth, a basically *reified relation*. If it cannot be proven that the basis of obligation is voluntary, i.e., based on explicit promise, but only hypothetically voluntary in the case of the majority of the citizens, the latter meaning "implicit promise" or consent to an already existing political authority in the form of voting and accepting the benefits rendered by the state, then we are rather confronted with alienated obedience.

She also asks whether: "The writers who are claiming that political obligation is owed primarily to fellow citizens. . . are presenting a completely different picture of political obligation from the traditional liberal one. Political obligation now appears as a 'horizontal' relationship between citizens. . . . If political obligation is owed to fellow citizens, on what grounds is it also owed to the state? How are the vertical and horizontal relationships linked to each other?" (p. 8). Her last question regards her very perspectives: power or authority? There can be no doubt about Pateman's option. By power she means a type of political authority based on hypothetical voluntarism or obedience while by authority she means a non-alienated, free association of citizens.

What is the political equivalent of consent (as a merely hypothetically voluntary act)? Voting. In contrast to many leftists who, by departing from real problems of liberal democracy, irresponsibly toy with the idea of dictatorship, Pateman is not an enemy of democracy. Just the opposite: she repeatedly emphasizes that the juncture at which mere liberalism, sometimes held together only by the Leviathan's sword, turned into liberal *democracy* was the breakthrough of *universal suffrage*. (As Weber pointed out, this most often happened under the impact of the "adversaries": radicals, socialists, working-class movements.) But she is an unhesitating critic of a political practice consisting exclusively of systematically recurring acts of voting: "Unlike promising, liberal democratic voting, for example, allows citizens to vote only at times, and on matters, chosen by others, and, in voting, citizens choose representatives who will then determine the content of their political obligation" (p. 83).[2] The overall result is general political apathy in the inter-election periods, making it simple for the ruling elite to rule.

What are the consequences of a system based on hypothetical voluntarism? First of all, the whole social life is based on *the promise to obey*. This is, however, precisely what she calls the *alienation of government* and thereby joins a very long tradition of political thinking and, in general, a radical trend within natural law. Further, she

2. In her earlier book, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (1970), she broadened this critique as follows: "Elections are crucial to the democratic method for it is primarily through elections that the majority can exercise control over their leaders. Responsiveness of leaders to non-elite demands, or 'control' over leaders, is ensured primarily through the sanction of loss of office at elections; the decisions of leaders can also be influenced by active groups bringing pressure to bear during inter-election periods. 'Political equality' in the theory refers to universal suffrage and to the existence of equality of opportunity of access to channels of influence over leaders" (p. 14). And once again in the present book: "It is pointed out [in a recent empirical study of voting — FF] that the liberal democratic electoral mechanism is such that voters can choose neither whom they vote for, what they vote about, nor when they vote" (p. 20).

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outlines the context within which a society based on the "promise to obey" or hypothetical voluntarism may develop. One of the extreme points is the "enforced covenant" which she defines by analyzing Hobbes: "Usually, if I have been forced under threats to say 'I promise,' my promise will not be regarded as valid; it is not a 'real' promise. However, Hobbes treats as 'voluntary' even those acts performed under the threat of violence or death. Fear and liberty are compatible, and thus Hobbes argues that convenants 'entered into by fear in the condition of mere Nature, are obligatory' " (p. 43). All this is much more than a mere theoretical conjecture. Pateman sees in it one of the negative alternatives of our age: "A contemporary version of Hobes' absolute sovereign is not inconceivable. The liberal democratic state could turn into an authoritarian state, based visibly on the sword, and administered by technical and military experts. Political obligation would then be irrelevant, and liberalism and the potential it contains for democratic development would be no more. . . ." (p. 166). The other extreme is, of course, the liberal welfare state in which the benefits obtained and accepted from the state form the basis of 'tacit consent.' But there is virtually no point within this field where tacit consent would be substituted for self-assumed obligation, where reified government and political apathy would be overcome. Finally, Pateman very correctly remarks that the system of hypothetical voluntarism reaches far beyond politics: the whole world of factory hierarchy is based on the notorious "promise to obey," the system of liberal civil liberties constantly has the aim to reproduce *substantive inequalities*.

What is the political counterpart of free promising? Participatory voting or, in a broader sense, *participatory democracy*, a free and self-assumed association. Its first characteristic is that it is constantly recreated by everyone: there is no reified political authority in this universe. Pateman emphasizes the fact that: "A democratic theory of self-assumed political obligation is not a contract theory" (p. 169). This is very understandably so, for the *contract* becomes with the next generation's (tacit) consent; the past would once again reconquer both present and future, which would defeat the whole strategy. The second characteristic is that even if there is obligation in it, it can constantly be reconsidered and revoked. This is another formulation of that fact that the citizen is not alienated to the lawgiver or to its own representatives. Thirdly, the principle of free association is extended in it to so-called "non-political" domains. Pateman quotes Cole in concurrence: "The 'principle of social obligation' (requires) not 'the recognition of associations by the State, but the demand that the State itself should be regarded only as an association' " (p. 95). This extension means that the overwhelming practice of "promising to obey" (and thus also factory hierarchy) should disappear in order for the participatory ideals to work.

Finally, dissent and disobedience have a totally different status in this as compared with the liberal conception. As Pateman points out, liberalism has a double strategy with regard to disobedience. Partly it tries to discredit its general relevance.[3] Furthermore, and in anticipation of coercive actions against disobedience, liberalism tries to "persuade" dissenters that the only appropriate thing for them to do is to accept the punishment willingly even if they were substantively justified in their dissent, for this is what "law and order" demands. In contrast, the world of participatory democracy will be one in which minorities retain their perfect right, and actual possibility, to act in a "dissenting" manner.

3. Here, she quotes one of the chief theorists of present-day liberalism: "Rawls, for example, argues that civil disobedience is not an appropriate action in cases of wider social injustice because these matters are too difficult to evaluate" (p. 79).

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Is Pateman's participatory democracy socialism? It becomes socialism through the radicalization of liberal democracy and not by the relinquishing of democratic principles. It is thus a socialist theory in a double sense. It raises the problem of actual inequality behind the facade of formal liberty (liberal democracy) and it extends its principles of free association and actual equality to *all domains of social life*. In this sense it is a complete theory of non-alienated socialism. Pateman's original analysis of Hobbes conclusive arguments against philosophical anarchism, the interesting debate with the so-called conceptual argument, her very clear polemics against Rawls, her provocative, but not aggressive, self-confidence in reopening questions regarded as closed forever by Holy Academia — all these make the book original and important: a book that will arouse much debate among those concerned with fundamental problems of democratic theory.

Yet, Pateman's theoretical apparatus is aimed against Hobbes, Locke and present-day theorists of liberal democracy from a Rousseauian viewpoint. She sees Rousseau as the theorist *par excellence* of *democratic* contract theory as against the liberal version. Similarly, in the Enlightenment, only Rousseau raised the issue of the relevance of self-governed and not of representative democracy. Still, Rousseau was bothered by an anthropological and technical skepticism regarding the feasibility of such a democracy, and he left it to his disciples to draw the conclusion (which he sometimes drew himself) that such a democracy is a moral and political impossibility. The famous contradiction between the *general will* and the *will of all*, in which the first is the wider and absorbing principle, had been invented precisely for that reason. Could the tragic aftermath of this theory have escaped Pateman's attention? How did it lead to the fatal Lukacsian distinction between the proletariat's empirical and the "ascribed" consciousness — a theoretical formulation of Leninist-Jacobin elitism?

And in this century of hermeneutics and of Walter Benjamin's theory of the role of the recipient, how can one neglect that Rousseau's theory has had as its embodiment a Maximilien Robespierre, who, in governing what was then the greatest liberated nation of Europe, concluded that "Le peuple ne peut se régner en masse," and acted accordingly?[4]

The real problem is a vacillation between conceiving liberal democracy as freedom but as *something that should be transcended*, and as a "fraudulent contrivance." Certain quotations can be very illuminating: "The liberal social contract is, in this respect, exactly like other contracts in which obedience is exchanged for protection: it is like the traditional marriage contract, the employment contract, *and even like a contract of slavery, for the master must protect his slaves if he is to obtain satisfactory service*" (p. 170, italics added). Anyone who has lived in countries of "real socialism," where workers have no right to leave their work place and to organize, where peasants cannot even leave their village without the consent of the authorities, knows that the liberal contract is to be transcended because it is the fixation of an alienated relation,

4. It did not entirely escape Pateman's attention, but she gives a "dialectical" and softening twist: "The participatory formulation of the general will is thus a process that 'forces' constant wills to the fore. Rousseau does not actually use his notorious phrase 'forced to be free' in this context, but he speaks of individuals being 'compelled to act on other principles' than self-interest. It has recently been suggested that *forcer d'être libre* should be translated as 'to strengthen to be free,' and this does capture the educative effect of political participation. It helps to emphasize that, if citizens are not to fall back into the 'chains' of inequality and servitude, they must judge and act according to their principle of political morality, and that, because this is a large departure from possessive individualist ways of thought and action, they need 'strengthening' to do this" (p. 156). Pateman does not mean to tell us that Jacobin terror stemmed from a misinterpreted passage in Rousseau!

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but it is *not* a contract of slavery. Were this a simple terminological problem, it would not be worth mentioning. But if we do regard liberal democracy and its liberties as an *inadequate* historical *result* of radical efforts, and act by starting from its liberties (which is, by the way, consistent with most of Pateman's book), we shall soon end up in a situation in which we are "forced to be free."

The real question is this: to what extent can freedom and democracy be defined *substantively*? Pateman interprets Rousseau idiosyncratically as follows: "It is true that the poor agree to the contract, but Rousseau argues that agreement or consent, taken in isolation, does not in itself create proper obligation.... For Rousseau, the form, content and conditions of the contract, not merely agreement in the abstract, are crucial" (p. 149). And later: "Rousseau's contract, in contrast, forms the actual basis for the new political order and has substantive content and consequences" (p. 151). Obviously, we are now on the terrain of "non-formal democracy" earlier described as a dangerous principle. Of course, there are always substantive elements in speaking about democracy when we mention "substantive freedoms" of speech, coalition, etc. But the danger of defining democracy substantively is that the adherent of the substantive principle will admit to the democratic character of democracy only in case of the fulfillment of certain specific expectations, i.e., only in the case of the predominance of a specific ideology. This predominance of a single ideology can, however, very easily be turned into a *monopoly* of that same ideology with the death of democracy as one of its necessary political consequences.

The problem of substance, however, should be raised on the level of *equality*. Vergniaud, hero, martyr and classic of liberalism formulated this problem in a typically concise manner. He admitted the compatibility of only *one* type of equality with freedom: formal equality in front of the law. All radical trends ever since have represented the *substantive* principle of equality otherwise. Without entering into a discussion of this principle — which has been dealt with in detail elsewhere,[5] one laconic comment is in order: there must be a limit even to the substantive conception of equality. When it becomes a Babuvian egalitarianism, i.e., a complete and violent homogenization of all human needs, then it turns into what Marx called a principle of despotic communism.

The difference between an inadequate social condition which is to be transcended radically, and a simple "fraudulent contrivance," is important especially from the viewpoint of *disobedience*. There are forms of disobedience which are compatible with a *democratic* transcendence of liberalism and others which are not. This is once again a missing element from Pateman's analysis, though she herself has raised the problem by referring to the classical case of Socrates. She is correct if she means that Socrates cannot be legitimately regarded as the forerunner of the "ideal" dissenter in liberal democracy, taking upon himself the (deserved) consequences of dissent, for the polis was an association of (free, male, and adult) citizens, not a reified state. Objections must be raised, however, if she considers the problem irrelevant from the viewpoint of obligation and disobedience. The traditional Socrates who knew that the democracy of his age was a sham but who acted *as if* it were genuine rather than choosing the tyrannical principle is a fascinating model for radicals. History has provided us with a situation in which it became clear how representative this attitude was. Robespierre, a world-historical personality still on the borderline between two worlds, who practiced terror but had doubts regarding its legitimacy and for whom democracy was, at least in principle, a supreme ideal, is our chief witness. On the 8th of Thermidor, when he

5. Cf. Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, "Forms of Equality," *Telos* 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 6-26.

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repeated his last speech in the Convention, read in the morning, surrounded by his disciples and in a deliberately theatrical gesture calling his speech his "last will and testament" he added: if my enemies win, I am ready to drink the hemlock. The reference is clear; the intention is sublime and democratic. When, however, the next day his enemies did win and Robespierre cried out: the Republic is lost, the brigands have won, he defined democracy *substantively*, through the monopoly of his own doctrine. The act of insurrection (which he was not ready to sanctify with his signature but which he hesitatingly joined) followed automatically. The aim of this (miscarried) insurrection is described by every realistic historian as the introduction of his personal dictatorship. That representative disciple of Robespierre, Lenin, would also espouse "Socratic" problems regarding disobedience. Every form of rebellion was good enough because for him freedom was inferior to what he called the "interests of the proletariat."

We have journeyed far from the original problem of obligation. But this is only a compliment to Carole Pateman's lucid, multifaceted and original book. Theoretically interested individuals who want to think through the problem of democracy will find rich material in it.

Ferenc Feher

George L. Mosse. *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism.* Howard Fertig: New York, 1978. 227 plus xvi pages. $18.50.

Race as a political phenomenon defies subsumption within the framework of the Left and of its Marxist variants. When not dismissed or simply ignored, racism has usually been relegated to epiphenomenal status. Often enough this is done with the hypocritical self-assurance intended to whistle inadequate paradigms past anomalies. So racism becomes "merely" a tool to divide the working class — a ploy that will be overcome either on the way to socialism or after the "revolution". Nowhere is this more obvious than in the U.S. where racism is clearly identifiable and is not confounded by nationality. Moreover, even when radical critique seeks to fit race to a Procrustean bed of alienated theory, it resorts to mystification. The severed limbs are salvaged, but they are not rejoined to the conceptual body. Either a static idea of racial discrimination is grafted onto the critique, or racism is ontologized as the animating element of all social interaction. The former tactic precludes comprehension of racial oppression in the context within which it is constituted (as with popular slogans exhortations to "smash" capitalism *and* racism), while the latter attempt turns into a conspiracy theory indistinguishable from racist theories. Both these responses fail because they do not confront racism as an *historical* phenomena. Race, therefore, is taken as a given and located in a fuzzy terrain between anthropology, biology, and politics. Today, since the mode of domination in the U.S. appears to be undergoing qualitative transformation, a study such as Mosse's, which seeks to penetrate the historical character of racism, is especially timely.

It is not unfair to read *Toward the Final Solution* from the viewpoint of the U.S., even though the volume scarcely mentions racial ideology in this country. Mosse's inquiry takes him back to the origins of two related phenomena which have been

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present throughout U.S. history: "the new sciences of the Enlightenment and the Pietistic revival of Christianity" (p.xvi). Thus, Mosse's study not only yields insights into the nature of racism, but also strays into the critique of Enlightenment as domination.

Racism appears as an expression of reason's ambivalence. Mosse traces the general notion of race to the Renaissance, noting that the specific meanings applied to it have varied considerably over the centuries to refer to groups of humans and animals. Nevertheless, the twentieth century version of racism is described as a "secular religion" which originated during the Enlightenment and the reaction against it. This, along with the theme of a "science of race and mystery of race" recur throughout Mosse's account.

The growth of science out of natural philosophy triggered a concern with detailed classifications. It is not difficult to imagine how such a project could embody the predominant mistrust of outsiders and assume commonly held myths as first principles. Yet, the revival of classicism in aesthetics simultaneously posited an ideal of physical beauty which reinforced and formalized the hierarchization of racial types.

This union of science and aesthetics came to fruition in the mid-nineteenth century under the banner of anthropology — a science which was to imperialist expansion outside Europe what political economy had been to the industrial revolution. Anthropology sought to eliminate prejudice from racial classification by appeal to "facts". At the same time, racial hygiene received a systematic expression in the form of eugenics. Similarly, phrenology and physiognomy further stimulated the fusion of scientism and aesthetics. Those two bizarre disciplines tended to hypostatize a particular physical type — the alleged hellenistic ideal — over all others to generate a theory of social deviance based on outward appearance.

Mosse distinguishes between racist tendencies within the scientific endeavor during this period and overt theories of racism. This allows him to distinguish between Darwin, Haeckel or even Gobineau on the one hand and Toussenel, Drumont or Chamberlain on the other. His account lays bare what is lost in scientism's exultation in its chosen image as the vehicle of human progress. When science claims exclusive authority among the varieites of knowing the world, the others burst forth as an indignant unreason whose cunning is at least reason's equal and whose simplicity assures it greater popular appeal. Rather than action and reaction, positivist science and mysticism are better understood as extremes of the same continuum. The extent to which Mosse subscribes to this view of the interdependence of reason and non-reason is not entirely clear. That he does not further develop the critique of science's role in the genesis of modern racism is a shortcoming. He distinguishes genuine science from its spurious racist debasements, but primarily on the basis of motivation. Because he does not question science itself, Mosse sees racism as an aberration rather than as an extension of the same logic of domination.

It is no accident that modern racism grew with the Enlightenment. As has been shown time and again,[1] the domination of the concept over external nature passes easily into domination over internal nature and finally to domination of man by man. Despite his successful historical account of racism, Mosse decontextualizes it by seeing it as a separate current within the mainstream of European intellectual history. The problem is compounded when he discusses racism as a "scavenger ideology" that attempts to annex other intellectual movements. Mosse does not sufficiently implicate

1. This theme runs throughout critical theory and has received current expression in William Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* (Boston, 1972).

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the Enlightenment's notion of reason in the development of racism. But this is not a major point. This failure to fully develop the critique of science only mutes certain aspects of Mosse's study.

The relation of racism to bureaucratic organizations is a case in point. Mosse notes the bureaucratic depersonalization of the death camps and discusses the Nazi's decision to let the bureaucracy determine who was legally Jewish. The whole process was driven by administrative rationality. As Mosse points out, the holocaust might not have been possible if by 1935 the Nazis had not compiled a complete list of Jews in Germany. Nor could the extermination have been so thorough without the Nazis' technological mobilization. The institutionalization of euthanasia and the Nazis' attraction to eugenics both suggest the extent to which Nazi racism fetishized instrumental rationality (pp.226ff.).

The Nazi adoption of Cesare Lombroso's notion of habitual criminality provides a clue to the complicity of science and racism. Lombroso, himself a Jew, had claimed under the mantle of science that physical characteristics reflect mental attitudes. Thus, he went on to outline the characteristics of habitual criminals and to argue that offenders bearing those characteristics be dealt with accordingly. As Mosse notes, the Nazis applied Lombroso's ideas to justify the annihilation of the Jews. The key here is the notion of order that serves as a core value for both science and racism. The objective is to eliminate contingency and to dissolve ambiguity. In each case order is sought by subjugating the alien. The point is not that science equals racism or that racism derives from science. Rather, science and racism both originate in a common psychic state of compulsive insecurity pervading the West over the last two or three centures in response to and as part of capitalism's destruction of organic society. Mosse touches on this when he discusses the millenarian nature of much racist ideology. The Jew, as the most characteristically urban and mobile type in Europe, easily came to be identified as the symbol both of predatory capitalism and of the destruction of traditional ways of life.[2]

In this context, Mosse points out that racist ideology's "emphasis on stereotypes rendered the abstract concrete... [and] made theory come to life in a simple, direct manner." (p. 233) This quality, already observable in the moral hierarchization of physical types, reached its fullest expression in the Nazis' conscious aestheticization of politics.[3] Mosse emphasizes the Nazi reliance on films and visual imagery to mobilize support for the National Socialist program. This is related to two additional characteristics of Hitler's program: the technicization of politics as an administratively manageable alternative to popular participation, and the reduction of the basis for truth claims to an immediately sensory dimension.[4] Again, this points toward a common foundation for both racist ideology and positivist science.

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2. Joel Kovel explores this mediating socio-psychological significance of racism in the American context in his excellent study, *White Racism: A Psychohistory* (New York, 1970).

3. Cf. Rainer Stollman, "Fascist Politics as a Total Work of Art: Tendencies Toward the Aesthetization of Political Life in National Socialism," *New German Critique* (Spring, 1978), pp. 41-60. Cf. also Stanley Aronowitz, "Mass Culture and the Eclipse of Reason," *College English* Vol. 38 (April 1977), pp. 768-774. Susan Sontag discusses the domination of the visual image over 20th century society in general. See *On Photography* (New York, 1977). With massification and alienation of visual imagery also has come desensitization to mass human slaughter.

4. This is one sense in which the National Socialist regime can be seen as a crude first approximation of the characteristic form of politics in monopoly capitalist conditions, as Horkheimer was aware at the time. Cf. Max Horkheimer, "The Authoritarian State," *Telos* 15 (Spring 1973), pp. 3-20.

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Mosse is hardly unaware of this common origin of racism and science. He sees racism as well as science as manifestations of the "drive to define man's place in nature and of the hope for an ordered, healthy, and happy world." (p.3) Thus, the mysticism of racist ideology — as exemplified in its affinities for theosophy, grand folkish myth and apocalyptic thinking generally — seeks the same kind of manifest, fixed, and incontestable explanations of the world which positivistic science also has sought. The relation of racist mysticism and scientific precision is exemplified in the zest with which German anthropoligists took advantage of the unique opportunities for controlled experimentation that Nazi genocide made available (p.227).

Although racism must also be understood on this epistemological level, it is primarily in the political sphere that it has had the most devastating effects. Mosse identifies the anti-urban, anti-secular, anti-liberal bases of twentieth century racism and indicates that the mythic qualities upon which racist ideologies are based boil down to typical petit-bourgeois virtues such as "cleanliness, honesty, moral earnestness, hard work and family life" (p.234). The last century has confronted these values with major challenges such as the growing secularization of life, the continuing rise of nationalism, and the re-conceptualization of the notion of loyalty legitimating an abstract polity, the growth of new class contradictions and the depersonalization resulting from the extension of the capitalist division of labor. Each of these challenges had a destabilizing impact. Racism held out the promise of reconstituting values with an appropriate social basis.

The racist focus on an easily recognizable (at least in principle) Other against which to define social identity gained popularity because it seemed to address central cultural problems arising with the shift from industrial to monopoly capitalism. Racism mitigated the ideological crisis precipitated by the diappearance of the community in the context of the increasingly collectivized and impersonal social organization of monopoly capitalism. Racist ideology, through artifices such as the myth of Teutonic exceptionalism, offered a conception of nationality that was sufficiently abstract to promise re-composition of the organic society at the level of the racial community. Moreover, the racist conceptualization of the origins of social conflict provided an apparently unambiguous and neatly resolvable alternative to class struggle; social antagonism became the product of the malevolent outsider against whom the race could unite to restore order and tranquility. So it was that racism became a key element in an ideology of national unification and imperialist expansion.

There is little in this account which resembles standard left analyses. In contradistinction to the "tool to divide the working class" thesis, Mosse points out that racism has not been the exclusive property of conservatism. In fact, the reactionary right may have been least susceptible to the extremes of racist ideology, while capitalism's left opposition was not immune to it (p. 145).Not only did the KPD in the Wiemar era consider that anti-Semitism among its constituency was a force viable and legitimate enough to be appeased to the point of eliminating Jews from the Central Committee in 1930 (pp. 186 and 207), but in Britain the Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb feared that the socialism they advocated might have as a dangerous political side effect the deterioration of the Anglo-Saxon race (p. 62).

Racism's political appeal thus appears anomalous, as being perhaps more congenial to revolutionaries that to reactionaries. Mosse, however, suggests an explanation (pp. 159-161). He observes that Jacobinism, which in different degrees underlies all left revolutions, leans toward the apocalyptic thinking that characterizes racist ideology and the rationalistic faith in progress that has been the main force in the history of

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positivist scientism. Indeed, Fabians and Jacobins shared this tendency, although only one of the two sought the revolutionary apocalypse. Still, discussion of the socio-economic conditions within which racism arose begs a further question: racism is not the only possible response to those conditions. The Bolshevik option comes to mind as one alternative. Yet it was racism, not revolution, that became most popular in Europe and the U.S., Why has racism proved more successful than the other ideological orientations with which it has competed? What are the peculiar characteristics of racism's appeal to mass consciousness? The answers lies largely within a pre-ideological psychic dimension, and in the historical linkage that Mosse establishes between racism and Jacobinism.

According to Mosse, during the past century racist ideology in Europe has fed on the youth's romantic rebellion and on ideals of "activism, heroism and camaraderie" (p.172ff.).[5] To the extent that racist and revolutionary ideology are both apocalyptic in their vision they promise to organize without diluting the unfocused energies characteristic of youth and to harness them to the conduct of purposive activity that alleges great meaningfulness, requires a long-term and intense commitment, and promises upon its ultimate realization to resolve once and for all the disorders of both the world and the soul. At this level racism and revolution are interchangeable, and only biographical quirks determine acceptance of one or the other.[6]

Of course, youth is not the only group that has felt the sway of the powerful apocalyptic ideologies. However, much of their appeal is aimed at a personality structure fraught with the insecurities, ambivalence, and weak identity generally associated with youth. Within advanced capitalism it is not suprising to find this personality structure at all age levels. Constant, rapid, and seemingly unpredictable change associated with the institutionalization of capitalist social relations exacerbates tendencies toward anxiety and insecurity in everyday life. Similarly, pressures exerted through the capitalist division of labor and the old work ethic require repression of energies whose expression could mitigate anxiety and assist in relatively autonomous individuation. Instead, fragmentation of work, increasing estrangement from immediate reference groups, the splitting of the personality between work and consumption, and the steady retreat from visibility of an authority system that simultaneously exerts ever greater power over daily life — all these factors impede resolution of inner conflicts characteristic of adolescence. Overt rebelliousness is usually repressed, but the insecurity and ambivalence toward authority remain as psychic forces which can dispose the individual toward apocalyptic ideologies promising resolution.[7]

Racism is more attractive as a means of resolution than competing apocalyptic ideologies because it is neater in its referents and cleaner in its explanations. The despised Other can be identified as the cause of whatever problems one experiences because racism is a close, circular explanatory system which the external world, moreover, seems to ratify. It assumes as a starting point the universal malevolence of the Other, and any unpleasantness encountered only demonstrates the validity of the

5. It is instructive in this regard that Hitler, the conqueror, preferred conservative dictators to fascist chiefs in the satellite nations. He felt the latter to be too volatile and therefore unreliable to maintain the order required to manage an empire. Cf. Mosse, p. 228.

6. Thus, Louis Malle's adolescent Lucien (*Lacombe, Lucien*) first tried to join the maquis before he gravitated toward the Nazis.

7. Cf. Kovel, *White Racism, op.cit.*, pp. 107-138. Kovel discusses the extent to which developments of the institutional and ideological structure of bourgeois society generate and maintain the psychic states noted here.

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assumption. Thus racism comfortably fits the requirements of the non-rational, suppressed fantasy life of the fragmented individual.[8] The more complex, reflexive and open-ended ideological systems do not have a comparable appeal.

Mosse's insightful study presents racism as an historical phenomenon with specific origins and with a subsequent natural history. This view, along with his linkage of racism with the Enlightenment and identification of the connections between racial and scientistic ideologies over the last two centuries, reinforces Kovel's earlier thesis concerning the relation of racism and the capitalist project of social rationalization. Racism can thus ultimately be understood as both a response to and a moment of the integrative logic of industrial capitalism on three distinct levels. First, as a political program, racism attests to the suppression of otherness which is the organizing principle of the modern industrial state; this is exemplifed in Mosse's discussion of Nazi racial policies. Second, racist ideology is seen as an outcome of the Enlightenment's emphasis on the domination of the concept over actual existence; on this level again racism reveals its complicity with the dynamic of capitalist rationalization.[9] Finally, in the psychic sphere, racism appears as an attempt to mediate specific tensions generated in the development and maintenance of the personality under the increasingly alienated conditions of modern capitalist culture. This view adds critical depth to the more common, though accurate, portrayal of racism as a compensatory mechanism mobilized to assuage the guilt of practitioners of racial domination.

This approach to the problem of racism requires that it be understood as an historically grounded competitor of, and alternative to, radical political strategies, without succumbing to the easy leftist formulae. Mosse's volume is a valuable contribution to that understanding.

Adolph Reed, Jr.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-230.

9. I have discussed this problem of the transcendence of racism from the perspective of a concern with the collapse of Afro-American oppositionist politics in "Black Particularity Reconsidered," *Telos* 39 (Spring 1979), pp. 71-93.

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION
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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS:*

DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, 4:1 (March 1979)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., P.O. Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, Holland. $25.85 per year (4 issues). AGNES HELLER, *"Toward an Anthropology of Feeling."* Heller refutes the behavioristic view of the human cognitive process and posits that "the human being as a whole experiences a unified process of acting, thinking, feeling and perceiving." Like Wittgenstein, she argues that thinking and feeling cannot be rigidly separated into formal categories. T. ALLEN CAINE, CHRISTY A.H. CAINE, *"The Evolution of Male Dominance."* The conservative explanation for the evolution of male dominance in societies is criticized. Instead, a quasi-Marxist theory, based on the differential access of men and women to scarce resources and goods, is offered. ORLANDO FALS BORDA, *"Investigating Reality in Order to Transform It: The Colombian Experience."* A readable discussion of the theoretical, practical, and philosophical implications of what has been termed "action research" (distinguished from militant research in that while it is revolutionary, action research is directed by a "party line"). KEN BROWN, *"On the Appropriation of Surplus in Tunisia since the Nineteenth Century."* A concise historical piece with an insightful discussion of the insurrection of 1864. JACK MENDELSON, *"On Engels' Metaphysical Dialectics: A Foundation of Orthodox 'Marxism'."* The authoritarian tendencies in past socialist governments are blamed on Engels' failure to understand the critical element in Marx's dialectics and Engels' overextended and static conception of dialectics. DAVID McCREERY JR., *"Marxist Approaches in England."* A review of Hindess and Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*, and Maurice Bloch, ed., *Marxist Analyses and Social Anthropology*. DW

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 8:1 (February 1979)

Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 9 Park Street, Boston, MA 02108. $20 per year (4 issues). KEITH TRIBE, *"Introduction to de Crisenoy."* Tribe briefly states some errors in de Crisenoy's analysis of Lenin's treatment of the growth of capitalism and agriculture in Russia, but concludes that de Crisenoy makes a "valuable contribution, and correction, to much contemporary discussion of the relation of Marxist analysis to the peasantry." CHANTAL de CRISENOY, *"Capitalism and Agriculture."* Maintains that the establishment of capitalism in a given social formation does not provoke the appearance of this mode within agriculture, and criticizes Lenin for his hypothesis that the development of capitalism in Russia is directly tied to the appearance of agricultural capitalism. GRETA JONES, *"British Scientists, Lysenko and the Cold War."* Lysenkoism in Britain and America was not purely a theoretical dispute. It became entangled with a wide range of ideological, political and social issues concerning the relationship between science and government, resulting in closer governmental observation of the scientific community. MICHAEL LONG, *"Hindess and the Critique of Social Phenomenology."* Long criticizes Hindess' insights into Schutz and Husserl and concludes that Schutz is in fact a phenomenologist working with a Weberian gloss, rather than a Weberian working with a phenomenological gloss. JUDITH ENNEW, *"The Material of Reproduction: Anthropological Views on Historical Materialism and Kinship."* Review article of books by Maurice Godelier, Jack Goody, Claude Meillassoux, and François Pouillon. HP

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 8:2 (May 1979)

PETER DEWS, *"The Nouvelle Philosophie and Foucault."* The first section of the paper gives an account of some of the intellectual and political background to the positions of the Nouvelle Philosophie. The author then discusses Foucault's notion of power in his earlier work, *L'Ordre du Discours,* where Foucault suggests that knowledge and power form an articulated unity. The Nouvelle Philosophie uses this notion of power to portray Marxism as an extreme instrument of power; since Marxism reveals knowledge it must also be an instrument of power; Foucault, however, no longer adheres to this view of Marxism. The author concludes by arguing against Foucault's suggestion that knowledge equals power, against the Nouvelle Philosophie as a resurgence of the Right, and against the "dissolution of Marxist certitudes of the Left, which is taking place across the advanced capitalist world." The author's concern with the drift away from orthodox Marxism focuses on *Telos*: "In the United States the left-wing intellectuals grouped around the journal *Telos* are also 'moving on' — this time not from Althusser to Foucault, but from a Hegelian and phenomenological Marxism to 'alternative traditions' of socialist and

*This section has been compiled by John Fekete, Department of Enlish Literature, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada K9S 7B8. The following have contributed reviews: John Fekete, Irene Harvey, Robert John, Michael Lacy, Pam McCallum, Gini Nelson, Harland Prechel, Robert Rucker, Jimmy Lee Shaw, Andrew Wernick, Nancy Wert, Dan Wildcat.

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libertarian thought." KEITH TRIBE, *Introduction to Weber."* Tribe gives two major reasons for the importance of translating the following article by Weber that relates Weber's political judgments on the economic conditions in eastern Germany and exposes an element of Weber's thought that has been excluded from translation by those who hold Weber as a proponent of 'value freedom' and the founder of liberal sociology. The article also reveals that Weber had more than a passing acquaintance with Marx. MAX WEBER, *"Development Tendencies in the Situation of East Elban Rural Laborers."* The main question is how does the general development of the workers' position relate to that of the nation, and what future do they have? Weber does not approach this problem from the perspective of the worker's welfare, but rather he focuses on the role of the state. Weber follows the historical progression of the rural labor movement in eastern Germany and views it as a mechanism to unify a class of rural proletariat. He sees this transformation as the preparatory stage to a class struggle. Weber analyzes the introduction of the Poles as migrant workers, and concludes that the only solution to the problems that follow is to restrict immigration. GARY LITTLEJOHN, *"State, Plan and Market in the Transition to Socialism: The Legacy of Bukharin."* Review article of books by S. Cohen, M. Lewin, W. Brus, and C. Bettelheim. HP

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 9:1-2 (Spring-Summer 1979)

M.E. Sharpe Inc., 901 N. Broadway, White Plains, NY 10603. $25 per year (4 issues). This issue, titled "Urban Self-Management," is a version of Simona Ganassi Agger's monograph, *Autogestione Urbana: L'Urbanistic per una Nuova Societa.* Her essay presents a critical approach to urban planning, based on a "maieutic," participatory model. She sets up the argument by reviewing the results of a cross-national survey concerning citizen involvement in public life in ten countries. Despite a variety of differences between, for example, the North American and the East European situation, she finds everywhere hierarchical tendencies that inhibit popular participation in planning. She then turns to an examination of the nature of urbanism in contemporary capitalist societies. Her fundamental indictment of this mode of life is its institutional enforcement of "fragmentation and partialization" of human life, reflected on the level of planning in the "technocratic approach to urban problems." Human beings, the ultimate referents of planning, are only encompassed within the abstract categories characteristic of the techniques of a whole process aiming at control. The key problem in urban planning is therefore not how to deliver more and better goods and services to an economically poor population, but how to bring all citizens into substantial participation. Agger concludes with a report on an attempt in Italy at participatory style of urban planning. Though it was not immediately successful, and was attacked by the Communist and Socialist parties, it did generate a basis and popular desire for further experiments in participatory planning. She finishes with a sketch of a theory of urban self-management, which holds that there are existing concrete possibilities for participatory urban planning, particularly in the United States, and that this form of political action points beyond itself to a wider reform of society as a whole. MGL

NEW LITERARY HISTORY, 10:2 (Winter 1979)

Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD 21218. $11 per year (3 issues). Theme: Medieval Literature and Contemporary Theory. HANS ROBERT JAUSS, *"The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval Literature."* Because the traditional models of positivistic research have exhausted themselves, the study of medieval literature can now be justified on three grounds: aesthetic pleasure, its surprising otherness, and the model character of medieval texts. PAUL ZUMTHOR, *"From History to Poem, or the Paths of Pun: the Grand Rhetoriqueurs of 15th-Century France."* A socio-cultural examination of the discourse that "stands out from the real and fictive universes." Zumthor's analysis is inpsired by Kristeva and Bakhtin. RAINER WARNING, *"On the Alterity of Medieval Religious Drama."* Dilthey's assurance that foreigners can be overcome by the hermeneutic process has given way to reflection on distance and alterity. In medieval drama "the unity of play and reality is no longer accessible to our experience." EUGENE VANCE, *"Mervelous Signals: Poetics, Sign Theory and Politics in Chaucer's* Troilus." Like modern semiologists, medieval thinkers speculated on "the nature and function of language as a privileged system of signs." Plus detailed analysis of *Troilus.* MARIA CORTI, *"Models and Antimodels in Medieval Culture."* An analysis of those aspects of medieval culture that exist at the periphery of the two dominant organizing models, *tres ordines* and *status.* Plus discussions of articles. PM

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OUR GENERATION, 13:2 (Spring 1979)

3981 Boulevard Saint-Laurent, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H2W 1Y5. $7.50 per year (4 issues). BILL FREEMAN, *"John Sewell and the New Urban Reformers Come to Power."* Sewell's rise from community organizer to mayor of Toronto is analyzed as a shift from radical to reformist urban politics. NOAM CHOMSKY, ED HERMAN, *"Corporate Censorship: The Political Economy of Human Rights."* The introduction to the authors' two-volume text (I: *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*; II: *After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology*) reviews attempts by Warner Publishing to suppress the book. MAX NEMNI, *"The Political Potential of Trade Unionism."* A theoretical attempt to provide both a critique of trade-union economism and a demonstration, drawing on Marx's analysis in *Capital* of capitalist circulation and production, that the institutional linkage that trade unionism offers between the economic and the political serves as the framework for a critical assessment of the political role and activity of trade unions. Optimistically identifies a "revolutionary potential" for trade unions inherent in their mediation of class, class action, and conflict, and fails to transcend the productivist bias of Marxian political thought. ARNOLD BENNETT, *"Red-Baiting Trade-Union Style: Cold War Factionalism in the Canadian Trade-Union Movement."* Radical historiography of the formative period of Canadian trade unionism through the years of depression, world war, and Cold War: from grass-roots communities of interest to bureaucracies subjected to the hegemony of state and 'system' interests. CLAIRE CULHANE, *"Prisons in Canada: A Basic Pillar of Society."* A review essay by the founder of the Vancouver-based Prisoners' Rights Group of Gerard McNeil and Sharon Vance's *Cruel and Unusual — The Shocking Reality of Life Behind Bars in Canada.* Plus book reviews. JAF

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM, 9:1 (Fall 1979)

P.O. Box 247, Boston University Station, Boston, MA 02215. ISAAC FRANCK, *"Self-Realization as Ethical Norm: A Critique."* Attempts a critical analysis of 'self-realization' in an effort to affirm self-realization as an ethical norm. This analysis compares and contrasts the views of S.C. Pepper, C.A. Campbell, K. Goldstein, A.H. Maslow, E. Fromm and C.R. Rogers. GARY B. HERBERT, *"Human Rights and Historicist Ontology."* Argues that the validity of an effort to locate a universally valid theory of human rights is undermined by the historicist ontology. Therefore, a valid theory of human rights can no longer be viewed as a problem over which reason or thought can exercise any special authority. MAX SCHELER, *"Concerning the Meaning of the Feminist Movement."* Argues that the role of women constitutes a force of negation within the world of adjustment from which will emerge a new type of human being who will not dominate or be dominated by another. HILDE HEIN, *"Comment on Max Scheler's 'Concerning the Meaning of the Feminist Movement'."* Argues that Scheler's view of the feminist movement is archaic and conservative since he adheres to a classical position which alleges woman's distinct natural difference from man and continues to cast women in a subordinate role. FREDERICK L. WILL, *"Truth and Correspondence."* Argues that the correspondence theory of truth has retarded the understanding of the notion of truth and correspondence. JEFFREY BARNOUW, *"Active Experience vs. Wish-Fulfillment in Francis Bacon's Moral Psychology of Science."* Outlines the significance of Bacon's insistence that social psychology and practical knowledge constitute significant factors in the scientific revolution. JLS

PHILOSOPHY TODAY, 23:1 (Spring 1979)

Ablex Publishing Corp., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, NJ 07648. $15 per year (4 issues). RICHARD LANIGAN, *"The Phenomenology of Human Communication."* A description of man's being-in-the-world as essentially a communicative relation of man to his environment of things and others, where the 'speech act' is a form of praxis wherein forms of ethics are generated. OTTO FRIEDRICH BOLLNOW, *"What Does it Mean to Understand a Writer Better than he Understands Himself?"* The history of this notion is traced through Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Boeckh, so that its assumption of creation as an unconscious phenomenon is elucidated. The attempt is made to limit this 'textual violence' with a condition that the 'beyond' of interpretation be restricted to the author's intent. Hence the goal of hermeneutic analysis is seen primarily to assist the author, not to demythologize the text. WILLIAM SULLIVAN, PAUL RABINOW, *"The Interpretive Turn: Emergence of an Approach."* The interpretive turn is expounded as a radically new methodology of the human sciences that has developed from Husserl's phenomenology and its return to the pre-subjective and pre-objective. The authors claim that this 'new approach,' as integrated in the Frankfurt School (!), is capable of dealing with particularity, specificity, and the 'web of meaning' that constitutes human existence. The

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climax of this perspective is a presentation of Gadamer and Habermas as if they were in agreement. PAUL SCHUCHMAN, *"Aristotle's Phronesis and Gadamer's Hermeneutics."* A misleading depiction of Gadamer's hermeneutics as focusing on the *application* of texts to a context beyond the sign. The author claims that this is the core of the meaning of the term fore-conception, and the basis of the question-and-answer dialogue that Gadamer sets up as the movement of interpretation. MARY GERHART, *"Imagination and History in Ricoeur's Interpretation Theory."* An uncritical and inadequate portrayal of the integration of literature and history via Ricoeur's hermeneutic approach to both. Ricoeur's early work on history as such is collapsed into his current work on metaphor and hermeneutics. WERNER H. KELBER, *"Walter Ong's Three Incarnations of the Word: Orality, Literacy, Technology."* A review of Ong's theory of the history of media which, through alterations, have altered consciousness. Basically a McLuhanesque vision that incorporates the 'myth of progress' into the idea of the medium being the message. MICHAEL J. MATTHIS, *"The Social in Kierkegaard's Concept of the Individual."* An argument is made for the reinterpretation of Kierkegaard so that the social aspect of being is realized as the ground of the individual. God is said to represent the 'essence of man' and God's presence as *otherness* is within. Thus the self entails otherness and otherness entails the social, the author claims. That this has not yet been recognized in interpretations of Kierkegaard to date simply reveals the truth of Kierkegaard in the sense of his critique of Christian-dominated thought in its institutionalized forms. He is thus presented as a thinker ahead of his time whom we have yet to catch up with. JOHN D. MULLEN, *"Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical: Kierkegaard's Either-Or."* A critique of Judge William's currently authoritative interpretation of *Either-Or,* which mistakenly entails the Hegelian assumptions of necessary stages and necessary development over time. The levels of ethical and aesthetic are claimed by the author to be not as rungs on a ladder but rather as alternate paths, equal but different, en route to the end: religion. Basically he is attempting to show that there is no need in Kierkegaard to move from the ethical stage to the aesthetic and then to the religious. He also suggests five alternate principles for reading Kierkegaard to William's five. IEH

PHILOSOPHY TODAY, 23:2 (Summer 1979)

MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN, *"Marx and Heidegger on the Technological Domination of Nature."* A comparison of Marx and Heidegger that emphasizes similarities in their views regarding the nature of man, the problem of alienation as one of inauthenticity and the movement of history as a form of destiny. The differences involve the "weaknesses" of Marx, as illustrated by the Frankfurt School, and can be overcome, the author claims, with Heidegger's revision of the notion of Being. ANTON DONOSO, *"The Notion of Freedom in Sartre, Kolakowski, Markovic and Kosik."* An examination of the influence of Sartre's concepts of freedom, choice, praxis and project on Eastern European Marxists in general and Kolakowski, Markovic and Kosik in particular. The conclusion is that contemporary existential Marxism, although Sartrean in some respects, is not a direct adoption of the !atter's platform. DAVID LEVY, *"Marcuse, Metaphysics and Marxism."* An attempt to define Marx as essentially Hegelian and to reveal Marxism as both materialist and idealist. The accomplishment of idealism is its materialism, for Levy. He cites Marcuse's position on the 'concept of essence' as the embodiment of this new reading of Marx. DONALD M. BORCHERT, *"On Being Fair to Marx."* Although the young and later Marx are assumed to speak in unison, the integration as posited by Tucker is thrashed for its moralistic and psychologistic treatment of the issue. "To be fair to Marx," for Borchert, is to judge him via his intentions, which would ironically be, for Marx, to commit the 'intentional fallacy.' WALTER SCHEER, *"Opening Address at the 16th World Congress of Philosophy."* A liberal appeal to philosophers to recognize that "democracy as practiced in the West" entails a metaphysic of questioning, skepticism, and self-analysis. THOMAS A. FAY, *"Heidegger and Wittgenstein on the Question of Ordinary Language."* The similarities between Wittgenstein's notion of the language game and Heidegger's concept of the referential totality of meaning are examined. ELIZABETH HIRSCH, *"Remembrance of Martin Heidegger in Marburg."* A biographical array of notes on Heidegger's idiosyncrasies in Marburg, with small supplements of intellectual history tossed in. GEORGE J. STACK, *"The Inward Journey: Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers."* A review of the first four volumes of "Journals and Papers," which includes a thorough analysis of dominant themes treated by Kierkegaard. His work is seen as having had a single focus and purpose: that of explicating the notion of the possible and thereby liberating the individual from institutional forms of domination. IEH

POLITICAL THEORY, 7:1 (February 1979)

Sage Publications Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. $15 per year (4 issues).

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S.M. SHUMER, *"Machiavelli: Republican Politics and its Corruption."* Acknowledging her debt to Arendt, Shumer uses the Machiavelli of the *Discourses* to characterize a healthy polity. Concludes that civic virtue rather than private interest, controversy rather than conformity, leadership by example and the constant attempt to recover the meaning of the founding spirit of the polity are a necessity. The success of these efforts are dependent on an open public sphere that "forces citizens to rely heavily on speech, on reputation, and persuasion in open political discourse." R.N. BERKI, *"On the Nature and Origins of Marx's Concept of Labor."* Identifies three dimensions of the concept of labor in Marx's early writings; labor qua production, qua creation, qua gratification. Concludes that Marx's concept of labor is "a synthesis of Hegelianism, political economy, early socialism, and romanticism." Hegel provides the element of labor as creation only when Geist is transformed into a material force, whereas early English political economists and socialists provide the "productive" interpretation of labor. Fichte and Carlyle, and the left Hegelians, von Cieszkowski and Hess, are credited as the influences that led Marx to view labor as gratification. RICHARD VERNON, *"Unintended Consequences."* Generally sterile treatment concludes that unintended consequences are not the result of "ignorance" or "conflict of interests." Unintended consequences will frustrate planned political change and social science methods. JOHN G. GUNNELL, *"Political Science and the Theory of Action: Prolegomena."* Mostly a critique of empiricism in political science. A critique of Critical Theory, especially Horkheimer and Habermas, graces the last two pages of the article. Gunnell charges that Critical Theory is "metascientific," "metatheoretical eclecticism" and remains within the instrumentalist framework of science. This reflects a complete misunderstanding of critical science, which Gunnell has simply equated with current scientific practice. Concludes the essay with the amusing unsupported assertion that all theory is inherently critical. E.A. GOERNER, *"On Thomistic Natural Law: The Bad Man's View of Thomistic Natural Right."* Disputes the common notion that Aquinas was a natural-law theorist. Goerner asserts that the foundation of his ethical and political teachings is natural right, a more relativistic concept that is based on the judgment of virtuous men, and that natural law is a secondary restraint intended to sanction only those who were not virtuous. This conclusion is based on the purpose for which Aquinas wrote the *Summa Theologiae,* and the fact that Aquinas himself did not divide the work into "treatises." Once these artificial divisions are eliminated, the "Treatise" on Law can be interpreted in its proper context as of secondary importance to virtue. TILO SCHABERT, *"A Note on Modernity."* Divides history of Western culture into three periods, each with a corresponding concept of modernity. The primary focus is on the last of these periods and the values that characterize modern existence as symbolized in art and literature. Plus communications and reviews. RJ

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, 42:1 (Spring 1979)

CUNY, John Jay College, Room 4331, 445 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019. $10 per year (4 issues). ROGER KEERAN, *"Everything for Victory: Communist Influence in the Auto Industry during World War II."* Takes another look at the decline of Communist influence in the UAW during World War II. NANCY L. GREEN, *"The Dreyfus Affair and Ruling Class Cohesion."* The Dreyfus Affair is dissected as a conjunctural crisis in the French Third Republic from the viewpoint of the organic structure of that society. The Jewish community and anti-semitism, clericals and anti-clericals, Republicans and Socialists, and the army are all reviewed as factions seeking to assert their particular position within the ruling structure of the Third Republic. LEILA J. RUPP, *"Women, Class and Mobilization in Nazi Germany."* The debate on whether Nazi Germany reduced women's participation in the labor force during the Depression asnd mobilized women to work in the labor force during World War II owing to the needs of its war-time economy is examined. JOHN R. EHRENBERG, *"Lenin and the Politics of Organization."* Reviews the popular view of Lenin as an "organization man" and the suggestion that this ideological stance is in direct contradiction to Marx's materialism. *"John Bellers — Educator of Marx?"* A comment. Plus book reviews and notes. NJW

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, 42:3 (Fall 1979)

GABRIEL KOLKO, *"Working Wives: Their Effects on the Structure of the Working Class."* Deals with the increase of the two-income family in the working class of America. RAYNA RAPP, *"Family and Class in Contemporary America: Notes toward an Understanding of Ideology."* Two contexts are utilized in this paper: the political one of the Women's Movement and its ongoing discussion of the future of the family, and the academic one embodied in anthropological, sociological, demographic, urban planning and policy studies of the contemporary American family. M.E. GIMENEZ, *"Structuralist Marxism on 'The Woman*

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Question'." A purely interpretive essay touching on the relationship between the capitalist mode of production and reproduction as seen in the superstructure, the internal situation and the external situation of the social formation. MARK NAISON, *"Historical Notes on Blacks and American Communism: The Harlem Experience."* Examines the impact of the Communist Party on racial discrimination in America from the 1928 resolution on Negro Work in the United States at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International to the Scottsboro incident in 1932 and reviews the role of the Communist Party in Harlem from 1928 to 1939. Naison examines three aspects of U.S. Communist Party history: (1) the accepted view of the party as a totalitarian organization immune to the influence of workers, minorities and intellectuals; (2) the view of the party as an organization that could serve the interests of groups represented within it as well as those of the Comintern and the Soviet Union; and (3) the relationship between the party's theoretical positions on particular issues and its concrete organizational activities. Plus reviews and communications. NJW

SCREEN, 20:1 (Spring 1979)

29 Old Compton Street, London W1V 5PL, England. $18 per year (4 issues). MICHEL FOUCAULT, *"What is an Author?"* A self-critical examination of the absence of the 'author' from *The Order of Things:* the author is not a subjective being but remains "at the contours of texts — separating one from the other, defining their form, and characterizing their mode of existence." Plus critical discussion with L. Goldman. SUE CLAYTON, JONATHAN CURLING, *"On Authorship."* Theoretical section analyzes the implications of authorship in structuralist terms: the process of reading constitutes the individual as a subject, but a subject that is constantly shifted by the play of signifiers. Plus discussion of the implications for copyright and independent film production. STEVE NEALE, *"Triumph of the Will: Notes on Documentary and Spectacle."* An examination of "spectacle" and "looking" in the film that are necessary preconditions for an ideological reading or conjunctural positioning. Plus detailed shot analyses. IAN CONNELL, *"Television, News and the Social Contract."* Using an analysis of the Labor government's attempt to win union support for their wage-restraint policy, Connell argues against a view of television news coverage as merely biased reporting. Rather "in and through the signifying practices specific to television journalism, political-economic antagonisms are contained and their development as antagonisms is neutralized." STUART MARSHALL, *"Video: Technology and Practice."* An examination of the potentiality and use of video by artists and non-broadcast users. Plus replies to earlier articles and debate. PM

SCREEN EDUCATION, No. 30 (Spring 1979)

29 Old Compton Street, London W1V 5PL, England. $10 per year (4 issues). GEOFFREY NOWELL-SMITH, *"In a State."* Both the economistic and ideologistic explanations of the state are inadequate. Instead, the state takes form from diffuse and shifting agencies, precariously centralized. JAMES DONALD, *"Green Paper: Noise of Crisis."* A summary of political orientations in the debate on British education. GRAHAM MURDOCK, ROBIN McCRON, *"The Television and Delinquency Debate."* A summary and critique of the analysis of delinquency and the media by Eysenck and Nias and Belson. The development of a "comprehensive relational account of the links between media imagery and social deviance is necessary." IAN CONNELL, *"Broadcasting: Democracy or Pluralism?"* Review of Anthony Smith, *The Politics of Information.* FREDRIC JAMESON, *"Class and Allegory in Contemporary Mass Culture: Dog Day Afternoon as a Political Film."* Beginning from the assumption that "the underlying object of our thoughts and representations — history and class structure — is itself as profoundly historical as our own capacity to grasp it," Jameson offers an insightful analysis of the representation and conflict in *Dog Day Afternoon.* Plus reviews. PM

SOCIAL TEXT, No. 1 (Winter 1979)

700 West Badger Road, Suite 101, Madison, WI 53713. $8 per year (3 issues). A new journal of theory, culture and ideology. EDWARD SAID, *"Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims."* Excellent historical and contemporary analysis of zionism placing it in the context of European imperialism and racism. Plus bibliography of material on Palestine available in English. BRUCE BOONE, *"Gay Language as Political Praxis: The Poetry of Frank O'Hara."* Previous Barthesian or Derridian analyses of O'Hara's poetry have ignored sexuality as a discursive category. "This antagonistic sexual question is in fact a repression of a politically oppositional language." JOHN BRENKMAN, *"Mass Media: From Collective Experience to the Culture of Privatization."* Against Habermas, Brenkman argues that advanced capitalism's fragmentation of "collective experience into the monadic isolation of the private experience of individuals" must be *ultimately*

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analyzed in terms of wage labor and its total set of effects. STANLEY ARONOWITZ, *"Film — The Art Form of Late Capitalism."* A historical survey of the possibilities of film as an oppositional art form. Tanner's *Jonah* "imposes temporal juxtaposition and spatial decentering" but Bertolucci's *1900* issues into abstract mythology. FREDRIC JAMESON, *"Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture."* Insightful article that contends: "We must rethink the opposition high culture-mass culture in such a way that the emphasis on evaluation to which it has traditionally given rise and which . . . tends to function in some timeless realm of absolute aesthetic judgment, is replaced by a genuinely historical and dialectical approach." Plus analysis of *Jaws* and *The Godfather*. SYLVIA WYNTER, *"Sambos and Minstrels."* Analysis of black stereotypes (the irresponsible Sambo and the rebellious Nat) as an ideology of paternalism. MICHAEL E. BROWN, *"The Politics of Anti-Theater."* A theatrical performance, as an accomplishment within history, is essentially non-repeatable. Plus analysis of *Shaggy Dog Animation* and *Cops*. MADISON SOCIAL TEXT GROUP, *"The New Right and Media."* Analysis of the media politics of the new right: computerized mailing, the Plain Truth, anti-ERA campaign, textronics. Plus short commentaries and reviews. PM

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 7:1-2 (January-March 1979)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017. $23 per year. THEDA SKOCPOL, *"State and Revolution, Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia and China."* An examination of countries subject to military pressures from more economically developed nations that have experienced social political crises as a result. Prussia and Japan are offered as counter-examples of countries that did not experience social revolution. JAMES C. SCOTT, *"Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars."* An attempt to provide a new look at peasant rebellions. The argument is that there are two revolutions, the revolution of the ingelligentsia and that of the peasantry. One focuses on a strong state and the other on land reform. The two revolutions have some shared interests, some non-shared non-conflicting interests, and some conflicting interests. Scott suggests looking at the conjunctions of the two revolutions. WALTER L. GOLDFRANK, *"Theories of Revolution and Revolution without Theory: The Case of Mexico."* Four conditions are identified as necessary and sufficient for revolutions in general and the Mexican revolution in particular: a favorable world context, an administrative and coercive crisis of the state, widespread rural rebellion and dissident elite movements. These are found in a historically grounded, world-system informed structural explanation that fits the data better than other theoretical perspectives. MARTIN SPENCER, *"Marx on the State: The Events in France between 1848 and 1850."* Spencer attempts to show Marx's basic thought structure in *Class Struggles* and the *Eighteenth Brumaire*. This is found to be inadequate systematic theory with respect to the French Revolution. Marx's economical-historical analysis is particularly found to be deficient, but his political analysis is far superior. Marx is noted to be deficient in imposing a comprehensive design on history that leads to theoretical contradictions. BORIS FRANKEL, *"On the State of the State, Marxist Theories of the State after Leninism."* Frankel suggests we turn our attention to the 1970s and not to 1871 or 1917. We need to look at the implications of modern capitalist states. Present revolutionary parties and sects have not resolved how to react to new groupings of state-capitalist relations within their own organizations. ARNE DISCH, *"Peasants and Revolts."* A discussion of J.M. Paige's *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*. Paige develops an explicit theory of agrarian revolution based on a two-class model, which he tests with empirical data. WILLIAM G. ROSENBERG, *"Bolshevism and the 'Imperatives' of Revolution, Russia 1917-1921."* An interseting review of books by Alexander Rabinowitch, John L.H. Keep, Charles Bettelheim and Oliver H. Radkey that focuses on the Russian revolution and the rise of Stalinism. RER

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 7:3 (May 1979)

CARLO GINZBERG, *"Clues: Roots of a Scientific Paradigm."* A look at the distinction between natural and social sciences, relying on a new epistemological model. The work of Morelli, a late 19th century Italian physician, is discussed with regard to his influence on Freud's method of psychoanalysis. Morelli provides an interpretive method based on the model of medical semiotics which looks at marginal clues as data. CHARLES C. LEMERT, *"Decentered Analysis: Ethnomethodology and Structuralism."* Claims that American ethnomethodology and European structuralism have similar internal structures. Both employ language as a primary theoretical resource and are critical of core values. An important theoretical change takes place when language replaces consciousness and subjectivity as the sociological problematic. DELL HYMES, *"De-Centering Linguistics: A Comment on Lemert."* Rejects Lemert's assumptions about the

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lack of utility of the concept of core values of language, and implies the need for historical study of linguistics. ANDREW FEENBERG, *"Beyond the Politics of Survival."* Environmentalism is seen to be a politics transcending nation and class divisions. Feenberg uses this theme to analyze the Ehrlich-Commoner debate of the early 1970s, which became more than a debate between two biologists. The debate reflects the different class positions to be found in the present-day scientific community. Environmentalism, he concludes, has not provided a united front, but is leading to more political divisions in the world. FRED BLOCK, LARRY HIRSCHHORN, *"New Productive Forces and the Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism.: A Post-Industrial Perspective."* Emancipatory politics have to deal with present-day realities and not be tied solely to the older and somewhat obsolete Marxist categories. ANTONIO CARLO, *"Inflation."* A discussion of Howard Y. Sherman's *Stagflation*, Andrew Gamble and Paul Walton's *Capitalism in Crisis*, and J.P. Mocker's *L'inflation en France, 1945-1975*. The books revolve around the themes of inflation, unemployment, and crisis. However, the article is less a review of the books than it is an insightful examination of the recent economic situation of industrial countries. JOHN H. SCHAAR, *"Melville's* Benito Cereno*."* An attempt to use a number of pieces of literature to help analyze society, giving insights into reality and its potential. RER

WOMEN'S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY, 1:3 (1978)

Issue theme: Feminist Theory. ELAINE REUBEN, *"In Defiance of the Evidence: Notes on Feminist Scholarship."* Argues for the unique nature of feminist scholarship. CAROLYN WOOD SHERIF *"Climbing Disciplinary Walls and Learning How to Borrow."* Stresses the need for an interdisciplinary approach, discusses the pitfalls of that approach and how to avoid them, and lists the advantages of feminist scholarship. ALISON KELLY, *"Feminism and Research."* Concerned with the relationship between feminism and research. The argument is illustrated by reference to a research project on girls and science. MARY O'BRIEN, *"The Dialectics of Reproduction."* Stresses the urgent need for the development of feminist theory. The central analogy develops from propositions concerning the reproductive process and the corresponding sexually differentiated reproductive consciousness. *"The opposition of public and private is to the social relations of reproduction what the opposition of economic classes is to the social relations of production."* GAYATRI SPIVAK, *"Feminism and Critical Theory."* Stresses the place of feminist criticism via "deconstruction," understanding the context and substance of a work and rewriting to extend understanding. Marx and Freud are used as examples; specifically their concepts of alienation and normality and health. The author argues that Marx failed to recognize the product of woman's labor, the child, and Freud failed to see where pain could be a determinant of normality, as in childbirth. SHEILA RUTH, *"A Feminist World View."* Traditional religion and contemporary social science, said to be the major sources of contemporary value and meaning, are shown to be inadequate for feminist women. DALE SPENDER, *"Notes on the Organization of Women's Studies."* Includes very practical suggestions, including six basic types of course design with course outlines as examples. Book reviews. GN

WOMEN'S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY, 1:4 (1978)

Issue theme: Education. DOROTHY E. SMITH, *"A Peculiar Eclipsing: Women's Exclusion from Man's Culture."* Women have been (and still are) overwhelmingly excluded from the discussion which begets "our" culture's art, philosophy, history, science, etc. CAROL DYHOUSE, *"Towards a 'Feminine' Curriculum for English Schoolgirls: the Demands of Ideology 1870-1963."* "The major part of this paper attempts to survey various social and ideological pressures on girls' schools in England over the last century to reshape the curriculum in order to make more provision for domestic training; to emphasize the importance of women's reproductive and domestic 'vocations' at the expense of intellectual, professional or other occupational goals." MARGHERITA RENDEL, *"The Death of Leadership or Educating People to Lead Themselves."* The skills, self-confidence, and will important for leadership generally are not taught or nurtured in females. Reform to be effective must come at all levels: woman as successful plumber is *as important* as woman as head of a department — success must be usual. Remedies discussed deal with different kinds of legislation. LYNNE A. CHISHOLD, *"The Comparative Career Development of Graduate Women and Men."* Significant disparities between the careers of single women and their married peers are indicated and their causes discussed. STEVI JACKSON, *"How to Make Babies: Sexism in Sex Education."* "Of all school 'subjects,' sex education is perhaps the most obviously sexist," the author says. KATHERINE CLARRICOATES, *" 'Dinosaurs in the Classroom' — A Re-examination of Some Aspects of the 'Hidden' Curriculum in Primary Schools."* Since boys are viewed as discipline problems and the

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girls seem brighter and not so much in need of help, subjects are geared to the boys' interests and boys given more attention generally, "reassured of their superiority in their own immedate world." GAIL PARADISE KELLY, *"Research on the Education of Women in the Third World: Problems and Perspectives."* An overview concentrating on what is not known, organized around four questions: "(1) To what extent can the study of the learning process result in reproducing the relations between the sexes that are found in American society in the Third World? (2) Can one study the education of women in the Third World independent of the developments in the entire school system? (3) What are the implications of studying the expectations of women who are educated? (4) What limitations arise from studying women's education and its relation to the work force within the boundaries of nation states?" PATRICIA M. LENGERMANN, KATHERINE M. MARCONI, RUTH A. WALLACE, *"Sociological Theory in Teaching Sex Roles: Marxism, Functionalism and Phenomenology."* Focusing on the basic concepts of the three main emphases in sociology, the authors present them as highly complementary: Marxist theory is the starting point and sets the boundaries, structural functionalism explains inhibiting factors of social control, phenomenology injects human action and responsibility in a social situation which is not static (as structural functionalism would have us believe). MARY I. EDWARDS, *"Women's Studies Curriculum Development: A View from the United States."* Describes the contents of the four-volume *Women's Studies Curriculum Series* developed on a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Volume titles and major themes: *Women and Identity* (sexuality, fertility, work and family, fear and envy, women's networks, individuality, and women and social change); *New Woman, New World: The American Experience* (the emerging American woman, woman's self and others, the transcendent self); *Women's Art and Culture* (introductory framework: conventional role for women in the arts, women's oppression and creativity, women on women, art and politics, and great women and great art); and *A Cross-cultural Study of Women* (overview of biological and cultural explanations of male dominance, women and economics, women and religion, and six different area modules). Plus book reviews. GN

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

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